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OVERLOOKED AND UNDERUSED: CLINICAL PRACTICE 
GUIDELINES AND MALPRACTICE LIABILITY FOR 
INDEPENDENT PHYSICIANS 
 
RONEN AVRAHAM, SJD* 
 
*** 
 
This paper discusses how the use of Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs) 
can improve the quality and delivery of healthcare in America.  The author 
states that with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010 the American healthcare system is in need of re-alignment, 
specifically challenging the established norms for promulgating 
CPGs.  The article explores the legal evolution of CPGs and new legal 
avenues for their promulgation by examining their history and 
purpose.  The author concludes by identifying three accountability models 
and arguing in favor of a private competitive regime for CPGs.  
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
American medical care is plagued by overuse, underuse, and 
misuse.1 Overconsumption of medical care is one of the main contributors 
towards rising health care costs in the United States.  A recent Institute of 
Medicine report estimates that unnecessary services cost $210 billion each 
year.2 However, even though Americans consume an enormous amount of 
health care, they only receive optimal care – or the care that is 
                                                                                                                 
* Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor of Law, University of Texas School of 
Law; Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University. I thank Bill Sage for help with prior 
drafts. All remaining errors are mine. 
1 Elise C. Becher & Mark Chassin, Improving the Quality of Health Care: 
Who Will Lead?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 164, 165–66 (2001) (defining quality problems 
as underuse, overuse, and misuse); Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 548–49 (2011) (discussing same) [hereinafter Avraham, 
Private Regulation]. Other papers refer to these concepts as defensive medicine, 
offensive medicine, and medical errors. E.g., Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Health Care System, 37 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 7, 9 (2011) [hereinafter Avraham, Warped Incentives]. 
2 INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY 
LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, 3-10 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2012). 
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recommended by the best available information – 54% of the time. 3 
President Obama recognized the danger of this mounting issue when, 
during the 2013 State of the Union, he identified rising health care costs as 
the biggest driver of long-term debt. 4  The million, or trillion, dollar 
question is how to reduce costs while simultaneously improving quality.  
This article explores an answer to that question. 
Following the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), it has become clear that there needs to be a 
major realignment of incentives for the various players in the health care 
system, and this cannot occur without significant shifts in payment, the 
structure of care delivery, and accountability for quality and safety.  
PPACA contemplates, for example, bundled payment for inpatient acute 
care that combines revenue streams for hospitals and for physicians, 
episodic payment for periods of illness or complete courses of treatment, 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) that are held to transparent 
standards for performance and bear financial risk for utilization of services, 
and patient-centered medical homes that offer comprehensive primary care 
services.  With different models for payment, transparency, and 
organizational affiliation, the hope is that hospitals and other large practices 
will have incentives to develop or adopt protocols for optimal delivery of 
care even if medical liability laws are unchanged.   
 Because of these and other developments, physicians have been 
leaving solo and small-group practice for employment in larger practices 
and hospitals.5 Notwithstanding these trends, American health care will 
remain more fragmented than someone unversed in history would predict 
given the complexity, capital requirements, and interdisciplinary nature of 
diagnosing and treating serious illnesses.  Many physicians will continue to 
practice medicine in small settings,6 and other health professionals, such as 
                                                                                                                 
3 INS. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST 146 (Robin 
Graham et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter 2011 IOM Report]. 
4  FOX NEWS (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/12/ 
transcript-obama-state-union-speech/ 
5  See Mark Hagland, One-Third of U.S. Physicians Plan to Quit Private 
Practice Within 10 Years, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Aug. 8, 2012), 
http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/news-item/one-third-us-physicians-plan-
quit-private-practice-within-10-years. 
6  APA Executive Director Keynote Address to 2011 State Leadership 
Conference (Mar. 31, 2011) (“Eighty nine percent of all physicians work in solo 
practice or small group practices of 10 or fewer physicians.”), available at 
http://www.apapracticecentral.org/update/2011/03-31/evolving-health.aspx. 
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advanced practice nurses, are likely to secure legal privileges for 
independent practice as well.   
 This paper focuses on physicians in small practice settings and on 
norms rather than incentives as a way to improve the delivery of care.  
Incentives – sticks and carrots – dominate most discussions, particularly 
bonuses and penalties associated with reimbursement schemes.  The 
problem is that these measures often provide only weak incentives to avoid 
errors but strong incentives to both over- and under-treat patients.  In this 
paper, I explore a more direct way to influence how practitioners deliver 
care: clinical practice guidelines (CPGs).   
CPGs are written statements of the best clinical practices to be 
applied to patient care based on the professional judgment of a given group 
of medical professionals who review the scientific evidence and assess the 
benefits and harms of alternative care options.  CPGs can be promulgated 
by public or private organizations, such as specialty societies, advocacy 
groups, state agencies, health plans, commercial entities, and in the future, 
perhaps even by computers.  Even IBM’s supercomputer Watson is 
reportedly getting into the field of medical advice.7 There are over 2,700 
CPGs in a U.S government run depository called the National Guideline 
Clearinghouse – promulgated by more than 350 groups.8  
The history of CPGs in the United States is intertwined with 
medical malpractice liability.  This is particularly true for physicians in 
solo or small-group practice.  As small businesspeople, these physicians 
tend to be very sensitive to the potential economic and reputational harm 
that allegations of malpractice can cause, and often feel very personally and 
intensely the uncertainty associated with litigation.  As described in more 
detail below, early experiments with CPGs were designed to assuage 
physicians’ fears of meritless suits and tendencies toward self-protection 
through costly defensive medicine.  These malpractice-oriented CPGs were 
often the first to be debated in legislatures and tested by the courts. 
However, treating CPGs as relevant primarily for litigation purposes is why 
CPGs are overlooked and underused, as the title of this paper suggests.  
The potential for cost reduction and quality improvement from CPGs is 
much greater than malpractice reform alone could induce.  
                                                                                                                 
7  NEWSER (Feb. 8, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.newser.com/story/162517/ 
ibms-watson-to-start-dispensing-medical-advice.html. 
8  NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.guideline.gov/browse/ 
by-topic.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).  
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CPGs have the potential to reduce the prevalence of unnecessary, 
and often incorrect, medical procedures in fragmented environments 
because their focus is directly on the proper way to deliver care, rather than 
on providing incentives (sticks and carrots) for the providers to find the 
proper care themselves.  As a doctor, especially as a solo practitioner, it is 
impossible to keep up with current medical research.  So many studies are 
published each year that a cardiologist would have to read 10 articles per 
day, 365 days a year, to stay current.9 Not only is this impossible, but it is a 
waste of the doctor’s time.  As science continues to build on itself, the 
number of studies increases exponentially, and no one person can be 
expected to synthesize and master it all.10 Advances in technology will 
contribute as well.  Today’s young doctors use smart phones, tablets, and 
laptops on the job.  This allows CPGs to be readily available, easily 
accessible, and instantaneously updated when new information is 
developed. 
Although the concept of medical best practices may seem 
uncontroversial, there are substantial challenges involved in achieving 
compliance by practicing physicians.  In 2012, for example, the U.S. 
Preventive Services Task Force released a new recommendation against 
PSA-based screening for prostate cancer.11 The recommendation advised 
doctors to stop testing for Prostate-Specific Antigen because of its high 
false-positive rate for adenocarcinoma (80%), complications arising from 
follow-up biopsies, and its limited ability to change health outcomes from 
diagnosed cancers.12 A survey fielded after the recommendation was issued 
found that 49% of physicians agreed with its reasoning, but surprisingly, 
only 1.8% actually planned to stop using the test. 13  Some doctors felt 
                                                                                                                 
9 IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS 
THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 92 (2007). 
10 Justin Kung et al., Failure of Clinical Practice Guidelines to Meet Institute 
of Medicine Standards, 172 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1628, 1628 (2012) 
(describing a “dizzying array” of CPGs that expands year after year). 
11  U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE, SCREENING FOR PROSTATE 
CANCER: CURRENT RECOMMENDATION (May 2012), http://www.uspreventive 
servicestaskforce.org/prostatecancerscreening.htm. 
12 Sarah Kliff, Many Doctors Think PSA Tests Don’t Work. But They’ll Keep 
Doing Them Anyway, WASH. POST, May 29, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/many-doctors-think-psa-tests-dont-work-but-theyllkeep-
doing-them-anyway/2012/05/29/gJQAOl0qyU_blog.html. 
13 Id. 
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patients expected to receive the test,14 others did not think they had time to 
explain the changes to their patients, and still others worried that patients 
would feel their health care was being rationed.15 Indeed, even doctors who 
wish to rely on CPGs are faced with numerous challenges because of how 
CPGs are currently created and regulated.  Authors often have conflicts of 
interest that may or may not be disclosed, guidelines are created that 
recommend conflicting treatments, and there is no system in place to 
ensure that CPGs are updated or that outdated recommendations are 
removed from circulation.16 
The importance of guaranteeing the trustworthiness of CPGs has 
not escaped Congress. Through the Medicare Improvements for Patients 
and Providers Act of 2008, Congress called on the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to contract with the Institute of Medicine (IOM),17 
through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ),18 to 
undertake a study that focuses on how to make CPGs trustworthy.  In 
March 2011 the IOM issued its report, which was entitled “Clinical 
                                                                                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Id. Guidelines for dealing with prostate cancer are just one example. Many 
more examples exist. For example, a recent study by pediatricians from the Cohen 
Children's Medical Center of New York that more than 90 percent of medical 
specialists who diagnose and manage ADHD in preschoolers do not follow 
treatment guidelines. See SCIENCE DAILY (May 4, 2013), http://www.science 
daily.com/releases/2013/05/130504163310.htm. 
16 See infra Part II(B). 
17 “The Institute of Medicine (IOM) is an independent, nonprofit organization 
that works outside of government to provide unbiased and authoritative advice to 
decision makers and the public. Established in 1970, the IOM is the health arm of 
the National Academy of Sciences, which was chartered under President Abraham 
Lincoln in 1863. Nearly 150 years later, the National Academy of Sciences has 
expanded into what is collectively known as the National Academies, which 
comprises the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of 
Engineering, the National Research Council, and the IOM.” See About the IOM, 
INS. OF MED., www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
18 “The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's (AHRQ) mission is to 
produce evidence to make health care safer, higher quality, more accessible, 
equitable, and affordable, and to work with the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and other partners to make sure that the evidence is 
understood and used.” See AHRQ Profile, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH 
AND QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/about/mission/glance/profile.html (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2014). 
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Practice Guidelines We Can Trust.” 19  The IOM made eight 
recommendations (or standards) regarding various issues related to the 
optimal development of CPGs. 20  These issues, such as transparency, 
conflict of interest, external review, and updating are indeed crucial for 
ensuring trustworthy CPGs. Importantly, the IOM called on the Secretary 
of HHS to “establish a public–private mechanism to examine, at the request 
of developer organizations, the procedures they use to produce their clinical 
practice guidelines and to certify whether these organizations’ CPG 
development procedures comply with [eight] standards for trustworthy 
CPGs.”  In other words, the IOM’s proposed model is one where a public–
private entity issues a seal of approval that the procedures taken by 
guidelines developers fit the standards.  
As this article argues, this is not the only possible model for 
optimal promulgation of CPGs.  
In this article, I examine various legal models for creating and 
disseminating CPGs in light of the PPACA and other aspects of the new 
health care environment, focusing on uses by independent physicians rather 
than large health care organizations.  In the course of analysis, I update 
research from almost two decades ago regarding how courts view and 
apply CPGs, primarily in malpractice litigation.  I also critique the recent 
endorsements by the IOM and the AHRQ of a model of public–private 
certification of CPG promulgators.  Recent articles by physicians “on the 
ground” have similarly found the IOM’s method for ensuring CPG 
reliability problematic.21  
                                                                                                                 
19  INS. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST, (Robin 
Graham et al. eds., 2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php? 
record_id=13058 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
20 These standards include: 1) transparency, 2) management of conflicts of 
interest, 3) the composition of guideline development groups, 4) the intersection of 
CPGs and systematic review of technology, 5) evidence foundations for guidelines 
and rating the strength of recommendations, 6) articulation of recommendations, 7) 
external review of developed guidelines, and 8) updating guidelines. Id. at 78-139. 
21 For example, a recent publication by the American Medical Association 
found that conflicts of interest were present for 91% of the committee co-
chairpersons of guideline producers. Justin Kung et al., Failure of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines to Meet Institute of Medicine Standards, 172 ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MED. 1628, 1628 (2012). This same study found conflicts of interest 
present in 71% of chairpersons. Id. In other words, despite IOM standards that 
called for transparency and the removal of conflicts from guidelines, little has 
actually changed. Another article reported that the IOM standards are impractical 
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The IOM’s approach asserts that CPGs on any given topic should 
be unbiased, expert, and convergent if not fully unitary (definitive).  I 
suggest that these conditions often cannot be met.  I advocate for a more 
thorough review of options, including those that accept bias as inevitable 
and that tolerate more diversity among CPGs.  One example, particularly 
suited to use by independent physicians, is a market-based system that 
would hold private CPG creators liable for their outcomes, rather than only 
their process of guideline development and promulgation.  CPGs produced 
in this market would be accurate and trustworthy because of accountability 
as well as transparency.  
Consider, for example, conflict of interest.  The IOM Report 
ultimately recognizes the myth of neutrality surrounding current CPGs, and 
acknowledges that CPG authors inevitably bring their personal and 
professional biases to the table.  Funding of CPGs by interested parties 
such as medical device makers or pharmaceutical companies can also be 
problematic because of pressure to recommend the funder’s products.  
Pharmaceutical companies stopped funding the creation of CPGs in 2010, 
but still pay for their distribution and updating.22  The IOM Report attempts 
to address conflict of interest using procedural rules, such as requiring that 
the chair of the guidelines development group will have no conflict of 
interest, and that members of the group divest themselves of relevant 
financial investments.  I propose that in many circumstances a different 
approach should be considered.  If one cannot beat market forces, one 
might be better served by harnessing them to the process of creating 
CPGs.23 In other words, a structured marketplace for guidelines may be 
optimal under certain circumstances.  
In Part II, I describe the history of CPGs and explain their 
purposes.  I focus on the connection between CPGs and specific attributes 
of the U.S. health care system.  I evaluate the relative strengths of 
government, self-regulatory organizations, and the private sector in 
producing guidelines.  I then outline a conceptual framework for 
understanding and evaluating possible accountability and governance 
mechanisms for the legal oversight of CPGs.  
                                                                                                                 
because 0 of 114 randomly selected CPGs met the IOM’s definition of trustworthy. 
David F. Ransohoff et al., How to Decide Whether a Clinical Practice Guideline is 
Trustworthy, 309 JAMA 139, 139–40 (2013). 
22 Avraham, Warped Incentives, supra note 1, at 29. 
23 See infra, Part IV(C). 
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Part III presents an empirical study of cases from the last decade 
and shows how courts regard CPGs as a practical matter.  In this part, I also 
review more comprehensive government initiatives involving guidelines.  
Part IV identifies and analyzes three accountability models for 
CPGs that have attracted attention from commentators and policymakers.   
Early guideline projects contemplated the direct development and issuance 
of CPGs by government.  By contrast, recent reports on CPGs issued by the 
IOM and the AHRQ endorse a model of legal governance based on 
government certification of acceptable guidelines promulgated by various 
parties.24 I argue that exclusive reliance on public models is misplaced, and 
other alternatives, including private competitive regimes, should be 
considered as well.25 I conclude by identifying ways in which a private 
competitive regime for CPGs might develop in the market for physician 
services. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF CPGS 
 
A. WHAT ARE CPGS AND WHERE DID THEY COME FROM? 
 
 Ideally, a clinical practice guideline is a clear, succinct statement of 
optimal medical care based on current professional knowledge.  It should 
provide an individual practitioner with the information needed to make a 
fully informed decision consistent with scientific evidence of treatment 
effectiveness.  It should also be updated regularly as new information about 
medical best practices becomes known.  
CPGs have existed for the last fifty years but were little known 
until the 1980s, when the number of guidelines being disseminated 
increased dramatically. Guidelines began to be produced by a variety of 
organizations, including professional societies, hospitals, professional 
review boards, and state health departments.  The federal government 
                                                                                                                 
24 Rosoff proposes a system that would use the federal government not to 
develop guidelines, but to certify privately developed CPGs. See Arnold J. Rosoff, 
The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH 
MATRIX 369, 395 (1995). 
25  Under Avraham’s model, called the Private Regulation Regime (PRR), 
private firms would develop and continually update medical practice guidelines, 
and they would compete to license their own CPGs to medical providers. 
Additionally, the private firms would be held liable for putting forth sub-optimal 
guidelines. Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 591. 
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became involved as well, most notably through the Agency for Health Care 
Policy and Research (AHCPR), a small branch of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services that spearheaded the development of roughly 
twenty different guidelines across key clinical practice areas.26 
 The rise of CPGs is relatively easy to explain.  Beginning in the 
1970s, studies by John Wennberg and his colleagues revealed substantial 
differences in clinical practice patterns from state to state and even from 
town to town that were not correlated with the severity of illness or the 
clinical outcome of each case. 27  These “small-area variation” studies 
quickly generated concerns about both excessive spending and suboptimal 
care quality.  These concerns were compounded by research revealing that 
even published results of randomized clinical trials – the gold standard for 
scientific evidence – changed the delivery of care in the community very 
slowly, if at all.  John Eisenberg, the first administrator of the Agency for 
Health care Research and Quality (AHRQ), suggested the root cause of this 
phenomenon was physician reluctance to incorporate new scientific 
evidence into practice.28 The logical solution was the practice guideline. 
 The conditions that make guidelines an appealing health policy tool 
have developed over the course of several decades.  Four assumptions 
plausibly comprise the foundation for guideline-based policy responses to 
clinical variation.  These attributes of the U.S. health care system are 
normatively contestable and subject to various economic and social 
pressures.  Even those that perhaps should change, however, will not 
change quickly.  
                                                                                                                 
26  This initiative attracted political opposition and the agency no longer 
performs this role.  Eleanor M. Perfetto & Lisa Stockwell Morris, Agency for 
Health Care Policy & Research Clinical Practice Guidelines, 30 ANNALS OF 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 1117 (1996). 
27  See generally John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice 
Variations: A Proposal for Action, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May 1984 at 6.  For 
example, a study published in the early 1980s described how in Maine, the 
likelihood of a woman’s having a hysterectomy by the time she reached age 70 
varied from 20 to 70 percent in different hospital markets. In Iowa, the likelihood 
that a man who reached the age of 85 would have had a prostatectomy varied from 
15 to 60 percent in different areas. In Vermont, children who had undergone a 
tonsillectomy varied from 8 to 70 percent depending on geographic area.  Id. at 9. 
28 John M. Eisenberg, Quality Research for Quality Health Care: The Data 
Connection, 35 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH xii (June 2000). 
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As such, it is assumed the following to be accurate characteristics 
of U.S. health care that are considered desirable by a substantial percentage 
of health care professionals and the public: 
 
1. Confidence in the physician as a legitimate source of 
clinical decisions affecting patients.  Respect for 
physicians as trained professionals, for example, 
conceptualizes CPGs as advisory rather than directive, 
rejects “cookbook medicine,” and accommodates patient 
variation and the exercise of medical judgment.  
 
2. Acceptance of solo and small-group practice models, with 
decentralized organization and fragmented care delivery, 
continuing to play an important role in the delivery of 
health care.  
 
3.  Belief that accurate, up-to-date, and useful information 
about medical practice is under-produced, that and 
supplying this information contributes a “public good” for 
physicians and the health care system.  
 
B.  PITFALLS AND PROMISES FOR CPGS 
  
1.  What is wrong with current CPGs? 
 
Scholars have been complaining for a long time about the quality 
of CPGs.29 One major issue is the unstructured oversight system now in 
                                                                                                                 
29 Researchers at the University of Maryland summed up the complaints as 
follows:  
 
Their concerns have focused on the quality of the evidence 
on which clinical practice guidelines are based, the tendency of 
guidelines to promote more care rather than more effective care, 
their narrow focus and use as marketing and opinion-based 
pieces rather than road maps to improved medical care, and the 
difficulties involved in customizing population-based 
recommendations to individual patients.  Also of concern has 
been the lack of transparency in the process by which clinical 
practice guidelines are created and potential conflicts (COIs) that 
might bias those preparing them. 
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place, which the IOM Report attempted to address.  Self-regulatory 
standards have existed for a decade.  The Appraisal of Guidelines, 
Research and Evaluation (AGREE) was published in 2003, and since that 
time has become the most widely accepted standard for assessing the 
quality of the process of guideline development.30 The IOM report built on 
and improved AGREE by addressing questions such as the funding of 
guideline development and managing conflict of interest. 31  The IOM 
Report does not consider accountability for drafters of CPGs, or legal 
recourse for injuries attributable to incorrect guidelines, even though 
holding drafters accountable could help ensure that guidelines are properly 
drafted and regularly updated.  
A recent University of Maryland study of 130 clinical practice 
guidelines found that many do not meet IOM standards.32 Fewer than half 
of the guidelines listed conflicts of interest, many did not offer differing 
committee member views, and few committees included an information 
scientist, a patient, or a patient representative.33 It is often difficult to know 
what methods a drafter used in writing the guidelines or whether there are 
conflicts of interest of which potential users should be aware. 34  As 
mentioned above, the approach taken in this paper is that instead of 
accepting the myth of neutrality of current CPGs and assuming there are 
minimal conflicts of interests, the default view should be the opposite: 
CPGs are likely to be riddled with conflicts of interest. 
 Even if guidelines were perfect, physicians face information 
overload when they are willing to use guidelines.  Although the number of 
guidelines is far less than the number of new research studies involving 
                                                                                                                 
Kung et al., supra note 21, at 1628–29. 
30 See generally The AGREE Collaboration, Development and Validation of 
an International Appraisal Instrument for Assessing the Quality of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines: The AGREE Project, 12 QUAL SAFETY HEALTH CARE 
18 (Feb. 2003). 
31 The IOM Report improved on other frontiers as well. It developed standards 
for the updating of guidelines, external review and public comment and requiring a 
systematic review of the literature as a necessary stage in the development. See 
David F. Ransohoff et al., How to Decide Whether a Clinical Practice Guideline is 
Trustworthy, 309 JAMA 139, 139 (2013). 
32 Kung et al., supra note 21, at 1629–30. 
33 Id. 
34 See 2011 IOM Report, supra note 3, at 2. 
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medical care,35 the National Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC), a database of 
CPGs in the United States, currently indexes over 2,700 guidelines.36 In 
2008 alone, the NGC added 722 new CPGs.37    
Alas, many CPGs are not user-friendly.  Guidelines are often long 
and dense.38 Even with the large amount of information they provide, they 
still may not offer clear instructions for doctors attempting to apply them to 
a specific patient.39  
Moreover, it remains unclear which CPGs are still authoritative.  
Optimal medical procedures change over time.  It is often difficult to 
determine when the weight of evidence has caused a justifiable shift against 
a certain treatment that should result in a change to the relevant CPGs.  On 
average, CPGs cost at least $200,000 to produce and substantial amounts to 
revise.40 Many of the parties that can most easily afford these sums, such as 
pharmaceutical companies,41 are particularly prone to conflicts of interest.   
There is also the semi-myth of uniformity.  Guidelines do not 
always agree even when they cover the same medical conditions or 
procedures.  This may partly result from varying incentives for each 
producer.  For example, a guideline created by a managed care plan may be 
more concerned with cost implications of treatment recommendations than 
a guideline created by a physician specialty society.  To be clear, different 
guidelines based on patients’ willingness to pay for procedures could make 
sense, like economy, business, and first-class airline seating.  But there 
must be a good reason for the different treatment.  If the reason for 
conflicting guidelines is just that the authors came to conflicting 
recommendations about the best treatment (regardless of costs) then that is 
an issue.  In that case both guidelines cannot both be correct.  
In many situations, available evidence regarding best practices is 
scarce.  While some would argue that this means no recommendation 
should be made, others argue that doctors need CPGs even more in these 
                                                                                                                 
35 From 1994 to 2001, there were around 25,000 randomized controlled trials 
published on MEDLINE, a medical literature database. Id. at 1. No organization, 
let alone a single doctor, is able to review 70 studies per day, evaluate their 
credibility, and apply their findings to their practice. 
36 Id. at 2. 
37 Id. 
38 See id. at 146. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 62 (internal citation omitted). 
41 See Avraham, Warped Incentives, supra note 1, at 29 and accompanying 
text. 
2014       OVERLOOKED AND UNDERUSED  285 
 
instances.42 Without a consistent rating scale that indicates the level of 
support for a particular guideline, however, it can be difficult to determine 
which guidelines are the most reliable.43 A study by Grilli and others found 
that 82% of guidelines studied did not expressly state the strength of their 
recommendation.44 
The IOM Report recognizes that “[n]on-standardized development 
results in substantial troubling variation in clinical recommendations.”45 
However, the IOM Report does not attempt to eliminate this problem but 
only predicts that, with increased oversight and stricter CPG production 
procedures, the problems of inconsistent recommendations can be 
reduced.46 In doing so the IOM Report seems to waive its hands in an 
attempt to address the semi-myth of uniformity with respect to current 
CPGs. 
 
2.  What is the Potential of CPGs? 
 
Legal commentators often focus on CPGs in connection with 
medical malpractice reform.47 In fact, CPGs’ benefits can be divided into 
three major categories: improving the quality of care and reducing errors, 
decreasing defensive medicine, and decreasing offensive medicine 
(overtreatment). 
 
a.  CPGs Can Improve Quality 
 
 First and foremost, CPGs should assure and improve the quality of 
medical care.  The standard for measuring quality used in health policy, 
articulated by Donabedian in the 1960s, distinguishes interpersonal aspects 
of quality, such as compassion, from technical aspects of quality, such as 
surgical precision.  It further divides technical aspects into three categories: 
structure (e.g., the number of nurses per hospital ward), processes (e.g., 
whether patients with bacterial infections receive antibiotics), and 
                                                                                                                 
42 See 2011 IOM Report, supra note 3, at 63. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. at 64 (internal citation omitted) (reviewing 431 guidelines developed by 
specialty societies between 1988 and 1998). This study also concluded that CPGs 
were making moderate progress over time. Id. 
45 Id. at 65–66 (internal citations omitted). 
46 Id. at 198–99. 
47 See infra notes 93–128. 
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outcomes (e.g., percentage of cancer patients who survive for five years 
after treatment).  
 Few will disagree that the best way to improve health care is to 
evaluate outcomes such as cures, survival rates, and symptom relief.  These 
outcome measures represent the third prong of the Donabedian definition 
of quality, and they are the preferred approach of proponents of new 
incentive systems for health care providers, such as pay-for-performance 
systems (P4P), and of systems that rely on transparency to motivate 
improvement, such as public “report cards” for hospitals and HMOs.  There 
are various problems with evaluating outcomes.  The most relevant here is 
that measuring outcomes in a statistically reliable manner requires large 
datasets.  Individual physicians cannot reasonably be held accountable for 
clinical outcomes because of their small patient populations.48  
What is, then, the role of CPGs in improving care? CPGs are 
primarily designed to define (technical) processes.49 Though this may seem 
obvious, it establishes the limitations of CPGs and distinguishes them from 
other instruments that can be governed separately.  Thus, interpersonal 
aspects of quality are monitored, if at all, through an uneasy balance 
between professional codes of ethics and consumer preferences.  CPGs do 
not attempt to address these dimensions of medical performance.  
Similarly, structural features of care, especially those involving large 
capital investments, often remain absent from CPGs because they are not 
viewed as within the control of individual physicians, who are the principal 
audience for guidelines.50 Governance mechanisms for structural features 
                                                                                                                 
48 See, e.g., Arnold Milstein & Thomas H. Lee, Comparing Physicians on 
Efficiency, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2649 (2007) (discussing the pitfalls and 
challenges facing solo and small practitioners). 
49  See generally AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND 
APPROACHES TO ASSESSMENT: EXPLORATIONS IN QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND 
MONITORING (Health Admin. Press 1980); Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating the 
Quality of Medical Care, 44 MILBANK MEM’L FUND Q. 166 (1966).   
50 Technology assessment has also been outside the mainstream of practice 
guidelines. To gain greater political acceptance, technology assessment will 
probably need to incorporate professional standards and work in tandem with 
practice guidelines because the public looks to physicians as experts on inventing 
and evaluating new clinical technology as well as on deploying it. Efforts are 
ongoing to integrate technology assessment with specific clinical 
recommendations. Notably, Congress recently chartered a new comparative 
effectiveness institute in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, but it placed significant legal 
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tend to be mandatory, implemented via compliance with regulatory or 
accreditation standards, and are usually applied to institutions as opposed to 
professionals.51  
 Moreover, guidelines are increasingly intertwined with health 
information technology such as electronic health records with 
computerized decision support.  Proponents of CPGs have generally 
assumed that users can easily recognize a functional guideline and 
therefore that using it would reflect a conscious decision to access a 
discrete set of recommendations. Indeed, existing technology, including 
tablets, smart phones, and other handheld devices with internet 
connectivity, makes reference information and decision support readily 
available to individuals performing both clinical and administrative 
functions.52 Some of these resources can be accessed on demand by users 
seeking guidance, but others are seamlessly incorporated into medical 
information systems.  Emerging technologies are likely to embed 
algorithms directly into the equipment, facilities, and systems that are used 
to deliver and manage care.  Individual users may even be unaware that a 
guideline is being followed. 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
restrictions on how findings of relative ineffectiveness can be used. See Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3011, 3501, 6302 
(2010). 
51  Examples are the conditions of participation that Medicare regulation 
imposes on health care facilities, and the accreditation standards for hospitals 
promulgated by the Joint Commission. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) issued an amended guideline on December 30, 2009 for 
ambulatory surgical centers. See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PUB. 100-07, REVISED APPENDIX L: 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES FOR AMBULATORY SURGICAL CENTERS (2009), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Transmit 
tals/downloads/r56soma.pdf. 
52 These technologies are already in use by doctors. See, e.g., Anne Eisenberg, 
Those Scan Results Are Just an App Away, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/business/medical-apps-to-assist-with-diagnos 
es-cleared-by-fda.html (discussing one doctor’s use of the Mobile MIM app, which 
allows his iPhone or iPad to act as a diagnostic medical instrument). 
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b. Clear Standards of Care Can Decrease Defensive 
Medicine and Improve Safety 
 
 Fear of malpractice liability has long been regarded as a major 
cause of physicians’ clinical idiosyncrasies, and therefore, it seems an 
obvious area where CPGs should be applied.  In the 1960s, the number of 
malpractice claims and the cost of physicians’ malpractice insurance 
premiums began to rise rapidly.  Some commentators attributed this rise to 
unscrupulous lawyers and corrupt expert witnesses who persuaded 
sympathetic juries to impose a higher “standard of care” on physicians than 
was required by the law or indicated by medical science.53 Moreover, this 
trend seemed to be self-reinforcing, as customary practice was defined 
upwards by the courts, creating a vicious circle of defensive medicine, 
waste, and litigation. 
 The first CPGs offered a potential liability shield against frivolous 
claims by countering adverse expert witness testimony.  Using national 
standards rather than customary practice in specific localities to define the 
standard of care seemed like a logical step to address the issue of 
unnecessary and potentially dangerous variation in quality across disparate 
medical practices.54 Early guideline proponents hoped judges and juries 
would accept CPGs to define the standard of care in individual lawsuits and 
that states would eventually amend their laws to make compliance with 
CPGs a formal defense to liability.  When the standard of care is clearly 
defined, there is no incentive to run unneeded tests or provide treatments 
solely for fear of future litigation. 
 It took several more years for policymakers and medical 
professionals to acknowledge that rates of medical error were unacceptably 
high,55 and that, because of the expense and unpredictability of malpractice 
                                                                                                                 
53 See, e.g., Louis J. Regan, Medicine and the Law, 250 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 
463 (1954) (blaming malpractice suits on unscrupulous lawyers and physician 
turncoats rather than poor care).   
54 Over time, the localism of malpractice law has faded both with respect to 
the “locality rule” for standard practice and in terms of evaluating care based on 
whether it was reasonable rather than merely customary. See generally E. Lee 
Schlender, Malpractice and the Idaho Locality Rule: Stuck in the Nineteenth 
Century, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 361 (2008); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of 
Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at The Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 163 (2000). 
55 There are estimates that medical errors still cause almost 100,000 deaths 
each year. Indeed, about 1 in 50 people who enter a medical facility will suffer an 
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litigation, few of these avoidable injuries were being compensated by the 
courts. 56  Revelations of rampant medical error in the late 1990s made 
avoiding misuse of tests and treatments a further goal of guideline 
compliance.  The problems of medical error and defensive medicine are 
interrelated, as both often stem from the lack of a clear guidepost against 
which to measure physician performance.  From this perspective, CPGs 
could also serve as a “liability sword,” identifying physicians who misused 
a given treatment.57 Predictably, the potential inculpatory application of 
CPGs in court was far less appealing to physicians than their use in a 
purely exculpatory role.   
  
c. Guidelines Can Combat Offensive Medicine and Reduce 
Wasteful Spending 
 
 The current fee-for-service payment system gives physicians a 
direct financial incentive to run additional tests and perform unnecessary 
procedures.  Combined with the easy availability of advanced clinical 
technologies (particularly in hospitals), the financial insulation of most 
insured patients from the cost of this care through health insurance, and 
physicians’ tendency to over-test to avoid potential malpractice suits, fee-
for-service payment is a major reason why the United States spends the 
most on health care but lags behind many developed nations in terms of 
health care quality.58  
 The FBI investigation of the Redding Medical Center in California 
highlights the dangers of offensive medicine.  At Redding, one thousand 
coronary artery bypass graft operations, a very profitable surgery, were 
performed each year, nearly three times the average rate for a facility of its 
                                                                                                                 
adverse event that could have been prevented, and most of this harm is due to 
negligence. Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 548–49.   
56 See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 22–44, 68–77 (2005); 
William M. Sage, New Directions in Medical Liability Reform, in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: A PHYSICIAN’S SOURCEBOOK 247–78 (Richard E. Anderson ed., 
2005). 
57 See generally Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of 
Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PENN L. 
REV. 645 (2001). 
58 See Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an International 
Context, 23 HEALTH AFF. 10, 10–12 (May/June 2004). 
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size.  The investigators alleged that a large portion were not medically 
justified, but were done to boost profits for the hospital and its physicians.59  
Although cost-effectiveness has rarely been an explicit element of 
CPGs, they can generate health care savings.  Discouraging overuse of 
medical care is the clearest but not the only connection between CPGs and 
health care costs.  Reducing misuse both improves safety and averts costly 
complications.  Even rooting out underuse can have desirable economic 
effects.  Many cost-effective tests supported by CPGs are overlooked and 
left unused by physicians lacking guidelines.  CPGs can also align pricing 
with care by having gold and platinum treatment levels for those who pay 
more.  Much like one can purchase more insurance to ensure coverage of 
more procedures, one could pay more to be in a higher CPG tier.      
 
3.  Who Might Produce and Regulate CPGs? 
 
Guidelines may be produced by public agencies, self-regulatory 
bodies, or private organizations.  As one might expect, the desired 
regulatory oversight scheme would differ significantly according to the 
guideline issuer’s identity.  Choosing among these alternatives should 
reflect serious thought about regulatory design.  Political feasibility is also 
important and should be prospectively considered.  
 
a. Government 
 
 One of the characteristics accepted in the introduction of this paper 
was the idea that CPGs are a public good.  With that in mind, one would 
think that the government should be responsible for their promulgation.  
Government promulgated guidelines are a more attractive policy 
option in countries where the government acts as a single health care payer 
because the government internalizes the cost of health care and, for that 
matter, the cost of medical liability.  In Britain, the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), an independent organization 
closely linked to the British government, evaluates new technologies for 
coverage by the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), and considers both 
                                                                                                                 
59 See Kurt Eichenwald, Operating Profits: Mining Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 12, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/12/business/ 
operating-profits-mining-medicare-one-hospital-benefited-questionable-
surgery.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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quality and cost.  NICE is thus well positioned to suggest best practices for 
NHS physicians.  
In the US, the federal government exerts considerable influence 
over the health care system by funding the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, while state government plays a more direct regulatory role in 
addition to its Medicaid oversight function.  Payment policy offers a 
straightforward justification for issuing CPGs and monitoring compliance 
with them.  Moreover, the government’s incentive and ability to influence 
clinical practice may grow stronger as national health reform following the 
PPACA is implemented, creating an opportunity for a comprehensive 
approach to public guideline development that combines clinical quality 
with cost and coverage for conditions where research has revealed 
suboptimal quality and/or economic waste.  A significant caution, however, 
is that political polarization over the risks of “socializing medicine” or 
rationing may discourage the creation of CPGs by the government, 
particularly for medical procedures influenced by powerful special interest 
groups.  Indeed, despite its size, budget, and power, the government has 
significant drawbacks as a source of CPGs.  Physicians and the public 
usually view the government with suspicion when it seeks to intrude on the 
autonomy of the medical profession in diagnosing and treating patients. 
Hence we have a conflict between CPGs as a public good and the 
autonomy of doctors.  This is particularly true when the government 
attempts to alter a clinical norm regarding risk-benefit calculations, as 
exemplified by PSA-screening for prostate cancer, the recently renewed 
debate over mammography for middle-aged women, or the continuing 
controversy over the potential side-effects of childhood vaccination.60  
 The government has insufficient personnel with the appropriate 
skills to produce a large number of detailed guidelines.  The cost of 
developing guidelines through public processes is also high and politically 
                                                                                                                 
60 See Sarah Kliff, Many Doctors Think PSA Tests Don’t Work. But They’ll 
Keep Doing Them Anyway, WASH. POST, May 29, 2012, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/many-doctors-think-psa-
tests-dont-work-but-theyll-keep-doing-them-anyway/2012/05/29/gJQAOl0qyU_ 
blog.html; Eliot Marshall, Brawling Over Mammography, 327 SCIENCE 936 (2010) 
(describing the public reaction to recent mammography guidelines); H. Gilbert 
Welch, Screening Mammography: A Long Run for a Short Slide?, 363 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1276 (2010) (suggesting that the mortality benefits from mammography 
may have declined as treatment options have improved); Liza Gross, A Broken 
Trust: Lessons from the Vaccine-Autism Wars, 7 PLOS BIOL. (2009) (describing 
the long battle over thimerosol and autism). 
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exposed. Because guidelines must be routinely updated and corrected, the 
administrative burden and associated political risk would resurface 
frequently. 61  In order to properly promulgate and update CPGs, a 
government agency would need to be well funded, closely connected to 
care delivery, and sheltered from political pressure by special interest 
groups.62  
 
b.  Self-Regulation 
 
 Self-regulation in the health care system is most commonly 
associated with physicians and other health professionals, but it may also 
include health care facilities, suppliers, and even insurers.  Professional 
organizations such as the American Medical Association and societies in 
each medical specialty promulgate ethical rules and standards of conduct 
that guide physician members’ behavior.  In the US, law and tradition 
allow the organized medical profession to maintain a surprising degree of 
collective control over physician education, training, licensing, 
disciplining, hospital affiliation, and even liability insurance. Nurses, 
                                                                                                                 
61  Guidelines are time-consuming and expensive both to develop and to 
update. See Richard Amerling et al., Guidelines Have Done More Harm Than 
Good, 26 BLOOD PURIFICATION 73 (2008). Often, the result is that guidelines are 
not based on the full evidence available. A 2001 study examined 17 guidelines 
developed by U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality. See Paul G. 
Shekelle et al., Validity of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
Clinical Practice Guidelines: How Quickly Do Guidelines Become Outdated?, 286 
JAMA 1461, 1461 (2001). Seven of the guidelines needed to be updated with new 
“diagnostic or therapeutic guideline recommendations” or withdrawn. Id. Six 
warranted marginal adjustments to their recommendations. Id. The methodology 
and development process for AHRQ guidelines were considered to represent a 
drastic improvement in the “science of practice guideline development.” Id. at 
1462. Yet, half of them were obsolete in 5.8 years and the study recommended that 
the guidelines be reevaluated for suitability every three years. Id. at 1461. Another 
cost-related concern is that providers do not have the necessary resources to 
comply with the guidelines. Ronni P. Solomon, Clinical Guidelines in the United 
States: Perspectives on Law and Litigation, in CLINICAL GUIDELINES: LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 137, 146 (John Tingle ed., 2002). 
62 See generally Bruce C. Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, 18 
HEALTH AFF. 22 (1998) (explaining interest group politics); Lawrence R. Jacobs, 
Politics of America’s Supply State: Health Reform and Technology, 14 HEALTH 
AFF. 143 (1995) (arguing that no collective force counters the political power of 
provider and supplier groups). 
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pharmacists, and other practitioners claim similar but generally lesser 
privileges to regulate their own professions.  
 Self-regulation may be preferable to direct government control 
when technical expertise is required, when cooperation from the regulated 
entities is important, or when the regulated industry is undergoing rapid 
change that outpaces public oversight.  Self-regulation usually will seem 
cheaper for the government than direct regulation because it is off-budget 
and less visible politically, and it may also be cheaper if compliance costs 
are lower.  On the other hand, self-regulation can be insular, self-serving, 
and anti-competitive if improperly executed.  Despite those concerns, 
medicine has historically enjoyed wide latitude to self-regulate because of 
public deference to physician expertise and professional ethics.  
 Self-regulation can take various forms pertaining to guidelines. 
Self-regulatory organizations can issue guidelines directly.  Many current 
guideline producers are non-profit, educational organizations.  In the US, 
the most prominent category of issuer is made up of medical specialty 
societies and other professional organizations, which promulgate guidelines 
focused on the effectiveness of treatment.63 However, these entities are 
seldom well funded and may not be able to afford to update CPGs on a 
continuing basis in a rapidly changing world.  In general, such 
organizations usually do not feel pressed to account for costs of care, and 
may be biased towards quality over efficiency.  
 Self-regulatory organizations can also certify guidelines produced 
by others and also may accredit those producers.  The imprimatur of an 
accrediting or certification body is typically used to convey information 
about superior quality or reliability to a purchaser or user of a product or 
service.  As noted above, the IOM recently recommended the establishment 
of a public-private partnership to certify guideline issuers in terms of 
compliance with best practices regarding guideline production that an IOM 
committee had identified.  
 State professional licensing boards exemplify what is often called 
“statutory” or “delegated” self-regulation.  In this model, a legislature 
confers broad discretion on what is a nominally governmental body but that 
is practically controlled by the regulated class of individuals.  Physicians 
often have considerable influence over medical licensing boards, for 
example, although public concern about safety has eroded the profession’s 
                                                                                                                 
63 Stefan Timmermans & Emily S. Kolker, Evidence-Based Medicine and the 
Reconfiguration of Medical Knowledge, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 177, 184 
(2004). 
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dominance in recent years.  The Joint Commission is a very powerful self-
regulatory body for hospitals and other health facilities in the US, and has 
delegated authority insofar as is its accreditation substitutes by law for 
direct government qualification of health facilities for participation in 
Medicare and Medicaid. Because of its reliance on convened groups of 
private experts, NICE in the UK often functions as a statutory self-
regulatory body.  Although existing statutory self-regulators in the US 
could issue or certify CPGs, none has yet done so.  Even the Joint 
Commission standards, designed to ensure quality of care, do not specify 
treatment processes. 
 An alternative model is “supervised self-regulation.” This is 
something like what used to happen in the US in healthcare, as outlined in 
the Public Model section of Part IV.  In this model, a formal government 
regulatory body backstops a self-regulatory organization.  A prominent 
example of this in another field is the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  The SEC has the right and obligation to review the work of 
various self-regulatory boards that adopt standards for matters such as 
corporate accounting practices and the operation of securities exchanges 
and to overrule them if it deems necessary.  
In health care, certain Medicare contractors – particularly those 
engaging in quality improvement activities under explicit statutory 
authorization – function as supervised self-regulators.  Unlike delegated 
self-regulation, a supervised model empowers an existing agency such as 
AHRQ, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), or the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to ensure that self-regulatory 
organizations charged with issuing guidelines are honest and competent.  
This might take the form of certifying the processes used by each producer, 
as suggested in the 2011 IOM Report.  
Self-regulation can operate locally as well, with monitoring and 
compliance systems internal to organizations being self-imposed or 
expressly required by the government or another self-regulator.  For 
example, internal self-regulation by a “self-governing medical staff” is 
required for most hospitals by state law and by the Joint Commission 
accreditation standards.  History, however, cautions us against locally 
produced or approved CPGs.  The principal justification for pursuing 
guidelines as a regulatory enterprise was the failure of reliable professional 
norms to develop in local, self-regulated physician communities.  It would 
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be ironic to turn to the same communities to create or bless guidelines.64 
National self-regulatory organizations would likely create better, evidence-
based products. 
 
c.  Private Sector 
 
Many types of private organizations produce and deploy clinical 
practice guidelines.  These efforts vary widely with respect to the quality 
and impartiality of the guidelines produced and also with respect to the 
transparency of the process of producing them.  They also vary in the 
degree to which guidelines are considered corporate assets intended for 
internal use as opposed to external dissemination.  
 Increasingly, guidelines are developed and/or purchased or 
modified prior to implementation by large clinical entities.  These include 
closed-panel HMOs, hospital-based integrated delivery systems, prepaid 
group practices, multispecialty clinics, and less unitary but still structurally 
coherent networks ranging from the independent practice associations 
(IPAs) of the 1990s to the accountable care organizations (ACOs) of today.  
Many, but far from all of these organizations, are non-profit corporations.  
Health care providers compete primarily on the underlying services and 
may view guidelines as proprietary business tools rather than common 
educational resources.65  
Among private, guideline-producing organizations targeting 
independent physicians, several are interested in reducing health care costs 
as well as improving quality.  These producers, including managed care 
organizations, health insurers, and a handful of large, self-insured 
employers,66 similarly may have business-related objectives for issuing and 
using guidelines on a competitive basis.67   
                                                                                                                 
64  See Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, The 
Physician Workforce, And Beneficiaries' Quality Of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. 184 
(2004). 
65 A search of private, for-profit guidelines yielded only seven guidelines, 
whereas the nonprofit search yielded 154 guidelines from a wide array of 
organizations. A search for guidelines from Hospital/Medical Centers yielded 38 
guidelines (of the approximately 2356 available) from only 3-4 organizations. 
66 Rosoff, supra note 24, at 374.   A search in the NGC dataset revealed, for 
example, that Kaiser Permanente (an MCO) has about 10 guidelines posted.  
67 Two private for-profit firms that came up in NGC’s database were the Reed 
Group, which is a company dedicated to getting injured employees back to work at 
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Benefits consultants, pharmacy benefit managers, disease 
management companies, and similar entities may also regard guidelines as 
proprietary.  Health care suppliers, such as pharmaceutical and medical 
device companies, frequently see guidelines as critical marketing tools for 
their products, or, if a particular guideline does not support that purpose, 
they view them as a threat to revenue.  Malpractice insurers for physicians 
or hospitals may also issue or use guidelines in connection with their risk 
management activities.  Some of these organizations already have the 
structures in place to organically develop a private model of CPGs similar 
to the private regulation regime discussed in Part IV.   
These various entities are usually well funded and have the 
requisite expertise to write useful guidelines.  However, they all have very 
different financial goals, particularly if the cost of suboptimal guidelines is 
borne elsewhere.  For example, CPGs produced by third-party payers may 
emphasize cost control over quality, possibly externalizing costs onto 
liability insurers if injury ensues. 68  In contrast, guidelines issued by 
physician groups anticipating fee-for-service payment may emphasize 
quality over cost control.  CPGs produced by liability insurers, in turn, may 
emphasize claims avoidance, with safe care a secondary objective and 
efficient care not prioritized, which tends to externalize costs onto both 
patients and third-party payers.69 Thus, physicians are sometimes forced to 
choose among conflicting guidelines with different goals.70  
Other private producers of guidelines have primarily political 
objectives.  Certain professional and trade groups seek to influence public 
                                                                                                                 
full-productivity and the Smith & Nephew, which is primarily a medical device 
manufacturer in Ireland. 
68 For example, HMOs may prefer fewer treatments to contain costs because 
they fully bear the costs of treatments, but do not fully bear the costs of 
malpractice. 
69  For example, malpractice insurers would require doctors to perform 
mammograms every year to prevent breast cancer, even if they are not needed, 
because the malpractice insurers do not bear the costs of extra mammograms, but 
do bear the costs of lawsuits from late diagnosis of breast cancer. 
70 Patricia R. Recupero, Clinical Practice Guidelines as Learned Treatises: 
Understanding Their Use as Evidence in the Courtroom, 36 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY L. 290, 298 (2008). Guidelines need not all be the same – for example 
a guideline could call for a more expensive treatment than is necessary – but to be 
covered under this premium guideline, rather than a standard guideline, one should 
be required to pay more into the system and thus be financially accountable for 
their choice of coverage. 
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opinion, legislation, and regulation that determine which health professions 
and which treatments receive favorable consideration.  Similar risks may 
arise when leading physician researchers are called upon to develop CPGs 
because they may have financial relationships with pharmaceutical or 
medical device manufacturers who wish to have their products 
recommended by experts.  
If guidelines are challenged in court, these varying incentives and 
potential biases may become a focal point of litigation rather than the 
guidelines being regarded as “a generally recognized standard of care 
within the medical profession”.71 During the 1980s and 1990s, courts were 
sensitized to the risk of bias in health insurance contracts as managed care 
became more aggressive about denying coverage for lack of medical 
necessity.72 More recently, financial relationships between pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and health care providers have raised concerns about 
conflicts of interests influencing clinical standards and practices. 73 
Fortunately, we now recognize neutrality as the myth that it is and can 
adjust our governance models to account for the fact that CPG authors 
bring their own biases to the drafting process. 
  
d.  Courts 
 
In the US, the health care system tends to be monitored by an ad 
hoc mixture of public law (i.e. Medicare and Medicaid) and private law 
represented by individual litigation over contractual agreements or personal 
injuries.  In this system, it is possible for judges – typically those serving 
on state rather than federal courts – to create “common law” regarding 
CPGs by interpreting contracts, determining the scope of fiduciary duties, 
allocating property rights, and holding producers of CPGs and other health 
                                                                                                                 
71 See Quigley v. Jobe, 851 P.2d 236, 238 (Colo. App. 1992) (holding that 
guidelines written by a liability insurance carrier did not meet the relevance test for 
scientific evidence, because they were created “by a private insurance company as 
part of an insurance contract and did not reflect a generally recognized standard of 
care within the medical profession.”). 
72 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989) 
73 See COMM. ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MED. RESEARCH, EDUC., & 
PRACTICE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN 
MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field, 
eds., 2009); William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why Banning 
“Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical Research, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (2007). 
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care providers liable to patients under tort law.  Should such cases occur 
frequently, an accountability regime for guidelines might emerge 
organically without the creation of an explicit legislative or regulatory 
framework.  But this seems unlikely to occur as the most victims of 
medical errors are not aware of them, and of those aware the vast majority 
does not file suits, and of those filing suits, the vast majority settle, never 
making it to courts.  
A more plausible outcome is episodic litigation resulting in judicial 
decisions that send strong, albeit indirect, signals to health care 
stakeholders regarding the value and enforceability of CPGs.  Normally, 
CPGs are brought up in the context of medical malpractice litigation, which 
usually plays an important role in molding physicians’ opinions about the 
acceptability of any proposed alteration to their clinical practices and 
standards. 74  Product liability lawsuits are also important indicators for 
manufacturers of drugs, medical devices, vaccines, and diagnostic tests.  
For health insurers, guidelines typically surface in disputes over benefits 
and coverage denials, such as in the interpretation of policy provisions 
regarding medical necessity or experimental treatment.75  
Medical malpractice litigation, for example, generates 
accountability mechanisms for guidelines that have particular 
characteristics.  Civil litigation ordinarily gives considerable deference to 
the discretion of individual judges in making evidentiary rulings.  
Accordingly, only a small number of structured guideline programs have 
been attempted in the malpractice context, and those have been heavily 
negotiated to respect judicial prerogatives and to operate through 
presumptions and affirmative defenses as opposed to conclusive 
determinations of liability or immunity from liability.  
 
                                                                                                                 
74 William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error, in 
ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 159 (2004). 
75 Like medical malpractice, insurance coverage law has both a technical and a 
symbolic importance to oversight of health care quality. See Nan D. Hunter, 
Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 93 (2006); William M. Sage, Managed Care’s 
Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative 
Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597 (2003); Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. 
Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1637 (1992). 
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III.  HOW ARE CPGS CURRENTLY USED? 
 
Although systematic efforts to provide governance and 
accountability mechanisms for CPGs have been lacking in the US, 
substantial experience has accumulated over the last two decades regarding 
the relationship between guidelines and the law.  While these experiences 
underscore the desirability of consciously creating accountability in the 
world of guidelines, they do not offer clear lessons for how such 
accountability should be achieved. 
The success of CPGs in replacing customary care with evidence-
based medicine depends primarily upon the level of acceptance of CPGs 
within the medical profession. 76  The law’s treatment of guidelines is 
critical to this process and to their acceptance by other stakeholders whose 
confidence in guidelines as a policy innovation is affected by how such 
guidelines are perceived by independent legal decision-makers such as 
judges and legislators.77 This section surveys the way CPGs have been 
treated by courts, insurance companies and various state level initiatives.   
 
A.  CPG USE IN LITIGATION: A CASE STUDY FROM 2000-2010 
 
How courts and lawyers are actually using CPGs in malpractice 
litigation has not been definitively established.  The most comprehensive 
study of court usage of CPGs was published almost two decades ago by 
Hyams, Shapiro, and Brennan. 78  They conducted surveys of medical 
malpractice attorneys and reviewed of all relevant case law from January 1, 
1980 through May 31, 1994.79 That study and subsequent articles suggest 
                                                                                                                 
76 Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Healthcare 
Reform: An Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21, 25-26 (2012). 
77  Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts 
Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POLIT., POL. & L. 327, 331 
(2001) [hereinafter Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine]; see also Arnold J. Rosoff, 
On Being a Physician in the Electronic Age: Peering into the Mists at Point-&-
Click Medicine, 46 ST. LOUIS L.J. 111, 115 (2002) (outlining the use of Clinical 
Decision Support Systems as a form of Clinical Practice Guidelines). 
78  Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice 
Litigation: An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POLIT., POL. & L. 289 (1996) 
[hereinafter Hyams et al.]. 
79 Id. at 295. 
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that courts have historically been hesitant to use CPGs in medical 
malpractice cases.80 
Hyams and colleagues found only thirty-seven published cases 
involving the use of CPGs.  Of those published decisions, the Hyams study 
identified twenty-two cases of successful inculpatory use and six cases of 
successful exculpatory use.81 However, the attorney surveys indicated that 
the profession was indeed aware of CPGs, and that guidelines aided in 
settlement negotiations and even in the decision of whether or not to take 
certain cases.82  
I extended the Hyams study by finding and analyzing judicial 
decisions involving CPGs in any context published between January 2000 
and March 2010.83 The review indicates that use of guidelines by courts 
continues to be sporadic and mostly conservative.  The use of guidelines 
for inculpatory purposes has tended to increase, though the sample size is 
so small that few conclusions can be drawn.  Of the twenty-eight cases 
found with parties using guidelines in some form, sixteen (57%) involved 
their use by plaintiffs as swords compared to 78% of cases in the Hyams 
study.  Twelve cases (43%) involved CPG use by defendants as shields 
compared to 22% in the Hyams study.84 Interestingly, in eight of the twelve 
                                                                                                                 
80 Id. at 310.  See also Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 
352; see also Mello, supra note 57 (discussing the different ways in which courts 
have approached medical malpractice).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
Hyams et al. study, see Avraham, Warped Incentives, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
81 Hyams et al., supra note 78, at 296. 
82 Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 341. 
83  The search was performed looking for the appearance of “medical” or 
“medicine” as well as “guideline” in all 50 state jurisdictions and in federal courts.  
Sometimes courts may discuss guidelines without necessarily referring to them as 
such, so a second search was run using terms like “algorithm” and “standard.”  To 
attempt to weed out results where “standard” appeared merely as a part of 
“standard of proof” or a legal “standard,” cases also were required to have 
“medicine,” “medical,” “hospital,” “doctor,” or “physician” in the text. While these 
results are likely not comprehensive (and there were surely cases missed which 
might have discussed clinical practice guidelines in some form), it’s most probable 
that these cases would not have dealt with guidelines extensively and thus would 
not have added a great deal to the discussion. 
84 Hyams et al., supra note 78, at 296. 
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cases where guidelines were used for exculpatory purposes, the defendant 
was successful.85  
These cases devoted little significant analysis to what organization 
drafted the relevant guidelines, and there was not a clear plurality of any 
one association’s guidelines being used successfully.  Guidelines written by 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the 
Centers for Disease Control did appear repeatedly, but whether this was a 
function of the guidelines or a correlate of the type of injury alleged is not 
clear.  Discussion tended to center on applicability, relevance, or 
evidentiary acceptability and not on the quality of the guidelines 
themselves.  
 While the full extent of court use of CPGs is unknown, if they are 
to eventually be effective in reducing the costs of medical malpractice 
litigation, the legal system will need to accept generalized use more 
definitively than published cases suggest.  As reflected in the cases, current 
obstacles to CPG adoption in court include the connection between 
evidence-based guidelines and the concept of a professionally determined 
standard of care, hearsay objections, 86  the battle between competing 
guidelines or experts,87 and how seemingly “one-size-fits-all” guidelines 
should yield to physician judgment in individual cases.88  
                                                                                                                 
85 There are several caveats. First, our findings are based on published judicial 
decisions, which are uncommon in medical malpractice litigation. Second, trials 
are rare events in malpractice litigation, so that the evidentiary use of guidelines 
does not necessarily capture the impact guidelines may have on the vast majority 
of malpractice cases that settle. Lastly, because it is so difficult to determine when 
the use of guidelines is dispositive, these figures do not necessarily indicate 
whether the cases were successful because of the use of guidelines. 
86 The Hyams study notes increasing willingness of courts to use the hearsay 
exception for learned treatises as an avenue to admitting guidelines as evidence.  
The trend towards the admissibility of guidelines has continued, although they are 
still not accepted to prove standard of care on their own.  Rather, litigants almost 
always employ an expert witness to act as the conduit for admitting guidelines. 
Hyams et al., supra note 78. 
87 See Mello, supra note 57, at 684; see also Avraham, Private Regulation, 
supra note 1, 618–19 (discussing the so called “battle of the guidelines” and the 
solution provided by Avraham’s private model for CPGs). 
88 978 So.2d 1257 (La. App. 2008). In Bond v. U.S. the court quoted the 
ACC/AHA guidelines to make this point: “These practice guidelines are intended 
to assist physicians in clinical decision-making by describing a range of generally 
acceptable approaches for the diagnosis, management, or prevention of specific 
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B.  CPG USE BY THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
 The law has also accounted for guidelines in regulation and 
litigation concerning health insurance coverage.  Before the 1960s, health 
insurers and the community of medical professionals maintained a general 
understanding that those responsible for payment would not interfere with 
clinical decisions.  As the cost of health care began to rise, however, this 
understanding was revisited and eventually abrogated, particularly in the 
1980s and 1990s.89 
 CPGs have been connected with the insurance industry primarily 
through regulation and litigation over the definition of “medically 
necessary care,” and the related question of whether or not a proposed 
treatment should be excluded from coverage because it is “experimental” 
or “investigational.” Over the last few decades, hundreds of judicial 
decisions have interpreted these contractual exclusions from coverage in 
disputes between patients and private insurers, Medicaid, and Medicare.90 
A common theme in the decisions is the desire of judges to assure 
themselves that coverage denials are not merely financially motivated 
efforts that incidentally deprive patients of scientifically correct care.  As a 
result, the law has struggled to find preferred sources of evidence about 
optimal practice procedures – in other words, CPGs.  
                                                                                                                 
diseases or conditions . . . The ultimate judgment regarding the care of a particular 
patient must be made by the physician and patient in light of all of the available 
information and the circumstances presented by that patient.” 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19881 at *25 (D. Or. 2008).  For more information on these problems and 
more see Avraham, Warped Incentives, supra note 1, at 18–20. 
89 Indeed, virtually all the fashionable innovations in health care organization, 
payment, and accountability today – including ACOs – are direct descendants of 
1990s-style managed care. See Kip Sullivan, The History and Definition of the 
“Accountable Care Organization” (October 2010), Physicians for a National 
Health Program California, http://pnhpcalifornia.org/2010/10/the-history-and-
definition-of-the-%E2%80%9Caccountable-care-organization%E2%80%9D/. 
90 See Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of 
Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992); Mark A. Hall, Teresa Rust 
Smith, Michelle Naughton & Andrea Ebbers, Judicial Protection of Managed Care 
Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1055, 1056, 1058 (1996); William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving 
Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe L'oeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. 
REV. 49, 49 (1998). 
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During the 1990s, some state lawmakers also began to combine 
health insurance benefit mandates with evidence-based coverage standards 
in particularly contentious scenarios, like in regard to access to clinical 
trials and denials of coverage involving potentially lifesaving treatments.91 
These laws are important to a discussion of governance and accountability 
for CPGs because they involve the government in establishing a hierarchy 
of evidence and mandatory procedures to be used to regulate access to 
cutting-edge clinical resources.    
More generally, mandated benefit laws for a variety of health care 
services are common at the state level, although the federal ERISA statute 
prevents them from being applied to self-insured employer-based coverage. 
Requirements that health plans in a state cover certain benefits are typically 
enacted at the behest of providers with focused interests and/or patient 
groups with sympathetic needs.  This has resulted in a large set of statutes 
that define a specific, favored clinical service.  Mandated benefit laws are 
not CPGs in intent or substance, but they are important to understanding 
how the law can explicitly specify clinical tasks that were historically left 
up to physician discretion.  
 
C.  SYSTEMATIC GUIDELINE INITIATIVES 
 
Both state and federal governments have attempted to confer a 
larger public policy role on clinical practice guidelines in the recent past. 
These efforts have tended to coincide with periods of interest in 
comprehensive health care reform, with peaks in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s, and another peak just emerging in connection with the advent 
of Obamacare.  Systematic guideline initiatives have focused on medical 
malpractice reform as well as more general improvements in the cost-
effectiveness of health care, with unnecessary health care spending (such as 
defensive medicine) representing the conceptual connection between 
them.92  
 
1.   AHCPR’s Guideline Program 
 
The first major attempt at using medical guidelines reform to spur 
broader healthcare improvement was in 1989 when Congress created the 
                                                                                                                 
91 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §14132.98 (West 2002). 
92 For more on state specific projects, see Avraham, supra note 1 (discussing 
other projects in Vermont, Minnesota, Kentucky, Maryland, and Texas). 
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Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) to “enhance the 
quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of health care services” through, 
among other things, “the development and periodic review and updating of 
. . . clinically relevant guidelines.” 93  Several years later, the Clinton 
administration attempted to take this initiative a step further by proposing a 
medical liability pilot program based on the practice guidelines developed 
by the AHCPR.  Under the pilot program, doctors who could show that 
their actions were consistent with relevant practice guidelines could avoid 
medical malpractice liability.94  
Because of political opposition to President Clinton’s healthcare 
reform and fierce interest group politics, President Clinton’s experimental 
initiative stalled and the AHCPR was almost completely eliminated in 
1995.95  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
93 Mello, supra note 57, at 651 (quoting Stephen M. Merz, Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: Policy Issues and Legal Implications, 19 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 306, 307 (1993)). 
94 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MAINE’S USE OF 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS 1–2 (Oct. 1993), available at 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/policy/150172.pdf. 
  95  The conflict that nearly eliminated the AHCPR emerged from a debate 
regarding spinal fusion surgery. Following many years of controversy over the merits 
of surgical procedures for low-back disorders, AHCPR funded a study that 
concluded that there was no evidence to support the use of spinal fusion surgery, that 
such surgery commonly had complications, and that more randomized controlled 
trials were needed to compare fusion surgery with non-surgical treatment. An 
association of back surgeons who disagreed with the conclusions launched an attack 
on the study and the agency itself. Bradford H. Gray, et al., AHCPR and The 
Changing Politics Of Health Services Research, HEALTH AFFAIRS W3-283, W3-297, 
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/06/25/hlthaff.w3.283. 
The Center for Patient Advocacy, which was formed by a back surgeon to lobby on 
the issue, mobilized an effort in the House of Representatives to end the agency’s 
funding. Only on the night of the vote was an amendment to reduce the agency’s 
budget to zero withdrawn, leaving the agency instead with a 21% budget cut. Id. at 
W3-295. The 1995 battle between the AHRQ and the back physicians was not the 
first time AHRQ faced attacks by physician groups. Earlier in 1993, an AHCPR 
study came under attack from various ophthalmology associations. Id. at W3-297. 
However, that attack never extended to attempts to defund AHCPR, and it came to 
an end when the ophthalmologists discovered they could use the data to discredit a 
GAO study alleging that inappropriate cataract surgery was widespread and to get 
insurers to pay for some surgery. Id. 
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One of the consequences of this battle was that the agency dropped 
its CPG development program and initiated support for external evidence-
based practice centers that organize data to help private-sector 
organizations develop CPGs.  In 1999, Congress passed legislation that 
changed the agency’s name to the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ). AHRQ has since become a major force in the 
dissemination of medical guidelines, though the actual creation of CPGs 
was eliminated from its mission.96  
   
2.   Maine’s Malpractice Guideline Project 
 
Maine was home to the most famous project that established 
clinical practice guidelines as statutory standards of care for physicians to 
use as a defense in malpractice suits. 97  The Maine Medical Liability 
Demonstration Project was a ten-year pilot study that began in 1989 and 
expired in 1999.  It instituted special advisory committees in charge of 
developing CPGs for four practice areas viewed as hotbeds for malpractice 
litigation and suspected defensive medicine.  Maine subsequently adopted 
twenty guidelines in anesthesiology, emergency medicine, 
obstetrics/gynecology, and radiology.  
Physicians, hospitals, and managed care organizations that elected 
to participate could use the guidelines as an affirmative defense against any 
malpractice claim.  Plaintiffs bringing such claims, however, could not 
introduce the guidelines into evidence to argue that failure to comply was 
malpractice.98 The guidelines were only available as a shield because the 
purpose of the reform was to reduce overall liability, a common purpose for 
reforms adopted during or after the malpractice insurance crisis of the mid-
1980s.  
The Maine project had little practical effect.99 Few doctors believed 
these regulations had any discernible impact on the malpractice system, and 
                                                                                                                 
  96 See Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 577–78. 
97  Linda L. LeCraw, Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 3 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 254 (2007). 
98 ME. REV. STAT. Tit. 24, §§ 2975, 2977 (1993). 
99 LeCraw, supra note 97. By one estimate, the guidelines affected only about 
three to four percent of medical practice in Maine. See Gordon H. Smith, A Case 
Study in Progress: Practice Guideline5 and the Affirmative Defense in Maine, 19 
Joint Commission J. ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 355, 361 (1993). 
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the affirmative defense was raised in only one case.100 The superintendent 
of the Maine Bureau of Insurance concluded “the medical demonstration 
project had no measurable effect on medical professional liability claims, 
claims settlement costs, or malpractice premiums.”101 
 
3.  Florida’s C-Section Guideline Project 
 
In 1994, concerns over the cost of defensive medicine prompted 
Florida to initiate its own CPG project to be administered by the state’s 
Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA).102 Similar to the Maine 
project in many respects, the Florida project created an affirmative defense 
for participating physicians, provided that they followed specific clinical 
practice guidelines.  
The primary difference from the Maine project was that Florida did 
not explicitly prevent plaintiffs from using the guidelines to help prove 
physicians failed to meet the standard of care, or from using the guidelines 
as a liability sword. 103  However, lack of physician compliance with 
guidelines did not create a prima facie case of negligence, and physicians 
were given leeway to demonstrate whether their decision to deviate from 
the guidelines was prudent given the specific circumstances of the case.104 
Florida’s guideline project concentrated on only one procedure.105 
Florida chose deliveries by caesarean section for their test project because 
it was the most common surgical procedure performed in Florida hospitals 
                                                                                                                 
100  Howard Zonana, Commentary: When Is a Practice Guideline Only a 
Guideline?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L., 302, 303 (2008). 
101 LeCraw, supra note 97, at 254 (citing ME. BUREAU OF INS. AND BD. OF LIC. 
IN MED., MEDICAL LIABILITY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 2 AND 5 (2000)).  Similar 
to Maine, in 1992 Minnesota also attempted to use clinical practice guidelines as a 
tool for health care reform, but the state never created the required guidelines to get 
the project off the ground. 1992 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 549 art. 7 (H.F. 2800); 
1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 234; see also William Trail & Brad Allen, 
Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening of Pandora's Box, 
10 J.L. & HEALTH 231, 247 (1995). 
102  FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, PRACTICE 
GUIDELINES AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: THE CESAREAN DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 
REPORT (1998). 
103 Trail, supra note 101, at 246.  
104 Id. 
105 FLA. STAT. § 408.02(9) (1996). 
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at the time.106 Supporters predicted that the C-section rate would decline if 
physicians practiced in accordance with the guidelines.  However, the 
affirmative defense proved to be an inadequate incentive to convince 
physicians to participate.  Only 20% of eligible physicians participated, and 
it was determined that the ones who did participate were already less likely 
to perform C-sections.  
Overall, Florida’s effort had little effect on physician behavior.  
The primary barriers included lack of awareness, lack of familiarity with 
the guidelines, and lack of agreement with the validity of the guidelines.107  
 
4.  Ongoing Initiatives 
 
This section provides a brief overview of some of the current 
attempts to improve quality and reduce health care costs using CPGs.  
 
a. Federal Malpractice Reform Demonstrations 
 
The Obama administration’s 2012 budget proposal included $250 
million for state-based alternatives to tort litigation for medical 
malpractice, with guidelines prominently featured among the favored 
reform approaches.108 These funds were not authorized or appropriated by 
Congress, but the proposal still represents a renewed interest in CPG use.  
Previously, AHRQ had awarded $25 million for planning and 
demonstration grants in states, communities, and provider organizations 
that integrate improvements in patient safety with improvements in medical 
malpractice litigation.109 CPGs fit this description, along with programs of 
error disclosure and offers of compensation, health courts, and a few other 
                                                                                                                 
106  J. Rosser Matthews, Practice Guidelines and Tort Reform: The Legal 
System Confronts the Technocratic Wish, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 275, 284 
(April 1999). 
107 In a study of the project, 54.5% of doctors surveyed attributed their failure 
to adhere to medical guidelines in part to a lack of awareness that relevant 
guidelines existed. Lack of familiarity with Florida’s guidelines was cited by 
56.5% as a cause of failure to adhere. 
108 Emily P. Walker, Obama’s Budget Includes $250M in Malpractice Grants, 
MED PAGE TODAY (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.medpagetoday.com/Practice 
Management/Medicolegal/24904. 
109 Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/liability/. 
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innovations.110  However, only one of the 13 small planning grants – a 
project from the Office of Oregon Health Policy and Research – and none 
of the seven larger demonstration grants initially awarded involved 
CPGs.111 
 
b. The Oregon Health Authority 
 
Between 1987 and 1994, the Oregon Legislature ratified several 
laws that established the structure for a public and private partnership that 
cumulatively constituted the Oregon Health Plan (OHP).112 The Oregon 
Health Plan was originally designed to increase access to health care for 
lower income groups while controlling costs.  Under the plan, prioritized 
medical services were to be incorporated into the basic benefit package for 
both Medicaid beneficiaries as well as people covered by private insurance 
in the state.113 In order to maintain budgetary restraint, the plan aimed to 
ration care by limiting the range of services covered under the basic 
benefits package.114 The program was cancelled in 2003 due to rising costs.  
                                                                                                                 
110 Additional funds were committed to AHRQ for malpractice and patient 
safety demonstrations in connection with the new health reform law, and a 
substantial expansion of federally funded experimentation is possible. 
111  Medical Liability Reform & Patient Safety Grants, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-
patient-safety/patient-safety-resources/resources/liability/medliabrep.html (last 
updated June 2010). 
112  See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 413.006 – 413.100, 414.065 (2013) 
(discussing the Oregon Health Authority and its policy-making and oversight body 
the Oregon Health Policy Board). 
113 Seventeen types of health ailments (including fatal acute conditions that 
can be fully treated, less serious acute problems, chronic conditions, maternity 
care, and preventative treatments) were established. Then, all diagnoses and 
corresponding care in both medical and surgical arenas were assigned to a 
particular category of health ailments. These diagnosis-treatment pairs were 
subsequently prioritized according to thirteen attributes (including life expectancy, 
quality of life, cost containment, clinical efficacy, net benefits, and number of 
people assisted by the treatment). Finally, based on the prioritized list and the 
state’s appropriations for the OHP, services and practices on the prioritized list 
above a certain level or ranking would be covered and those below the ranking 
would not be reimbursed. 
114 Vidhya Alakeson, Why Oregon Went Wrong, 337 BRITISH MED.  
J, 900, 901 (2008); Oregon Health Plan: An Historical Overview, OREGON 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 3 (July 2006), available at 
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The rise in the number of uninsured residents, increased medical 
expenses, and reductions in employer-based health care prompted Oregon 
to revisit reform.  In 2009, the state ratified HB 2009, which established the 
Oregon Health Authority (OHA) and empowered it to streamline and 
harmonize the state’s health care programs.115 The OHA is responsible for 
improving efficiency, coordinating health administration, and executing the 
reforms mandated by HB 2009. 116  These reforms included developing 
“evidence-based clinical standards and practice guidelines that may be used 
by providers.” 117  The guidelines promulgated by the OHA, though not 
expressly given the force of law, could eventually come to represent the 
standard of care in disciplinary proceedings and malpractice suits.  
As noted, the OHA received one of the initial AHRQ planning 
grants for liability and patient safety innovation.  The results of the 
planning process were mixed.  In a report to AHRQ, the grantees estimated 
that 5% of malpractice injuries could have been avoided if clinicians had 
followed guidelines, but also found that cost savings from reduced 
defensive medicine and safe harbor laws would be minimal or non-
existent. 118  Although Oregon would have saved $4 million in medical 
liability costs under a safe harbor program, the additional administrative 
costs of such a program likely would have negated any savings.119 Given 
the patient safety benefits, one of the two pillars that support an increased 
role for CPGs, the report recommends additional research.120  
 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/healthplan/DataReportsDocs/Oregon%20Health%20Pl
an%20-%20An%20historical%20overview.pdf. 
115 Establishing Oregon Health Policy Board, H.R. HB 2009-C, 75th Leg. §20 
(Or. 2009). 
116 Id. at §§1, 9.  HB 2009 effectively dissolved the Oregon Health Fund Board 
and replaced it with the Oregon Health Policy Board (OHPB), which formulates 
policy and acts as the oversight body for the Oregon Health Authority. The nine-
member group is required to widen access, control the cost and quality of the 
health care delivery system, and enhance the health of Oregonians by developing 
state public health objectives, policies, initiatives, and benchmarks. 
117 OR. REV. STAT. § 413.011(e) (2013). 
118 Medical Liability & Patient Safety Planning Grant: Final Progress Report, 
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH QUALITY 1, 10-11 (2012), http://www. 
oregon.gov/oha/OHPR/PSDM/AHRQ_MLPS_Report.pdf. 
119 Id. at 11. 
120 Id. at 14. 
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c.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
 
Signed into law in 2009 by President Obama, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) included funding and 
administrative support for comparative effectiveness research, an area 
where CPGs play a prominent role.121 The ARRA appropriated $1.1 billion 
for comparative effectiveness studies, including comparative trials, medical 
registries, clinical databases, and methodical appraisals. 122  Furthermore, 
ARRA directed the IOM to conduct a national study of critical areas that 
could utilize comparative effectiveness and could capitalize on the 
appropriated funds.123 The 2009 law also created the Federal Coordinating 
Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research; a committee chaired by 
the Secretary of DHHS and composed of federal administrators and 
clinicians.  
Interestingly, while the council was directed to propose and 
organize research efforts, it was prohibited from using the studies to 
specify clinical practice guidelines or implementing changes in coverage 
and reimbursement procedures.124 Still, this series of studies can provide 
once completed important information that can be used by others to create 
effective CPGs 
 
d. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
 
Paralleling renewed interest in evidence-based guidelines and cost-
effective treatment, the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) expands comparative effectiveness research. 125  The federal 
government designated a minimum of $500 million to pursue statistical 
studies that judge the efficacy of drugs, devices, and treatments.  PPACA 
also experiments with “new payment systems for doctors,” fines hospitals 
                                                                                                                 
121 American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009). 
122  Id. The Agency for Health care Research and Quality (AHRQ) was 
designed to oversee $300 million of the $1.1 billion total, with $400 million 
directed by the National Institute of Health (NIH) and $400 million administered 
by the Department of human and Human Services (DHHS). 
123  Initial National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research, 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 2 (2009). 
124 Robert Steinbrook, Health Care & the American Recovery & Reinvestment 
Act, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1057, 1058 (2009). 
125 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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for “high readmission rates,” and establishes an independent commission to 
determine which procedures Medicare should reimburse.  The studies will 
be overseen by the newly created Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute (PCORI), which is authorized to determine research needs and 
perform studies that evaluate the relative usefulness of medical therapies.126  
Lastly, under the PPACA, AHRQ will occupy an integral role in 
designing, pursuing, and disseminating clinical effectiveness research.  The 
Act places AHRQ on the Board of Governors for the PCORI, and the 
agency must also work with the NIH to train researchers for the new 
studies and convey its findings.  In concert with DHHS, AHRQ and CMS 
will be granted $75 million over five years to jointly formulate quality 
standards.  To improve the quality of the provision of medical care, the 
PPACA also allocates $20 million to the AHRQ for the agency to 
determine, formulate, assess, and teach new processes and approaches in 
clinical practices between 2010 and 2014.127  
 The next section of the paper discusses three main models for 
ensuring trustworthiness of CPGs: the Public Model, the Semi-Public 
Model, and the Private Model.  The first two models exist or existed in the 
U.S and the U.K, the third is novel.  These discussions will highlight the 
benefits and drawbacks of each method. 
 
IV.  MODELS FOR STRUCTURED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
CPGS  
 
 In its 2011 Report, the IOM lays out eight standards that focus on 
the procedures by which CPGs are to be developed.  To enforce these 
standards the IOM recommends forming a private–public entity, which will 
provide a seal of approval to CPGs that meet those eight standards. But that 
is just one possible model (and one that I argue cannot work well in 
practice).  In this section I describe the several broad approaches to CPG 
quality control and explain the advantages and disadvantages of each one. 
One option is to approve the guideline itself.  Here the certifier (public, 
semi-public, or private) reviews the CPG and makes sure that it is optimal.  
A regime with a public certifier existed in the US in the past but no longer 
exists in pure form in the US or in the UK.  Part of this is because it can be 
                                                                                                                 
126 Alex Nussbaum et al., Obamacare’s Cost Scalpel, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., 
Apr. 5, 2010, at 66. 
127 Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3013, 
3501, 6301, 10602, 124 Stat. 119, 381, 507, 727, 1005 (2010). 
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difficult to employ due to the time, resources, and expertise necessary to 
approve an individual guideline.  The more realistic method focuses on 
approving the process used to develop individual CPGs.  Professor Rosoff 
offered this model almost two decades ago.  
Alternatively, the certifier can approve the legitimacy of the 
institution that develops them.  In this system, the certifier provides a seal 
of approval for the entity promulgating the CPGs.  This gives the entity an 
approved status based on more general checkups and not based on any one 
individual guideline.  The downside of this approach is that the individual 
CPGs are not reviewed.  Such a system exists in the UK with a public 
certifier, and was proposed by the IOM (but with a public-private certifier) 
for the US.  
Lastly, there is a private model, proposed by Avraham, where 
guidelines are promulgated by private entities and compete in the market 
for the endorsement of practitioners.  The private model can take hold in 
two ways.  First, and most obvious, it can be created by legislation that 
changes our current system such that new organizations will emerge.  
Secondly, and perhaps more realistically, the regime will evolve 
incrementally from organizations that realize it is in everyone’s best 
interest to implement a private model of accountability to ensure high 
quality guidelines are drafted and used by physicians.   
The following table roughly summarizes this and demonstrates 
how the different models match the analysis:  
 
Table 1: Models of CPG Quality Control 
 
 
Certifier 
Public Model Semi Public 
Model 
Private 
Model 
In
sp
ec
te
d 
Output  
(CPGs themselves) 
US (old 
model), UK  Avraham 
Credentials of 
Promulgators  UK US (IOM)   
Procedures Used in 
specific Guidelines  Rosoff   
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A.  THE PUBLIC MODEL 
 
 The Public Model actually consists of three variations, each of 
which is covered in this section of the Article.  The government can be the 
entity that actually drafts and publishes CPGs, it can certify entities that it 
deems qualified to publish reliable CPGs, or it can itself provide an 
approval system that evaluates the process by which CPGs are created and 
approves CPG meeting the stated requirements on an individualized basis. 
 
1.  Government Promulgating CPGs (UK & Old US Model) 
 
In general, the UK uses a public model, although promulgation of 
CPGs in the UK is not entirely centralized.  The Department of Health 
(DH)128 oversees the government health care system, the National Health 
Service (NHS).129 The NHS, in turn, coordinates with the DH’s various 
Arm’s Length Bodies (ALB),130 which are financed by the government but 
act independently, in order to help implement various functions of the 
NHS.  The ALB for standards of promulgation is the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), 131  which is responsible for 
providing national guidance on the promotion of good health and the 
prevention and treatment of ill health within the NHS. 132  Through 
collaboration and a series of researching steps, NICE develops guidelines 
that suggest optimal practices for NHS health care practitioners.133 
                                                                                                                 
128 The Department of Health, GOV. UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
organisations/department-of-health (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
129 The National Health Service, GOV. UK, http://www.nhs.uk/Pages/Home 
Page.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
130  Arm’s length bodies,  DEPT. OF HEALTH, 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/government/publications/arms-length-bodies/our-arms-
length-bodies (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
131  THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH & CLINICAL EXCELLENCE, 
http://www.nice.org.uk/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). 
132  About NICE, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE, 
http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
133  Nat’l Inst. For Health and Care Excellence (NICE), Developing NICE 
Clinical Guidelines, http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/howwework/developing 
niceclinicalguidelines/developing_nice_clinical_guidelines.jsp (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014). 
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In the US, as mentioned earlier in the paper, after a fierce political 
battle in the early 1990s, the AHRQ stopped promulgating guidelines.  The 
AHRQ now perceives itself as facilitating the creation of CPGs by other 
actors.  
Still, there are good reasons to think that the government should 
write and publish guidelines.  Other government agencies – such as CMS – 
write guidelines, and governments in other countries like the UK do as 
well.  For example, in September 2006, the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention issued its “Revised Recommendations for HIV Testing of 
Adults, Adolescents, and Pregnant Women in Health-Care Settings.”134 
These examples of the public model point towards government agencies as 
a potentially desirable source of CPGs.  
 On the surface there is something appealing about the government 
writing guidelines because CPGs are, after all, a public good.  But how 
does this model of promulgation affect the quality of health care?  The 
foremost concern with this model is the issuing agency’s ability to keep its 
guidelines up-to-date.  Because medical research evolves very quickly, it is 
likely that government CPGs would fail to keep up with current medical 
research.  A 2001 study found thirteen out of seventeen CPGs developed by 
the AHRQ to be outdated.135 The study also found that it was estimated to 
cost $4 million per guideline to properly update them using the AHRQ’s 
Evidence Based Practice Center Program. 136  Unfortunately, medical 
research does not evolve on a rigid timetable, so agency guidelines may 
significantly lag behind cutting-edge medical advances.  There are, 
therefore, reasons to think government promulgation of CPGs may actually 
impede quality improvement.  
 In addition to quality problems, government authorship of 
guidelines could easily create greater cost-inefficiency in the health care 
system.  Various dynamics suggest that government agencies may create 
overly lax guidelines (or under-enforce them).137 First, agencies will often 
lack the resources to set the regulations efficiently (and as discussed above, 
                                                                                                                 
134  Revised Recommendations for HIV Testing of Adults, Adolescents, and 
Pregnant Women in Health-Care Settings, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml 
/rr5514a1.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
135 Shekelle, supra note 61, at 1464. 
136 Id. at 1462. 
137 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional 
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 494-95 (2008). 
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update them regularly).138 Second, as the history of the AHRQ revealed, 
agencies are vulnerable to the political preferences of the administration in 
power, to self-aggrandizing administrators, and interest group capture.139 A 
change in the government can lead to ossification of standards.  
Administrators operating in a revolving door environment may advance 
their post-agency careers by catering to interest groups that favor lax 
standards.  Most importantly, interest group capture can lead to under 
enforcement and, as in the case of the AHRQ, may hamstring guideline 
development or even cause the abandonment of CPG promulgation 
altogether. 140  Interest group capture can also lead to subtle biases and 
conflicts of interest in the guidelines that promote one company’s products 
or services over another’s at the expense of the patient. 
 At the same time, there are reasons why some federal agencies 
might adopt overly strict guidelines.  Occasionally, agencies regulate in 
response to crises, and this may lead to reactionary guidelines being 
promulgated.  Second, agencies lack the financial accountability necessary 
to incentivize efficient rulemaking.  Government agencies cannot be sued 
for making poor guidelines in a classic example of who watches the 
watchmen.141 As it is, an agency rule maker would be less likely to fully 
internalize the financial consequences of their own guidelines and may 
choose to overregulate.  Third, the overregulation may become even more 
exaggerated because, while the regulator may not be financially 
accountable, they will be politically accountable, which usually leads to 
more defensive policies.  If the agency errs by failing to regulate, its 
political accountability assures their punishment.  However, an agency can 
scarcely be punished politically for overly stringent regulations.142 More 
                                                                                                                 
138 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 571, 609 (1998). 
139  Interest group capture occurs when special interest groups gain a 
disproportional share of influence over a government agency. This can happen 
because of, for example, campaign donations or the revolving door between 
government and the private sector. 
140 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (describing how the AHRQ had 
to stop promulgating guidelines due to interest group pressure). 
141  In the US one cannot sue the FDA or any other agency for a wrong 
decision within their discretion. See 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (2006) (imposing this 
exception to the general waiver of sovereign immunity created by the Federal Tort 
Claims Act). 
142 See Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A 
Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, J. Tort L., at 
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likely they will be commended for taking such a stern stance against 
liability prevention, but this does nothing to alleviate the economic 
pressures faced by the modern health care system.  
 Due to these countervailing considerations, there is uncertainty 
whether agencies would regulate in an overly strict or overly lax manner.  
The efficiency, however, would be diminished in either scenario.143 As a 
result the pure public model would probably do little to contain health care 
costs and might impair quality.  In sum, the chance that government 
promulgation of CPGs would directly improve the quality of care while 
being systematically and continuously efficient is slim.  
 
2. Certification of CPG Promulgators (UK Model) 
 
 While part of the UK Model involves the government 
promulgating CPGs, the part of the UK Model I want to focus on is when 
the government approves other entities that in turn create CPGs.  This 
certification process is done by the NHS Evidence Advisory Committee, 
created by the Board of NICE as an independent, standing committee.  The 
NHS Evidence Advisory Committee does not verify the efficacy of the 
individual guidelines, but chooses to focus on the methods used by 
guideline creators in guidelines production.144 These guidelines, along with 
others from accredited and non-accredited producers alike, are posted to the 
                                                                                                                 
22 (2006) (arguing agencies have incentives to regulate in an overly risk-adverse 
fashion because of self interest); see also Daniel P. Carpenter, The Political 
Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics, and Lessons for Policy, 23 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1, (2004). 
143  Most agencies seem to regulate only minimum standards of care. A 
possible exception is the FDA. See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (acknowledging that the FDA seeks to encourage the optimal level 
of use in light of reasonable safety concerns, by requiring scientific evidence that 
establishes an association between a drug and a particular hazard before warning of 
that association on a drug's labeling). 
144  NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH AND CARE EXCELLENCE (NICE), PROCESS 
MANUAL FOR ACCREDITING PRODUCERS OF GUIDANCE, ADVICE, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR PRODUCERS AND 
STAKEHOLDERS, available at http://www.evidence.nhs.uk/Accreditation/Document 
s/ NHSEvidenceAccredManual.pdf [hereinafter Accreditation Manual]. 
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committee’s website, NHS Evidence.145 Since 2009, NICE has accredited 
sixty organizations.146 Guidelines from these organizations are marked on 
the NICE website with a symbol indicating the approval from the 
government.  
How is the quality of care impacted by guidelines and guideline 
promulgation in the UK?  To try to understand the impact on health care 
costs and quality of the NICE accreditation system it is helpful to think 
about the themes of accountability, guideline agreement, and consistent use 
by doctors that an ideal CPG system would have.  Beginning with 
accountability, it is easy to see that a system focusing on process rather 
than output may have some issues.  Organizations that have been 
accredited are accountable to NICE for their processes, but not for the 
contents of the guideline.  If an organization creates a guideline that turns 
out to be incorrect, there is no liability that would hold that organization 
responsible for its recommendation.  There is also no promise that CPGs 
created by certified organizations will not be biased.  With no 
accountability, doctors would instead be on their own in defending their 
actions and would have less of an incentive to adopt CPGs. 
A second issue with the UK Model flows out of the lack of 
accountability.  Having a certification process that does not review 
individual guidelines or compare them to each other allows for the 
certification and publication of conflicting guidelines.  In the case of CPGs, 
more information is not always a good thing.  Conflicting CPGs, especially 
when both are stamped with government approval, may make doctors less 
likely to follow any guideline because they will not know which guideline 
actually represents the current best practices.  As we mentioned above, it is 
unrealistic for doctors to keep up with ongoing medical research given the 
enormous volume of studies and reports that are published each year.  
Synthesizing new studies and providing recommendations is one of the 
benefits of CPGs because they can reduce the information costs to doctors, 
especially those in solo practice.  When conflicting guidelines are certified, 
however, this benefit is largely lost and the implementation rate by doctors 
will likely drop. 
                                                                                                                 
145 Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE 
EXCELLENCE (NICE), http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/accreditation/FAQs.jsp 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
146  NICE Accreditation, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE 
(NICE), http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/accreditation/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014). 
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Relatedly, a third issue with the UK Model is inconsistent use of 
guidelines by doctors.  This final and equally important issue with the UK 
Model is that it does not take full advantage of CPG’s potential to increase 
the quality of health care.  While having a system that certifies certain 
organizations that follow a specific process will improve the quality of 
guidelines, it will not achieve the same level of quality that could be 
achieved if, for example, the guideline producers were held accountable for 
the correctness of their guidelines.  If doctors are faced with a multitude of 
options, they may choose none since they will have reduced incentives to 
use CPGs and their trust in the system will have diminished.  If we assume 
that CPGs represent that best and most cost effective treatment for a 
disease, then when doctors do not follow CPG recommendations, the 
quality of health care drops. 
 
3. Certification of CPGs (Rosoff )  
 
Rosoff puts forth a CPG model where the government would stamp 
adequate guidelines with a seal of approval.  Rosoff is primarily interested 
in the role of CPGs in courts, yet he keeps one eye on the impact they have 
on the optimal delivery of care.147 Rosoff calls for a system of voluntary 
federal government certification for CPGs in order to clarify the role they 
play in medical malpractice litigation.  CPGs would continue to emanate 
from “all interested and qualified parties”148 as is currently the case.  Out of 
this free-market for guidelines, those that are submitted for review and 
satisfy the government’s criteria would receive a seal of approval.  
The government review process would focus primarily on 
guideline development.  The certification would require that the guideline 
be developed: 
 
(1) through solid, scientific outcomes research, using an 
appropriate and adequately large clinical practice data 
base; (2) using appropriate methodology, as defined by 
DHHS regulations; (3) with input from qualified medical 
professionals; and (4) with provision for prompt, 
periodic updating . . . . The applicant would pay both the 
                                                                                                                 
147 Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines, supra note 24, at 371. 
148 Id. at 395. 
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cost of the initial review process and subsequent 
updating or recertification.149  
 
As Rosoff acknowledges, difficulties would arise in 
implementation because, while certification would be a part of a national 
program, the litigation process it intends to affect mostly occurs in state 
courts.  Of course, any number of states could voluntarily accept the 
certification program via their legislatures.150  
                                                                                                                 
149 Id.  
150 For those states that do not join, Rosoff offers four mechanisms to force 
implementation. The first possibility is the commerce power.  Rosoff proposes that 
Congress preempt state law regarding medical litigation by use of the commerce 
power. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 364. He 
acknowledges, however, that such preemption would be problematic, as the object 
to be regulated in this instance is not commercial like health care or insurance, but 
the legal mechanisms usually reserved to the states. Indeed, a similar 
Congressional provision that preempted such state law, the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), received criticism. Id. Rosoff next proposes 
attaching the requirement of acceptance of the certification program to federal 
funding, an exercise of the spending power.  This would likely be a legitimate use 
of the spending power, provided the funding to which the program was tied was 
optional to the states. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Similarly, 
Rosoff suggests attaching the CPG program to other federal health care programs. 
Citing the example of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 
1985 (EMTALA), he recommends tying his proposed use of CPGs to the Medicare 
and/or Medicaid programs. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 
365. Finally, there is the possibility of a less straightforward approach, which 
Rosoff describes as “an artful use of ‘carrot and stick’ mechanisms.” Id. 
Presumably, an act could be written that would incentivize adoption of the CPG 
certification program. Implicit in each of these possibilities (other than the use of 
the commerce power) is that states would still ultimately have the power to decide 
whether to join in the program.  As with all such scenarios, however, the incentives 
to accept the program could be structured to leave little for states to ponder.  The 
second and third possibilities are the spending power and attachment to other 
health care programs.  Citing the example of EMTALA, Rosoff recommends tying 
his proposed use of CPGs to the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs. Id. The last 
method he suggests is “the carrot and stick” approach. Id. He points to the National 
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1975, which permits the 
granting of funding to states “on the basis of an established competitive review 
process” to be used for a variety of programs aimed at reducing the incidence and 
mortality rate of breast and cervical cancer.  42 U.S.C. § 300k (2006). 
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Similar to the case with NICE, the stamp of approval for these 
guidelines focuses on the process by which the guidelines were created, not 
the properness of the actual CPG.  Yet, while NICE gave a stamp of 
approval for a guidelines developer, under Rosoff’s model the stamp of 
approval will be for each individual guideline.  
 Rosoff argues the certification program would increase the quality 
of care and also the quality of the guidelines themselves.  Increased 
reliance on CPGs would eliminate the guesswork of choosing between 
alternatives, which would result in faster, more effective treatment. 151 
Rosoff asserts that another benefit of his model would be the reduction of 
health care costs nationwide.  Because CPGs would have to be derived 
from evidence-based research, they would provide direction for medical 
professionals from a much larger cost-conscious perspective than such 
practitioners typically consider in treatment.152 Further, CPGs will typically 
recommend the most cost-effective treatment considered in light of its 
success rate and that of similar treatments.153 Finally, clinicians should be 
more inclined to follow the guidelines given the prospect of proposed 
liability shields.  Combined, these aspects of the Rosoff model should 
generally reduce costs.  
 Rosoff also envisions significant changes to the current medical 
malpractice regime by using CPGs to set the standard of care at trial and 
raising a presumption against negligence rebuttable only by “clear and 
convincing evidence.” 154  Rosoff intends to substantially reduce the 
expenditures associated with medical malpractice litigation.  The 
implementation of this proposal would reduce the actual need for litigation 
and those disputes that do reach litigation would be resolved in a less costly 
manner.  Using CPGs to set the standard of care would streamline one of 
the major questions present in malpractice cases.155  
                                                                                                                 
151 Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines, supra note 24, at 371. 
152 See id. at 372. 
153 Id. 
154 Rosoff, Evidence Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 361. It should be noted 
that the opposite application of the presumption is also true: noncompliance would 
raise the same, strong presumption of a breach. 
155  Id. at 363. Rosoff argues this conclusion must follow if doctors are 
permitted to use the guidelines in defending malpractice suits. Id. Though Rosoff 
brushes over the possibility of liability of developers in the current system, another 
commentator suggests that possibility is a very real one. See supra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
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Putting aside issues with feasibility, 156  Rosoff’s model is 
problematic because there are doubts as to its ability to ensure CPGs meet 
the goals of improved healthcare quality and reduced costs.  To begin, the 
proposal itself ignores the problem of convergent guidelines recommending 
different treatments for the same conditions.  In fact, Rosoff seems to 
encourage this occurrence rather than deter it.157 While the problem may be 
resolved by the courts, it does nothing for medical professionals seeking 
evidence-based clarity.  Conflicting guidelines also likely means wasteful 
offensive and defensive medicine costs if the guidelines differ because solo 
practitioners, concerned about litigation, will not know ex ante if they will 
be protected by Rosoff’s proposed liability shield. 
 Looking closer at Rosoff’s proposal, the basic idea of a federal 
certifying agency poses special problems.  If the certification standards are 
too low, as some claim the NGC standards are, then the certification is 
essentially useless.  If, in contrast, the standards are too high, the agency 
will suffer criticism for being a government enforcer of only one “right 
way” to conduct medical practice.158 How to determine which standards are 
too stringent or which are too lax remains an open question.  For example, 
the National Guidelines Clearinghouse (NGC), supported by the AHRQ, 
                                                                                                                 
156 It is worth mentioning that even if Rosoff’s model was consistent with the 
goals set out at the beginning of this section, there may still be other issues with its 
implementation. First, the IOM’s endorsement notwithstanding, it would be 
difficult for the proposal to garner the political support necessary to push through 
Congress a certification program that impacts the courts in such a broad manner. 
Also, the sheer size of a federal agency such a system would require in order to 
address the volume of extant and newly produced guidelines would make the 
undertaking prohibitive. It would also be difficult to ensure the competence of the 
people certifying the guidelines in such a large agency. The roller-coaster ride of 
Obamacare is evidence enough of Congress’s reluctance to directly alter the health 
care delivery system. There would also be a constitutional question as to whether 
Congress could alter state medical malpractice rules to the extent of wholly 
extinguishing state law claims or providing an alternative federal remedy meeting 
Seventh Amendment standards.  See Abigail Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs:  
The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 844, 846-47 (2009). It is possible that courts could develop a more friendly 
view of CPGs, but as discussed above, this has not happened yet.   
157 See Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 356. 
158 The same is not true for other countries such as the UK, where the health 
care system is structured differently than in the US and there is much more trust in 
the government and willingness to accept its mandates for medical care. 
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looks to “maintain a certain degree of quality control.” 159  The NGC’s 
criteria offer similar points of evaluation to those suggested by Rosoff.  
One criterion requires, for instance, that “a systematic literature search and 
review of existing scientific evidence published in peer reviewed journals 
[be] performed during the guideline development.”160 This is consistent 
with Rosoff’s criteria (1) and (2) above.161 For the NGC, a CPG must also 
be “produced under the auspices of medical specialty associations; relevant 
professional societies, public or private organizations, government agencies 
at the Federal, State or local level; or health care organizations or plans.”162 
This is consistent with Rosoff’s criterion (3).163 Moreover, the NGC does 
not review the guidelines themselves, but instead outsources that task to 
private entities.  Thus, but for this latter point it is not entirely clear how 
Rosoff’s model differs from the existing NGC model.  And higher 
standards cannot always be met.  Indeed, in a recent study it was found that 
the majority of guidelines sampled from the NGC website meet less than 
half of the IOM’s stricter requirements.164  
 The final problem with Rosoff’s model is that it suffers from the 
same lack of accountability found in the public model.  While there will be 
reputational incentives to promulgate accurate CPGs, this may not be 
enough to achieve the maximum result.  Without accountability, removing 
conflicts of interest is more difficult.  A recent study in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association supports this theory, finding that for the 
committees that produced guidelines appearing on the NGC website, 71% 
of the committee chairpersons had a conflict of interest and 91% of 
                                                                                                                 
159  See NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.guideline.gov/ 
index.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
160 Inclusion Criteria, NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, www.guideline 
.gov/about/inclusion-criteria.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
161  “(1) through rigorous, scientific outcomes research, based upon an 
appropriate and adequately large set of clinical practice data; (2) using appropriate 
methodology, as defined by AHRQ regulations . . . .” Rosoff, Evidence-Based 
Medicine, supra note 77, at 360. 
162 NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 160. NGC lists only 
the following types of qualifying organizations: medical specialty associations; 
relevant professional societies, public or private organizations, government 
agencies at the Federal, State, or local level; or health care organizations or plans. 
163  “(3) with input from qualified medical professionals . . . .” Rosoff, 
Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 360. 
164 See Kung et al., supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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committee co-chairpersons also had a conflict of interest.165 This is a huge 
problem, and will require a more comprehensive approach then that 
provided for by Rosoff. 
 The lack of accountability, conflicts of interest, and potential for 
conflicting guidelines that appear in the Rosoff model will likely lead to 
inconsistent use among physicians, especially those who are solo-
practitioners.  Doctors face their own set of incentives and costs when it 
comes to the care that they provide to patients, and the best model is one 
that will align these incentives with those of the guideline producer and the 
other healthcare players.   
 
B. THE SEMI-PUBLIC MODEL (IOM)  
 
 Rosoff rejects the possibility of private certification for CPGs in 
favor of a federal certification program.  Because an objective of his 
certification program is to assist judges in distinguishing reliable, valid 
guidelines from those that are not, he argues that private certification would 
lack the “official” certainty necessary to achieve that objective.  Courts, he 
continues, would be confused over the validity of conflicting guidelines if 
private certification reigned.166 Indeed, if one assumes that helping courts is 
the main goal of a certification program, as Rosoff does, a governmental 
system might make more sense.  
 But CPGs should do more than just help courts gauge the standard 
of care. CPGs should, above all, foster better delivery of care.  When 
viewed with this objective in mind, a private entity could implement the 
same criteria as Rosoff’s proposed government certifier.  This would allow 
the government to outsource its quality control to a private entity.167 I call 
this the Semi-Public Model and this is what the IOM recommended when it 
called for the establishment of a public–private mechanism to certify CPG 
development processes. 
                                                                                                                 
165 See id. at 1630. Other authors have discussed different ways that companies 
try to influence CPGs.  See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, 
Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An Agenda for Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 511, 518 (2012) (“[F]irms fund physician and medical society activities to 
influence their clinical practice guidelines, which influences physician 
prescribing.”). 
166 Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine, supra note 77, at 357-58. 
167 The National Commission on Quality Assurance (NCQA) and the Joint 
Commission (JC) are examples of similar private certification programs. 
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 As was mentioned above, the IOM Report is based around eight 
standards that all CPGs should attempt to achieve compliance with.  These 
standards are process oriented such that they focus on the creation of the 
guideline rather than its contents.  Now is the time to review them more 
closely.  The IOM’s first requirement for CPGs is transparency, with a 
focus on ensuring that the way the guideline was developed and the source 
of its funding are easily accessible.168 Second, CPGs must be free from 
conflicts of interest.  To achieve this, the IOM Report calls for the 
disclosure of any and all COIs by guideline authors, the divestment of 
financial investments that could be affected by CPG recommendations, and 
the exclusion of authors with a COI whenever possible.169 The chair and 
co-chairs of the guideline committee especially should not have a COI.170 
Third, the guideline development group members should come 
from a variety of backgrounds including experts, clinicians, and patients.171 
This will help to ensure that all voices are heard during the process.  
Fourth, systematic review is the desired method for guideline drafting.172 
Fifth, and relatedly, the strength of the recommendation should be included 
in the guideline.173 This rating should include a description of the harms 
and benefits, also an explanation of the role that opinion and theory (as 
opposed to facts and systematic review of the evidence) played in the 
recommendation. 174  Sixth, the recommended action should be stated 
precisely so that it can be more easily understood and implemented by 
doctors.175 
Seventh, CPGs should undergo a process of external review from 
all the relevant health care players, including the public and the federal 
government. 176  These reviewers should be allowed to comment 
confidentially and the guideline authors should keep a record of why (or 
why not) they took the comments into account.177 Eighth, and lastly, CPGs 
should be regularly updated.  This includes monitoring the literature so that 
                                                                                                                 
168 2011 IOM Report, supra note 3, at 6. 
169 Id. at 7. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 7–8. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 8. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
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new evidence can be incorporated when it becomes known and the 
continued validity of the CPG can be ensured.178  
Given the similarities between this Semi-Public model and 
Rosoff’s and the UK models, it seems likely the same general effects would 
be observed and the same criticisms raised above will apply here as well.  
Well-defined development and evaluation criteria should elevate the 
quality of care, while financial incentives for developers should increase 
efficiency and reduce costs.  One important point of divergence, though, 
could be the role of CPGs in malpractice litigation under this model.  
Without government involvement, courts might still be reluctant to give 
weight to guidelines.  
 As discussed in the previous section, there is also the problem of 
conflicts of interest.  Although the standards may call for screening such 
guidelines out during the certification process, it has been shown that the 
vast majority of CPGs on the NGC website were created by a committee 
for which the chairperson or co-chairperson had a conflict of interest.179 
The Semi-Public Model also suffers from the same issues related to 
conflicting guidelines.180 All of these problems make CPGs certified under 
this model less helpful to doctors, and especially unhelpful to solo 
practitioners who have little time to review multiple guidelines for every 
procedure. 
 At their most basic level, CPGs should be trustworthy.  The IOM 
attempts to implement a system whereby trustworthy guidelines can be 
easily identified.  However, it has become clear that “[w]hile the IOM 
committee provided a comprehensive set of standards, it imposed an 
impractical definition of trustworthiness.” 181  By requiring adherence to 
eight standards, the system established by the IOM Report resulted in none 
of the current CPGs meeting the IOM’s definition of trustworthy.182 Not 
only do none of the existing CPGs meet, and perhaps can never meet, all 
eight standards, the majority of the CPGs in the NGC meet less than half of 
the IOM standards.183 While an unregulated system of CPGs does not help 
                                                                                                                 
178 Id. at 8–9. 
179 Id. 
180 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
181 David F. Ransohoff et al., How to Decide Whether a Clinical Practice 
Guideline is Trustworthy, 309 JAMA 139, 140 (Jan. 9, 2013). 
182 Id. 
183 See Kung et al., supra note 21, at 1629. 
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doctors, neither does a model where no guideline can be certified.  This is 
what is happening in practice with the Public and Semi-Public Models. 
 
C. THE PRIVATE MODEL (AVRAHAM) 
 
In a series of recent popular press articles and papers Avraham 
proposed a model for private regulation of CPGs.184 While it is still a new 
proposal in the field, it has received some attention in the literature. 185 In 
contrast to Rosoff, Avraham’s main goal is to use CPGs to achieve optimal 
                                                                                                                 
184  Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1 at 547; Avraham, Warped 
Incentives, supra note 1; Ronen Avraham, Private and Competitive Regulation of 
Medicine, 34 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 546, 547 (2009); Ronen Avraham, A 
Market Solution for Malpractice (N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/opinion/29Avraham.html?_r=1&ref=opinion; 
Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation of Medicine: A Win-Win-win For Doctors, 
Patients and Public, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2009) http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/ronen-avraham/private-regulation-of-med_b_242937.html. 
185 See, e.g., Alex Stein, Toward A Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 1201, 1245 n.248 (2012) (describing Avraham’s Private Model as “an 
insightful reform proposal”); Nathan S. Richards, Judicial Resolution of Emtala 
Screening Claims at Summary Judgment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 629 n.194 (2012) 
(noting Avraham’s proposal as “fascinating and novel”); Katharine A. Van Tassel, 
Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal System for Publishing Reports of 
“Bad” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2031, 2080 n.309 (2012) (citing Avraham’s model for CPG regulation as a way of 
enhancing quality of care while decreasing healthcare costs); Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 201 n.9 (2012) (citing Avraham’s model as a way to 
privatize the regulation of medical care); Jonathon H. Roth, Regulating Your 
Medical History Without Regulations: A Private Regulatory Framework to 
Electronic Health Record Adoption, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2103, 2122 (2011) 
(“Professor Ronen Avraham proposes a unique solution to rectify the inherent 
deficiencies in self-regulation: private regulation.”); Adam Candeub, Contract, 
Warranty, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 45, 58 (2011) (arguing for warranties but admitting that “as medicine 
becomes more algorithmic, Avraham's position makes complete sense”); David A. 
Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Global 
Perspective: How Does the U.S. Do It?, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 172 (2012) 
(citing to Avraham’s proposal while discussing clinical practice guidelines); Nadia 
N. Sawicki, Patient Protection and Decision-Aid Quality: Regulatory and Tort 
Law Approaches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 635, n.75 (2012) (citing to Avraham’s op-
ed in the NY Times on private regulation). 
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care delivery.186 The role of CPGs in court proceedings is only one aspect 
of achieving this goal.  In contrast to the IOM proposal, Avraham’s model 
focuses on the guidelines themselves, and not on the procedures by which 
they were developed.  In contrast to the old US model and the current UK 
model, Avraham’s certifiers are not the government but the private market.  
The proposed regime purports to align society’s incentives in a socially and 
economically efficient manner, thereby improving the quality of care and 
reducing costs.187     
 In the most general terms, the Private Model would consist of 
private firms competing to provide evidence-based medical guidelines and 
to offer liability protection to complying providers.  Doctors, especially 
solo practitioners, would be (at least in the beginning) required to purchase 
guidelines from a provider in order to be licensed by the state or as a 
condition of participation in government health programs.  Because of the 
proposed “private regulatory-compliance defense” doctrine that is part of 
the model, CPG subscriptions fees under the Private Model would replace 
the medical malpractice insurance premiums that doctors currently pay.188 
As will be discussed, the price paid for CPGs should be lower than current 
medical malpractice insurance premiums because, assuming the doctor 
follows the guidelines, there will be no liability.  
 The Private Model achieves the triplet goals of improving the 
quality of care, increasing cost-efficiency and respecting patients’ 
preferences for the tradeoff between risk and coverage. 189  Free market 
                                                                                                                 
186 Michelle Mello also sees only a limited role for CPGs. She has argued that, 
given the current state of CPGs, they should not be used for inculpatory or 
exculpatory purposes. This is because CPGs did not generally represent the best 
practices in medicine. Mello instead advocated for expert’s use of CPGs to 
supplement their testimony. Given the advances in CPGs since the 2001 article was 
published, it could be that Mello’s views have changed. See generally Michelle M. 
Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645 (2001). 
187  The contours of the proposal are laid out in full in Avraham, Private 
Regulation, supra note 1.   
188 If a doctor was concerned about potential liability that much being incurred 
by the failure to follow a guideline for a given procedure, he or she might obtain 
insurance coverage but since the chance of that happening should be very small the 
corresponding premium would also be very low. 
189 Under the current system a patient can have no insurance, insurance with a 
high deductible that does not cover every treatment, or a “Cadillac” health 
insurance plan that has a low deductible and covers every conceivable treatment 
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competition should keep costs low and legal liability for producing 
inadequate guidelines would force private firms to keep patient safety high.  
In order to attract customers (patients) seeking to minimize costs, private 
regulators would be forced to offer competitively priced guidelines without 
sacrificing quality or ease of use.  To achieve this, private regulators would 
have to discard unduly expensive or ineffective procedures.  Defensive 
medicine would not be an option.  At the same time, in contrast to current 
regimes in the US and the UK, and to the proposed regime by the IOM or 
Rosoff, patients would have a cause of action against the promulgating firm 
if the firm issued substandard guidelines that, directly or indirectly, caused 
injury to a patient.  The fear of liability may well cause firms to push 
medical standards higher, elevating the general quality of health care.  
 Unlike other models, accountability is one of the pillars of the 
Private Model.  This will ensure that the neutrality of CPGs is not a myth.  
Instead of a government agency that is subject only to administrative 
review of its rulemaking, the private firms would be held liable for 
damages caused by inefficient prescriptions.  Moreover, unlike an agency, 
a private firm could expect to legitimately profit from making safer, more 
efficient standards.  This proposal would also eliminate biased guidelines 
because they would be disciplined by market forces or legal liability.  As a 
result, the influence of other interested actors – namely drug and device 
manufacturers – would substantially decrease.  Lastly, unlike current 
medical practices a private firm’s profit margin would be closely aligned 
with patient safety, so these firms would have the financial incentive to 
invest in continuous improvement without relying on groups that have a 
conflict of interest.  At the same time, these firms would not feel so held 
hostage by the threat of litigation that they would advocate wasteful 
defensive medicine like unnecessary tests and procedures.  Outside 
influences from other actors in the healthcare industry can probably not be 
eliminated completely, but the introduction of market forces via the Private 
Model should cause conflicts to substantially decrease.190 
 The Private Model also successfully addresses the issue of 
inconsistent use.  Health care providers, especially solo practitioners, 
                                                                                                                 
option. Under the Private Model there would also be variations. One can imagine a 
tiered system with different levels of CPGs that patients can choose much like they 
select their health insurance plans today. This model would more directly reflect 
patients’ preferences regarding the cost and quality of care. For more on this, see 
Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 631. 
190 Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 584. 
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would be incentivized to use guidelines for two primary reasons.  First, 
reduction in bias would lead to better guidelines, allowing doctors to trust 
their recommendations.  The financial interests and professional 
responsibilities of providers would align, making it likely that they would 
utilize the techniques prescribed by the guidelines.  With hundreds of 
available CPGs, often with conflicting recommendations, doctors will 
benefit from having the guideline producer review, synthesize, and approve 
CPGs.  Through the Private Model doctors would not have to worry about 
multiple CPGs being certified for the same procedure.  As it stands now it 
is impossible for doctors to keep current with new guidelines because of 
their volume, something the guideline producer is better situated to deal 
with.  Second, if a doctor purchased the guidelines and followed them in 
treating patients, that person would be immune from malpractice liability.  
In other words, purchasing a CPG subscription from a firm would dilute the 
need for malpractice insurance, as long as the provider followed the 
guidelines.  The sum effect of increased reliance on better guidelines and 
decreased liability should reduce costs throughout the entire system.   
 To provide optimal incentives to putative private “regulators”, the 
legal infrastructure would have to have these five characteristics: (1) 
guideline evaluation from the ex ante perspective, (2) recognition of a new 
legal doctrine called the private regulatory-compliance defense, (3) 
provision of intellectual property protection for issued guidelines, (4) 
elimination of the state-of-the-art defense, and (5) imposition of solvency 
requirements on private firms producing guidelines.  It is possible that 
many of these will develop organically as healthcare players and judges 
recognize the benefits of such a system, but it is also possible that 
legislation would be required to fully implement this model.  The five 
characteristics are detailed below.  
 First, in order to properly incentivize private guideline producers, 
those firms must be exposed to legal liability for promulgating sub-optimal 
guidelines.  To create these optimal incentives, this liability must be judged 
in a courtroom from the ex ante perspective.  This would avoid hindsight 
bias and, importantly, it would take into account all potential beneficiaries, 
not just the specific plaintiff in a case.  Because firms know they could be 
subject to review at any time, they would be incentivized to develop 
efficient, impartial, and reliable guidelines.191   
                                                                                                                 
191 Without further protection, however, there would still be an incentive for 
overly safe guidelines. A simple way to deal with the problem is by using contracts 
between payers and providers that link reimbursements to the optimal level of 
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 Second, in order to incentivize providers to purchase and follow 
guidelines, a private regulatory compliance defense, essentially a safe-
harbor, would have to be added to the legal landscape.  This defense would 
be available to any doctor or hospital that purchased guidelines and then 
followed them, and private regulatory compliance with guidelines would 
have to be a complete defense.192 Third, it may be necessary to provide 
intellectual property (IP) protection for CPGs.  The concern is that, without 
protection, no private firm would have an incentive to develop CPGs.  The 
fear is that as soon as a guideline was published, other firms would free-
ride, thus making the production unprofitable. 193  Fourth, it would be 
necessary to eliminate the state-of-the-art defense.  Some states currently 
allow defendants to escape liability if their product or procedure was state-
of-the-art at the time it was originally made, even if research since that time 
has proven it to be dangerous.194 Under the Private Model, this defense 
would have to be eliminated in claims against the guideline producers in 
order to incentivize firms to continuously research better medical 
procedures and incorporate them into their guidelines.   
 Fifth, the solvency of the private firms promulgating guidelines 
would be necessary.  Otherwise, firms would have an incentive to 
                                                                                                                 
safety and cost-effectiveness. See Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 
594. 
192 In order to maintain doctors’ discretion failure to comply with CPGs will 
not determine she was negligent – the physician still has the opportunity to 
convince the court that its deviation was clinically justified. (Granted, given the 
respect CPGs will get in court the task of convincing the court will not be an easy 
one.) Thus, CPGs serve as a “short sword” to distinguish from a regular sword 
because deviating from them does not determine liability, but only make it harder 
for the defendant to win the case. We do not find this asymmetry problematic on 
Equal Protection grounds at all. Patients are not a suspect class and there is no 
fundamental interest involved. The Equal Protection analysis would follow the 
traditional rational basis review standard. The rational basis is the legislature's 
interest in lowering health care costs and rewarding doctors that follow certain 
standards of care while enabling individualized care when needed. Moreover, 
counter-intuitively, the short-sword property of CPGs, benefits doctors because it 
is this property that conserves their autonomy to deviate from the guidelines. And 
doctors’ autonomy, as is well known, is extremely important to them. See 
Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1. 
193 See Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1. 
194 Traditionally limited to product liability cases, this defense has penetrated 
medical malpractice law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY §§ 1–2 (1998). 
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promulgate overly risky guidelines because they would know that the worst 
thing that could happen is bankruptcy.  The solvency guarantee could be 
obtained by requiring firms to have minimum assets or liability 
insurance.195 These requirements would mirror the solvency requirements 
currently in place for insurance companies.  As one can see, much of this 
reform could be accomplished with willing judges and/or private 
arrangements between relevant healthcare organizations. 
 While the multitude of changes needed to make this model work 
make it seem like more of a theoretical solution, entities in the medical 
field already operate under similar arrangements.  In the health care market, 
there are already private companies that create and market guidelines.  For 
example, McKesson is a company that provides CPGs as a part of its 
service package.196 These proprietary guidelines are not made publically 
available and McKesson has research staff that continuously reviews new 
literature and revises its recommendations as new information emerges.197 
Other companies providing similar services include UpToDate, 
FirstConsult, and Dynamed, several of which cater specifically to general 
practitioners. 198  Further, these CPGs are integrated with other software 
tools to improve workflow and cost efficiency.  This model is close to the 
Private Model proposal and provides hope that this system could be 
successful.  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Putting effective CPGs in place is only one part of reforming the 
health care delivery system.  Major structural reorganizations of health care 
delivery are also necessary – particularly for specialty services and the 
management of complex patients with multiple chronic diseases – and will 
be accompanied by radical changes in payment policy (e.g., bundled 
payment) and a serious commitment to outcomes measurement.   
Still, process-based health policy tools such as CPGs will be very 
useful in the transition to an improved delivery system.  An effective 
                                                                                                                 
195 S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 45 (1986); 
Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance 
as Solutions to the Judgment Proof Problem (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10341, 2004). 
196 2011 IOM Report, supra note 3, at 41. 
197 Id. 
198 Avraham, Private Regulation, supra note 1, at 612–13. 
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governance structure and accountability mechanism for CPGs need not 
solve every information or incentive problem in the health care 
system.  But it must be broadly acceptable to physicians and the public, it 
must acknowledge the importance of cost-effectiveness as well as clinical 
effectiveness, and it must not become an independent power center that 
could end up working at cross-purposes to other goals and institutions that 
are critical components of health care reform. 
Clinical practice guidelines serve an important role in helping 
physicians who will remain in independent practice navigate the 
challenging waters of health care reform.  Going forward, CPGs should not 
be viewed primarily as a solution for problems with malpractice liability 
but as broader tools for quality improvement and cost reduction. 199 
Moreover, malpractice liability itself should be accepted only as part of the 
solution to problems that plague the promulgation and dissemination of 
CPGs.  Specifically, malpractice policies should be harnessed to help 
implement CPGs that can improve care.  
I argue that the exclusive reliance on public or semi-public models 
by the 2011 IOM Report is misplaced, and other alternatives, including 
private competitive regimes, should be considered as well, especially for 
solo practitioners.  Under the model selected by the IOM, issues with 
accountability and conflicts of interest in guideline production will 
continue to hinder the creation and widespread adoption of CPGs.  CPGs 
must be promulgated with assurances of both substantive and procedural 
integrity, disseminated to providers in an accessible manner, and used 
appropriately by consumers and payers in addition to courts.  This is likely 
to be true whether CPGs remain as standalone protocols or become 
embedded in other practice tools used by physicians in independent 
practice such as electronic medical decision aids, electronic health records 
with decision support, coding/billing software, and malpractice risk 
management guides.  It is also applicable to new models of primary care 
based on advanced practice nurses rather than physicians or using 
interdisciplinary teams that constitute “medical homes” for patients.  In the 
battle to reduce healthcare costs while improving patient care, CPGs are a 
powerful tool; but to be utilized to their full potential policymakers must 
                                                                                                                 
199 Of course there still remains a place for CPGs in malpractice reform. For 
example, the Obama administration’s $250 million package of grants to encourage 
states to overhaul their malpractice systems by, among other things, creating “safe 
harbor” laws based on CPGs may well prove beneficial. See Walker, supra note 
108. 
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keep an open mind and be willing to consider proposals that are outside the 
box. 
 
  

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CHOICE, FREE MARKET 
IDEOLOGY AND THE EMPIRICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
401(K) PLAN LARGE MENU DEFENSE 
 
MERCER BULLARD* 
 
*** 
 
This article explores the recent “hidden-fee” litigation trend that has 
consumed the 401(k) world and how recent decisions by these courts will 
likely result in reduced wealth for workers.  The author challenges the 
“large menu defense” espoused by the Third, Seventh and Eight Circuit 
Courts of Appeals as not fitting within the intent of ERISA’s “safe harbor.”  
In addition, the author questions the logic of these decisions by suggesting 
that courts are evaluating the employers’ legal responsibilities using free-
market ideology rather than the fiduciary duties prescribed by ERISA and 
questions the belief that “large menu” pension benefit plans are wealth-
maximizing. 
 
*** 
 
 In October 2008, just after the peak of the financial crisis, former 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, testified: “I do have an 
ideology.  My judgment is that free, competitive markets are by far the 
unrivaled way to organize economies.  We’ve tried regulation.  None 
meaningfully worked.”1 In fact, regulation has often worked and worked 
well, as illustrated by reforms in pension plan regulation.  Investors often 
do behave like the rational actors on which the efficacy of free, competitive 
markets is based, especially when they are deciding whether to participate 
in their employers’ 401(k) plans.  Many employees do not participate, even 
when their employers offer to match employees’ contributions.  In 2006, 
Congress amended the Employee Retirement Security Income Act of 1974 
(ERISA) to permit employers to automatically enroll their employees in the 
company’s 401(k) plan.  As a result, plan participation rates have risen 
                                                                                                                                
* Associate Professor of Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law 
and Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association Distinguished Lecturer. 
1 Financial Crisis and the Role of Government Regulators: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 46 (2008). As the financial 
crisis unfolded around him, however, Chairman Greenspan acknowledged that he 
had become aware of a “flaw” in this ideology. Id. 
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dramatically.  This regulatory “nudge” has increased the wealth of millions 
of Americans. 
 In a series of recent decisions, however, federal courts have taken 
positions that effectively reduce employee participation rates in 401(k) 
plans.  They have exalted free market ideology in derogation of express 
regulatory mandates on the assumption that substituting their economic 
assumptions for legal requirements will maximize the wealth of 401(k) 
participants.  Yet their faith in free markets is not grounded in any 
empirical foundation.  In fact, their economic theories are directly 
contradicted by the overwhelming weight of empirical research, which 
shows that the effect of their decisions will reduce workers’ wealth rather 
than increase it.  This collision of judicial free-market ideology and 
financial reality, the subject of this article, is costing American workers 
billions of dollars in lost pension benefits every year. 
 Over the last decade, a slew of lawsuits have consumed the 401(k) 
world, making a substantial amount of new case law and sending 
employers in search of experts to find ways to protect them from liability.  
This so-called “hidden-fee litigation” generally involves claims that 
employers and other pension benefit plan fiduciaries violated ERISA’s 
“prudent man” rule by selecting investment options that charge excessive 
fees and hide information about fees from participants.  Some courts have 
dismissed claims against employers that offer a large number of investment 
options in their plans on the ground that, regardless of whether the 
employer acted imprudently, the legal cause of any resulting loss was the 
participant’s choice of the option(s) in which to invest.  These courts 
consider large 401(k) menus to offer a kind of marketplace that trumps 
employers’ fiduciary obligations.  This “large menu defense” creates an 
incentive for employers to increase the number of options in their 401(k) 
plans in order to minimize their ERISA liability risk. 
 These courts have ignored ERISA’s express imposition of liability 
on plan fiduciaries for failing to exercise due care in choosing plan 
investment options.  Section 404(a) of the Act establishes a “prudent man” 
standard that requires, among other things, that plan sponsors choose 
investment options with due care.  Section 404(c) provides a safe harbor 
(“404(c)” or “control” safe harbor) from Section 404(a) liability to the 
extent that a self-directed plan permits a participant “to exercise control 
over the assets in his account.”  Under Section 404(c)’s authority, the 
Department of Labor (DOL) has adopted rules providing that a participant 
may be deemed to have exercised control if, among other things, the plan 
offers a “broad range of investment alternatives” that enables participants 
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to create portfolios with risk-return characteristics that are appropriate for 
the participant. 
 Some courts have deemed participants to have exercised control 
under the 404(c) safe harbor if a plan’s range of options is so broad that, in 
the court’s opinion, it approximates the range of options that would be 
available in a free market.2 The availability of a large range of options 
thereby abrogates employer responsibility for imprudently selecting 
investment options.  The large menu defense effectively substitutes judicial 
economic theories for statutory fiduciary duties, based primarily on the 
courts’ ideological view, like Chairman Greenspan’s, that participants’ 
choices should be regulated by free market principles rather than under 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties.  The courts’ view, consistent with widely 
accepted rational choice theory, is that offering the largest range of choices 
will maximize workers’ wealth.  Indeed, they view increasing choice, in 
and of itself, as a central purpose of ERISA. 
 This de facto judicial nullification of ERISA’s prudent man rule 
would not be of such concern if the courts were correct that larger menus 
create wealth for workers.  In that case, employers that increased the 
number of options in their plans in order to reduce their ERISA liability 
risk would also maximize the social benefits of 401(k) plans.  However, 
empirical research shows that larger menus are inversely correlated with 
workers’ wealth.  Large 401(k) menus result in lower participation rates, 
overly conservative allocations, inferior investment options and other 
adverse effects that, collectively, cost workers billions of dollars every 
year.  Notwithstanding the courts’ views on rational choice theory, “a fully 
informed and fully rational investor would prefer a smaller menu.”3 
 Section I of this article describes the legal framework for employers’ 
liability under ERISA in connection with the selection of plan investment 
options.  Section II discusses the large menu defense adopted by courts that 
have dismissed fiduciary claims against employers that were alleged to 
have selected options impudently.  The courts’ free-market rationale for the 
large menu defense is described in Section III, and Section IV sets forth the 
empirical research on the wealth-reducing effects of large menus in 401(k) 
plans.  Section V concludes. 
                                                                                                                                
2 See infra Section II. 
3  David Goldreich & Hanna Hałaburda, When Smaller Menus Are Better: 
Variability in Menu-Setting Ability 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-
086, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/11-086. 
pdf. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
 ERISA generally applies to “employee benefit plans,” which are 
defined to include employee welfare benefit plans and employee pension 
benefit plans.4 This article is concerned with pension benefit plans, such as 
401(k) plans, which are defined as funds or programs maintained by an 
employer that “(i) provide retirement income to employees, or (ii) result in 
a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination 
of covered employment or beyond.” 5  If an employer offers a pension 
benefit plan, ERISA requires that it identify at least one “named” fiduciary 
who is responsible for the administration of the plan.  For example, the plan 
trustee is a named plan fiduciary.  A person can also become a fiduciary by 
exercising discretion over plan assets or providing advice for a fee to the 
plan.  A plan fiduciary can designate another person as a fiduciary and 
thereby shift their fiduciary responsibilities to that person. 
 A plan fiduciary is subject to two primary sets of duties under 
ERISA.  First, Section 404(a) of ERISA subjects fiduciaries to a prudent 
man standard of care.  They must act with the “care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence” that a “prudent man acting in a like capacity” would use in 
selecting investment options and diversifying the plan’s investments “so as 
to minimize the risk of large losses.”  Section 404(a) also imposes a duty of 
loyalty.  Fiduciaries must discharge their duties “solely in the interests of 
the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of: (i) 
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying 
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”  
 Second, ERISA prohibits plan fiduciaries from engaging in a broad 
range of transactions with the plan.  Specifically, Section 406(b) of ERISA 
prohibits fiduciaries from dealing with plan assets in the fiduciary’s “own 
interest,” acting on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction, or receiving 
any consideration from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a 
transaction involving the assets of the plan.  Plan participants have a private 
right of action against fiduciaries to recover losses resulting from a breach 
of their obligations under ERISA.6 The breadth of Sections 404(a) and 
406(b), coupled with a private right of action for damages, presents 
employers with significant liability risk.  
                                                                                                                                
4 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2006). 
5 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006). 
6 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006). 
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 To mitigate this risk, ERISA provides a number of statutory safe 
harbors for fiduciaries, which are supplemented by prohibited transaction 
exemptions and interpretive safe harbors promulgated by the DOL.7 Plan 
fiduciaries generally attempt to limit their liability by conforming their 
conduct to these safe harbors and exemptions.  One of the most commonly 
relied-upon safe harbors is provided by Section 404(c)(1)(A)(ii) (“404(c)” 
or “control” safe harbor), which insulates fiduciaries from liability for 
losses resulting “from the participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control” 
over the assets in his account.  
 The DOL has set forth a number of conditions on the availability of 
the 404(c) safe harbor.  These conditions include offering a diversified set 
of investment options and providing participants with sufficient 
information to evaluate them.  A participant has “exercised control” if, 
among other things, he “has an opportunity to choose, from a broad range 
of investment alternatives, the manner in which some or all of the assets in 
his account are invested.”8 A “broad range of investment alternatives” has 
been provided if the participant has an opportunity to: (1) materially affect 
the potential return and degree of risk of the account; (2) diversify so as to 
minimize the risk of large losses; and (3) choose from at least three 
diversified investment options. 9  These investment options must have 
materially different risk and return characteristics such that they can be 
combined in a portfolio with aggregate risk-return characteristics that are 
                                                                                                                                
7 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(19) (2006) (exemption from Section 406(b)(2) 
for certain cross transactions); Class Exemption To Permit Certain Loans of 
Securities by Employee Benefit Plans, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,786 (Feb. 2, 2006) 
(exemption from Section 406(b)(1) with respect to securities lending activities); 
Class Exemption for Cross-Trades of Securities by Index and Model-Driven 
Funds, 67 Fed. Reg. 6614 (Feb. 12, 2002) (exemption from 406(b)(2) with respect 
to certain cross transactions involving passively managed funds); Class Exemption 
for Securities Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers, 
51 Fed. Reg. 41,686 (Nov. 18, 1986) (exemption from Section 406(b) to 
fiduciaries that execute transactions on behalf of a plan); Class Exemption for 
Certain Transactions Between Investment Companies and Employee Benefit Plans, 
42 Fed. Reg. 18,732 (Apr. 8, 1977) (exemption for fiduciary when acting in 
capacity of investment adviser to mutual fund in which plan assets are invested); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2012) (no breach of fiduciary duty solely by reason 
of receiving soft dollar benefits limited to brokerage and research services). 
8 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c–1(b)(1)(ii) (2013). 
9 29 C.F.R. §2550.404c-1(b)(iii) (2013). 
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within the range that is appropriate for the participant and that tend to 
minimize the risk of the overall portfolio. 
 Over the last decade, a series of lawsuits against plan fiduciaries has 
challenged the edifice of safe harbors and exemptions on which they have 
come to depend.  The plaintiffs in these lawsuits – lawsuits which are often 
referred to as “hidden fee litigation” – have generally claimed that plan 
fiduciaries violated their duties by offering investment options that charge 
excessive and/or hidden fees.  Plaintiffs allege that fees were hidden 
because they were not disclosed to participants and excessive because the 
plans invested in retail classes of fund shares that made side payments to 
plan services providers (known as “revenue sharing” payments) rather than 
in less expensive institutional classes of shares.  The hidden fee litigation 
has generated dozens of judicial decisions addressing a broad array of 
issues under ERISA. 
 This article focuses on the role that the size of a plan’s menu of 
investment options has played in the application of the 404(c) safe harbor 
and the disposition of these cases.  As discussed immediately below, a 
number of courts have found that offering a large menu of investment 
options supports a finding that participants exercised control for purposes 
of the safe harbor.  These courts have expressly rejected the DOL’s 
“paternalistic” view that plan fiduciaries are responsible for any options 
that have been imprudently included in the mix even when participants 
have been able to choose from a large number of alternatives.  
 
II.  THE LARGE MENU DEFENSE 
 
 In one set of hidden fee cases, courts have held that offering a large 
number of investment options can protect an ERISA fiduciary from 
liability, while offering a small number may increase a fiduciary’s legal 
exposure.  The leading case for the “large menu defense” is Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., in which the Seventh Circuit found that Deere’s offering of 
thousands of investment options in its 401(k) helped establish that, even if 
some options had been imprudently selected, Deere’s imprudence could not 
have been a legal cause of the plaintiffs’ losses.10 The court found that the 
large menu of investment options effectively placed the participant in 
control of his investment decisions, thereby relieving Deere of potential 
liability.  
                                                                                                                                
10 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 584–87 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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 In Hecker, a class of participants in Deere’s 401(k) plan sued Deere 
for breaching its fiduciary duty to the plan by, among other things, 
selecting investment options that charged excessive, hidden fees.  The 
plaintiffs generally alleged that the fees were excessive because: (1) the 
administrator of the plan was compensated indirectly through revenue 
sharing payments by the investment options in which the plans invested 
rather than directly from the plans themselves; and (2) those fees were not 
reasonable in view of the services provided.  They argued that Deere 
violated its fiduciary duty by failing to exercise proper care in evaluating 
and selecting the investment options.  
 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the 
ground that Deere was protected by ERISA’s 404(c) safe harbor.  As noted 
above, the 404(c) safe harbor insulates fiduciaries from liability for any 
loss that “results from the participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control” 
over the assets in his account.  The court found that Deere had satisfied the 
404(c) safe harbor by offering a large number of investment options.11 The 
plan offered twenty-three Fidelity mutual funds, two funds managed by 
Fidelity Trust, an employer stock fund, and an investment window that 
provided access to more than 2,500 funds managed by different 
companies.12 The district court found that, in light of the large number of 
investment options and the impossibility of every one of them having an 
excessive expense ratio, “[t]he only possible conclusion is that to the extent 
participants incurred excessive expenses, those losses were the result of 
participants exercising control over their investments within the meaning of 
the safe harbor provision.”13 Whether Deere exercised due care in selecting 
the investment options did not matter to the court: “[a]ssuming . . . that 
defendants failed to satisfy their fiduciary obligation to consider expenses 
when selecting mutual fund investment options, they are nevertheless 
insulated from liability by the safe harbor provision because of the nature 
and breadth of funds made available to participants under the plans.”14 
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that Deere had “include[d] a 
sufficient range of options so that the participants have control over the risk 
                                                                                                                                
11 Although the 404(c) safe harbor is an affirmative defense that normally 
would not be available at the pleading stage, the court found that the plaintiffs had 
opened the door to defense by anticipating the safe harbor in their complaint. 
12 556 F.3d at 578. 
13 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
14 Id. at 976. 
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of loss.”15 Assuming that Deere had a duty to “furnish an acceptable array 
of investment vehicles,” the court found that the “wide range of expense 
ratios among the 20 Fidelity mutual funds and the 2,500 other funds 
available through [the plan]” satisfied this duty.16 Any losses experienced 
by participants were “attributable to their individual choices.  Given the 
numerous investment options, varied in type and fee, neither Deere nor 
Fidelity . . .  can be held responsible for those choices.”17 
 The Third Circuit adopted Hecker’s large menu defense in Renfro v. 
Unisys Corp.18 In Renfro, a class of participants in Unisys Corporation’s 
401(k) plan sued Unisys for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.  As in 
Hecker, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants’ selection of investment 
options was imprudent because the options charged revenue sharing 
payments that were hidden and excessive.  The plan, one of the largest one 
percent of 401(k) plans in the U.S., held approximately $2 billion in more 
than seventy different investment options.  Nearly $1.9 billion of that 
amount was held in “Fidelity-branded” retail mutual funds that plaintiffs 
alleged had charged excessive fees. 
 The district court granted Unisys’s motion to dismiss on the ground 
that “no rational trier of fact could find, on the basis of the facts alleged in 
the operative complaint, that the Unisys Defendants breached an ERISA 
fiduciary duty by offering this particular array of investment vehicles.”19 
The court, citing Hecker in support, found that Unisys could not be held 
liable for the selection of investments because it had offered a broad range 
of investment alternatives, regardless of whether it had placed any 
inappropriate investment options in the plan. 20  The participants “could 
choose from among the investment options to create a portfolio tailored to 
meet their investment objectives,”21 which insulated Unisys from liability.  
The court considered Unisys’s large menu to support both a Rule 12(b)(6) 
                                                                                                                                
15 556 F.3d at 589. 
16 Id. at 586. 
17 Id. at 590. 
18 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011). 
19 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 07-2098, 2010 WL 1688540, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 26, 2010). 
20 Id. at *9. 
21 Id. at *5. 
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motion to dismiss and a summary judgment motion based on the 404(c) 
safe harbor.22 
 The Third Circuit declined to rule on the safe harbor issue, but 
affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the 
large menu defense.  The court observed that the plan included “seventy-
three distinct investment options . . . company stock, commingled funds, 
and mutual funds . . . [representing] a variety of risk and fee profiles,”23 
thereby accomplishing ERISA’s purpose of “offer[ing] participants 
meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement savings.” 24 
Following Hecker’s lead, the court found that offering a large number of 
investment options insulated Unisys from liability as to the particular 
options it had selected for the plan. 
 The district court in Renfro took Hecker one step further by raising 
the possibility that, if the number of funds were a factor supporting 
liability, liability might arise from the offering of too few investment 
options in a plan, not too many.  The court observed that, while the plan in 
Hecker included more than 2,500 options, “the Hecker court in no way 
indicated that fiduciaries to an ERISA plan breach their duty when they 
offer less than a few thousand investment options to plan participants.”25 In 
fact, a court had already found that offering too few options might increase 
a plan sponsor’s liability risk.   
 In Braden v. Wal-Mart, the Eighth Circuit found that the relatively 
small number of investment options in Wal-Mart’s 401(k) provided support 
for plaintiffs’ claim that Wal-Mart had managed the plan imprudently.26 As 
in Hecker and Renfro, a class of 401(k) participants alleged that the plan’s 
fees were excessive and hidden, and that Wal-Mart had failed adequately to 
investigate lower-cost alternatives.  The Wal-Mart plan offered only “ten 
mutual funds, a common/collective trust, Wal-Mart common stock, and a 
stable value fund.”  The court characterized the plaintiffs as alleging that 
the “[p]lan include[d] a relatively limited menu of funds which were 
selected by Wal-Mart executives despite the ready availability of better 
                                                                                                                                
22 Although the court did not rely on the control safe harbor per se in granting 
the motion to dismiss, it effectively adopted the safe harbor’s reasoning. The 
following discussion treats this court as having applied the control safe harbor. 
23 671 F.3d at 327. 
24 Id.  
25 Renfro, 2010 WL 1688540, at n.6. 
26 Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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options.”27 It specifically compared Wal-Mart’s small menu of options with 
the 2,500 mutual funds offered by the plan in Hecker, and quoted the 
Hecker court’s finding that it was “untenable to suggest that all of the more 
than 2,500 publicly available investment options had excessive expense 
ratios.”28 In contrasting the present facts with Hecker, the court concluded 
that “[t]he far narrower range of investment options available in this case 
makes more plausible the claim that this Plan was imprudently 
managed.”29 
 The Renfro court made the inverse relationship between Hecker’s 
large menu defense and Braden’s small menu stigma explicit in describing 
the cases as sharing a “similar analytical framework”: “Both courts looked 
first to the characteristics of the mix and range of options and then 
evaluated the plausibility of claims challenging fund selection against the 
backdrop of the reasonableness of the mix and range of investment 
options.”30 The court in Renfro viewed small-menu Braden as taking the 
same approach as large-menu Hecker in declining to dismiss “in light of a 
plan that had far fewer available investment options than the plan in 
Hecker.”31 
 The large menu defense caught the attention of the DOL, which 
objected to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Hecker.  In an amicus brief, 
the DOL complained that the court’s decision would provide a defense for 
a fiduciary’s imprudent selection of investment options if the fiduciary 
                                                                                                                                
27 Id. at 596. 
28 Id. at n.6 (quoting Hecker, 556 F.3d at 581).  
29 Id. (emphasis added); see Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 
959, 963 (S.D. Iowa 2010) (citing argument that limited menu in Braden, 
compared with large menu in Hecker, made imprudent management claim more 
plausible); Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (reiterating 
the argument in Ruppert). 
30 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2011). 
31 Id. at 327. (“We agree with our sister circuits' approach to evaluating these 
claims. An ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants 
meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement savings. Accordingly, we 
hold the range of investment options and the characteristics of those included 
options – including the risk profiles, investment strategies, and associated fees – 
are highly relevant and readily ascertainable facts against which the plausibility of 
claims challenging the overall composition of a plan's mix and range of investment 
options should be measured.”). 
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simply selected a large number of options. 32  In response, the Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged that such a strategy would “result in the inclusion of 
many investment alternatives that a responsible fiduciary should exclude 
[and] . . . place an unreasonable burden on unsophisticated plan participants 
who do not have the resources to pre-screen investment alternatives.”33 
This concession seemed to reflect the court’s reconsideration of the large 
menu defense, but the court said nothing about this “burden on 
unsophisticated plan participants” lessening their ultimate responsibility for 
losses under the safe harbor.  Nor did the court disavow the dispositive 
weight afforded to the offering of a large number of investment options in 
determining whether the participant had exercised control over his account.  
 The Seventh Circuit soon removed any doubt about its commitment to 
the large menu defense.  In Loomis v. Exelon Corp.,34 the court relied on 
Hecker’s large menu defense to dismiss hidden-excessive fee claims 
against Exelon Corp.35  Its understanding of Hecker and Hecker II was 
unambiguous: “By offering a wide range of options, Hecker held, Deere's 
plan complied with ERISA's fiduciary duties.  Plaintiffs contend that the 
                                                                                                                                
32 Amended Brief of the Sec’y of Labor, Elaine Chao, as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Hecker v. Deere & Co., 2008 WL 5731147 (7th 
Cir. April 4, 2008) (No. 08-1224).  
33 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 569 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter 
Hecker II]. Phyllis Borzi, the Assistant Secretary for the Employee Benefits 
Administration, has cited finding “‘a disturbing trend’ among plan sponsors 
seeking to avoid ERISA responsibility by ‘just giving choices’” in reference to 
401(k) brokerage account windows. Hazel Bradford, Borzi: Sponsors Have Always 
Been Responsible for Monitoring Brokerage Windows, PENSION & INVESTMENTS 
(June 18, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120618/DAILYREG/ 
120619900/borzi-sponsors-have-always-been-responsible-for-monitoring-
brokerage-windows. This statement was made in the context of guidance issued by 
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) in May 2012 that took the position that 
employers may be responsible for decisions made within a 401(k) brokerage 
account window.  See Robert Steyer, Labor Department Stands Firm on Self-
Directed Brokerage Account Guidance, PENSION & INVESTMENTS (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20120601/DAILYREG/120609983/labor- 
department-stands-firm-on-self-directed-brokerage-account-guidance. The DOL 
later withdrew that position under industry pressure.  See Robert Steyer, ‘Intensive’ 
Lobbying Behind DOL Turnabout on DC Plan Brokerage Window, PENSION & 
INVESTMENTS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120806/ 
PRINTSUB/308069984. 
34 Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2011).  
35 Id. 
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panel in Hecker retreated from this holding when denying a petition for 
rehearing [in Hecker II].  It did not.”36 
 The court characterized Hecker as having “held that as a matter of 
law that [Deere offered] an acceptable array of investment options, 
observing that ‘all of these funds were also offered to investors in the 
general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the 
backdrop of market competition.’”37 
 The Loomis court applied the Hecker large menu defense in finding 
that Exelon could not be faulted if it selected hidden excessive fee options 
for the plan because, with thirty-two investment options to choose from, 
                                                                                                                                
 36 Id. at 670.  Notwithstanding the court’s definitive statement that Hecker II 
did not represent a change in the court’s position, the DOL has argued that Hecker 
II “backed away” from the “breadth of its earlier ruling,” citing the Seventh 
Circuit’s subsequent decision in Howell. Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 552 
(7th Cir. 2011). See Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 2011 WL 2178417 at *24 (9th Cir. 
May 25, 2011) (No. 10-56415) (quoting Howell, 633 F.3d at 567 (citing Hecker, 
569 F.3d at 708)).  However, Howell involved the prudence of offering an 
employer stock option in the plan, and courts have applied a different, arguably 
inconsistent standard in cases involving employer stock.  Howell, 633 F.3d. at 567. 
Howell’s position on the responsibility of employers for imprudently selecting 
employer stock as an option directly contradicts the same court’s position on the 
selection of other types of options: “The choice of which investments will be 
presented in the menu that the plan sponsor adopts is not within the participant's 
power. It is instead a core decision relating to the administration of the plan and the 
benefits that will be offered to participants. . . . It is . . . the fiduciary's 
responsibility . . . to screen investment alternatives and to ensure that imprudent 
options are not offered to plan participants. Id. Although beyond the scope of this 
article, it is worth noting that courts such as Howell have been more willing to 
second-guess employers’ choice of employer stock as an option than diversified 
mutual funds notwithstanding that ERISA provides a specific statutory safe harbor 
for employer stock.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2011); see, e.g., Pfeil v. State 
Street Bank & Trust Co., 671 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2012); Peabody v. Davis, 636 F.3d 
368 (7th Cir. 2011); DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Langbecker v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 476 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2007); Dann v. 
Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
37 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 670 (quoting Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586). See Spano v. 
Boeing, 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Cf. Hecker, 556 F.3d 575, 584–87 
(7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the record showed sufficient variety in investments and 
fee levels to satisfy ERISA requirements)”); Loomis v. Exelon Corp., No. 06 CV 
4900, 2009 WL 4667092 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2009) (endorsing Hecker’s 
“sufficient mix of investments defense”). 
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“[a]ny participant who want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1% can get it 
through Exelon's Plan.”38 The court appeared to believe that the employer 
did not have a fiduciary duty to abjure excessive or hidden fee investment 
options for its plan because the large number of options offered ensured 
that at least one low-cost option was available. 
 Thus, the Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have taken the position 
that a large 401(k) menu can protect a plan fiduciary from liability for 
imprudently selecting investment options for the plan.  Even assuming that 
the plan fiduciary violated Section 404(c)’s prudent man standard in the 
selection of investment options, the availability of a large number of 
options abrogated the fiduciary’s legal responsibility under ERISA.  
Conversely, offering a small menu of investment options, as in Wal-Mart, 
made it “more plausible” that the plan was imprudently managed.  The 
large menu defense courts view participants as having exercised safe 
harbor control when the number of investment options is large enough that 
the participants’ choices become the effective, proximate cause of any 
losses resulting from, for example, excessive fees.  
 Although no other court has directly addressed the large menu 
defense, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the mainstay of the large menu 
defense theory that employers’ responsibility for imprudently selecting 
investment options can be abrogated in the context of a menu of diversified 
investment options.  In Tibble v. Edison Int’l, the court explained that 
treating a participant’s act of choosing an investment option as abrogating 
the employer’s responsibility for selecting options could not be reconciled 
with the plain meaning of the statute.39 The court found that considering the 
participant’s investment decision as an intervening cause of the 
participant’s loss, i.e., a safe-harbor exercise of control, “would render 
parts of the ERISA statute a nullity by making it nearly impossible for 
defined-contribution-plan beneficiaries to vindicate fiduciary 
imprudence.”40 Defendants in ERISA cases would always be able to pass 
                                                                                                                                
38 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671. 
39 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). In Tibble, the 
court affirmed the district court’s finding that the employer had imprudently failed 
to consider the potential cost savings of selecting institutional rather than retail 
classes of mutual fund shares. During the relevant period, the plan at issue offered 
from six to fifty investment options. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 639 F. Supp. 2d 
1074, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the issue of the size of the menu. 
40 Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1074 (citing LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 
552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (citing the DOL's regulations implementing section 
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responsibility for losses to participants because “there can be no loss 
without the participant selecting an investment.”41 The Tibble court agreed 
with the DOL’s view that the employer’s selection of investment options 
necessarily precedes the participant’s investment decision and therefore 
should reasonably be viewed as the most salient cause of losses arising 
from the inclusion of a particular option in the 401(k) menu.42 As explained 
in Tibble, the large menu defense contradicts the plain meaning of the 
control safe harbor. 
 The large menu defense interpretation of the control safe harbor also 
fails because it misreads the purpose of the safe harbor’s “broad range of 
investment alternatives” requirement.  The courts view the broad-range 
requirement as reflecting a policy favoring large menus, as if its purpose 
were to maximize participant choice.  The Renfro court stated that “[a]n 
ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants 
meaningful choices,”43 which Loomis echoed in characterizing the 404(c) 
safe harbor as “encourag[ing] sponsors to allow more choice to participants 
in defined-contribution plans.” 44  The courts interpret the safe harbor’s 
diversification requirement as reflecting Congress’s wish that employers 
offer as many options as feasible to provide participants with the greatest 
possible control over their investments.  
 This choice-for-choice’s sake view misunderstands that the broad-
range requirement is designed to promote diversification, not large menus.  
It is intended to incentivize employers to offer menus that enable 
participants to construct an efficient portfolio with appropriate risk-return 
characteristics. 45  The diversification purpose of the broad-range 
                                                                                                                                
404(c) in rejecting the converse interpretation) and Langbecker, 476 F.3d at 321 
(Reavley, J., dissenting) (“All commentators recognize that § 404(c) does not shift 
liability for a plan fiduciary's duty to ensure that each investment option is and 
continues to be a prudent one.”)). 
41 Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1073 (“For a 401(k) (or for any defined-contribution 
plan for that matter), it is admittedly the case that monetary damage flowing from a 
fiduciary's imprudent design of the investment menu passes through the 
participant, as intermediary. But is it proper to conclude that those losses, in the 
language of section 404(c), ‘result from’ the participant's choice? This might seem 
an odd question given that, literally speaking, there can be no loss without the 
participant selecting an investment.”). 
42 Id. 
43 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. (2011). 
44 Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 2011). 
45  A “broad range of investment alternatives” has been provided if the 
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requirement is illustrated by the following example.  If a participant who 
planned to retire in 2008 had invested 100% of her assets in stock funds 
(which would have declined precipitously that year), that unfortunate 
allocation decision would have reflected her exercise of control if the 
employer had provided a diversified menu of options, including fixed 
income options in which she could have invested to create a more 
appropriate portfolio.46 The allocation would have been entirely outside the 
employer’s control.47 In contrast, if the stock funds that she chose were 
                                                                                                                                
participant has an opportunity to: (1) materially affect the potential return and 
degree of risk of the account;, (2) diversify to as to minimize the risk of large 
losses; and (3) choose from at least three diversified investment options. These 
investment options must have materially different risk and return characteristics 
such that they can be combined in a portfolio: (1) with aggregate risk-return 
characteristics that are within the range that is appropriate for the participant and 
(2) that tends to minimize the risk of the overall portfolio. See 29 C.F.R. § 
2550.404c–1. 
 46 As stated by the Seventh Circuit in an employer-stock option case, “it would 
make no sense [under the 404(c) safe harbor] to blame the fiduciary for the 
participant's decision to invest 40% of her assets in Fund A and 60% in Fund B, 
rather than splitting assets somehow among four different funds, emphasizing A 
rather than B, or taking any other decision.” Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 
552, 567 (7th Cir. 2011). (As noted earlier, the Seventh Circuit has not applied its 
analysis in employer-stock cases to cases involving the selection of other types of 
investment options.) The Hecker and Loomis courts effectively held that choosing 
an excessive fee option over a non-excessive fee option from a large menu is the 
equivalent of choosing Fund A over Fund B, in that the participant’s decision is the 
proximate cause of both decisions. But the Hecker and Loomis analysis does not 
make sense as an interpretation of the DOL’s “broad range” requirement. That 
requirement is designed to produce a menu with diversified risk/return 
characteristics; it is not designed to produce a menu that is diversified in the sense 
of offering a mix of excessive and non-excessive fee options. 
 47 Although the participant’s allocation may have been the legal cause of the 
losses, research shows that the selection of the menu, even if it is adequately 
diversified, also bears a causal relationship to the participant’s allocation. For 
example, participants will invest a much higher percentage of plan assets in stock 
funds when a plan offers a mix of four stock funds and one bond fund than when 
the plan offers a mix of one stock fund and four bond funds. See Shlomo Benartzi 
& Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution 
Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 87 (2001) (finding that when equity options 
comprised a larger percentage of hypothetical options, study subjects invested a 
larger percentage of accounts in equities than when equity options comprised a 
smaller percentage of options), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/ 
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imprudently selected because they charged excessive fees, then the 
employer would be responsible for the losses due to the excessive fees.  
Although the employee chose the excessive fee option, and there may have 
been stock funds in the menu that did not charge excessive fees, the 
employer’s selection of the options would have been the proximate, 
preceding cause of the loss.  Whether the total number of options was large 
or small is irrelevant to the employer’s responsibility for the imprudent 
selection of the excessive fee option. 
 In summary, some courts have dismissed claims that an employer 
violated the prudent man standard by placing excessive fee investment 
options in its 401(k) plan based on a large menu defense.  The courts have 
reasoned that when a 401(k) plan offers a large number of investment 
options, any losses due to the imprudent selection of an investment option 
resulted not from the employer’s selection of the investment option, but 
from the participant’s exercise of control in choosing to invest in the 
option.  This position is inconsistent with ERISA because the preceding 
proximate cause of losses due to the inclusion of an imprudently selected 
investment in the plan is, in fact, the employer’s decision to include the 
investment in the plan.  The courts’ large menu defense cannot be 
reconciled with a reasonable reading of the control safe harbor.  The courts 
also seem to misunderstand that the purpose of the safe harbor’s legal 
incentives to offer a broad range of investment alternatives is not to inflate 
the size of 401(k) menus, but to encourage employers to offer an 
appropriately diverse set of options.  However, the large menu defense may 
reflect less of a disagreement about the nature of causation or the meaning 
of the safe harbor than a more fundamental ideological view that the 
regulation of plan participants’ 401(k) investments should be left to the 
marketplace rather than ERISA’s fiduciary duties.  
 
                                                                                                                                
documents/areas/fac/accounting/naive_diversification.pdf; see also Jeffrey Brown 
et al., Individual Account Investment Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral 
Lessons from 401(K) Plans (NBER Working Paper, No. 13169, June 2007) 
(increasing equity fund representation from 1/3 to 1/2 of menu increased 
participants’ equity allocations by 7.5%) (“Behavioral Lessons”), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13169.pdf?new_window=1; Anders Karlsson et al., 
Portfolio Choice and Menu Exposure, EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings (February 7, 
2006) (likelihood of option being chosen increases with its representation in 
menu), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ 
ssrn.888661.  
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III. FREE MARKETS, LARGE MENUS AND THE FIDUCIARY 
STANDARD 
 
The remainder of this article discusses two major concerns 
regarding the large menu defense.  The first concern is that the large menu 
defense evinces a judicial decision to evaluate employers’ legal 
responsibilities on the basis of judges’ free market ideology instead of 
employers’ fiduciary duties under ERISA.  These judges prefer that 
economic activities be allowed to operate pursuant to free market axioms, 
which conflicts with the imposition of a fiduciary duty on employers.  The 
large menu defense reflects the particular free market axiom that offering 
plan participants the widest possible range of choice in their 401(k) plans 
maximizes social wealth.  However, this position is fundamentally 
incompatible with the mandate in ERISA to enforce the paternalistic 
principles that a fiduciary duty inherently entails, as discussed further in 
this section.  The second concern presented by the large menu defense, as 
discussed in Section IV, is that the courts’ view that large 401(k) menus are 
wealth-maximizing is empirically false.  Large 401(k) menus make 
workers poorer, not wealthier. 
The large menu defense is generally based on the view that free 
market principles are superior to fiduciary duties in regulating employers’ 
selections of 401(k) investment options.  The defense views a large 401(k) 
menu as effectively a marketplace in which the only legally controlling 
factor is the participant’s role in choosing an investment.  Courts in favor 
of the large menu defense found that participants were responsible 
“because of the nature and breadth of funds made available,” “the 
numerous investment options,” and “the wide range of expense ratios 
among” the funds offered.  The plans offered a “variety of risk and fee 
profiles” constituting “meaningful choices about how to invest their 
retirement savings” and included enough investment options from which 
“to create a portfolio tailored to meet [participants’] investment 
objectives.”  
A plan that replicates an open marketplace effectively abrogates 
the employer’s legal responsibility for selecting investment options for the 
plan.  In contrast, Wal-Mart’s “narrower range of investment options” 
made “it more plausible . . . that the Plan was imprudently managed” 
because the invisible hand of the market was replaced with the visible hand 
of the employer.  Where the number of plans is small, the employer may be 
faulted for interfering with free market forces by narrowing participants’ 
investment decisions to an artificially limited set.  If employers allow the 
invisible hand free reign, then they will be relieved of liability.  
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This ideology is illustrated in Hecker, as quoted approvingly in 
Loomis, where the court notes that Deere’s 401(k) funds “were also offered 
to investors in the general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily 
were set against the backdrop of market competition.”48 The Renfro court 
was similarly skeptical of plaintiffs’ claim that fees were excessive with 
respect to “funds that are available on the same terms to individual 
investors in the open market.” 49  In Loomis, it did not matter that an 
employer chose excessive fee options for the plan; “[a]ny participant who 
want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1% [could] get it through Exelon's 
Plan.”50 The courts’ marketplace theory of liability essentially finds that an 
employer can shed its fiduciary role in selecting 401(k) investment options 
by choosing a menu that replicates the marketplace.  
The market-based criteria on which these courts based the large 
menu defense contradict not only the plain meaning of the control safe 
harbor, as discussed supra in Section II, but also the essential nature of the 
fiduciary duty.  Judge Cardozo’s iconic characterization of the fiduciary 
duty in Meinhard v. Salmon tees up the fundamental conflict between 
fiduciary duties and market-based principles:  
 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world 
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those 
bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something 
stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior.51 
 
In the fiduciary context, pure market dynamics cannot be relied upon to 
yield the sought-after social benefits of commercial activities.  Fiduciary 
principles, therefore, are not circumscribed by the rules that apply to 
commercial, “arm’s length” relationships, but are based on non-market 
criteria because markets are not always efficient.  Inefficiencies can reduce 
the social utility of market-based transactions.  These inefficiencies may 
arise from a host of factors, including unequal bargaining positions, 
informational asymmetries, monopoly power, bounded rationality and/or 
                                                                                                                                
48 See supra note 37.  
49 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2011). 
50 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671. 
51 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
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rent-seeking regulation.52 Judge Cardozo may not have been thinking in 
terms of economic theory yet to take concrete form, but he nevertheless 
understood that, in the face of market inefficiencies, “honesty alone,” i.e., 
requiring only that a fiduciary refrain from fraud or other 
misrepresentation, was inadequate to ensure that free market activities 
would increase, rather than reduce, net social wealth. 
Common law and statutory fiduciary duties reflect, respectively, 
courts’ and legislators’ decisions to modify or supplant market forces with 
external rules in situations in which market-based principles are likely to 
fail to create the social benefits of commercial activities.  While there is a 
robust scholarship about when and to what extent fiduciary duties are 
actually wealth-maximizing,53 there is general agreement with the position 
that fiduciary duties are intended to and do, in fact, modify or supplant 
market forces.  They reflect an inherently paternalistic view that, when 
fiduciary duties apply, courts and legislatures should redirect the natural 
course of commerce even if doing so replaces the usually wealth-
maximizing decisions of rational economic actors with the judgment of 
government actors.  
In short, courts applying the large menu defense simply disagree 
with Congress’s decision to impose fiduciary duties on employers when 
selecting 401(k) investment options.  The Loomis court revealed the 
ideological nature of its disagreement with Congress in charging that the 
problem in that case was that the “[p]laintiffs' theory is paternalistic.”54 
This statement, taken literally, is absurd because the legal theories 
underlying a fiduciary claim are necessarily paternalistic.  ERISA is 
paternalistic to its core.  The Congressional findings and declaration of 
policy in ERISA speak of protecting the interests of plan beneficiaries “by 
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for 
                                                                                                                                
52 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. b (2007). 
53 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996) (discussing the scope of managers’ duties 
in the context of the corporation and the corporate contract). See also Paul 
Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right (Univ. 
of Virginia Law School Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 00-8, Jan. 2000) 
(finding higher rates of real per capita growth in common law economies); Ross 
Levine et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 205, Feb. 1999) (finding that common 
law systems enhance financial intermediary development, which causes higher 
economic growth), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=247793. 
54 658 F.3d at 673. 
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fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate 
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”55 Congress 
sought to protect the interests of participants “by improving the equitable 
character and the soundness of such plans.”56 These broad, paternalistic 
goals look to decidedly non-market-based rules to regulate the operation of 
pension benefit plans. 
The ERISA prudent man and prohibited transaction rules give 
concrete form to the paternalistic structure and purpose of ERISA.  
Employee pension plans are required to have a fiduciary and a fiduciary is 
required to assume fiduciary duties with respect to the structure and 
operation of the plan, including selecting investment options in the plan.  
ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules narrowly circumscribe or flatly 
prohibit transactions that normally would be subject only to the rules that 
apply to arm’s-length deals.  ERISA empowers employers to automatically 
enroll employees in a plan and invest an employer-determined percentage 
of the employee’s wages in an employer-selected investment option when 
employees have not affirmatively taken these steps themselves.57  
Regardless of whether ERISA’s paternalism is good policy, its 
paternalism is undeniable.  It is difficult to understand how the Loomis 
court could criticize the “[p]laintiffs’ theory” for being “paternalistic” when 
the private cause of action on which the theory is based is intrinsically 
paternalistic.  This contradiction is sharpened by the fact that the Loomis 
opinion’s author, Judge Frank Easterbrook, established his reputation as a 
scholar by elucidating the paternalistic nature of fiduciary duties and 
identifying situations in which he believed that fiduciary duties should be 
waivable or eliminated.  
As a member of the judiciary, Judge Easterbrook has previously 
attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to substitute a market-based test for an 
express fiduciary duty under federal law.  In Jones v. Harris Associates 
                                                                                                                                
55 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006). 
56 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2006). 
57  ERISA’s automatic enrollment provision is the regulatory policy most 
extensively discussed in Richard Thaler’s and Cass Sunstein’s best-seller, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, which is based 
on a regulatory model that they call “libertarian paternalism.” RICHARD THALER & 
CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS (2008).   
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L.P.,58 he authored the opinion that affirmed the dismissal of a claim under 
section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which provides that 
“the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be 
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation 
for services.”59  Prior to Jones, courts had generally interpreted section 
36(b) under a fiduciary standard established by the Second Circuit twenty-
five years earlier in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.60 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Gartenberg standard in holding that the 
fiduciary duty under section 36(b) could only be violated if the fees paid 
were “‘so unusual’ as to give rise to an inference ‘that deceit must have 
occurred, or that the persons responsible for decision have abdicated.’”61 
As in Loomis, the court’s decision was based on its view that market forces, 
not fiduciary duties, should be the exclusive determinant of prices, and that 
“honesty alone” was enough. 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit’s 
Jones decision. 62  The Court’s analysis is instructive as to the 
incompatibility of strictly market-based rules of construction and the 
intrinsically paternalistic nature of the fiduciary duty.  It pointedly 
summarized the Seventh Circuit’s Jones analysis as follows:  
 
The panel argued that this [deceit-based] understanding of 
§ 36(b) is consistent with the forces operating in the 
contemporary mutual fund market.  Noting that “[t]oday 
thousands of mutual funds compete,” the panel concluded 
that “sophisticated investors” shop for the funds that 
produce the best overall results, “mov[e] their money 
elsewhere” when fees are “excessive in relation to the 
results,” and thus “create a competitive pressure” that 
                                                                                                                                
58 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated 559 U.S. 
335, 353 (2010). In the interests of full disclosure, this author was an expert 
witness in Jones. 
59 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
60 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
61 537 F.3d at 732. 
62 As the Wall Street Journal editorial page has noted, “It isn’t easy to lose 9 - 
0 on the current ideologically divided Supreme Court.” Editorial, Supremes 9, SEC 
0, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887324662404578330260976961512.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_
AboveLEFTTop. 
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generally keeps fees low.  The panel faulted Gartenberg on 
the ground that it “relies too little on markets.”63  
 
The Court flatly rejected the idea that markets set the boundaries of Section 
36(b)’s fiduciary duty.64 Instead, it treated Section 36(b)’s “fiduciary duty” 
as a fiduciary duty.  The Court adopted the traditional fiduciary standard 
that it applied in Pepper v. Litton in 1939—notably reaching back to the era 
of Cardozo’s fiduciary duty in Meinhard—which involved a “dominant or 
controlling shareholder’s claim for compensation against a bankrupt 
corporation.”65 Under that classically paternalistic standard, the shareholder 
had the burden not only “to prove the good faith of the transaction but also 
to show its inherent fairness.” 66  The Court’s holding reflected its 
understanding that a statutory fiduciary duty represents the legislature’s 
decision not to defer blindly to the “morals of the marketplace” because 
free market forces will not always yield an optimal outcome.  
One basis for the Court’s decision was its recognition that free 
markets are not, in fact, necessarily wealth-maximizing.  It warned that, in 
applying Section 36(b), “courts should not rely too heavily on comparisons 
with fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers.  These comparisons 
are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the 
product of negotiations conducted at arm's length.”67 
In support of this statement, the Court cited the dissent from the 
Seventh Circuit’s denial of a rehearing en banc,68 in which Judge Richard 
Posner had argued that “the panel base[d] its rejection of Gartenberg 
mainly on an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the basis 
of growing indications that executive compensation in large publicly traded 
firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of 
                                                                                                                                
63 Jones, 559 U.S. at 342 (quoting Jones, 527 F.3d at 632). 
64 Jones, 335 U.S. at 353.  E.g. id. (“By focusing almost entirely on the 
element of disclosure, the Seventh Circuit panel erred. An investment adviser 
‘must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on 
compensation.’”) (quoting Jones, 527 F.3d at 632)). 
65 Jones, 335 U.S. at 346 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)). 
66 Id. at 346-47 (quoting Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306-07). 
67 Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added). 
68  Id. (citing Jones, 537 F.3d at 731); id. (“Competition between money 
market funds for shareholder business does not support an inference that 
competition must therefore also exist between [investment advisers] for fund 
business. The former may be vigorous even though the latter is virtually non-
existent.”) (quoting Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929).     
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directors to police compensation.69 Judge Posner continued, “[c]ompetition 
in product and capital markets can't be counted on to solve the problem 
because the same structure of incentives operates on all large corporations 
and similar entities, including mutual funds.”70 The Jones case suggests 
that, if the large menu defense reaches the Court, it will be struck down just 
as decisively as the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Jones. 
Possibly concerned about being reversed on appeal again, Judge 
Easterbrook attempted to distinguish Jones from Loomis on the ground that 
the defendant in a section 36(b) case has a conflict of interest.  A fund 
manager directly benefits from the receipt of fees that the section 36(b) 
plaintiff alleges are excessive.  In contrast, “there is no reason to think that 
Exelon chose the funds to enrich itself at participants' expense.”71 However, 
there is no support, and the Loomis court cited none, for the proposition 
that fiduciary liability under ERISA attaches only with proof of the 
fiduciary’s self-dealing motive.  To the contrary, “the great principles of 
trust fiduciary law, loyalty and prudence, do not depend upon the 
transferor's motive, whether making a gift or doing a deal.”72 A trustee is 
                                                                                                                                
69 Jones, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. 
71  Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671 (“[E]xelon had (and has) every reason to use 
competition in the market for fund management to drive down the expenses 
charged to participants, . . . Competition thus assists both employers and 
employees, as Hecker observed.”). It is hard to take this distinction seriously, as 
Judge Easterbrook made the same argument in Jones that a fund manager has the 
same market-based incentive to keep fees low: 
 
Holding costs down is vital in competition, when investors are 
seeking maximum return net of expenses—and as management 
fees are a substantial component of administrative costs, mutual 
funds have a powerful reason to keep them low unless higher 
fees are associated with higher return on investment. A 
difference of 0.1% per annum in total administrative expenses 
adds up by compounding over time and is enough to induce 
many investors to change mutual funds. That mutual funds are 
“captives” of investment advisers does not curtail this 
competition. An adviser can't make money from its captive fund 
if high fees drive investors away.  
 
Jones, 527 F.3d at 631-32. 
72 John H. Langbein, Essay, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an 
Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 186 (1997). 
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bound to the duties it has assumed regardless of whether it may personally 
benefit from any alleged malfeasance, just as ERISA’s prudent man 
standard applies regardless of whether violating it is accompanied by a 
financial benefit to the fiduciary. 
The Loomis court’s preference for free market principles in 
derogation of express statutory fiduciary duties reveals the ideological 
nature of its position that ERISA fiduciary claims must conform to an 
overriding, rational-actor model of human behavior.  Yet the Supreme Court 
rejected precisely this approach in Jones, namely, the court’s substitution of 
its own economic analysis for Congress’s decision to qualify the primacy of 
the rational actor model by imposing a fiduciary duty in certain situations.  
If and when the market-based, large menu defense reaches the Court, it is 
likely to suffer the same fate as the market-based approach taken in Jones. 
 The large menu defense goes further than exalting free market 
principles over plain statutory mandates; it re-interprets ERISA’s 
diversification requirement as a paean to the liberation ideology of free 
choice.  Courts in favor of the large menu defense consider choice-
maximization to be a central purpose of ERISA.  Tibble’s “centerpiece” of 
ERISA was “participant choice.”73 Renfro viewed ERISA’s diversification 
standard as “being designed to offer participants meaningful choices,”74 as 
echoed by Loomis’s view that its purpose was, “[f]ar from reflecting a 
paternalistic approach, [to] encourage sponsors to allow more choice to 
participants.”75 Loomis applauded Exelon because, as directed by the safe 
harbor, it had “left choice to the people who have the most interest in the 
outcome, and it cannot be faulted for doing this.”76  
The courts’ view that the purpose of ERISA is to maximize 
participant choice, which turns the statute on its head.  Congress did not 
enact ERISA to generate more investment choices for workers; it enacted 
ERISA to enhance their retirement security.  As noted herein, ERISA 
reflects a strongly paternalistic view of pension plans.77 Congress did not 
                                                                                                                                
73 Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1083.   
74 Renfro, 671 F.3d at 327. 
75 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673. 
76 Id. 
77 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (b)-(c) (2012); Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673; RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (showing that ERISA’s automatic enrollment 
provision is the regulatory policy and is based on a regulatory model that the 
authors call “libertarian paternalism”).   
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enact ERISA to free workers of some imaginary yoke of oppression 
imposed by employers that offer a limited menu of 401(k) investment 
options.  Rather, Congress intended that ERISA restrict employers’ and 
workers’ discretion, respectively, in offering and choosing investments. 
The large menu defense treats consumer choice as an end in itself; 
under ERISA, it is only a means to an end.  The statute does not require 
choice for choice’s sake.  The 404(a) safe harbor mandates at least three 
diversified investment options as a means of maximizing plan participants’ 
wealth, not as a means of promoting individual freedom.  The DOL 
conditions the safe harbor on plans’ offering a “broad range of investment 
alternatives” not in order to enhance rational actors’ ability to maximize 
their personal utility, but to maximize the wealth of plan participants as a 
group based on the government’s faith in a particular theory of investing 
(modern portfolio theory).78  
The incentives that ERISA offers to employers to offer multiple 
investment options, as well as related DOL regulations and interpretation, 
reflect patently paternalistic public policy decisions about what is best for 
workers.  These policies are decidedly not motivated by a liberation 
ideology of individual freedom and choice.  The safe harbors relieve 
employers of liability for following government guidelines in selecting 
investment options, not for seeking to maximize plan participant freedom.  
The courts’ re-characterization of a government mandate based on modern 
portfolio theory as a policy of liberation designed to maximize worker 
freedom is nothing more than wishful thinking, statutory nullification, or 
both.  
 
IV. JUDICIAL ECONOMICS AND THE EMPIRICAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF LARGE 401(K) MENUS 
 
As discussed immediately above, the large menu defense is based 
on the courts’ belief that ERISA’s prudent man rule is rendered inoperative 
                                                                                                                                
78 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(ii) (2010). See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee 
and the Prudent Investor: The Emerging Acceptance of Alternative Investments as 
the New Fiduciary Standard, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 653, 666-68 (2012) (discussing 
relationship between modern portfolio theory and the prudent investor rule); W. 
Scott Simon, Illuminating the ‘Broad Range’ Requirement of ERISA Section 
404(c) With the Language of Modern Portfolio Theory Found in the Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act and the Restatement 3rd of Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule),  
13 J. PENSION BENEFITS 87 (2005) . 
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as to an employer’s selection of 401(k) investment options if the employer 
offers a large enough number of investment options.  By offering a large 
menu of options, the employer in Loomis, for example, “left choice to the 
people who have the most interest in the outcome, and it cannot be faulted 
for doing this.” 79  In contrast, employers such as Wal-Mart, that 
paternalistically limit the number of investment options, thereby increase 
their ERISA liability risk.  This judicial exercise of extralegal authority is 
reason to be concerned, but if the courts’ faith in the wealth-maximizing 
effect of choice in 401(k) plans is well-founded, then at least workers 
would be wealthier as a result. 
However, larger 401(k) menus actually reduce workers’ wealth.  
Research demonstrates that the assumption made by free market ideologues 
that increasing choice in 401(k) plans maximizes wealth is empirically 
false.  The courts supporting the large menu defense do not cite any 
research to support their view of the economic benefits of large 401(k) 
menus; they seem entirely indifferent as to whether their theories bear any 
relation to reality.  The effect of the large menu defense is to make workers 
poorer, while also creating a perverse incentive for employers to reduce 
their ERISA liability risk by adding more options to their 401(k) plans. 
The large menu defense reflects the courts’ view of the model of 
plan participants as rational utility maximizers.  Traditional free market 
theory assumes that economic actors are rational.  Consumers make choices 
to maximize their personal wealth, or “utility.”  A larger set of choices 
should enhance consumers’ abilities to maximize their utility because with 
every additional choice, the chance that the set of options will include the 
most utility-maximizing option for a particular consumer increases. 80 
Larger 401(k) menus should therefore be wealth maximizing because they 
increase the likelihood that the set of investment options will include 
utility-maximizing options for every participant.  The more flavors of ice 
cream that are available, the greater the likelihood that the consumer’s 
favorite flavor will be among them.  Conversely, restricting the size of 
401(k) menus should reduce participants’ wealth because a smaller menu is 
less likely to include the particular investment that will maximize a 
participant’s utility. 
                                                                                                                                
79 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673-74. 
80 See generally Sheena S. Iyengar &Wei Jiang, The Psychological Costs of 
Ever Increasing Choice: A Fallback to the Sure Bet 3 (Columbia Univ., Working 
Paper, 2005) (discussing rational choice theory). 
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In practice, however, offering more choices to consumers adversely 
affects their ability to maximize their utility.  For example, numerous 
studies have shown that offering subjects a small set of purchase options 
increases the likelihood that they will make a purchase.  One prominent 
study found that shoppers were more likely to buy jam when offered six 
flavors to choose from instead of twenty-four.  One reason for the adverse 
effect of providing more choices may be that choice creates stress, which 
was illustrated by a study in which subjects were made to choose from 
among an array of Godiva chocolates.  They reported feelings of regret and 
less certainty when offered thirty chocolates than when offered only six.  
Thus, reducing the number of available choices can create both material 
and psychological benefits. 
While investment options in 401(k) plans are a far cry from jams and 
chocolates, the effects of offering more choice to plan participants is the 
same – and vastly more costly.  Studies have shown that large menus have 
the effect of substantially reducing plan participation rates, thereby 
resulting in huge financial losses to workers.  There is also empirical 
evidence that large menus result in investment options that are lower 
quality and more expensive, lead to inferior asset allocation decisions, and 
impair the effectiveness of disclosure due to information overload.  The 
aggregate effects of the consequences of large menus are an annual 
deadweight wealth reduction of billions of dollars and a less secure 
retirement for millions of Americans.  
 
A.  LARGE MENU EFFECTS – REDUCED PARTICIPATION RATES 
 
The most prominent study on the effect of large 401(k) menus is 
also the most comprehensive.  Three Columbia University researchers 
studied the participation rates of more than 800,000 employees across 647 
plans.81 In short, they found that, with every ten additional options, the 
plan’s participation rate declined by approximately two percentage points.  
As the number of investment options increased from two to eleven, the 
participation rate declined steadily from 75% to 70%.  The participation 
rate remained at approximately 70% as the number of options increased 
from eleven to thirty, at which point the rate began to decline 
approximately two percentage points for each ten-option increase.  The 
                                                                                                                                
81 Id at 2. See also GARY R. MOTTOLA & STEPHEN P. UTKUS, VANGUARD CTR. 
FOR RET. RES., CAN THERE BE TOO MUCH CHOICE IN A RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
PLAN? (2003) (summarizing and commenting on Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80). 
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participation rate declined to 67% when the number of investment options 
increased to thirty-five, and declined further to 61% when the number of 
options reached fifty-six.82 
 These data take on a human face when applied to an actual 401(k) 
plan.  As discussed herein, Deere’s plan included twenty-five core mutual 
fund options and 2,500 additional funds.  The plan had approximately 
31,000 participants,83 which would represent a participation rate ranging 
from 61% to 68%, depending on whether one treated the plan as offering 
more than fifty-six options (61%) or only twenty-five options (68%).84 If 
the plan had offered only two options and achieved a 75% participation 
rate, it would have had approximately 38,000 participants under the fifty-
six-plus-options assumption and 34,000 participants under a twenty-five-
option assumption.  In other words, by providing its employees with a large 
number of investment options, Deere effectively excluded 3,000 to 8,000 
employees from its plan,85 and reduced its ERISA liability risk by doing so.  
 The wealth reduction caused by large menus is staggering, primarily 
because nonparticipation deprives employees of the company match.  
About 85% of plan sponsors make matching contributions to defined 
contribution plans.86 The most common match amount is either 50% or 
                                                                                                                                
82 A 2009 survey by Watson Wyatt found that the most common number of 
options in 401(k) plans was ten to fourteen, with 11% of plans offering more than 
twenty-four options. SeeNews Archives – August / September 2009, BENEFITS AND 
PENSIONS MONITOR ONLINE,http://www.bpmmagazine.com/benefits_news_august 
_september_2009.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
83 Second Am. Compl. for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at para. 28(a), Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., No. 06-C-0719-S (W.D. Wis., Mar. 6, 2007) 2007 WL 2891544, at 
*8. 
84 If 30,000 participants equaled a 61% or a 68% participation rate, then a 75% 
participation rate would equal, respectively, 36,885 and 33,088 participants 
(.75*(30000/.61) and .75*(30,000/.68)). The participation rate estimates in this 
section are extrapolated from the Columbia analysis for illustrative purposes. They 
are not intended to reflect actual rates, which are generally available in a 
company’s Form 5500 filings. 
85 Exelon’s large menu probably had a similar effect. Approximately 23,000 
Exelon Corp. employees participated in its thirty-two-option retirement plan, 
which, assuming a large-menu-suppressed 68% participation rate, means that 2,000 
fewer employees participated than likely would have participated in a two-option 
plan. See Compl. for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at para. 27(a), Loomis v. Exelon 
Corp., No. 06CV4900 (N.D. Ill.., Sept. 11, 2006), 2006 WL 2791653 (23,000 
participants in Exelon plan). 
86  See AON HEWITT, 2011 TRENDS AND EXPERIENCE IN DEFINED 
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100% of employee contributions up to 6% of their pay.87 Deere offered a 
maximum 401(k) match of 6%, 88  which means that for every $1 
contributed by an employee up to 6% of their pay, Deere contributed $1 to 
the employee’s 401(k) account.  For a Deere employee earning $25,000 
annually who contributed 6% of his pay to Deere’s 401(k) plan, the 6% 
match would represent $1,500 in additional annual income.  The Deere 
employee who does not participate in the 401(k) plan receives none of this 
additional income.  Assuming Deere’s large menu effectively excludes 
3,000 to 8,000 employees from its plan, these employees lose $4.5 to $12 
million in income every year, even before taking into account lost 
investment gains. 
 By offering a large menu, Deere reduces not only its ERISA liability 
risk, but also its compensation expenses.  The $4.5 to $12 million of 
foregone annual income directly increases Deere’s profits.  This means that 
the Seventh Circuit’s assumption that employers do not have a conflict of 
interest in the design of their 401(k) plans is actually false.89 Employers can 
increase their profits by increasing the size of their 401(k) menus because 
                                                                                                                                
CONTRIBUTION PLANS 4 (2011), available at http://www.aon.com/attachments/ 
thought-leadership/2011_Trends_Experience_Executive_Summary_v5.pdf. 
87 See id.  
88 See Hecker v. Deere & Co. 556 F.3d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 2009).  
89  Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671 (Exelon “had (and has) every reason to use 
competition in the market for fund management to drive down the expenses 
charged to participants, . . . Competition thus assists both employers and 
employees, as Hecker observed.”). It is hard to take this distinction seriously, as 
Judge Easterbrook made the same argument in Jones that a fund manager has the 
same market-based incentive to keep fees low: 
 
Holding costs down is vital in competition, when investors are 
seeking maximum return net of expenses—and as management 
fees are a substantial component of administrative costs, mutual 
funds have a powerful reason to keep them low unless higher 
fees are associated with higher return on investment. A 
difference of 0.1% per annum in total administrative expenses 
adds up by compounding over time and is enough to induce 
many investors to change mutual funds. That mutual funds are 
“captives” of investment advisers does not curtail this 
competition. An adviser can't make money from its captive fund 
if high fees drive investors away.  
 
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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that will result in fewer employees taking advantage of the employer 
match.  The employer will still be able to attract workers by advertising 
employee compensation as including a 6% match.  This cause-and-effect 
relationship is, of course, somewhat attenuated, but it is useful in 
illustrating the absurd position in which the large menu defense courts have 
placed employers. 
 In contrast with Deere’s being rewarded for its large menu, Wal-
Mart was punished for offering a limited menu that, precisely because it is 
limited, creates billions of dollars of wealth for its employees.90 The Wal-
Mart plan offered eleven investment options and had approximately one 
million participants, which would represent a 70% participation rate under 
the Columbia analysis.  If Wal-Mart had offered fifty-six options, its plan’s 
predicted participation rate would have been 61%, which translates into 
approximately 130,000 fewer employees participating in the plan.  Wal-
Mart offers a full match up to 6% of the employee’s pay, which for 
130,000 employees earning $25,000 annually would total approximately $2 
billion over ten years, even before taking into account investment gains.  
Thus, Wal-Mart employees’ wealth has been increased by billions of 
dollars because Wal-Mart’s plan has a limited menu of options.  The large 
menu defense creates an incentive, however, for Wal-Mart to increase the 
number of options in its plan in order to reduce its ERISA liability 
exposure.  If Wal-Mart decides to follow the guidance of the courts which 
support the large menu defense, then its workers will be billions of dollars 
poorer as a result.  
 The adverse effects of large menus are most pronounced for the 
groups who stand the most to lose by not participating in 401(k).  The 
Columbia researchers found that the reduction in participation rates caused 
by large menus was even greater for older workers, female workers and 
low-income workers.91 These are the groups for whom inadequate investing 
for retirement will have the direst consequences.  Older workers have less 
time to put away funds for retirement, females live longer and therefore 
have longer retirements to plan for, and low-income workers have the 
greatest need for each additional dollar of income in retirement.  The 
                                                                                                                                
90 Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 603 n.6 (8th Cir. 2009); see 
Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 959, 963 (S.D. Iowa 2010) 
(citing argument that limited menu in Braden, compared with large menu in 
Hecker, made imprudent management claim more plausible); Tibble v. Edison 
Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013).  
91 Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 16. 
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disproportionate effect of large menus on these groups will impose greater 
financial burdens on society as well because reduced standards of living in 
retirement will inevitably place greater pressure on our already strained 
Social Security system.  
 
B.  LARGE MENU EFFECTS – OVERLY CONSERVATIVE 
ALLOCATIONS 
 
 The losses attributable to large menus are by no means limited to 
lower participation rates.  The Columbia study found that large menus also 
harm participants by causing them to make overly conservative allocations 
of their assets.  This finding is consistent with general research showing 
that increasing choice suppresses risk-taking.  For example, in one study, 
researchers asked subjects to choose from a series of hypothetical salary 
options.  The researchers found that the subjects’ willingness to take risks 
was inversely correlated with the number of options offered.  Similar 
studies have shown that subjects are more likely to make worse decisions 
as the number of options increases.  For example, a 1995 study found that 
doctors, when offered the option of prescribing either of two medicines for 
a medical condition, each of which would have been an improvement over 
doing nothing, usually chose to do nothing.92  
 These responses to increasing the number of choices were similarly 
reflected in plan participants’ allocation decisions.  The Columbia 
researchers found that, for every ten-option increase in the size of the 
menu, participants’ allocations to equity funds decreased by 7.1 to 8.9 
percentage points, “an amount both economically and statistically 
significant (at the 2.5% level).”93 This reduction in equity fund allocations 
is not nearly as striking as the increase in participants who allocated none 
of their contributions to equities.  The researchers found that “the 
                                                                                                                                
92 See Donald A. Redelmeier & Eldar Shafir, Medical Decision Making in 
Situations That Offer Multiple Alternatives, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 302 (1995), 
available at  https://psych.princeton.edu/~psych/psychology/research/shafir/ 
pubs/JAMA.pdf. 
93 See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 30; see also Sheena S. Iyengar & 
Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 94 
J. PUB. ECON. 530 (2010) (finding that when a correlation is statistically significant 
at the 2.5% level, there is a 2.5% chance that a correlation is the result of chance). 
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probability that an individual contributes anything at all to equity funds 
also drops by 3.1-4.6%, significantly different from zero at the 5% level.”94 
 Conversely, a ten-option menu increase resulted in “3.9% and 5.4% 
increases in contribution allocations to, respectively, money market funds 
alone and both money market and bond funds combined.”95  Each ten-
option menu increase also produced “nearly a 2% increase in the 
percentage of choosers who allocated over half their contributions to 
money market funds alone, and a 3.6% increase in the percentage of 
choosers who allocated over half their contributions to money markets and 
bonds combined.”96 This shift of assets to less volatile classes would make 
sense for older workers, but the researchers found that the effects of large 
menus were uncorrelated with age or job tenure.  These effects were 
greater, however, for female workers and low-income workers,97 for whom 
the adverse effects of inadequate retirement preparedness are also greater.98  
 These large-menu effects impose substantial opportunity costs on 
plan participants.  The expected value of a twenty-year investment in 
equities, which is an appropriate investment period in light of the increased 
risk of equity investments, is substantially higher than the expected value 
of a twenty-year investment in bonds or money market instruments.  This 
problem of overly conservative investment options was a concern for the 
                                                                                                                                
94 See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 30. This tendency may be countered 
if the percentage of equity funds grows with the size of the menu because investors 
tend to increase their allocations to a particular asset class in proportion to that 
asset class’s representation in the menu. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, 
Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM. 
ECON. REV. 79, 87 (2001) (finding that when equity options comprised a larger 
percentage of hypothetical options, study subjects invested a larger percentage of 
accounts in equities than when equity options comprised a smaller percentage of 
options), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/documents/areas/fac/ 
accounting/naive_diversification.pdf; see also Jeffrey Brown et al., Individual 
Account Investment Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral Lessons from 
401(K) Plans (NBER Working Paper, No. 13169, June 2007) (increasing equity 
fund representation from 1/3 to 1/2 of menu increased participants’ equity 
allocations by 7.5%) (“Behavioral Lessons”), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w13169.pdf?new_window=1; Karlsson et al., supra note 46 (likelihood of 
option being chosen increases with its representation in menu), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=888661. 
95 See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 33-34.   .    
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 31.  
98 Id. at 16.  
2014      THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CHOICE  367 
 
DOL in 2006, when it was considering the kinds of investment options to 
which employers should allocate contributions of participants who 
provided no instructions.  Stable value fund sponsors lobbied the DOL to 
include such funds as “qualified default investment alternatives,” but DOL 
wisely rejected their entreaties.  Its decision to encourage more appropriate 
risk-taking by participants contrasts with the large menu defense’s effect of 
arbitrarily reducing risk-taking by encouraging larger menus.  The large 
menu defense similarly undermines the 2006 legislative reform that 
permitted automatic enrollment of employees in 401(k) plans and has 
substantially increased plan participation rates.  On both fronts, the large 
menu defense courts are effectively undoing the demonstrated benefits of 
regulatory reforms.  
 
C. LARGE MENU EFFECTS – INFERIOR INVESTMENT OPTIONS  
 
 In addition to reducing participation rates and causing overly 
conservative asset allocations, large menus reduce the quality of the 
investment options in 401(k) plans as a group.  Researchers have found that 
the quality of the funds in a plan declines as the number of options 
increases. 99  David Goldreich and Hanna Hałaburda studied 131 401(k) 
plans with the number of investment options offered ranging from four to 
twenty-eight.  They evaluated the objective quality of the plans by 
comparing their respective Sharpe ratios, which measure expected 
investment return in light of the degree of risk taken by the investor.  The 
data showed a negative correlation between the number of investment 
options offered and the quality of the plan that was significant at the 1% 
level.  Like the Columbia group, Goldreich and Hałaburda concluded 
“empirically that larger menus are objectively worse than smaller menus, 
on average, in an important economic context—401(k) pension plans, 
where a plan is a menu of investment choices.” 
 Along the same lines, Nina Tang and Olivia Mitchell found that 
increasing the number of investment options offered in a 401(k) plan did 
not increase the efficiency of the menu.  They evaluated efficiency based 
on each plan’s Sharpe ratio, degree of nondiversifiable risk, and 
participants’ potential welfare/utility loss resulting from a less efficient 
menu.100 They concluded that, “even with a handful of investment choices, 
                                                                                                                                
99 See Goldreich & Hałaburda, supra note 3, at 1. 
100 Ning Tang & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Efficiency of Pension Plan Investment 
Menus: Investment Choices in Defined Contribution Pension Plans (Mich. Ret. 
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participants will not suffer from menu restriction, as long as the choices 
offered are sensible ones.”101 They found that it would be “more sensible to 
add funds that make the menu more efficient, than simply to make the 
menu longer,” 102  which is precisely the intent of the three-option and 
broad-range diversification safe harbor requirements.103  “The key factor 
contributing to plan efficiency and performance has to do with the types of 
funds offered, rather than the total number of investment options 
provided.”104 
 Larger menus are also correlated with higher cost options. 105 
Researchers have found that, as the size of a 401(k) plan’s menu increases, 
the representation of actively-managed funds increases at a greater rate.  
Actively managed funds charge higher fees than index funds, which means 
that larger menus correlate with higher costs.  The higher fees also mean 
that large menus have inferior performance.  The researchers found that, 
while the gross performance of index and actively-managed funds was 
similar, their relative performance net of fees was quite different, with 
index funds substantially outperforming in terms of both investment returns 
and percentile ranking.106 Thus, large menus are correlated with inferior, 
higher-cost, lower-performing investment options and provide no 
efficiency benefits. 
 
D. LARGE MENU EFFECTS AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
 
 The foregoing empirical research demonstrates that rational choice 
theory fails in the context of large 401(k) menus, notwithstanding the faith 
that courts in favor of the large menu defense have in the infallible 
                                                                                                                                
Res. Ctr., Working Paper 2008-176, No. UM08-20), available at 
http://www.mrrc. isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp176.pdf. 
101 Id. at 7. 
102 Id. at 16.   
103 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(1-4). 
104 Tang & Mitchell., supra note 100, at 2. 
105 See Brown et al., supra note 47, at 2. 
106 See id. at 26 (“while the actively managed and index equity funds offered 
in our sample of 401(k) plans have similar performance before accounting for 
expenses (index funds actually slightly outperformed, but the difference is not 
significant), they differ significantly in their reported annual expenses (on the order 
of 50 basis points per year), which leads to worse performance after accounting for 
expenses (both in terms of returns and percentile rankings within its investment 
objective.)”). 
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efficiency of “rational” actors and free markets.  Large menus cause 
employees to make worse choices either by making inferior asset allocation 
decisions or by not participating in 401(k) plans at all.  Large menus also 
result in inferior options being selected by employers.  One explanation for 
investors’ behavioral response to large menus is information overload and 
complexity, which is particularly ironic in the context of the free market 
ideology underlying the large menu defense.  That ideology assumes that 
investors are better off with large menus because it is more likely that the 
menu will include, for example, a low-cost fund.  As the Loomis court 
argued, “[a]ny participant who want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1% 
can get it through Exelon's Plan.”107 However, the fact that a large menu 
may be more likely to include such a low-cost fund misses the point.  The 
evidence suggests that an investor would be less likely to actually find or 
invest in the 0.1% fund precisely because it was part of a large menu.  
 Researchers have found that search costs are a significant factor in 
the depressing effect of large choice sets on consumers’ willingness to 
make choices. 108  The additional search costs that a large menu of 
investment options imposes may lead investors not to search at all (i.e., not 
participate), or to favor the simplest options, such as money market and 
bond funds.109 They may be more likely to follow irrational heuristics, such 
as making an allocation to equity investments based on the percentage of 
equity options offered.110 Large menus that impose high search costs make 
it less likely that investors are actually exercising the “control” that is the 
basis of the control safe harbor because they will be deterred from 
exercising control by search costs, yet courts employing the large menu 
defense assume that larger menus lead to the exercise of greater participant 
control.  In fact, investors may be more likely to avoid an excessive fee 
fund that is included in a small menu rather than a large one because they 
are more likely to seek out information about a small number of funds than 
                                                                                                                                
107 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671. 
108  See generally Dmitri Kuksov & J. Miquel Villas-Boas, When More 
Alternatives Lead to Less Choice, 29 MKTG. SCI. 507 (2010), available at 
http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/marketing/PAPERS/VILLAS/Marketing%20Scien
ce%202010%20alternatives.pdf; Julie Agnew & Lisa Szykman, Asset Allocation 
and Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, 
and Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 (2005) (showing that study subjects 
reported greater feeling of information overload with more choices) available at 
http://mason.wm.edu/faculty/agnew_j/documents/assetallocation.pdf. 
109 Kuskov & Villas-Boas, supra note 108, at 512.  
110 See Brown et al., supra note 47, at 18. 
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when intimidated by a large number.  As one research team concluded, “the 
burgeoning number of actively-managed funds [in large 401(k) menus] 
makes it harder for investors to find the lower-cost index fund in the 
plan.”111 In other words, investors are less likely to conduct the information 
search necessary to identify the low-cost needle when included in a large 
menu haystack. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The law and economics movement was the most influential 
jurisprudential development of the 20th century.  The application of 
economic principles to traditional legal concepts has substantially 
improved our understanding of the relationship between law and practice.  
In no field has this been truer than in the regulation of commercial 
activities.  Law and economics has improved our ability to apply traditional 
notions of equity, such as good faith and fair dealing, unconscionability, 
and fiduciary duties, in ways that better achieve their utility-maximizing 
purpose. 
 However, law and economics, especially in the hands of judges, can 
be an instrument of economic destruction when based on blind adherence 
to a free market ideology unmoored from any empirical foundation.  The 
large menu defense adopted by some courts applies an axiom of free 
market adherents—rational choice theory—the social utility of which is 
disproved by empirical research on the actual effect of large 401(k) menus 
on workers’ welfare.  Large 401(k) menus already cost American workers 
billions of dollars every year.  The effect of the large menu defense, unless 
promptly repealed by Congress or overturned by the Supreme Court, will 
exacerbate the problem of large 401(k) menus and cause billions of dollars 
of additional losses. 
                                                                                                                                
111 Id. at 25. 
RETHINKING ERISA’S PROMISE OF INCOME SECURITY IN 
A WORLD OF 401(K) PLANS 
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*** 
 
This article discusses the evolution of retirement income funds from defined 
benefit packages to 401(k) and IRA accounts and how the changing 
dynamic has reshaped the way retirees think about post-retirement income.  
The article outlines the mechanics of 401(k) accounts and rollover IRAs in 
the post-retirement period and presents questions about the ability of 
retirees to successfully address the complex issues relating to investment 
choices including, what entity they entrust their savings to, the volume and 
source of distributions, and long-term sufficiency planning.  The article 
suggests that an increase in the use of annuities may help to resolve some 
of the challenges faced by today’s retirees. 
 
*** 
 
I. THE DECLINE OF THE DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN. 
 
Over the last twenty years the number of defined benefit plans has 
steadily declined; as of 2011, fewer than twenty percent of all employees 
participated in one.1  Defined benefit plans are being replaced by defined 
contribution plans: more specifically, 401(k) plans in the private sector, 
403(b) plans by tax exempt organizations or public schools, and 457(b) 
plans for some state and local governmental employees.2 (For brevity, these 
plans will collectively be referred to as 401(k) plans.)  Participation in 
401(k) plans has steadily risen so that over fifty percent of employees 
participate in one.3 The dollar amount saved in those accounts is 
                                                                                                        
* Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR. STATISTICS, The Last Private Industry Pension 
Plans, (2013), http://stats.bls.gov/opub/ted/2013/ted_20130103.htm. 
2 The plans take their names from the Internal Revenue Code sections that 
govern them: I.R.C. § 401(k) (2010), I.R.C. §§ 403(b), 457(b) (2008). 
3 William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-Based 
Retirement Benefits, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2011), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20110927ar01p1.htm. 
372   CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
astounding.  As of December 2010, defined contribution plans held $4.5 
trillion.4   
Employers often cite investment risk as a compelling reason for 
abandoning defined benefit plans and replacing them with 401(k) plans.5 
Employers who sponsor a defined benefit plan must annually fund it with 
the amount due based on several variables, including the probable amount 
of the defined benefit or pension owed to each retiring employee, the life 
expectancy of the retired employees and other plan beneficiaries, and the 
expected investment return on the plan assets.  The latter, the return on the 
plan investments, can cause the greatest year-to-year variance in the 
employer’s required annual plan contribution.  The higher the investment 
return, the fewer dollars that the employer must contribute to the plan.  
During years of high interest rates on bonds and strong returns on stocks, 
the employer may need to contribute little or nothing to the plan.  But in 
years of low interest rates on bonds and losses from stock investments, the 
employer will have to make significant contributions in order to keep the 
plan actuarially fully funded.  Over time, of course, the good investment 
years and the bad investment years off-set each other, so that over the life 
of the plan, the pension fund should have an acceptable average return.  
“Over time,” however, provides little comfort to the employer during the 
years of poor or negative investment returns, which will mandate greater 
employer contributions to the plan.  It is that short-term risk, which may 
not be all that “short,” that employers, or more accurately, the corporate 
executives, fear.   
The swings in the plan investment return and the corresponding 
changes in the required employer annual contribution affect the employer’s 
annual profit because the plan contributions are expenses that reduce 
income.  Worse, the employer will likely be forced to make greater 
contributions in years when the economy is doing poorly, causing the 
investment returns to lag.  Moreover, if the economy is performing poorly, 
the employer’s business may also be suffering.  Faced with lower revenues 
and declining profits, the employer will be required to make larger 
contributions to the plan, thereby further depressing profits. 
In response, employers have turned to defined contribution plans, 
specifically 401(k) accounts, which do not promise a pension or other form 
                                                                                                        
4 INV. CO. INST., 2011 INV. CO. FACT BOOK 102 (51st  ed. 2011). 
5 For a detailed discussion on why employers prefer defined contribution plans 
to defined benefit plans, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution 
Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451 (2004).  
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of assured retirement benefit, but only promise the participating employee 
that the employer will make contributions to the employee’s 401(k) 
account.  The employee is then responsible for investing the funds in the 
401(k) account. Because the success of those investments largely 
determines the value of the account at the time the employee retires, the 
investment risk is shifted from the employer to the employee.  Moreover, 
the employer has a fixed, predictable cost because its contribution is 
usually a percentage of the employees’ pay for those employees who 
choose to participate.     
This shift of the investment risk to the employee is well 
understood, as well as the risk of participation, the risk of not participating 
at the maximum degree allowed by the plan, and the risk of borrowing 
from the 401(k) account.6 Post-retirement risks faced by 401(k) participants 
has failed to garner much attention.7 The realities of the post-retirement 
world create substantial risks that threaten to lead to the impoverishment of 
many elderly retirees.  
 
II. THE RISE OF THE ROLLOVER INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT  
ACCOUNT  
 
Upon retirement, employees who own a 401(k) account have the 
option of leaving their account in the employer’s 401(k) plan or, as most 
do, rolling it over, tax-free, into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA).8 
In 2011 rollover IRAs had a total value of $4.7 trillion.9 (In this paper, 
retiree defined benefits retirement accounts, whether remaining in the 
401(k) or rolled over into an IRA, will be referred to as IRAs.) 
                                                                                                        
6 Joellen Leavelle, Borrowing Against the Future with a 401(k) Loan, PENSION 
RIGHTS CTR. (Apr. 12, 2013), www.pensionrights.org/blog/borrowing-against-
future-401k-loan; James J. Choi et al., $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal 
Investment in 401(k) Plans, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 748, 748-49 (2011). Most 
retirees will also have insufficient funds in their 401(k) account to support an 
adequate income during retirement. See James Kwak, Improving Retirement 
Savings Options for Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 489 (2013). 
7 But see Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 
401(k) Accounts Into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 277 (2010). 
8 I.R.C. § 402(c)(2) (2005). 
9 INV. CO. INST., supra note 4. 
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 Whether they leave their funds in the 401(k) or roll them over into 
an IRA, retirees face formidable financial planning hurdles.10 They must 
successfully invest the IRA for what is likely to be twenty or more years of 
their remaining lives, as the average life expectancy at age sixty-five is 
about nineteen years for men and twenty-one years for women.11 For many, 
post-retirement will last much longer, as about twenty-five percent of 
today’s sixty-five-year-olds will live past age ninety and ten percent, a 
majority of whom will be women, will live past age ninety-five.12 To 
maintain the value of their retirement fund during their retirement years, 
retirees must successfully invest it, which at a minimum means earning an 
investment return at least equal to the rate of inflation.  As the financial 
collapse of the markets in 2001 and 2008 demonstrated, however, even that 
modest goal may be difficult to achieve.  For example, the Dow Jones 
Industrial average in September 2008, was 13,896.  In February 2009, it 
was 7,069, and in February 2013, it had reached 13,973. Thus, ignoring 
possible dividends, an investor whose stock portfolio resembled the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average would have had essentially zero returns for the 
five-year period from February 2008 to February 2013.  Nor would our 
investor have fared much better by investing in bonds.  From 2003 to 
February 2013, the Vanguard Total Bond fund yielded 5.2 percent, but 
because inflation from 2002 through 2012 was 2.63 percent, the real annual 
return on the bonds was less than three percent.13  
Second, retirees must spend their retirement fund at a rate that will 
not exhaust it before they die, yet take a sufficient amount out that, when 
added to their other sources of income such as Social Security, will enable 
them to live at the level that they deem adequate.  Taking money out of a 
                                                                                                        
10 Even the decision of whether and where to roll over the funds raises difficult 
choices for retirees. According to the Government Accounting Office, “401(k) plan 
participants separating from their employers must decide what to do with their plan 
savings. Many roll over their plan savings to IRAs. As GAO previously reported, 
there is concern that participants may be encouraged to choose rollovers to IRAs in 
lieu of options that could be more in their interests.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-13-30, 401(K) PLAN: LABOR AND IRS COULD IMPROVE THE 
ROLLOVER PROCESS FOR PARTICIPANTS (2013). 
11 SOC. SEC, Calculators: Life Expectancy, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/planners/lifeexpectancy.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
12 Id. 
13 VANGUARD, Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund Admiral Shares, 
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?FundId=0584&FundIntExt=INT 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
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retirement account can be even trickier than being a successful investor.  
Although the two goals (investment returns that at a minimum keep pace 
with inflation, and taking distributions at a rate that neither exhausts the 
fund nor leaves the retiree in poverty) can support each other – good 
investing means more to spend while tempered withdrawals maintain 
capital – the two goals are also in conflict.  The more the retiree withdraws 
to live on, the less there will be to invest, which will result in less available 
income in later years. 
  The percent of the fund that can be taken out each year without 
exhausting the fund before death is surprisingly low.  The current 
conventional wisdom is to withdraw no more than four percent of the initial 
fund plus annual increases for inflation.14 Following that advice would 
mean that a retiree with an IRA of $1,000,000 on the first day of retirement 
could take out only $40,000 the first year.  Even if the retiree was willing to 
risk exhaustion of the fund by taking out at a rate of five percent, the IRA 
would yield only $50,000 a year.15   
Other factors also diminish the income security of a retiree with a 
401(k) account.  The right upon retirement to take funds from the 401(k) 
account creates the potential temptation not to save the funds, but to spend 
them or use them to pay off existing debts.16 For many retirees, the right 
upon retirement to take money out of their 401(k) plan is the first time in 
                                                                                                        
14 See, e.g., Gregg S. Fisher, What Portfolio Withdrawal Rate Can You Live 
With? (Dec. 5, 2012, 2:13 PM), FORBES, available at http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/greggfisher/2012/12/05/what-portfolio-withdrawal-rate-can-you-live-with/  
(“Our research points to 4% as being a reasonable starting point for a withdrawal 
rate. Investors should also consider age, health, and other individual-specific issues 
in determining whether their own withdrawal rate should in fact be lower than this, 
or possibly higher. But historically, investors with diversified balanced portfolios 
who took a total return approach to managing their investments in retirement were 
able to make this 4% withdrawal rate quite consistently.”).  
15 Taking out at a rate of 4% may be too optimistic. The U.S. Department of 
Labor provides an income calculator that estimates the amount of income that can 
safely be taken from a retirement account. The calculator uses a rate of interest 
equal to the 10-year constant maturity Treasury securities rate, which, as of 
December 3, 2012 was equal to 1.63%, meaning that $1,000,000 of retirement 
savings would produce only $16,300 per year. See Lifetime Income Calculator, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/lifetimeincomecalculator.html 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
16 Colleen E. Medill, The Retirement Distribution Decision Ten Years Later: 
Results from an Empirical Study, 16 ELDER L.J. 295, 316 (2009). 
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their lives they have access to what seems to them to be significant wealth.  
The temptation is great to spend some of it and so reward themselves for 
forty-five years of daily toil.  Spending any substantial amount of their 
lump-sum payout, however, will severely affect their future financial well-
being.  We do not know how often recently retired employees spend part of 
their 401(k) accounts, but common sense tells us that many may buy a boat 
or a car or take a special vacation as they celebrate their retirement.  Some 
undoubtedly spend a significant percentage of their 401(k) accounts by 
“investing” in a better house or vacation home.  Others will have debts that 
they will need to pay off.17 Regardless of how much is spent or what it is 
spent on, however, the result is a diminution in future disposable income.   
 
III. WHY PENSIONS ARE PREFERABLE TO 401(K) ACCOUNTS 
 
 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which 
was enacted to protect the retirement income of employees, was reasonably 
successful when defined benefit plans prevailed and when retirement plans 
paid retirees a lifetime pension.  In today’s world, however, where defined 
contribution plans are in the majority, 401(k) plans prevail, and ERISA 
“income security” ends at retirement when retired employees roll over their 
401(k) accounts into IRAs. Once the retiree funds the IRA, ERISA 
protection ends.18 As a result, many of America’s retirees will encounter 
hard times during their retirement. 
 Consider the meaning of ERISA’s commitment to “income 
security.”  The purpose of ERISA was to help ensure that retirees would 
receive the retirement benefits promised to them, which in 1974 typically 
meant a pension paid by a defined benefit plan.  ERISA was not enacted as 
a means of creating wealth for workers that they could pass on to their 
descendants as a legacy.  ERISA was enacted to help assure that retirees 
would have a dependable source of retirement income that, along with 
Social Security retirement benefits, would provide economic security 
                                                                                                        
17 Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The 
Growing Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 
44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.167, 168 (2007). 
18 IRAs are not governed by the qualified retirement plan regulation of I.R.C. 
§ 401(c). They are governed by I.R.C. § 408. See I.R.C. § 408 (2005); I.R.C. § 
401(c) (2004). 
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during their retirement.19 When ERISA was enacted, defined contribution 
plans, though permitted, were in the minority.20 When workers had a 
choice, as when negotiating their retirement benefits through collective 
bargaining, they overwhelmingly bargained for a pension as the best way 
of creating a financially secure retirement. They preferred a pension 
because they wanted to replace the loss of income occasioned by 
retirement, particularly when retirement was often not voluntary but 
imposed by a mandated retirement age, most commonly age sixty-five.21 
The concept of the need to replace lost income due to retirement is 
the foundation of American retirement financial security.  The most basic 
source of income security is the nearly universal Social Security tax on 
wages, which supports an old age pension.22 Intended as a replacement of 
income lost due to retirement, its benefits are directly tied to the amount of 
wages earned during the retiree’s working years, with the benefit calculated 
as a percentage replacement of the highest thirty-five years of earned 
income that was subject to the Social Security wage tax.23 Social Security 
is not a promise of a minimum income for every retiree.  That function is 
performed by the Supplemental Security Income program that pays a 
modest benefit – in 2013, $710 a month for a single individual or $8,520 a 
year – and is best perceived as an anti-poverty program that provides a very 
modest degree of financial security.24 In contrast, in 2013, the maximum 
                                                                                                        
19 James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, 
Part 1, 14 J. PENS. BEN. 31, 32 (2006); David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA 
Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 
443–46 (1987) (describing the pension failures that gave rise to the enactment of 
ERISA). 
20 Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 433, 448-49 (2010). 
21 Until the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967 
(29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1974)), most employers had the right to terminate 
employees because of their age. 
22 The benefit is payable at age 66 to those eligible. There is no requirement 
that the recipient retire in order to collect benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2004). 
 23 David Pratt, Retirement in a Defined Contribution Era: Making the Money 
Last, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1091, 1125 (2008); SOC. SEC. Frequently Asked 
Questions, (Dec. 26, 2013), https://faq.ssa.gov/ics/support/KBAnswer.asp? 
questionID=1989&hitOffset=65+36+35+27+23+19+18+13+11+10+8+4+3&docI
D=4533. 
24 SOC. SEC, SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2014, 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/cola/SSI.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
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Social Security monthly benefit for a worker retiring at age sixty-six was 
$2,533 or $30,396 a year, which is a replacement percentage of almost 
twenty-seven percent of the maximum amount of earnings of $113,700 
subject to the Social Security wage tax.25 
Employment based pensions, when added to Social Security 
benefits, were expected to create enough income to permit the retiree to 
live comfortably.  In recognition of the retiree’s receipt of Social Security 
benefits, in calculating the amount of the retiree’s pension, the retirement 
plan can be “integrated” with Social Security; that is, Social Security 
benefits can be taken into account.26 The right to create a pension benefit 
formula in light of Social Security benefits only emphasizes how pensions 
are a means of income replacement.  To the extent that Social Security has 
already replaced lost income, an employer provided pension is relieved of 
that obligation.  
When it became apparent that employer promises of pensions 
would often not be fulfilled, Congress enacted ERISA.  It was meant to 
strengthen workers’ rights by imposing fiduciary obligations on plan 
administrators and mandate adequate funding to increase the likelihood that 
pensions would not just be promised, but actually paid.  The Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was also created to provide 
assurance that if the plan was unable to meet its pension obligations, at 
least some of the lost pension income would be replaced.27 With the certain 
payment of Social Security and the relative security of pension payments, 
retirees were supposedly assured income for life. 
The replacement of defined benefit pensions with 401(k) plans, 
however, has resulted in an upending of the original goal of income 
replacement.  While 401(k) accounts are often criticized for moving the 
risk of investment from the employer to the employee, that is only part of 
the problem arising from the abandonment of pensions.  Far more 
depressing, at least for retirees, has been the end of the national 
                                                                                                        
25 SOC. SEC., Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/34011/34019/Article/What-160-are-160-the-maximum-
160-taxable-earnings-amounts-and-the-Social-Security-tax-rate-for-2013. 
26 See generally Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement 
Income and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1136–79 (1997). 
27 Clare Staub, Fiduciary Liability Issues in ERISA Pension Plan 
Terminations, 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX. L. J.  427, 430 (2011). 
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commitment to a guaranteed stream of income secured by ERISA funding 
requirements, plan administrator fiduciary obligations, and the PBGC.  
Rather than promoting retirement income, a 401(k) plan promises 
the accumulation of a fund that the retiree may draw down and live on 
during retirement.  While in theory a 401(k) plan should be able to serve as 
a secure source of income in retirement, in reality it will usually not.  The 
difference between a pension – a set amount of annual income for life – 
and a lump sum that can be converted into a stream of income by annual 
distributions, is so great that to say that a 401(k) is a replacement for a 
pension is like saying that an orange is a substitute for an apple because 
both are fruits.  Yes, both a pension and a 401(k) represent a form of 
wealth, and both can be converted into goods and services in the same way 
that both oranges and apples can be converted in caloric energy.  Other 
than both providing the opportunity for consumption, however, there is 
simply no resemblance between a pension and a 401(k) account.  The 
former represents a form of income replacement, while the latter, the 
401(k), is a form of wealth accumulation.  And while it is true that wealth 
can be used to replace income, it is not at heart income.  Wealth must be 
managed, invested and husbanded in order for it to produce income during 
the many years of retirement. 
The essence of a pension is its dependable and repetitive nature, so 
that every dollar received can be used to purchase goods and services, 
because another dollar, i.e., next month’s pension payment, is on the way.  
That is the good news.  The bad news is that the pension benefit is fixed 
and usually not adjusted to reflect a loss of purchasing power due to 
inflation, and the death of the pensioner, or the spouse of the pensioner, 
terminates the benefits.  (Though many pensions pay until the last to die of 
the worker or the worker’s spouse, for convenience this paper will refer 
only to a single pensioner.)  Because an ERISA pension is non-assignable 
and cannot be sold,28 a pension has no present value.  
A 401(k) account is the opposite of a pension.  Once transferred to 
an IRA, the funds are assignable, have a present value and maintain that 
value at the death of the retiree.  But the funds, once spent, are forever 
gone.  Every dollar spent is a dollar that will not be replaced.  In short, a 
pension is income, a 401(k) account is wealth.  And yes, income can be 
converted into wealth by not spending it, just as wealth, if spent, can be 
converted into income.  But to save pension income in order to create 
                                                                                                        
28 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006). 
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wealth means the loss of current consumption, which defeats the very 
reason for the pension – the replacement of income loss due to retirement.  
And to spend the wealth in a 401(k) plan to create income defeats the core 
advantage of wealth, the possibility of future consumption either by the 
current owner of the wealth or by a designated successor.   
Pensions, which offer the certainty of income over the life of the 
retiree or pensioner, meet the challenge of how to pay a fixed level of 
income for an unknown number of years without assuming any additional 
funding after the commencement of the pension.  There is no risk of 
running out of income for a retiree because that risk is borne by the payer 
of the pension, or more correctly the risk is reduced to the risk of the payer 
not being able to pay the pension because of actuarial miscalculations, 
lower-than-expected investment returns, or the plan sponsor encountering 
financial difficulties and so not making required contributions to the plan.   
If we conceive of the pension as being a pooling of individual 
retirement funds by all of the pensioners – albeit contributed by the 
employer and not the workers – the promise of lifetime income is possible 
only because of the insurance aspect of the fund.  Pensions are a form of 
pooled risk; the promise of lifetime income to all participants is possible 
only because of differential dates of death by the participants.  Some 
pensioners will outlive their life expectancy and so receive more value in 
annual distributions than would be called for based on the dollars that their 
employer contributed to the pension plan for that individual.  Other 
pensioners will die before their expected life expectancy and so never 
realize the value of the dollars that were contributed to the fund on their 
behalf.  Those who die before their expected time not only collect a 
pension for fewer years; they also forfeit what they “paid” to their pension 
in the form of foregone wages.  To the extent their wages were reduced, as 
the employer shifted their compensation from current wage income to 
future pension income, pensioners who die early experience an actual loss 
of lifetime disposable income compared to workers whose employer did 
not reduce their wages to contribute to a pension plan.  In short, a worker 
enrolled in a pension plan is betting that he or she will live long enough to 
recapture the loss of current wages in the form of pension income.   
A 401(k) account that is rolled over into IRA is the antithesis of the 
pension plan’s pooled risk; each retiree individually bears the risk of living 
beyond his or her life expectancy and so exhausting the IRA.  The 
uncertainty of when death may occur and the “risk” of a long life means a 
retiree cannot spend all of his or her IRA and must hold back some of it in 
order to guarantee that the fund will not be exhausted before death, 
2014   RETHINKING ERISA’S PROMISE OF INCOME SECURITY  381 
 
 
meaning that not all the 401(k) account is available for consumption during 
retirement.   
The uncertainty of when death will occur and the lack of “income 
insurance” for the long-living retiree results in a pension having a greater 
worth than an IRA of a similar dollar value.  On the first day of retirement, 
if a pension is discounted back to present value, and that value is equal to 
the present value of a rollover IRA, the pension will provide more annual 
income for consumption than the IRA because, unlike the IRA, every dollar 
of the pension is available for consumption.  A pension plan, which has 
sufficient participants to effectively spread the actuarial risk, can calculate 
the annual payoff that will exhaust the allocated capital for each participant 
at the average expected date of death of the plan participants knowing that 
the “early” deaths of participants and the resultant savings of capital will 
counterbalance the “late” deaths and so ensure sufficient funds to pay every 
participant a pension for life.  The ability to payout all of the capital is what 
makes a pension inherently more valuable in terms of consumption to a 
retiree than a rollover IRA, which the retiree cannot spend down to zero 
because the retiree does not know when death will occur.   
Of course, by not spending all the capital in an account, the IRA 
owner has funds to pass on after death.  The dollar amount of what is 
passed on will be an actual number, but the value to the IRA owner of 
passing on funds to another will vary according to the value to the IRA 
owner of leaving a legacy.  Some place a high value on doing so, while 
others prefer to consume more of the IRA during their life rather than 
passing that consumption opportunity as a legacy on to another.   
The legacy advantage of an IRA is not unique, however, because it 
can be achieved by a pensioner by the purchase of life insurance.  
Assuming upon retirement that the pensioner is insurable, he or she can 
purchase life insurance, whose annual premium will reduce consumption 
but ensure a legacy.  By doing so, a pensioner might end up with a level of 
annual consumption that is close to the amount of an annual distribution 
from an IRA that can safely be taken out over the life of the owner.  
Similarly, an IRA owner can capture the value of a pension by using the 
IRA to purchase an immediate pay, lifetime annuity, but the transaction 
costs associated with purchasing an annuity and the conservative future rate 
of interest assumed by the seller of the annuity will likely result in a lower 
annual payment than if the same amount in the IRA had been contributed 
annually to a defined benefit plan and used to finance an annual pension.   
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It is not the marginally lower return of an individually purchased 
annuity, however, that accounts for the lack of purchases by IRA owners.29 
Scholars of behavioral economics tell us that a variety of psychological 
traits, such as hyper-discounting of future income, the common reluctance 
to exchange a very large amount of money for a future stream of income, 
over-confidence as to the ability to invest, excessive optimism as to rate of 
return on investments, and underestimating life expectancy, are so deeply 
inured that it is unlikely that immediate pay annuities will ever find a 
significant market with IRA owners.30 The result is that most IRA owners 
do not purchase an annuity and so must manage their accounts during their 
retirement.   
 
IV. HOW SUCCESSFUL ARE RETIREES IN MANAGING A  
ROLLOVER IRA? 
 
Upon retirement, the individual can rollover a 401(k) account into 
a tax-free IRA.31 A retiree who decides to rollover a 401(k) account into an 
IRA must decide where to roll over the funds.  There is no shortage of 
choices; mutual funds, banks, investment advisors, and investment 
companies all compete for 401(k) accounts dollars, which is hardly a 
surprise given the opportunity for fees and commissions for the custodian 
of the IRA.  We know very little as to how employees choose the 
repository of a 401(k) rollover.  We do not know if they compare costs in 
the form of fees and commissions, whether they look closely at the 
investment return, seek safety from fraud or embezzlement, or search out 
low or high risk investments.  Perhaps they just respond to advertisements 
or merely follow advice from a friend or relative.   
We do know that the choice of the investment vehicle is crucial in 
terms of the investment return.  Retirees who choose unwisely may suffer 
diminished income in their twenty or thirty years of retirement.  We also 
know that the choice is not “one and done.”  Hopefully, over time the 
retiree gains investment sophistication and invests the account more wisely 
than at the time of the rollover.  Unfortunately, inertia usually wins out 
                                                                                                        
29 Wei-Yin Hu & Jason S. Scott, Behavioral Obstacles in the Annuity Market, 
63 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 71, 79 (2007). 
30 See generally GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE 
MAKE BIG MONEY MISTAKES – AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE 
NEW SCIENCE OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS  (2010). 
31 I.R.C. § 402(c)(2) (2006). 
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over wisdom (assuming that retirees gain investment skill as they age) so 
that the initial investment decisions are unlikely to be changed.32  
Of course, the need to make successful investment choices is not 
new, as the employee faced the same decisions when working.  What is 
new is that the retired employee will be withdrawing funds from the 
account, or at least the annual minimum distribution that is required after 
age seventy and a half.33  
The required minimum distribution rules, as well as the practical 
need to take distributions to provide additional income, raise a number of 
difficult decisions for the IRA owner.  Each year the owner must decide 
from which assets to take distributions.  There are several options, 
including distributing the most risky assets first, proportional distribution 
by asset, and either first liquidating equities or the fixed income 
investments.  After each distribution, and in light of past investment 
returns, the IRA owner faces the choice of whether to adjust the asset 
allocation.  The number and complexity of the choices raised by the need to 
make annual distributions strongly suggests that many older retirees will 
not be up to the task.   
A retiree who owns an IRA faces confusing choices because the 
“right” answers are dependent on uncertain variables, including future 
interest rates, future stock prices, the rate of inflation, future income needs, 
and the life expectancy of the retiree and the retiree’s spouse.  Of course, 
investors of any age can guess wrong as to the direction of the stock market 
or future interest rates, but a wrong choice by a retiree may result in a loss 
of capital: a possibly irreversible choice that may significant lower future 
distributions.   
Given the number of variables that impact retirees’ choices as to 
how to manage their rollover IRAs, it is unlikely that most are making 
optimum decisions.  Even if they make a wise decision, it is not a final 
decision.  Each year a new retiree can make new mistakes.  This repeated 
need to make difficult investment decisions continues throughout the 
retiree’s life – stretching from retirement at age sixty-five to age eighty-
five, ninety-five or even one hundred.  Does anyone really think that most 
ninety-five-year-olds are up to the task of managing an IRA?   
 
                                                                                                        
32 See Jeffrey Zwiebel, Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation, 
103 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1, 15–16 (1995). 
33 I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-9 (2011) 
(portraying A-2, Uniform Lifetime Table). 
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V. DIMINISHED PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CAPACITY 
  
Much has been written about how employees lack the ability to 
sensibly invest their 401(k) accounts during their working years.34 They 
also fail to contribute as much as they might, too often borrow from the 
account, and some even deplete it long before retirement by taking 
hardship distributions.35 The failure to fully participate, lack of investment 
acumen, and leakage during working years are all significant drawbacks of 
401(k) accounts, yet they fail to capture another inherent fundamental flaw.   
Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the inability of many 
retirees to successfully manage their rollover retirement IRA funds during 
the long years of their retirement.36 Retirees typically face twenty to thirty 
years of retirement.  During those many years they must continue to 
successfully invest and manage an IRA.  Unfortunately, during their 
retirement years most retirees are in physical and mental decline, which 
erodes their investment skills and diminishes the probability that they will 
successfully manage their retirement account.    
Physical decline is a normal part of aging.  The loss of hearing, 
serious vision impairment, loss of physical energy, and loss of short-term 
memory are all too common with those aged seventy-five and older.37 The 
degree of decline varies greatly from individual to individual.  Some 
experience only modest physical decline, such as diminished eyesight or 
loss of hearing.  Others suffer from a general loss of energy and growing 
frailty.  A few will suffer serious declines in short-term memory, others 
will have significant vision problems, such as macular degeneration, and 
many will have impaired hearing even if they use a hearing aid.  It is 
difficult to believe that those with serious physical declines can 
successfully manage an IRA. If, because of failing vision, you have 
difficulty or cannot read, you cannot effectively review your IRA reports.  
                                                                                                        
34 E.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 
15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483 (2013); Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 53 (2012). 
35 Thomas Olson, 401(k) Leakage: Crafting a Solution Consistent with the 
Shift to Employee-Managed Retirement Accounts, 20 ELDER L.J. 449, 462–65 
(2013). 
36 One exception is Pratt, supra note 23, at 1137–42. 
37 Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Lawyering: Representing Seniors in Light of 
Cognitive Changes Accompanying Aging, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1091–98 
(2013); Frolik, supra note 7, at 292–97. 
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Poor hearing may mean you do not hear the advice given to you, mishear it, 
or avoid meetings with advisors because of your difficulty in hearing.  If 
your short-term memory has severely declined and you have trouble 
reading because of vision problems, you simply will not be able to make 
considered decisions.  Add to this a general loss of vigor, and it becomes 
apparent that many very old IRA owners are not capable of active, 
reasoned management of their account.   
Chronic illness is the fate of many elderly.  They suffer from 
conditions such as diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and congestive heart 
failure, which rob them of the energy and concentration needed to be a 
sophisticated investor.  Consider an eighty-year-old woman suffering from 
end stage renal disease, who travels to the dialysis center three days a 
week.  On the other days of the week, is she really going to devote her 
limited time and energy to her financial affairs?  Will she have the 
concentration and energy to do so?  Other elderly persons experience acute 
illnesses such as cancer, that leave them in pain, disoriented by drugs or 
other therapies, and much more concerned about whether they will live 
than whether their IRA is overloaded with equities or worried about which 
assets should be sold to provide cash for the annual required minimum 
distribution.   
Even more chilling is the specter of millions of IRA owners who 
suffer progressive dementia.  It is estimated that up to half of those age 
eighty-five or older suffer from dementia.38 At its most severe, dementia 
and related illnesses such as Parkinson’s leave the victim without the 
ability to manage even daily expenditures, much less an IRA.  It is an odd 
form of retirement planning indeed to pin the hopes of financial security 
during retirement on individually managed IRAs, knowing as we do, that a 
significant percentage of those IRA owners will lose the mental ability to 
manage those accounts due to dementia.  Of course, millions of recipients 
of pensions will also become demented and lose the ability to handle a 
monthly pension check.  But the risk to a pension recipient is much less.  
Even if the monthly pension check is lost or misused, another check will 
arrive next month.  But if a demented IRA owner makes investments that 
result in significant financial losses, there is no additional money coming to 
the rescue.   
                                                                                                        
38 THE MERCK MANUAL OF GERIATRICS 357 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 3rd ed. 
2000). 
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The financial risks to an IRA owner during the early stages of 
progressive dementia are very great. Dementia or a similar loss of 
executive functioning can arise from several sources, but the two most 
prevalent are Alzheimer’s and vascular (multi-infarct) dementia.  
Alzheimer’s, the most common form of dementia, is a progressive and 
irreversible condition that eventually leads to death.39 Vascular dementia, 
the second most common cause of dementia, is caused by one or more 
mini-strokes in the brain.  While vascular dementia is not necessarily 
progressive, often the individual experiences additional strokes with a 
resulting additional loss of mental capacity.  The loss of capacity is patchy, 
as some forms of cognition are unaffected, but the strokes can also cause 
the loss of physical capability.40 The decline in both mental and physical 
capacity can potentially seriously diminish an individual’s ability to 
effectively manage an IRA.                          
Whether caused by Alzheimer’s or vascular strokes, in its early 
stages dementia is often not diagnosed.  Although some victims of 
dementia are aware that something is amiss, most do not understand or 
appreciate that they are losing mental capacity, or they fail to understand 
the extent of the loss.  One of the tragedies of dementia is that it robs its 
victim of self-awareness and self-judgment.  Dementia often waxes and 
wanes so that the individual may experience times of awareness and realize 
that they cannot remember some obvious past event or they failed to 
recognize a good friend on the previous day.  But this interval of awareness 
rarely leads to individuals admitting that they are in mental decline and 
taking steps to assure that their finances are protected.   
Family and friends of individuals with early stages or mild 
dementia frequently misread it as merely as normal memory loss associated 
with aging.  During the early stages of the disease, the victim can often 
cover for the deficits; rather than engaging in a conversation, they reply 
with timeworn clichés or phrases that give the appearance of someone who 
may be less engaged with the world but is still of sound mind.  Some 
observers perceive the loss of executive functioning as a sign of normal 
aging or else assume that the older person is merely confused by modern 
life and new circumstances.  Often family members do not want to admit 
that a parent or spouse is suffering from dementia, and essentially deny the 
                                                                                                        
39 For a detailed discussion of the causes and symptoms of Alzheimer’s 
disease, see JAMES E. SPAR & ASENATH LA RUE, CLINICAL MANUAL OF GERIATRIC 
PSYCHIATRY, 173–220 (2006). 
40 Id. at 242–48. 
2014   RETHINKING ERISA’S PROMISE OF INCOME SECURITY  387 
 
 
obvious signs.  It seems better to laugh off the confusion and memory loss, 
which waxes and wanes, and claim that “Mom has good days and bad 
days,” and hope that it is not a progressive condition.   
It is during the early stages of dementia that the individual is at 
particular risk of making misguided decisions about an IRA.  Because no 
one may be aware of the degree of the loss of capacity, the IRA owner will 
continue to make investment and distribution decisions without anyone 
raising an objection or intervening.  The financial advisor may disagree 
with IRA owner’s decisions, but, absent understanding that the decisions 
arise from a diminished capacity, the advisor will merely assume that the 
client has poor judgment.  Worse, the individual with early or mild 
dementia is very vulnerable to financial exploitation and abuse because the 
loss of capacity leaves the individual less capable of perceiving poor advice 
or spotting a conflict of interest.  The loss of capacity also typically results 
in the individual being much more susceptible to advice, suggestions and 
even undue influence from third parties or unreliable sources, such as 
financial commentators on television or on internet sites. Even family 
members may take advantage of a confused, forgetful individual suffering 
from mild dementia by asking for gifts, requesting money for their own 
investment or business schemes, or even becoming the chief investment 
advisor (for a fee, of course).  
How many IRA owners suffer from some degree of dementia and 
how much harm that has caused to their accounts is unknown.  But 
statistically we know that millions of older IRA owners have dementia, and 
we also know that individuals with dementia make poorer decisions and are 
vulnerable to poor or exploitive advice.  So it follows that millions of IRA 
owners are making poor investment decisions.  For an IRA owner not to 
take steps to assure effective management of the IRA in the event that he or 
she loses mental capacity reflects a failure to plan for a fairly likely 
eventuality.   
 
VI. THE LIMITATIONS OF GUARDIANSHIP AND POWERS OF  
ATTORNEY 
 
The inability of many older individuals to handle their financial 
affairs has led to the reliance on substituted decision makers: court 
appointed guardians and agents acting under a power of attorney.  
Unfortunately, both have serious drawbacks.   
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A. GUARDIANS 
 
Every state has a guardianship statute that permits a judicial 
determination that an individual is legally incapacitated and in need of a 
guardian.  Guardianship (called conservatorship in some states) has long 
been the state response to attempt to protect those who lack mental 
capacity.41 At present, the typical statutory test of legal incapacity is the 
inability of an individual to make reasonable decisions.42 If an individual is 
found to lack mental capacity, the court is empowered to appoint a 
guardian (or conservator) to act as a substitute decision-maker for the 
incapacitated individual.  The standard of proof of mental incapacity is 
high because states do not wish to override individuals’ autonomy even if 
they are less mentally capable than they once were or even if they are 
making questionable financial decisions.  Consequently, an IRA owner 
with diminished capacity might not qualify for the appointment of a 
guardian even though, because of the loss of mental capacity, his or her 
investment decisions have been questionable and result in financial losses.   
 Assuming, however, that a court finds the individual to be 
mentally incapacitated, the court has the authority to strip the individual of 
the right to manage an IRA, and all other assets, and appoint a guardian to 
take over management of the IRA as well as the individual’s other assets.  
The court will grant the guardian sufficient authority to carry out its 
assigned duties, but usually will not instruct the guardian as to how it 
should carry out its responsibilities, such as managing an IRA.  A guardian 
is assumed to be capable of protecting the assets of the incapacitated person 
in an efficient and sensible manner, though a guardian may be subject to 
some statutory instructions or limitations.  Often, for example, a guardian 
has the authority to spend the income of the incapacitated individual, but 
must ask the court for authority to spend capital.   
Most states expect a guardian to make that decision in accordance 
with the doctrine of substituted judgment, which requires the guardian to 
attempt to do what the incapacitated person would have done but for the 
incapacity.43 The guardian is expected to attempt to ascertain what the 
                                                                                                        
41 See generally Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, A 
Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1981). 
42 E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 30.1-26-01 (amended 2010). 
43 Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making 
Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1494 
(2012). 
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incapacitated person would have done on the basis of his or her prior oral 
or written statements, any relevant instructions or comments made to 
financial advisors or others, and by the pattern of prior decisions.  For 
example, if the incapacitated person had invested the IRA exclusively in 
bonds and eschewed stocks, under substituted judgment, the guardian 
should continue that investment allocation.  Similarly, the guardian should 
continue to make distributions from the IRA at the same level as in prior 
years unless the needs of the incapacitated person or his or her spouse 
suggest larger annual distributions would be appropriate.   
 The guardian is accountable to the appointing court, perhaps in the 
form of annual reports, but the level of judicial supervision is usually 
minimal and largely ineffective because of limited court resources.44 It is 
also not clear how courts expect a guardian to manage an IRA.  For 
example, is a guardian permitted to distribute more than the minimally 
required annual distribution without prior court approval?  The answer 
likely varies from state to state and may vary from court to court within a 
state.  Guardians, in short, are usually left to their own devices; whether 
that results in optimal choices about IRA investments and distributions is 
doubtful.   
Guardianship has other drawbacks.  The imposition of a 
guardianship may not be possible even though an individual has diminished 
capacity, because the appointment of a guardian can only occur if the 
individual meets the state’s statutory test of incapacity.  State standards of 
when a guardian can be appointed are deliberately set fairly high because 
the state is naturally hesitant to strip an individual of the right to control his 
or her life.  It is thought better to permit individuals with reduced capacity 
to continue to manage their own affairs so long as they are not putting 
either themselves or their property at serious risk of harm.  Thus, for 
example, just because an IRA owner puts the funds in more risky 
investments or comes under the sway of an new financial advisor whose 
views are out of the mainstream, is not reason enough to impose a 
guardianship since many IRA owners, who have with no loss of capacity, 
invest their funds in high risk investments or rely on controversial 
investment advice.   
                                                                                                        
44 Naomi Karp & Erica F. Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National 
Survey of Court Practices, 37 STETSON L. REV. 143, 185 (2007). 
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Even if the court finds the requisite incapacity and approves a 
guardian, the individual appointed as guardian may lack the knowledge or 
skill to be an effective manager of an IRA.  Typically, the court appoints as 
guardian the individual nominated in the petition that was filed seeking the 
imposition of a guardianship.  The ability of the individual nominated to 
wisely manage a retirement IRA undoubtedly varies greatly.  Often those 
nominated are selected more for their willingness and availability to act as 
guardian rather than for any special financial acumen.  Worse, the 
individual who agrees to act as guardian may agree to do so from a desire 
to gain some advantage or profit from the assets of the older person rather 
than using the IRA to promote the interests of the incapacitated person.45  
 
B.  AGENTS 
 
Because of the costs, complexities, and lack of privacy associated 
with guardianship, every state has a statute that permits an individual to 
create a durable power of attorney that appoints an agent to handle 
financial affairs in the event the principal should be unable to do so.  The 
use of a power of attorney would seem to be the sensible and efficient 
solution to an older retiree losing the ability to handle a retirement IRA.  It 
is inexpensive because most powers of attorney are based on a form or a 
standard document, and can be seen as something akin to a private 
guardianship arrangement, with the agent being comparable to a guardian.  
The agent takes on his or her duties when the principal is no longer capable 
of managing his or her financial affairs.  There is no judicial involvement 
involved.  The appointment of an agent under a power of attorney is a 
private solution to a private problem.   
Unfortunately, despite the wide use of the durable powers of 
attorney, no state has succeeded in preventing the misuse of that power by 
the agent.46 Absent requirements in the power that mandate oversight or 
preapproval of an agent’s actions, agents are essentially on their own.47 As 
a result, an agent can manage the financial affairs of the principal as the 
agent sees fit.  Without any on-going oversight, who is to know if the agent 
                                                                                                        
45 Alison Barnes, The Virtues of Corporate and Professional Guardians, 31 
STETSON L. REV. 941, 956 (2002). 
46 See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: 
Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 8 (2007). 
47 Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden 
Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 18 (2006). 
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is dutifully carrying out his or her responsibilities?  The agent is, to be sure, 
a fiduciary and held to the duty of loyalty and the obligation to avoid 
conflicts of interest and self-dealing, but how the agent is to make decisions 
is less clear.48 Most states require the guardian to act in accord with 
substituted judgment, that is, to do what the incapacitated person would 
have done, although some states expect the agent to act in the best interests 
of the principal.49 The latter presumably allows an agent to ignore the 
expressed wishes of the principal or the previous pattern of decisions by the 
principal if those decisions do not appear to be the best way to further the 
principal’s financial interest.  That has the advantage that an agent acting 
according to the best interest standard can ignore what the principal might 
have said or done in the period when the principal might have been 
suffering from a decline in capacity, though before the loss was sufficient 
to permit the agent to take control. Even states that insist upon the 
application of substituted judgment permit an agent to ignore what the 
principal would have wished if the agent believes that to do so would not 
be in the principal’s best interest.50 In the end, how an agent acts may not 
differ much whether the state standard is one of substituted judgment or 
best interest; the agent will do what the principal would have done unless it 
does not seem in the best interest of the principal to do so.   
 Of course, that is the point of a power of attorney – to create 
powers in the agent that are very similar to the legal rights of the principal.  
Unfortunately, that wide grant of authority makes it easy for an agent to 
perform poorly in managing an IRA even though carrying out his or her 
duties in a lawful manner.   
The initial challenge for the agent is to intelligently invest the IRA 
assets.  Probably, many agents do what is easiest, which is to do nothing 
and leave the assets invested as they found them.  Maintaining the status 
quo is an attractive option.  When faced with whether to act or do nothing, 
individuals usually prefer to stay the course rather than to make any 
changes because a lost opportunity is more easily overlooked and forgotten 
as compared with doing something that proves to be a mistake.51 The 
                                                                                                        
48 Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of 
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001). 
49 See Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power 
of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574 (1996). 
50 Whitton & Frolik, supra note 43, at 1499. 
51 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 675 (1998). 
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preference for the status quo and the desire to avoid losses when faced with 
uncertain alternatives is well documented in psychological studies.52 So it 
is to be expected that an agent, unless quite confident in his or her 
investment skills, may choose to leave the asset allocation as is.  Changing 
investments opens the agent to the possibility that the new investments will 
perform less well than the old investments would have if they had not been 
abandoned.  That underperformance is a natural test to apply to the new 
investments.  In contrast, the wisdom of not changing the investments is 
difficult to judge because it is unclear as to which possible alternative 
investment choice the status quo should be measured against.  Suppose that 
when the agent took control from an incapacitated IRA owner, the IRA was 
invested forty percent in stocks and sixty percent in bonds.  An agent, who 
maintained that asset allocation, could not be criticized because that is a 
common and defensible allocation of IRA assets.  If, however, the agent 
changed the allocation to eighty percent bonds and twenty percent stocks, it 
is easy to measure the return of stocks over the next year and observe 
whether the retreat from stocks was a good decision; that is, the most 
profitable  choice.  If stocks had soared in value, it would seem that the 
agent made a mistake even though, to be fair, the wisdom of the decision to 
sell stocks and buy bonds should have been judged at the time of the stocks 
were sold and not in hindsight.   
The maintenance of the status quo also fulfills the requirement of 
substituted judgment by doing what the principal apparently would have 
done.  Doing so, however, assumes that the prior acts of the principal 
represented decisions made when the principal was fully in command of his 
or her mental facilities.  In many instances, however, that will not be the 
case.  The principal’s mental incapacity might have been the result of a 
swift and dramatic debilitating illness, but it is far more likely that the 
principal’s capacity was a gradual decline and that he or she continued to 
manage the IRA while suffering from diminished capacity.  And during 
that period of time, the principal may have made investment decisions that 
did not represent the “true” intent of the principal; that is, the principal at 
full mental capacity. Obviously, no agent should feel bound by substituted 
judgment to carry out decisions made by a principal, who suffered from 
reduced capacity. Given that the agent cannot know when the principal 
began to lose capacity, and so which past decisions reflect a reduced level 
                                                                                                        
52 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk,  47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
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of incapacity, an agent should be hesitant to apply substituted judgment to 
the management of an IRA.   
An agent, if not bound by substituted judgment, necessarily must 
apply the best interest test and manage the IRA in a manner that best 
promotes the principal’s interests, presumably both financial and personal.  
That dictate, however, presents a number of difficulties for a conscientious 
agent.   
The agent must manage the IRA in a manner that will maximize 
returns commensurate with an acceptable level of risk. While maintaining a 
proper return/risk balance is difficult for any investor, an agent  managing 
an IRA, faces the additional obligation of serving the best interest of the 
principal, which is an almost impossible task because there is no simple 
metric that tells the agent whether any particular investment strategy meets 
that obligation.  If the agent errs on the side of lower risk, the investment 
return will suffer, and that in turn will either mean smaller distributions in 
the future, and so a diminished quality of life for the principal, or an IRA of 
a lesser value to pass on the principal’s heirs.  Of course, the agent has no 
way of knowing whether the principal is better served by lower investment 
returns but less risk, or whether the principal would be better off if the 
agent took greater risks and so achieved greater investment returns.  Taking 
greater risks could either mean greater distributions or a larger IRA to pass 
on to heirs, but could also mean a loss of capital and so lower returns in the 
future.   
Not only do investment decisions present difficulties for an agent; 
so do distributions.  An agent, when making IRA distributions beyond 
those mandated by the minimum distribution rules, must look to the quality 
of life of the principal with an eye towards balancing present and future 
needs.  An increase in distributions today may result in smaller 
distributions in the future, and also dictates taking greater investment risks 
in order to support continued large distributions in the future.  The agent, 
who must make decisions in an ever-changing investment climate, must 
also make distributions with due consideration of the possibility that the 
principal’s financial needs may be increasing as his or her physical and 
mental condition declines.   
It should be apparent, then, that even a dedicated, conscientious 
agent will find it difficult to manage an IRA.  Many individuals, no matter 
how well intentioned, will not be up to the task.  They will lack the 
investment acumen and sophistication required to successfully handle 
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investments of a fund from which annual distributions are being made.53 
They will also be unable to determine the appropriate amount of 
distributions in light of the tension between the current and future needs of 
the principal.  The interplay of investment choices, distribution decisions, a 
fluid investment landscape, and the changing needs of a physically and 
mentally declining principal will be beyond the ability of most agents.   
The inability of the typical agent to effectively manage an IRA is 
also a result of who the principal is likely to appoint as agent.  Usually, in 
order of priority, principals name their spouse, next an adult child, and 
finally a more distant relation.  None of these individuals are selected 
because they are financially sophisticated or skilled at managing an IRA; 
rather, they are named because they are someone the principal trusts and 
who are willing to serve as an agent.  Overwhelmingly, principals name 
spouses and children as agents, in part because the principal does not 
realize how difficult it can be for an agent to manage the principal’s 
financial affairs, particularly if the principal owns a rollover IRA.   
Additionally, even if the individual who was named agent made 
sense at the time the power of attorney was executed, that appointment 
might not be a wise choice by the time the agent actually takes over for the 
incapacitated principal.  For example, at age seventy, the IRA owner 
named his sixty-nine-year-old wife as agent, but when he became 
incapacitated at age eighty-six, she was eighty-five and beginning to suffer 
some mild loss of memory.  Will she be mentally sharp enough in the 
coming years to successfully manage his IRA account?  What of the 
seventy-five-year-old woman who named her fifty-three-year-old daughter 
as agent, but did not become incapacitated until age ninety when her 
daughter was sixty-eight and undergoing intensive treatment for lung 
cancer?  Is the daughter really going to be capable of handling her mother’s 
IRA?  Or consider a seventy-five-year-old man who names his twenty-five-
year-old nephew as his agent.  Ten years later, when the principal needs his 
agent to take over the principal’s finances, the now thirty-five-year-old 
nephew has just filed for bankruptcy after he lost his job, had his house 
foreclosed and is in the midst of a bitter divorce, not exactly the person the 
eighty-five-year-old principal would now choose to act as his agent.   
                                                                                                        
53 Financial literacy varies considerably. Some agents may be quite capable; 
others much less so. One study found that individuals with less education and less 
wealth have a lower level of financial sophistication and are prone to making more 
investment errors. Laurent E. Calvet et al., Measuring the Financial Sophistication 
of Households, 99 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 393, 397–98 (2009). 
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Even if the agent is not suffering from health or financial problems, 
there is no reason to suppose that most agents will be effective at managing 
an IRA.  When managing an IRA, an agent has incentives and motivations 
that are not the same as those of the principal, which result in classic 
“agency costs.”54 Unlike the principal, who has a financial stake in the 
management of the IRA, the agent does not.  If the agent is paid, it will be 
by the hour with little regard to the quality of the agent’s performance.  The 
many agents who are not compensated are motivated by love, concern, and 
a sense of responsibility; none of which may translate into effective 
management of the principal’s IRA.  Agents may in fact be less capable 
because they are not dealing with their own money and the quality of their 
own life is not affected by their decisions.  Although the agent may want to 
make decisions that best promote the interest of the principal, it is unlikely 
that an agent will devote as much time and energy in managing the IRA as 
would the principal.  That lack of self-interest alone is likely enough to 
mean less effective management of the IRA by the agent, even assuming 
the agent has skills comparable to the principal.   
In some cases, third parties may bring pressure to bear on the 
agent.  Those who are the beneficiaries of the IRA after the principal’s 
death may urge greater or lesser risk taking in the IRA investments as a 
way of protecting their expected future inheritance.  Or they may advise the 
agent to minimize distributions in order to increase their inheritance.  For 
example, if the principal needs daily assistance, the question may arise as 
to whether to purchase daily attendant care in the principal’s home or elect 
more economical housing in an assisted living facility.  Whether the agent 
is willing to pay for expensive personal care may depend on the agent’s 
relation to the principal.  An agent, who is the spouse of the principal, may 
choose to pay for personal care, while an adult child, with an eye to his or 
her inheritance, may think assisted living is a more sensible choice.   
If the agent stands to inherit the IRA, the conflict of interest is 
obvious and real; yet the selection of an adult child as agent is 
understandable, though still unfortunate.  How an agent responds to a 
conflict of interest may depend on the agent’s relative financial status and 
how much the agent is looking forward to inheriting a well-funded IRA.  
                                                                                                        
54 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
308–10 (1976). For an analysis of why a trustee’s relation to a settlor exhibits 
agency costs, see Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 624 (2004). 
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The agent is a fiduciary and so should resolve any conflict in favor of the 
principal or resign as agent.  In reality, however, an agent’s decisions as to 
the management of an IRA are likely to be within the zone of the agent’s 
discretion and so are not obvious violations of the agent’s fiduciary duty.  
Even if the agent fails to meet his or her fiduciary obligations, absent a 
rather obvious transgression and someone who is willing to object, the 
agent will not be called to account.   
Beyond the honest but marginally competent agent are those who 
misuse, abuse or steal the principal’s assets.  In the past, agents have made 
inappropriate gifts to third parties, made inappropriate gifts to themselves, 
made gifts to charities not favored by the principal, defeated estate plans by 
creating joint accounts with survivorship interests, changed beneficiaries 
named in life insurance contracts, revoked trusts, engaged in self-dealing, 
and used their powers to benefit their spouses, friends or relatives.  In short, 
agents routinely violate their fiduciary obligations and use their authority to 
advance their own interests at the expense of the principal.55  
If the agent misuses or wastes the assets in the IRA, the elderly 
IRA owner will not only be incapacitated but may also be impoverished.  
Of course, an elderly IRA owner will try to select a trustworthy person to 
act as agent, and most probably succeed in doing so, but not all will make 
the right choice.   
An aging owner of a retirement IRA who is losing the ability to 
manage it faces the alternative of accepting guardianship or appointing an 
agent under a durable power of attorney, neither of which assures proper 
management of the IRA.  This is the world that our nation’s retirement 
system has created for its elderly.  The reliance on 401(k) plans has been 
rightly criticized for leaving retirees with inadequate savings for their 
retirement.  Many have attacked 401(k) accounts for putting the investment 
risk on employees who in general are not up to the burden.56 But even those 
employees who arrive at retirement having adequately managed their 
account and have an account with enough money to create a financially 
secure retirement must still navigate the perilous years of their retirement.  
                                                                                                        
55 See generally Jennifer L. Rhein, No One In Charge: Durable Powers of 
Attorney and the Failure to Protect Incapacitated Persons, 17 ELDER L.J. 165 
(2009) (describing how agents acting under durable powers of attorney agreements 
can exploit incapacitated principals). 
56 Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself Retirement: Allowing Employees to Direct 
the Investment of Their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 365 
(2005). 
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Like a modern Odysseus, they must successfully navigate a long and 
difficult voyage.   
 
VII.  ANNUITIES 
 
Because of the difficulties of post-retirement management of a 
rollover IRA, some hope to recreate the advantages of the defined benefit 
pension by encouraging retirees to convert some or all of their IRA into an 
immediate pay, lifetime annuity.57 Doing so would address the two 
significant risks created for retirees - financial management and longevity.   
 
A. RECREATING THE ADVANTAGES OF A DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN  
 
The owner of an IRA can capture many of the advantages of the 
pensions offered by defined benefit plans by converting some or all of the 
account into an annuity.  Merely investing half of the account can 
dramatically increase the probability that the retiree will not outlive the 
IRA.58 The purchase of a lifetime annuity eliminates the need to manage 
the investment of those funds, determining which assets should be used to 
fund distributions, and the fear of zeroing out the fund prior to death.  At 
present, only twenty percent of defined contribution plans offer retirees the 
option of converting their accounts into an annuity, and only about ten 
percent of the employees of those plans choose the annuity option.  Even if 
an annuity is available as part of the 401(k) plan, retirees typically prefer a 
lump-sum distribution to an annuity.59 Interestingly, retirees who 
participate in defined benefit plans often have the option of accepting a 
pension, which can be thought of as an annuity, or accepting a lump-sum 
distribution.  Although some do elect to take the lump sum, the rate of 
those who choose the pension do so at a much higher rate than those with 
defined contribution accounts elect to convert them into an annuity.  
Apparently, both those expecting pensions and those anticipating the 
                                                                                                        
57 See generally Frolik, supra note 7 (arguing that federally guaranteed 
annuities for retirees paid for by 401(k) accounts would provide a more secure 
method of extending retirement savings). 
58 Walter Updegrave, Make Your Dough Last and Last…and Last, 38 MONEY 
92, 94 (Oct. 2009). 
59 Steven D. Cohen, Note, Autoenrollment and Annuitization: Enabling 401(k) 
“DB-ation,” 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 281, 317 (2009). 
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receipt of a lump sum prefer to stay with the status quo.60 For most retirees, 
exchanging a lifetime of accumulated retirement investment, a very large 
figure, for periodic annuity benefits, a much smaller figure, is not an 
appealing tradeoff.61  
A variety of structural reforms are needed to encourage the 
purchase of annuities.  No one reform is going to drastically change the 
current retiree reluctance to purchase annuities, but in combination, they 
could begin to change their attitudes.  What is needed is a sense by retirees 
that annuitizing at least part of their rollover IRA is presumptively the 
intelligent thing to do.  We need to reach the point where a retiree feels the 
need to justify not buying an annuity rather than retirees believing, as they 
do today, that keeping a lump sum distribution in an IRA is the more 
sensible approach.   
Perhaps many retirees reject annuities because they think of an 
annuity as an investment rather than the insurance product that it is.62 The 
purchase of an immediate pay, lifetime annuity is the purchase of a stream 
of income, to be sure, but it is better understood as a “guarantee” of income 
for life.63 The value of the product is not just the benefits that it pays, but 
more importantly the assurance of a lifetime of income.  An annuity 
provides a relatively risk-free means of converting capital – the cost of the 
annuity – into disposable income without fear of exhausting the fund.  The 
insurance value of the annuity is fulfilled no matter when the annuitant dies 
and the benefit payments cease.  Even if an annuitant dies before his or her 
actuarially projected date of death, he or she does not “lose.”  Someone 
who buys fire insurance has not “lost” if there is no fire and no 
compensation is paid, because it is avoidance of the risk of loss that was the 
motivation for the purchase.  In the case of an annuity, it is the guarantee of 
a lifetime of income that justifies its acquisition.   
                                                                                                        
60 Shlomo Benartzi et al., Annuitization Puzzles, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 143, 156 
(2011). 
61 Robert Gazzale et al., Do Default and Longevity Annuities Improve Annuity 
Take-Up Rates? Results from an Experiment, 11 AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 10, 10–
11 (Oct. 2012).   
62 See Benartzi et al., supra note 60, at 156. 
63 The “guarantee” of course is only as good as the financial strength of the 
seller of the annuity. Those who purchase annuities, however, assume that the 
seller will in fact pay the annuity as promised. It is difficult to believe that any 
annuitant who had doubts about the certainty of payment would buy an annuity. 
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Unfortunately, too often those who buy annuities think that they 
must outlive their expected date of death to avoid “losing” the bet with the 
seller of the annuity.64 To overcome the perceived “gamble” of buying an 
annuity, an agent, who is selling the annuity, points out that the annuity 
protects buyers who outlive their life expectancy from outliving their 
savings.  What the agent may not realize is that most individuals 
underestimate how long they will live.  The agent who points out to sixty-
five-year-olds that if they live longer than their twenty year life expectancy, 
they will reap a windfall (actually merely a modestly higher rate of return 
on the investment, i.e. the cost of the annuity) fails to realize that many 
potential buyers do not expect to live for another twenty years and so fear 
that they will never realize that windfall.  Moreover, because of the 
tendency of individuals to hyper-discount future income, even if the 
potential buyers expect to live long enough to get the windfall, they greatly 
undervalue it.  The combination of underestimating the likelihood of living 
past their projected life expectancy and undervaluing the payoff if they do, 
naturally causes many to avoid annuities, which they perceive as very 
likely resulting in a large “loss” (the cost of the annuity) and a smaller 
chance of a small gain (the payments continuing on past their life 
expectancy). Given that many see an annuity as being more likely to result 
in a perceived, if not a real, loss, and given that most individuals fear losses 
more than they appreciate gains, it is  small wonder that annuities are not 
attractive to most retirees.65  
   For many, annuities are also unattractive because they limit the 
ability to leave a financial legacy.  They look at the total value of an IRA, 
and underestimating how long they will live, assume that they will be able 
to leave most, if not all of that IRA, to their children.66 They cannot 
imagine giving up that legacy by purchasing an annuity regardless of the 
advantages of doing so.  To a remarkable degree, the elderly are willing to 
                                                                                                        
64 Most who purchase annuities try to reduce the risk of an early death 
resulting in a “loss” by purchasing an annuity with a term certain payout period. 
For example, the annuity might guarantee a minimum payout of ten years. Hu & 
Scott, supra note 29, at 77. 
65 Jeffery R. Brown et al., Why Don’t People Insure Late-Life Consumption? A 
Framing Explanation of the Under Annuitization Puzzle, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 304, 304–05 (2008). 
66 This description holds true whether the IRA owner is single or married. If 
the latter, then the expectation is that the IRA will be intact at the death of the 
second to die of the spouses and the IRA owner. 
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forego consumption in order to preserve their assets so that they can pass 
them on, usually to their children.  While the children and their financial 
advisors may urge the older person to spend more on themselves, to “live a 
little,” that advice is often not heeded because many elderly are determined 
to preserve their capital for their heirs.   
Even financially sophisticated retirees who understand the 
advantages of annuities may not buy them for fear that the seller of the 
annuity might find itself unable to pay the annuity.  Other potential 
purchasers may be willing to bear the modest risk of possible nonpayment, 
but may be reluctant to buy annuities because of the fear of rising interest 
rates.  A reasonable fear of the annuity purchaser is that interest rates (as 
well as investment returns in general) will rise after the annuity has been 
purchased, leaving the annuitant locked into an annuity whose payments 
are low because they are based on projected lower interest rates.67 
Similarly, because sellers of annuities also invest in stocks, a general rise in 
the stock market after the purchase of an annuity may mean that the 
purchaser, by waiting a few months and realizing more on the sale of his or 
her stocks, could have bought a larger annuity.   
 The possible rise in annuity payment rates is one reason some 
advocate buying more than one annuity and spacing out the purchases over 
a few years.  Known as “laddering,” the strategy may backfire if future 
annuity payments decline because of lower interest rates or a decline in the 
value of stocks, but it does have the advantage of averaging annuity 
payments over several years and so avoiding extremely low payments, 
albeit at the potential cost of not locking in higher payments.  Laddering 
also protects against investing a significant portion of assets into a single 
lifetime annuity that does not have a minimum payout period, and dying 
soon thereafter.  By laddering, or deferring the investment of some funds 
targeted for the purchase of an annuity, the individual may die before 
having invested all of the value of the IRA in annuities.   
To overcome potential purchasers’ fears that they may die early in 
the payout period, annuities are often sold with minimum payout periods, 
with 10 years being common.  Of course, a minimum payout period lowers 
the annual payout, but for many purchasers the trade-off is worth it.  Other 
annuities guarantee a back-pay equal to the initial purchase price.  If the 
                                                                                                        
67 The seller of the annuity will invest the purchase price. The benefits paid by 
the annuity will vary based upon the projected investment return anticipated by the 
seller. If interest rates are low, the seller has to assume a lower rate of investment 
return. 
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annuitant dies before that occurs, the annuity continues to pay until it has 
paid back the purchase price, but of course at the cost of a lower annual 
payment.  Simply put, the more an annuity varies from the “pure product” 
of a lifetime guarantee without any minimum payment guaranty, the lower 
the annual payment but the more it appeals to purchasers who are not 
comfortable with the prospect of dying long before their projected life 
expectancy.   
For those apprehensive about whether the seller of the annuity will 
be financially secure enough to pay the annuity, one solution is to buy 
smaller annuities from several annuity sellers, thereby spreading the risk.  
If one seller should fail, only a portion of the total annuity payments would 
be lost.   
Another possibility is to purchase a deferred annuity with a fixed 
payout.68 For example, a 65-year-old buys an annuity for $X that will pay 
$Y per year for life, but the initial payment will not begin for 10 years 
(when the purchaser is age 75).  Depending on the annuity, it may pay back 
some, or all, of the purchase price if the annuitant dies before reaching age 
seventy-five.  The advantage to the annuitant is that for $X purchase price, 
the annuitant realizes a significantly larger annual payment than by paying 
the same amount for an immediate pay annuity.69 During the intervening 
ten years, the annuitant can draw down his or her savings knowing that, at 
age seventy-five, a new stream of income will appear.  Some advocate 
dividing the retirement savings that the retiree expects to spend during 
retirement – not including savings that are being held back to pass on to 
heirs – into two equal parts: buying an annuity to begin at age 80, and then 
spending the other half during the years leading up to age 80.  The delay in 
the start of the annuity will result in a higher annual payment, and the 
certainty of the forthcoming income permits the annuitant to “self-
annuitize” the other half of the savings over the years leading up to age 80.   
 
 
                                                                                                        
68 Jonathan Barry Forman, Optimal Distribution Rules for Defined 
Contribution Plans: What Can the United States and Australia Learn from Other 
Countries?, in N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BEN, & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 3-1, 3-28 
(Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2012). 
69 In February of 2012, the purchase of a deferred annuity for $100,000 by a 
sixty-five-year-old male with the first payment to begin at age seventy-five paid 
about $11,650 a year. If the annuity was deferred until age eighty-five, the yearly 
payment was about $25,450 per year. Calculations are taken from id. at 3–29. 
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B. POSSIBLE REFORMS TO ENCOURAGE THE PURCHASE OF ANNUITIES 
 
The first step is to mandate that all 401(k) plans offer an annuity 
option and require all rollover IRAs to permit the owner to purchase an 
annuity without recognition of immediate income.70 As a practical matter, 
the use of IRA funds to purchase an annuity without being taxed on the 
purchase price should be time limited, perhaps to the first year after the 
rollover into the IRA.  Of course, the entire amount of the annuity is be 
taxed as ordinary income; the exclusion ratio provided in section seventy-
two of the IRC does not apply to annuities purchased with funds that were 
never subject to the income tax.   
Unless the government does something to encourage the use of 
annuities by IRA owners, the financial security of many retirees will be 
severely compromised in the years to come.  We can expect unacceptable 
rates of elderly poverty and increasing elderly financial exploitation and 
abuse.  To overcome the reluctance of retirees to purchase annuities, the 
federal government could create, sell, and likely subsidize new forms of 
annuities for retirees who have a rollover IRA.71 No one would be required 
to purchase an annuity from the government, but if the annuities were 
attractive enough, many retirees might be inclined to purchase them.   
A public entity that sold annuities (fully backed by the federal 
government) would overcome retiree fears about the financial solvency of 
the issuer of the annuity.  So that government would not compete generally 
with issuers of annuities, the entity should be limited to selling annuities to 
retirees who pay for it with funds from their 401(k) or a rollover IRA.  
Such an entity should be able to sell an attractively priced annuity in part 
because of savings in the form of lower administrative costs, the lack of the 
need to advertise, and savings from not paying commissions to sellers of 
the annuities, as well as not being burdened with the need to create a profit.   
To meet the concern of annuity purchasers that they might be 
buying the annuity when interest rates were too low, the annuities could be 
tied to a rolling, five-year interest rate based on the interest rate of U.S. 
Treasury notes.  The pension paid to those who participate in a defined 
benefit plan is not dependent on the prevailing interest rates at the time of 
the employee’s retirement.  Similarly, employees who participate in 401(k) 
plans should have the opportunity to convert their 401(k) accounts into a 
                                                                                                        
70 A more radical solution would be to require retirees with 401(k) accounts to 
purchase annuities. See id. at 3–32. 
71 Frolik, supra note 7, at 278. 
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stream of income that is not wholly dependent on the rate of interest 
prevailing at the time of their retirement.  Perhaps some form of post-
purchase protection in the form of a higher payout if interest rates rise 
appreciably might be a solution.  The annuities might also offer modest 
inflation protection.  The monthly payout could be increased by a certain 
percentage in the event that the increase in the consumer price index 
exceeded a predetermined trigger level.  While not offering the complete 
inflation protection enjoyed by Social Security recipients, whose annual 
benefit rises with inflation, the partial protection would encourage the 
purchase of annuities by those who are wary of locking their capital into a 
fixed income investment.72  
Of course, the more protection offered by the annuities, the more 
they would cost unless some or all of those protections were subsidized by 
the government.  The justification for a subsidy is the public interest in 
assisting retirees who participated in defined contribution plans to use, 
enjoy and create lifetime, assured streams of income.  For years the nation 
has promoted employer provided retirement plans by providing generous 
deferral of income taxes on 401(k) accounts.  Modestly extending that 
subsidy to the post-employment years would not seem excessive.   
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
The assumption that retirees can successfully manage their IRAs 
during their declining years is a folly.  Why any society would willfully 
create a retirement system that relies on the financial acumen of millions of 
aging individuals can only be explained as the triumph of hope over 
common sense and reality.  Unless we relieve retirees of the burden of the 
responsibility for their retirement assets, we can expect growing poverty 
among the elderly as they mismanage and spend down their retirement 
funds.   
It is time to admit that what most retirees need is a stream of 
income.  Our nation’s retirees need and deserve the security of having a 
check arrive every month that does not depend upon their skill at managing 
an IRA during their declining years.   
 
 
                                                                                                        
72 See id. at 320-30 (discussing ways the government could encourage the 
purchase of annuities). 

THE SURPRISING EQUALITY OF RETIREMENT TIME: 
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This article discusses the impact changes to the retirement age may have 
on the distribution of retirement time.  The author investigates the length of 
time men and women are alive between the date of their retirement and 
their death, finding that the most critical factor in determining length of 
retirement time is and individual’s socio-economic status.  As a result, the 
author opines that because individuals in lower economic classes tend to 
die earlier, increasing the retirement age will impact these individuals 
disproportionally and increase retirement time inequality. 
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, economic inequality in the United States reached its 
highest level in 100 years.1 Increasingly, inequality is considered by global 
                                                                                                                                
*Graduate Student, Economics Department, The New School for Social 
Research. 
**Irene and Bernard L. Schwartz Chair of Economic Policy Analysis, 
Professor of Economic Policy Analysis and Chair of Economics Department, and 
corresponding author. 
1 Every year from 1913 to 2012 (the earliest and latest years for which data is 
available) the top 10%, 1% and 0.1% of income earners won a greater share of 
national 2012-value-income than in any previous year (this is true whether one 
includes or excludes capital gains). See Facundo Alvaredo et al., The Database, 
THE WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE, http://topincomes.gmond.parisschool 
ofeconomics.eu/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (accessed by selecting the “The 
Database” link and then selecting the corresponding country and years). Census 
data for the Gini coefficient (which is negatively related with the degree of 
equality) has steadily increased since 1967 when records began. In 2012 (and 
2011) the Gini coefficient was 0.477 – roughly equal to the Gini measure of 
inequality for Singapore, Kenya, and the Dominican Republic. See Historical 
Income Tables: Households tbl.H-4, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census. 
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economic and financial leaders to be the principal barrier to economic 
growth.2 However, the disparity of wealth and income do not alone convey 
the deepening stratification of American society.  An equally important 
dimension of well-being is access to time at the end of a person’s working 
life.  We identify “retirement time” as a resource that employees consume 
after permanently exiting the labor market.  Retirement time is simply the 
time between retiring and dying: the difference between the age at death 
and the age at the start of retirement.  Upper income individuals live longer 
than lower income workers and the longevity gap has grown wider by 
socio-economic status (SES) over time.3 We expect the growing inequality 
of longevity due to SES, coupled with the increasing effort that lower-
income older people are making to stay in the labor force, will cause 
retirement time to become more unequally distributed between SES groups.  
A growing time-inequality should be avoided because retirement time is 
one of the only areas where the nation has made significant progress 
achieving equality among working people.4 
On average, Americans over age sixty-five are living longer, but 
longevity gains are unequally distributed between people of different races, 
between men and women, and among those of different socio-economic 
status.5 For example, white men’s longevity at age seventy-five increased 
25% between 1980 and 2000, whereas black men’s increase in life 
expectancy at age seventy-five grew by 22.9% over the same time period.6 
                                                                                                                                
gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/ (follow “Table H-4” hyperlink) 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
2 See Larry Elliot, Income Gap Poses Biggest Threat to Global Community, 
Warns WEF, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 16, 2014, available at http://www.the guardian 
.com/business/2014/jan/16/income-gap-biggest-risk-global-community-world-
economic-forum. 
3 That is, not only has income and wealth grown wider, so too has the gap in 
longevity. See Julian P. Cristia, Rising Mortality and Life Expectancy Differentials 
by Lifetime Earnings in the United States, (Inter-American Dev. Bank, Working 
Paper No. 665, 2009); Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2007, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN STATISTICS NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Sept. 28, 2011, at 48. 
4 See infra App. A.  
5  NAT’L INST. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH 
PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA: THE HEALTH & RET. STUDY 
20 (2007). 
6 Number of years expected to live from age seventy-five onwards is 10.1 and 
12.5 years respectively for white males and females, and 11.7 and 14.1 years 
respectively for black males and females. See infra App. A. 
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But small differences in rates of change compound over time.  The 
white/black gap in age seventy-five life expectancy in 2010 was only nine 
months.  If trends continue however, in twenty years the difference will be 
over one year and three months.  Though longevity is on track to become 
more unequal, analysis of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 7 
demonstrates that retirement time is still remarkably equal among the last 
generation of workers – our current retirees – primarily because lower 
income people tend to retire earlier. 
While retirement time had been an equalizing asset between 
members of different income classes,8 there is nascent evidence that the 
distribution of retirement time may become more unequal.9 Income, of 
course, is not the only factor driving the distribution of retirement time.  
Not surprisingly, healthier individuals consume more retirement time 
because they live longer.9 Further, although it was not expected, men have 
more retirement time than women who have retired.10 Also unexpected is 
that since lower income workers retire earlier than higher income workers, 
the lower income groups have, on average, more retirement time. 11 
However, these results are reversed among middle class elderly persons 
(i.e., among the group excluding retirees in the top 20% and bottom 20% of 
the income distribution). 12  When focusing on the middle 60% of the 
distribution, there is evidence that retirement time inequality may be on the 
rise.13 
Retirement time inequality will also likely increase as a result of 
the continuing weakness of the U.S. labor market as older workers 
(especially those with less income) work, or search for work, later into life 
than previous cohorts.  We also expect, as the panel grows larger, the bias 
in the data set (containing a disproportionate share of people who die 
earlier than normal) will dissipate.  The HRS panel data has only a small 
                                                                                                                                
7 See infra note 41. 
8  Although SES is the key conceptual division, we will avoid the 
complications of defining precise SES criteria and instead focus simply on full-
time labor market income as a rough proxy for SES. 
9 See NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 56-
60. 
9 Id. at 40. 
10 Id. at 22, 35, 40. 
11 Id. at 51-65. 
12 Id. 
13 NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 51-65. 
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number of respondents who have died after living an average life span,14 
which means the sample is not perfectly representative of the population.  
However, the large sample currently available is representative in some key 
dimensions, such as health status.  Despite the limitations in the data, we 
find support for the hypothesis that the distribution of retirement time 
remains relatively equal because upper-middle class income men work 
longer and retire at older ages.  However, there is nascent evidence that this 
equity is eroding. 
Retirement time inequality should inform policies concerning the 
appropriate “normal retirement age” in Social Security, Medicare, and 
other old age programs.  If benefits are cut by raising the age participants 
can collect full benefits, then lower income workers will likely work later 
into life, eroding their retirement time relative to wealthier and/or healthier 
individuals.  To date, the nation’s old age programs are among the few 
mechanisms that mitigate the impacts of deepening inequality of wealth, 
income, opportunity and mortality in the United States. 
 
II.  RETIREMENT IN AMERICA – BACKGROUND AND 
RECENT FINDINGS 
 
Since the 1950s, the labor force participation of men over age fifty 
declined across all income groups as the expansion of Social Security made 
retirement income more equally distributed than preretirement income.15 
Defined benefit (DB) pension plans were more prevalent in jobs that were 
physically taxing, so those with lower than average longevity were able to 
retire sooner.16 This recent success in achieving some equity in retirement 
time stems from the design of the American retirement and disability 
income system, which has its roots in social systems developed for state 
and municipal employees at the turn of the last century.17 These systems 
were extended to most private sector workers with the adoption of Social 
                                                                                                                                
14 Id. 
15 Edward N. Wolff, Pensions in the 2000s: The Lost Decade? (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16991, 2011), available at http://www.nber 
.org/papers/w16991. 
16 NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 51. 
17 See ROBERT L. CLARK ET AL., A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1, 167-71 (2003). 
2014      THE SURPRISING EQUALITY OF RETIREMENT TIME 409 
 
 
Security in 1935.18 More workers were able to retire when Social Security 
old age benefits and disability programs expanded significantly from the 
1950s through to the 1970s.19 This came with the coincident growth of 
unions and employer-based DB pension plans in the 1940s and continuing 
until the 1970s.20 Further, Medicare was established in 1965, providing 
universal health insurance for those over age sixty-five, which significantly 
improved the health and longevity of the aged. 21  As a result of these 
changes, workers in all socioeconomic groups were able to control some of 
their own leisure time before they died. 
In 2008, Teresa Ghilarducci was the first scholar to measure the 
distribution of retirement time, finding that the distribution of retirement 
time was strikingly equal for people who died before age sixty-five. 22 
Relying on the 2006 HRS sample, Ghilarducci found that the top income-
earning quintile of retirees between ages fifty and sixty-five had 
approximately the same share of retirement time as the other four quintiles 
in the same age range.23 The analysis added together retirement times of 
these retirees before age sixty-five and then found each quintile’s relative 
share of the total sum of retirement time.24 The top quintile accounted for 
their proportionate share of retirement time consumed before the age of 
sixty-five.  Specifically, retired men in the top 20% of the asset distribution 
– those with assets worth over $271,000 – had 5.57 years of retirement time 
before the age of sixty-five and accounted for 22% of the total amount of 
retirement time.25 Men in the bottom 20% – those with an average debt of 
$6,000 – accounted for 18% of the total retirement time before the age of 
sixty-five.26 Furthermore, Ghilarducci noted that although the top 20% of 
the men had 85% of all the wealth and the poorest 20% were in debt, the 
distribution of retirement time before age sixty-five was almost equal.27 For 
                                                                                                                                
18 See Patricia P. Martin & David A. Weaver, Social Security: A Program & 
Policy History, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1, 1-3 (2005). 
19 Id. at 1, 7-9. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 8. 
22  See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST 
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 200-01 (2008). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 200. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 201. 
27 Ghilarducci, supra note 22, at 201. 
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women the distribution of pre-sixty-five retirement time was also equal.28 
The top and bottom fifths of women accounted for the same share of 
retirement time – 22.6% for the top and 22.7% for the bottom.29 
Furthermore, Ghilarducci found that women and men, blacks and 
whites, high and low income, have approximately the same amount of 
retirement time prior to age sixty-five.30  She argued retirement time is 
distributed relatively equally because in the United States the “retirement 
date” is flexible.31 Many defined benefit plans allow pension collection 
before age sixty-two, when workers become eligible for early Social 
Security benefits. 32  Similarly, Social Security and workplace disability 
pensions are available before age sixty-two for eligible workers (albeit at 
the cost of reduced benefits).33 In some pension plans, American workers 
can start collecting a defined benefit pension as early as age fifty.34  
Because age discrimination is illegal in the United States,35 many 
older workers are able to stay in the labor market beyond age sixty-five.36 
Since professionals are likely to work later into life than blue-collar 
workers,37 a retirement system can be more balanced and fair even in the 
face of longevity differences among social economic classes.  In fact, 
pension systems that allow and encourage people who die sooner than 
average to retire sooner than average – Social Security and DB pensions 
have these features38 – are potentially very progressive.  If people who die 
earlier also retire at younger ages they could conceivably have the same 
amount of retirement time as higher-income people who live longer.  In 
contrast, 401(k)-type pensions (defined contribution (DC) pensions) 
accumulate significantly as a person ages and pays out lump sums so that 
retiring earlier is often difficult for lower income individuals.39 Finally, 
people without employer-based pensions or independent assets would need 
to work longer, as they can rely only on Social Security benefits.  Workers 
                                                                                                                                
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 214. 
31 Id. at 215. 
32 NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 57-62. 
33 Id. at 62. 
34 Id. 
35 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2008). 
36 Id.  
37 NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757 supra note 5, at 43-44. 
38 Id. at 51. 
39 Id. 
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in such situations are predominantly low-income earners with shorter life 
spans.  As DC plans replace traditional DB pensions and as coverage by 
any employer based retirement plan has stagnated, 40  one of the key 
equalizing mechanisms of the American retirement system will be lost. 
 
III.  HRS DATA ON RETIREMENT TIME DISTRIBUTION AND 
METHODOLOGY41 
 
HRS is administered by the University of Michigan every two 
years as a series of in-depth interviews with people age fifty and over.42 
The first cohort began in 1992 and included more than 10,000 
respondents.43 The latest available survey is data from 2010.44 Our sample 
comes from each of the ten surveys.  Every sixth year (or third survey), the 
HRS adds approximately 5,000 new participants in order to maintain a 
sample.45 The panel nature of the HRS data is essential to determining 
individuals’ time spent in retirement since we need to know the year and 
month of both retirement and of death.  The key variable, retirement time, 
is measured as the difference between the respondent’s year of death and 
year of retirement, plus the numeric difference between her or his month of 
death and the month of retirement where months are coded sequentially, 
with January equal to one and December equal to twelve.46 
 
                                                                                                                                
40 Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: 
Geographic Differences and Trends, 2011, 378 EMP. BEN. RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 
1, 26, 36 (2012), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB _11-
2012_No378_RetParticip.pdf. 
41 Health and Retirement Study, U. MICHIGAN, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/ 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; Sample Sizes and Response Rates, U. MICHIGAN, 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/sitedocs/sampleresponse.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 
2014). 
46 This coding pattern assumes that reported dates occur at the end of the 
reported month. Alternatively, one could code months as January = 0, February = 
1, … December = 11. The reported result would not differ. 
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ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܶ݅݉݁ 
ൌ ൤ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨
െ ൤ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨ 
(1) 
 
Defining the start of retirement can be difficult since many people 
continue to work, volunteer, or do other activities after they leave a long-
term career.  Judging what is or is not retirement from work is difficult.  
We use HRS respondents’ own declaration of whether or not they are 
retired.  Specifically, the survey asks respondents if they are retired, 
disabled or working, and the date of their retirement.47 However, if an 
individual reports she is retired in 1994, working in 1996, and then retired 
again in 1998, equation (1) uses her most recent statement of retirement 
year and retirement month (i.e., whatever year and month she states in the 
1998 survey wave). 
 To calculate retirement and death ages, we use a similar formula as 
(1).  We calculate individuals’ age of retirement based on their latest 
answer to their year/month of retirement by subtracting the respondent’s 
year and month of birth. 
 
 
ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܣ݃݁
ൌ ൤ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܴ݁ݐ݅ݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨
െ  ൤ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨ 
(2) 
 
Finally we compute age at death with a similar subtraction: 
 
 
ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܣ݃݁ 
ൌ ൤ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܦ݁ܽݐ݄ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨ 
െ ൤ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ܯ݋݊ݐ݄12 ൨ 
(3) 
 
                                                                                                                                
47  Health and Retirement Study, supra note 41; 2010 Questionnaire, U. 
MICHIGAN, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/modules/meta/2010/core/qnaire/ online 
/10hr10JCore.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
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Once these core values are computed, we restrict the data set to 
respondents who report at least one instance of full-time labor market 
income.48 In addition to dividing the sample of 12,033 respondents by their 
labor market status, this restriction ensures that we analyze the retirement 
patterns of workers.  Since workers report labor market income in various 
years, we adjust all values to 2008 dollars according to the Census 
Bureau’s consumer price index (CPI) for the appropriate year. 49  After 
adjusting for inflation, we calculate each respondent’s mean full-time 
income.  Thus, if a respondent reports full-time income in only one survey 
year, this amount is his average real income; if a respondent reports full-
time income in three separate surveys her average real income is one-third 
of the sum of the adjusted values. 
The sample sizes for retirement time, retirement age and death age 
are different because more respondents (5,557) consider themselves retired 
(and provide the interviewer with a valid retirement year and month) than 
have died.  Since the first HRS wave was in 1992, and the latest available 
data is from 2010, the youngest respondent would be fifty years old (the 
age one enters the HRS) plus eighteen years, or sixty-eight years old.  This 
limitation leads to a much smaller number of observed death ages (1,418) 
since these individuals must have reported at least one year of full-time 
labor market income before retiring and dying.  However, since many 
respondents may have worked and died without ever retiring, the number 
of those with a retirement time is about half of those with a death age.50 
 
A.  DOWNWARD LONGEVITY BIAS 
 
 Because the survey is only eighteen years old, the majority of 
respondents are still alive.  Due to this, we cannot know living retirees’ 
total retirement time, which creates a bias in our data set because less than 
12% (1,418/12,033 = 11.7%) of the eligible sample are deceased.  Among 
                                                                                                                                
48 We define full-time labor market attachment as respondents who described 
the “usual” working time as at least thirty-five hours per week and “usual” work 
frequency as forty weeks per year. 
49  See Minn. Population Ctr., Univ. of Minn., Note on Adjusting Dollar 
Amount Variables for Inflation (CPI-U), IPUMS-CPS, https://cps.ipums.org/cps/ 
intro.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (“The IPUMS variable CPI99 provides an 
easy way to adjust dollar amounts to constant dollars”). 
50 An individual could also have no measured retirement time because not all 
the necessary data points (year of death, month of death, year of retirement and 
month of retirement) were recorded, so retirement time was not computed. 
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the deceased, only half (725/1,418 = 51.3%) have a corresponding 
retirement date by which retirement time can be calculated.  The resulting 
problem is a downward bias in longevity as shown by the low mean death 
age of 67.9 in our sample.  Therefore, the results reported here must be 
recognized as representing an unfortunate (early death) subgroup of the 
population.  Key variables are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Employing different techniques or restrictions to correct for the 
downward bias in death age, however, does not alter the central results of 
our analysis.  One method is restricting the sample to respondents aged 
sixty or older when they first entered the HRS.  To partially mitigate the 
large reduction in sample size of this approach we drop the full-time 
restriction on labor market income.  These two changes generate a sample 
of approximately 3,100 – about one-quarter the size of our chosen sample.  
The benefit of this smaller sample is that the downward longevity bias is 
largely removed as the average age of death increases from 67.9 to 77.4, 
which is comparable to this generation’s expected longevity.51 However, 
not only does this approach require an arbitrary age cut off, but the 
inclusion of part-time income greatly skews the average real income 
                                                                                                                                
51  The current longevity estimate for those born in the 1930s is 83.8 years.  
See generally Arias, supra note 3, at 48. 
Table 1: Sample Summary for HRS Respondents with Some Full-Time 
Income  
 Observations Mean Value Standard Deviation 
Total Number of 
Respondents 12,033   
Death Age 1,418 67.86 7.57 
Retirement Age 5,557 62.10 5.57 
Retirement Time 725 8.71 5.68 
Average Real 
Income (Full-
Time) 
12,033 $51,173 $58,550 
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variable downward.52 Therefore, correcting for one skew in the sample’s 
distribution introduces another, but at the additional cost of many lost 
observations. 
Yet, in spite of these imposed restrictions, the overall results did 
not substantially change: men still had more retirement time than women, 
working men retired earlier than working women, and having a pension 
continues to appear to have little impact on retirement time.  Moreover, 
retirement time in the restricted sample is still negatively related to income 
overall, but it is positively correlated among the middle 60% of the 
distribution.  Therefore, given the larger, non-arbitrary and more robust 
results of the sample presented in Table 1, as well as the importance of full-
time labor market income to proxy socio-economic status, we proceed with 
the analysis acknowledging the downward longevity bias and eagerly await 
more waves of the HRS. 
 
B.  RETIREMENT DISTRIBUTION BY DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC 
CATEGORIES 
 
 In our sample, 725 people retired and died with an average 
retirement time of 8.7 years.  This group retired at ages 4.5 months (0.38 of 
a year) older than the average of all the 5,557 retirees.  Table 2 displays 
retirement age, death age and retirement time by sex, race, pension 
coverage, and health status.  The subgroup sizes are listed below the mean 
value.  The last column reports the retirement age of those who died, which 
are the individuals for whom we calculate their retirement time. 
  
                                                                                                                                
52 Approximately one-third of this sample of persons aged sixty or older had 
an annual labor market income of under $4,500 since, in this case, labor market 
income is not restricted to full-time workers. 
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Table 2: Retired, Deceased and Retirement Time Averages by Demographics 
 
Subgroups 
 
Retirement 
Age 
 
Death Age 
 
Retirement 
Time 
 
Retirement 
Age 
(Deceased) 
All 
62.10 67.86 8.715 62.48 
5,557 1,418 725 
Women 
62.05 66.86 8.46 62.75 
2,535 475 216 
Men 
62.14 68.37 8.823 62.37 
3,022 943 509 
Nonwhite 
61.6 66.61 9.111 61.02 
1,002 285 141 
White 
62.2 68.18 8.619 62.83 
4,555 1,133 584 
No Pension in 
1992 63.21 68.2 8.325 63.38 
 986 342 173 
Has Pension in 
1992 62.05 67.93 8.431 61.74 
 2,755 627 393 
Health: Good 
to Poor 
62.02 67.30 8.454 62.44 
2,319 800 397 
Health: 
Excellent to 
Very Good
62.15 68.59 9.03 62.52 
3,238 618 328 
 
Although men and women retire at roughly the same age (62.14 
and 62.05, respectively), the 509 retired men who died had over four extra 
months of retirement time than did the 216 deceased women (8.82 versus 
8.46, respectively) because the men lived longer than the women who 
retired.  Also surprising, the non-white workers have half a year more of 
retirement time than white workers (9.11 versus 8.62) because they retired 
earlier, at age 61.6 compared to 62.2.  Since the number of observations 
differs for each variable, Table 2 lists the subgroup sizes below each 
group’s mean value.  The last column reports the retirement age of those 
who have died, which are the individuals for whom we calculate retirement 
time. 
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The difference in retirement age and death age between those with 
and without pensions was not significant.  Those without pensions had, on 
average, 8.32 years of retirement time compared to 8.43 years for those 
with access to pensions – a difference of about five weeks. 53  Not 
surprisingly those with self-described ‘excellent’ or ‘very good’ health had 
a mean 9.03 years in retirement time, whereas those with ‘good’, ‘fair’ or 
‘poor’ health had only 8.45 years of retirement time on average.54 Since the 
healthy and less healthy have approximately the same retirement age (62.52 
and 62.44, respectively), the difference in retirement time comes entirely 
from the healthier group’s longer-than-average lifespan (68.59 versus 
67.30). 
Now that we have presented differences by race, sex and health, we 
examine two income categories: 
 
(i) Respondents with income above and below the median full-
time labor market income $40,000, and; 
(ii) Respondents groups by full-time average real income 
quintiles.55 
 
The bottom 50% of income earners had an average retirement time 
of 9 years, which is significantly greater than the top half’s retirement time 
of 8.3 years, or 8.4 months more retirement time enjoyed by the lower 
income half of retired workers, as can be seen in Table 3.  Table 3 shows 
that this negative relation between income and retirement time is driven, to 
a significant extent, by the top and bottom quintiles which have an average 
of 7.4 and 10.2 years of retirement, respectively.  These extreme 
differences are not apparent between the second, third and fourth quintiles, 
which have retirement times of 8.4, 8.2 and 8.9 years, respectively.  These 
stark differences in retirement time are discussed further below, but first we 
                                                                                                                                
53 Although restricting this part to individuals in the 1992 HRS reduces our 
potential sample size, for these rows, only a very few individuals not in the 1992 
wave have pensions in later waves and have a valid retirement time. Thus, the 
substantive results are not affected by this restriction. 
54  The HRS question regarding personal health status is asked of each 
respondent in each wave. We have relied on an individual’s first reported personal 
health status – making it perhaps even more surprising that there is such a large 
division between the self-assessed healthy and unhealthy. We collapse the HRS’s 
five categories into a binary one for ease of analysis. 
55 The minimum average annual incomes to be included in each quintile are 
$0, $21,906.64, $33,362.48, $47,328.59 and $69,543.62. 
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consider the distribution of retirement time among income groups of men 
and women separately. 
 
Table 3: Retired, Deceased and Retirement Time Averages by Income 
Groups 
 
Subgroups 
 
Retirement 
Age 
 
Death Age
 
Retirement 
Time 
 
Retirement 
Age 
(Deceased) 
Lower Half of 
Incomes 
62.55 68.27 9.04 62.86 
2,668 776 384 
Upper Half of 
Incomes 
61.67 67.37 8.348 62.05 
 2,889 642 341 
Bottom 20% 
62.4 69.04 10.16 62.84 
1,065 340 164 
20-40% 
62.52 68.02 8.367 63.22 
1,070 293 145 
40-60% 
62.61 67.21 8.229 62.68 
1,106 297 152 
60-80% 
61.32 67.41 8.934 61.36 
1,235 279 153 
Top 20% 
61.74 67.27 7.393 62.25 
1,081 209 111 
 
We find lower-income women and men retire at approximately the 
same age, 62.50 and 62.63, respectively.  While there is a larger gap 
(approximately seven months) between the retirement ages of higher-
income women (61.27) and men (61.87), higher earning individuals of both 
sexes retire at earlier ages than their lower-income counterparts, as shown 
in Table 4.  Yet, this equality between the sexes in retirement age does not 
carry over into retirement time.  Both upper- and lower-income women – 
for whom we can determine retirement time – have almost identical 
amounts of retirement time: 8.46 and 8.45 years, respectively.56 However, 
                                                                                                                                
56 It must be noted that at this level of data, parsing our cell counts (i.e., the 
number of observations per variable type) are approaching the limit of what can be 
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higher income men have nearly one year less of retirement time than lower 
income men.  The 281 higher-income males have an average of 8.33 years 
of retirement, whereas the 228 lower-income males have 9.43 years.  Thus, 
in contrast to our initial expectations, among retired workers, retirement 
time is not positively correlated with labor market income.  However, as 
demonstrated in Table 5, the “reverse inequality” result (i.e., the poor have 
more) is driven by including the richest and poorest quintiles of retired 
men. 
 
Table 4: Retirement Age and Time by Sex and Income Group 
 
 Women Men 
Income Class Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
 
No. Retired 1,596 939 1,072 1,950 
Mean Retirement Age 62.50 61.27 62.63 61.87 
Obs. Retirement Time 156 60 228 281 
Mean Retirement Age 
if Deceased 62.86 62.46 62.86 61.96 
Mean Retirement 
Time 8.464 8.450 9.434 8.327 
 
Restricting the sample to the middle 60% of the income 
distribution yields a different income and retirement time relationship than 
in the full sample.  Table 5 presents the same data as Table 4, but with the 
sample restricted to the middle 60% of the income distribution.  In the 
middle class, the lower income women work for a longer period of time: 
women in the lower half of the middle class retiree distribution retire a full 
year later than the upper middle-income class women (62.4 years versus 
61.4 years).  For men, the 1.2 years gap is even larger.  Lower-income, 
middle class men work until nearly age 63 and upper-income middle class 
men retire at age 61.8 years.  Furthermore, the difference in retirement time 
is positively related to income.  Men in the 50th to 80th percentile range 
                                                                                                                                
considered useful. The smallest cell counts are 60 and 49, which demand one to 
extrapolate the results with much caution. 
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have about 8.8 years of retirement, and their counterparts in the 20th to 
50th percentile range have less time in retirement, at an average of 8.5 
years.  Therefore, the negative relationship between retirement time and 
income class shown in Table 3 is driven entirely by the top 20% and 
bottom 20% of male income earners. 
 
 
We conclude that the anomalous results of retirement time – that 
the lower income fare better – for the full sample is driven in particular by 
the extreme experiences of men in the top 20% and bottom 20% of the 
income distribution.  As discussed, the top 50% and bottom 50% of 
females have near-identical retirement time.  Yet, Table 5 reveals that this 
similarity evaporates for the middle 60% of women.  The upper-half of 
middle income women have 8.8 years of retirement time, while the lower-
half of middle income women have 7.7 years of retirement time.  Note the 
observations are small – involving eighty-five and forty-nine women, 
respectively.  Nevertheless, these observations are numerically important in 
calculating average retirement times (insofar as they represent a sizeable 
portion of the total retirement time sample).  Therefore, these data for 
women reinforce the conclusion that it is the top and bottom quintiles of 
men, specifically, which account for the entirety of the negative relation 
between income and retirement time. 
Table 5: Middle Income Retirees -- 60% of Distribution -- 
Retirement Age and Time by Gender and Income Group 
 Women Men 
Binary Income Class Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
No. Retired 920 716 683 1,092 
Mean Retirement Age 62.42 61.41 62.98 61.78 
Obs. Retirement Time 85 49 135 181 
Mean Retirement Age 
if Deceased 62.54 62.48 63.08 61.81 
Mean Retirement 
Time 7.727 8.825 8.503 8.805 
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Next we consider the income class differences according to the 
health status of respondents. 57  When the bottom and top quintiles are 
included, lower-income individuals, regardless of health, garner more 
retirement time than their higher-income counterparts (8.7 versus 8.1 for 
poorer health individuals; 9.4 versus 8.6 for healthier individuals) even 
though lower income individuals retire later – at ages 62.4 for the less 
healthy and 62.7 for the healthier – than the higher income individuals, at 
ages 61.5 and 61.7, respectively.  Note that the retirement time benefit from 
being healthy is larger for of the lower half of retirees (0.72 years) than 
wealthier retirees (0.52 years).  Overall we confirm, in Table 6, that health 
status is a key driver of retirement time: healthier individuals, regardless of 
income, enjoy more time in retirement than their unhealthy counterparts. 
 
Table 6: Retirement Age and Time by Health Status and Income 
Group in the Full Sample 
Health  Good, Fair, Poor   Excellent, Very good 
Income Class Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
Lower 
Income 
Upper 
Income 
No. Retired 1,298 1,021 1,370 1,868 
Mean Retirement Age 62.42 61.51 62.68 61.76 
Obs. Retirement Time 222 175 162 166 
Mean Retirement Age 
if Deceased 62.78 62.02 62.97 62.09 
Mean Retirement Time 8.736 8.095 9.456 8.615 
 
Excluding the extreme 20% at the top and bottom of the income 
distribution, we see, in Table 7, that healthy and/or wealthy individuals 
share approximately equal retirement times.  Among the lower-income 
middle class, healthier retirees have nearly a full year more of retirement 
                                                                                                                                
57 The cross tabulation of retirement time by income class and race does not 
provide further insights beyond what has been discussed above: nonwhites have 
more retirement time than whites, and in both cases, the relation is negatively 
associated with income class for the full sample and positively associated with the 
restricted, middle 60% sample. More importantly, we do not include these results 
here because the cell counts for nonwhites becomes unjustifiably small in both 
cases. 
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time (8.7 years) than the less healthy lower-income middle class (7.8 
years).  However, the retirement time differential among the upper-income 
middle class is insignificant at a mere 0.09 years (although this happens to 
be in favor of the less healthy).  Moreover, these retirement time figures for 
the upper half of income earners are nearly equal to that of the healthy but 
poor segment of the middle class.  Thus, among the middle 60% of the 
distribution, it is only the unhealthy, lower middle class that is at a 
significant disadvantage in obtaining retirement time. 
 
 
Before moving to the regression analysis, we provide a brief 
explanation of the observed biasness of our sample.  If an individual 
entered the HRS in the first survey wave in 1992, they would have been 
followed for eighteen years (1992 through 2010).  Many individuals have 
simply not been a part of the survey long enough to have died.  Those who 
have died, and for whom we calculate a retirement time, are those from 
groups with lower-than-average life expectancy.  Since it is well 
documented that longevity is positively correlated with income, the people 
who died are more likely to be lower income workers.  Moreover, since 
longevity is normally distributed, the HRS data captures a disproportionate 
share of lower-income individuals’ left tail of their death age distribution, 
relative to the death age distribution of higher income individuals.  That is, 
because the average death age of wealthier individuals is higher, we 
observed a smaller segment of this distribution’s left tail. 
Table 7: Retirement Age and Time by Health Status and Income 
Group Middle 60% of Distribution 
Health Good, Fair or Poor Excellent/Very good 
Income Class Lower Half 
Upper 
Half 
Lower 
Half 
Upper 
Half 
No. Retired 754 704 849 1,104 
Mean Retirement Age 62.47 61.66 62.82 61.62 
Obs. Retirement Time 124 122 96 108 
Mean Retirement Age 
if Deceased 62.56 61.61 63.28 62.34 
Mean Retirement 
Time 7.79 8.85 8.74 8.76 
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This assessment is borne out in the data present in Tables 8 and 9.  
The middle three quintiles have roughly equivalent rates of death (12.1%, 
12.3% and 11.6%), whereas 14.13% of the bottom 20% of the income 
distribution died compared to a mere 8.69% of the top 20%.  Further, far 
more men (15.2%), than women (8.14%) have died.  The sex disparity, in 
fact, is larger than the difference between the very healthy individuals who 
died (8.9%) and the proportion of deceased people with worse health 
(15.6%) as seen in Table 8.  Each of the large differences – between 
women and men, health status and the top and bottom 20% of the income 
distribution – are associated with unexpected outcomes in the distribution 
of retirement time.  These rates of death support our focus on the middle 
60% of the income distribution.  Moreover, given the near-equal death rates 
among the middle three quintiles, this middle class is likely more 
representative of the true population.  In other words, the middle class 
subset is a reasonable representation of retirement times. 
 
Table 8: Number and Proportion of Deceased Individuals, Plus Death 
Age, Retirement Age and Time in the Full Sample 
   
Proportion 
Dead 
 
Deceased Individuals with a Retirement 
Time Value 
 
   No. 
Deceased
Mean 
Death 
Age 
Mean 
Retirement 
Age 
Mean 
Retirement 
Time 
Gender 
Women 8.14% 216 71.21 62.75 8.460 
Men 15.22% 509 71.19 62.37 8.823 
Health 
Status 
Good - Poor 15.63% 397 70.90 62.44 8.454 
Excellent -
Very Good 8.94% 328 71.56 62.52 9.030 
Income 
Group 
Lower Half 12.89% 384 71.90 62.86 9.040 
Upper Half 10.67% 341 70.40 62.05 8.348 
Income 
Quintile 
Bottom 20% 14.13% 164 73.00 62.84 10.160 
20-40% 12.17% 145 71.58 63.22 8.367 
40-60% 12.35% 152 70.91 62.68 8.229 
60-80% 11.59% 153 70.30 61.36 8.934 
Top 20% 8.69% 111 69.64 62.25 7.393 
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However, the final two rows of Table 9 show that the lower death 
rate variation among the middle class does not hold across gender and 
health categories.  The proportion of deceased men (16.5%) is still far 
greater than that of women (7.7%), as is the proportion of the deceased who 
reported poorer health (16.0%) over those who reported being healthy 
(9.1%).  As a result, we are unable to entirely eliminate all biasness in 
health and gender dimensions, even though we have eliminated the bias for 
income groups.  Therefore, in the regression analysis, we look at both the 
full sample and the middle 60% subsample to provide some early insights 
into the state of retirement in America. 
 
Table 9: Number and Proportion of Deceased Individuals, Plus Death 
Age, Retirement Age and Time in the Middle Class (Middle Three 
Quintiles) 
 
  Proportion 
Dead 
Deceased Individuals with a Retirement 
Time Value 
  
 
No. 
Deceased
Mean 
Death 
Age 
Mean 
Retirement 
Age 
Mean 
Retirement 
Time 
Gender 
Women 7.66% 134 70.65 62.52 8.129 
Men 16.52% 316 71.03 62.36 8.676 
Health 
Status 
Good - Poor 16.00% 246 70.41 62.09 8.314 
Excellent - 
Very Good 9.08% 204 71.53 62.78 8.753 
Income 
Group 
Lower 
Half 12.07% 220 71.08 62.87 8.203 
Upper Half 12.00% 230 70.77 61.96 8.809 
 
D.   REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Using an ordinary least squares regression on the full sample, we 
find higher income reduces retirement time, retirement age, and death age.  
In fact, average full-time labor market income is the only significant 
variable in each of the three regressions.  Note income and retirement age 
are negatively correlated: higher income people work longer.  That higher 
income individuals remain longer in the workforce explains much of the 
anomalous results that higher income workers have less retirement time. 
After controlling for income and health, men still have more 
retirement time than women, but the difference is not statistically 
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significant.  Healthier individuals, after controlling for sex and income, die 
1.36 years later and the result is highly significant (p-value ൌ 0).  The age 
of death, seen in the final column of Table 10, is negatively correlated with 
income.  Thus, as expected from the cross tabulations, the top 20% of this 
sample tend to retire older and die a bit sooner. 
 
Table 10: Retirement Time, Age and Death Age by Income, Gender 
and Health Status 
Full Sample (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Retirement 
Time 
Retirement 
Age 
Death Age 
    
Average Full-time 
Labor Market Income 
(Thousands of 2008 $) 
-0.0116** -0.00333** -0.0109** 
(0.00471) (0.00157) (0.00488) 
Gender 
(Male = 1; 
Female = 0) 
0.577 0.167 1.721*** 
(0.468) (0.154) (0.433) 
Health Status 
(Excellent/ V. Good = 
1; 
Good to Poor = 0) 
0.604 0.168 1.358*** 
(0.422) (0.153) (0.403) 
Constant 8.576*** 62.07*** 66.62*** 
(0.455) (0.151) (0.412) 
 
Observations 725 5,557 1,418 
R-squared 0.012 0.001 0.019 
 
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Working past age sixty-five is correlated with higher income and 
earlier death in the full sample, but not for the middle class sample, 
represented in Table 11.  Labor market income is now associated with more 
retirement time, which confirms the findings from the simple cross 
tabulations.  For the middle class, every $10,000 of labor market income 
increases retirement time by 0.139 years (approximately 6 weeks).  
Unfortunately, with the reduced sample size, from 725 observations in the 
full sample in Table 10, to 450 in middle class sample in Table 11, the 
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coefficient on retirement time is not statistically significant.  Nevertheless, 
the negative relationship between retirement age and labor market income 
is significant in this sub-sample regression.  Therefore, although this 
second regression loses some of its explanatory power compared to the full 
sample regression, it supports the hypothesis that, for now, the U.S. 
retirement system enables lower income individuals to obtain retirement 
time on an equal basis by enabling them to overcome their shorter life 
expectancy through earlier retirement. 
 
Table 11: Retirement Time, Age and Death Age by Income, Gender 
and Health Status 
Middle 60% (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Retirement 
Time 
Retirement 
Age 
Death Age 
    
Average Full-time Labor 
Market Income 
(Thousands of 2008 $) 
0.0139 -0.0464*** -0.0344* 
(0.0184) (0.00692) (0.0192) 
Gender 
(Male = 1; 
Female = 0) 
0.497 0.522*** 1.488*** 
(0.521) (0.180) (0.529) 
Health Status 
(Excellent/ V. Good = 1; 
Good to Poor = 0) 
0.441 0.197 1.519*** 
(0.471) (0.179) (0.491) 
Constant 7.382*** 63.70*** 67.31*** 
(0.846) (0.312) (0.857) 
 
Observations 450 3,411 869 
R-squared 0.006 0.014 0.020 
 
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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IV.  INCOME INEQUALITY AMONG OLDER WORKERS IS 
GETTING WORSE58 
 
Finding that the U.S. retirement system equalizes retirement time is 
in sharp contrast to the growing inequality of income over the past two 
decades.  Using the same data set, we find the income distribution for full-
time workers and their households has become more unequal.  In 1992, 
looking at Table 12, the mean full-time labor market income of middle-
income earners (i.e., those in the third quintile – the 40th to 60th percentile) 
was 31.7% of the average full-time labor market income of those in the top 
quintile.59 By 2010, the middle quintile of workers’ average income was 
only a quarter (25.3%) of the average income of the top 20%.  The 
disparities in median incomes also grew.  In 1992, the middle-quintile’s 
median income was 40.7% of that in the top quintile; by 2010, the median 
middle-income individual had only one-third (33.3%) of the top 20%’s 
median income. 
 
Table 12:  Ratio of Third Quintile (40-60%) to Fifth Quintile (80-
100%) of Full-time Labor Market Income 
Year of HRS 
Sample Quintile’s Mean Income Quintile’s Median Income 
1992 31.7% 40.7% 
1994 31.5% 41.8% 
1996 32.1% 40.8% 
1998 28.2% 35.9% 
2000 29.8% 37.3% 
2002 27.9% 33.3% 
2004 27.3% 34.7% 
2006 26.4% 35.0% 
2008 26.8% 34.5% 
2010 25.3% 33.3% 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
58 See NAT’L INST. ON AGING, NIH PUBL’N NO. 07-5757, supra note 5, at 57. 
59 Note that these figures for the distribution of full-time income come from 
the entire full-time workers sample in the HRS and thus are not subject to the 
sample bias that exists when restricting the sample retirees or the deceased. 
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V.  RETIREMENT TIME EQUALITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
FOR RETIREMENT AGE POLICIES 
 
This study aimed to uncover retirement trends hidden by averages.  
That the average American man is retiring earlier and living longer hides 
the potential erosion in a major social accomplishment: Social Security, 
Medicare, and pension programs allow rich, middle class, and low income 
workers alike to retire before they die. 
The lowest income groups in this sample are retiring early, while 
others in the middle class are working longer and not enjoying as rapid 
improvements in longevity.  This means retirement time could grow more 
unequal by social economic class if the age at which Social Security 
beneficiaries collect full Social Security benefits is raised.  It is a mistake to 
assume that the facts that Americans are living longer and that Americans 
are retiring earlier are not connected.  Retirement improves health, 
especially for men, so if people work longer, longevity improvements 
could decrease and access to retirement time could decrease as well.60 
Reforming policies regarding one aspect of aging (e.g., retirement time) 
because of changes in the average of another (e.g., death age) is, therefore, 
ill advised. 
It is well documented that the average American’s life expectancy 
has increased markedly since World War II.61 The average American born 
in 1950 lived to 68 years old.62  By 1980, life expectancy at birth had 
increased to 73.9 years and to then nearly 78 years by 2007. 63  These 
remarkable increases hide a growing disparity of life expectancies among 
different socio-economic groups.  Longevity has not improved equally for 
all Americans.  Life expectancy for those in the top half of the income 
distribution has improved much more than for those in the bottom half.64 
Stunningly, this increasing inequality of outcomes has occurred with 
remarkable speed.  For example, the Inter-American Development Bank 
                                                                                                                                
60 See Kevin Neuman, Quit Your Job and Get Healthier? The Effect of 
Retirement on Health, 29 J. LAB. RES., 177–201 (2008). 
61 Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930-2010, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, available at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html. 
62 Id. 
63 Arias, supra note 3, at 48. 
64 See Cristia, supra note 3. 
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estimates that from the 1983-1997 period to the 1998-2003 period,65 The 
differences in life expectancy between the highest 20% and lowest earning 
20% of Americans (for those ages 35-76) grew from 0.7 to 1.5 years among 
women, and from 2.7 years to 3.6 years among men.66 
To explain the growing disparities in longevity, other studies have 
sought to isolate a broader range of socio-economic variables.  Education is 
a driving force behind longevity and mortality differentials.67 Waldron, an 
economist, finds income is the driving force, though she did not have data 
on education.68 Specifically, differentials in life expectancy among race-sex 
groups (at age twenty-five) remained constant from 1990 to 2000, but that 
differences significantly increase between high- and low-education 
groups.69 Lower-educated women (both white and black) had a statistically 
significant lower average life expectancy in 2000, compared to better-
educated women than they did in 1990.70 
What are the implications for retirement policy?  The evidence 
suggests that raising the retirement age and implementing other policies 
that encourage longer working lives may actually reverse longevity gains, 
so that higher labor incomes may result in a decrease in retirement time.  
Raising the normal retirement age in Social Security, which is equivalent to 
cutting benefits for workers, will reduce income for any person in a group 
that tends to leave the labor force early to compensate for a lower life 
expectancy.  Higher income people also obtain more years of life, but the 
inequality of life expectancy can be counterbalanced by a well-designed 
pension system that allows lower income and lower educated workers to 
collect pensions or disability benefits earlier than higher income and higher 
educated individuals.  On the other hand, pension systems that encourage 
lower-income, lower-educated people to work longer will create unequal 
distributions of retirement time. 
In sum, sex and health are important factors in predicting who will 
have more or less retirement time, but economic class is a key factor.  If 
                                                                                                                                
65 These periods were chosen so that the sizes of the two groups considered 
were approximately equal. 
66 Cristia, supra note 3, at 20, 29-30. 
67 See Ellen R. Meara et al., The Gap gets Bigger: Changes in Mortality and 
Life Expectancy, by Education, 1981-2000, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 350 (2008). 
68 See Hilary Waldron, Trends in Mortality Differentials and Life Expectancy 
for Male Social Security-Covered Workers by Socioeconomic Status, 67 SOC. SEC. 
BULL., no. 3, 2007. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
430      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
lower socio-economic status individuals are forced to delay retirement 
because private and/or public pension payments shrink, then retirement 
time is bound to become more unequal. 
 
Appendix A: Longevity at various ages, by race71 
 
Table A: Longevity at Various Ages from 1980-2010, by Race 
 White Male White Female Black Male Black Female 
At birth 8.2% 4.1% 12.5% 7.6% 
At 65 years 25.4% 10.3% 22.3% 14.9% 
At 75 years 25.0% 11.3% 22.9% 16.8% 
 
  
                                                                                                                                
71 See ROBERT D. GROVE & ALICE M. HETZEL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., 
& WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1960 (1968), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/vsrates1940_60.pdf; ELIZABETH 
ARIAS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES BY 
HISPANIC ORIGIN (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/ 
sr_02/sr02_152.pdf; Sherry L. Murphy, et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN STATISTICS NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at 
1, 3, 18-21, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchc/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf. 
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Appendix B: Definition Variables 
 
Variable 
Name 
Stata code Explanation Other Notes 
Entry Age Y_age Age of respondent when 
he/she first enters the HRS 
survey. 
Here ‘age’ is simply 
the difference 
between year of birth 
and survey year 
Death Age death_age Difference between 
year/month of death and 
year/month of birth.  
Month’s (1=January; 12 = 
December) are divided by 
12 and added/subtracted 
from the difference in 
years 
HRS 2010 Tracker 
data. 
 
HRS records year of 
death and then 
verifies with CDC 
mortality tables. 
Retirement 
Age 
ret_age Difference between 
year/month of stated date 
of retirement and 
year/month of birth 
Year and month of 
retirement is asked if 
retired `year’ == 1 
(see below) 
Disabled 
Age 
dis_age Difference between 
year/month of stated date 
of when a disability 
(keeping one from work) 
began and year/month of 
birth 
 
Time in
Retirement 
ret_time Difference between 
retirement or disabled age 
and death age.  If 
respondent has both a 
retirement and disability 
age, retirement age is used. 
 
Retired retired{`year
’} or retired 
(0 = not 
retired; 
1 = retired) 
Based on the respondents 
labor force status (reported 
in each survey), he/she is 
considered retired only if 
the first/primary response 
is “retired”.   Therefore a 
respondent may be coded 
as 1 for several survey 
years – and may switch to 
and from retirement. 
Each respondent with 
retired `year’ == 1 
also states a year and 
month of retirement.  
For the calculations 
of retirement time 
and age we take the 
mostly recently 
reported retirement 
year and month. 
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Individual 
Income 
inc{`year’} Annual income from 
wages, salaries and 
business. 
Positive values only. 
RAND income and 
wealth files, 1992 
through 2010. (e.g., 
r1iearn) 
Average 
Real 
Income 
avg_inc_r Constructed by adjusting 
individual incomes by CPI 
to 2010 US dollars. 
 
Average is constructed as 
the mean for each 
individuals across the 
survey years they report an 
individual income 
CPI adjustment 
figures are taken 
from IPUMS CPS 
(CPI99) 
 
The variable is 
restricted to full-time 
income only (35+ 
hr/wk; 40+ wk/yr) 
Top Half / 
Bottom 
Half 
avg_topbotto
m (0 = 
bottom; 1 = 
top) 
Binary value assigned to 
each respondent based on 
whether their average real 
income is above or below 
of the median income 
The median average 
income is the median 
Income 
Quintile 
avg_quint 
(1 = poorest 
20%; 
5 = richest 
20%) 
Same as Top / Bottom, but 
dividing individuals into 5 
income groups rather than 
2. 
Cut off points are 
based on average real 
income 
Sex/Gender GENDER 
(0 = Woman; 
1 = Man) 
 HRS 2010 Tracker 
data 
White/Non-
White 
white 
(0 = not 
white; 
1 = white) 
 HRS 2010 Tracker 
data 
Covered by 
a Pension 
Plan, 1992 
inplan1992 
(1 covered 
by a plan; 0 
= not 
covered) 
Whether employed persons 
in 1992 are or are not 
covered by a pension plan 
at work that year. 
 
Health 
Status 
health1 
(0 = not 
great; 
1= great) 
Health status is a self-
reported 5-level variable 
with responses: ‘Poor’, 
‘Fair’, ‘Good’, ‘Very 
Good’ and ‘Excellent’.  
The latter two are coded as 
0, the former three are 
coded as 1. 
Health status is asked 
in each survey year.  
health1 takes the  
first reported status 
 
DESPERATE RETIREES: THE PERPLEXING CHALLENGE 
OF COVERING RETIREMENT HEALTH CARE COSTS 
 IN A YOYO WORLD 
 
RICHARD L. KAPLAN* 
 
*** 
 
This article explores the challenges that retirees face when it comes to 
selecting and paying for the proper healthcare coverage post retirement.  
The author examines the rising cost of healthcare as well as the 
complexities of Medicare plans that often make up a retiree’s healthcare 
coverage package.  The author concludes that most retirees are not 
prepared to pay for healthcare in their retirement years. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
That retirement formulas and templates of earlier times have little 
relevance to today’s retirees is a vast understatement.  In virtually every 
significant aspect of retirement planning, it is a brand new ball game, and 
almost every change has spawned increasing uncertainty, unpredictability, 
and anxiety for persons affected by these changes.  To encapsulate the 
direction of these massive changes, I have resorted to a four-letter acronym, 
YOYO, which stands for You’re On Your Own.1 Quite bluntly, retirees and 
prospective retirees are now the locus of increasing risks relating to 
retirement security,2 and the foreseeable trends suggest that this situation 
will only exacerbate in the future. 
                                                                                                                                      
* Peer and Sarah Pedersen Professor of Law, University of Illinois. This article 
was prepared for the Symposium on “The Challenge of Retirement in a Defined 
Contribution World” that was held at the University of Connecticut School of Law 
on April 5, 2013. 
1 To be sure, there is a whole sub-industry of advice-providers seeking to 
assist individuals with the financial aspects of retirement. See, e.g., WALL ST. J., 
May 13, 2013, at C7 (full-page advertisement showcasing twenty-five “best selling 
authors” on this topic from a single publisher).  
2 See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security 
Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2004). See generally EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, 
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Rather than try to consider all of these changes, I will explore 
instead just one very important, but largely neglected, component of the 
increasingly desperate condition in which today’s retirees find themselves – 
namely, covering the cost of health care during their retirement.  The 
significance of this issue is captured by the most recent Health Confidence 
Survey that was reported this past January.3 An analysis of that Survey by 
the Employee Benefit Research Institute concluded that “[t]he percentage 
of Americans reporting that health expenses are an important consideration 
when planning for retirement has always been relatively high, and it has 
recently increased.”4 The survey results for the most recent three years are 
summarized in the following table:5 
 
Percent of Respondents Citing Medical Expenses as  
Extremely or Very Important in Planning for Retirement 
 2010 2011 2012 
 
Extremely Important 
 
38 37 45 
Very Important 
 
31 33 26 
Total 69 70 71 
 
Paying for one’s health care is, of course, a major issue throughout 
a person’s life, but many people were able to ignore the fundamental 
necessity of securing health insurance until they retire, because their 
employers typically provided health insurance as part of their compensation 
package.6 While the specific components of such coverage undoubtedly 
                                                                                                                                      
THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA (2007). 
3 Paul Fronstin, Views on Health Coverage and Retirement: Findings from the 
2012 Health Confidence Survey, EMP. BENEFITS RES. INST. NOTES, Jan. 2013 at 2, 
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_01_Jan-13_HCS-TxEx 
ps3.pdf. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at 5, fig.3. 
6 See Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health 
Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 535, 537–40 (2005). 
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changed over the years, the essential availability and general contours of 
such coverage were generally not a major concern.  Employers negotiated 
with health care providers or insurers, designing one or more packages of 
benefits that they thought their employees might want, handled much of the 
attendant paperwork in administering the plan, and facilitated enrollment 
via their payroll systems.7 Such employer involvement, if not beneficence, 
basically disappears once a person retires.  As a result, the financial context 
of health care coverage that retirees confront is fundamentally different 
than what they had when they were working. 
The nature of this contrast can be described in overview as follows: 
wage earners received periodic income, increased irregularly for reasons of 
inflation or career advancement, with income taxes withheld from each 
payment,8 along with health insurance for themselves and their dependents. 
Classic pension schemes based on defined benefit plans9 self-consciously 
sought to mimic this basic pattern, though usually without any scheduled 
increases in payment amounts.  That is, traditional pensions and retirement 
annuities provide periodic income, with income taxes withheld from each 
payment,10 but no increases for inflation once they commence.  But the 
bigger difference is that most retirees cannot look to their former employer 
for coverage of their health care expenses.  As I have noted elsewhere,11 
retiree health benefits are provided by fewer employers every year, and the 
benefits that are provided are diminished regularly. Accordingly, 
employees who had been largely sheltered from the chore of securing 
coverage for unexpected health care costs must become their own human 
resources counselors upon retirement.  They must learn how to navigate a 
very different health care system, one that was assembled over several 
decades with no coherent vision and with precious little regard to consumer 
friendliness.  
Fidelity Investments, the major financial services provider, has 
estimated that a retired couple aged sixty-five years is likely to need nearly 
                                                                                                                                      
7 See id. at 540–41; see also David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for 
Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23 
(2001). 
8 I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
9 See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 361–64 (5th ed. 2010).  
10 I.R.C. § 3405(a)(1) (Supp. V 2007–2012). 
11 See generally Richard L. Kaplan et al., Retirees at Risk: The Precarious 
Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 287 (2009). 
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a quarter of a million dollars to pay for their health care costs in 
retirement.12 This estimate is necessarily an average figure, and many 
retirees will need substantially more funds for this essential retirement 
outlay.  Much depends upon how long a specific individual lives, that 
person’s health status, the nature and extent of health care that that person 
receives, and the rate of health care cost inflation, among other factors.  A 
careful simulation by the Employee Benefit Research Institute determined 
that a sixty-five year old man would need savings of $135,000 to 
$185,000,13 depending on the extent of his prescription drug usage, and a 
sixty-five year old female would require $154,000 to $210,000.14 These 
projections cover anticipated Medicare premiums, deductibles, and co-
payment or cost-sharing obligations as well as the cost of certain 
supplementary arrangements.  They do not, however, include the cost of 
long-term care.15 But the basic point is that retirees face a large and 
unpredictable liability in retirement for their health care expenses.  That 
such a prospect is foisted on retirees in a “You’re On Your Own” world 
makes retirement security – the theme of this Symposium – especially 
problematic. 
 
II. MEDICARE ELIGIBILITY 
 
Many workers, and much of the public as well, have the mistaken 
impression that upon retirement, their health care cost concerns are over 
because they can now access the federal government’s Medicare program.  
But Medicare is no walk in the park in terms of understandability or 
internal consistency, and it is not generally available to retirees who have 
not yet reached the statutory eligibility age of sixty-five years.16  This is a 
very important point because many Americans retire before that age, not 
always as a matter of choice.  In fact, most retirees begin collecting Social 
                                                                                                                                      
12 FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, THE INCREASING COST OF HEALTH 
CARE UPON RETIREMENT (2012), available at 
http://workplace.fidelity.com/sites/default /files/FF_TBO_IncreasingCostofHC.pdf 
(projecting required savings at $240,000). 
13 Paul Fronstin et al., Savings Needed for Health Expenses for People Eligible 
for Medicare: Some Rare Good News, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES, Oct. 2012, 
at 2, 4, available at http://www.ebri.org/ pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_10_Oct-12. 
HlthSvg-IRAs.pdf. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 5. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 1395c(1) (2006). 
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Security retirement benefits before reaching age sixty-five, and a majority 
do so as early as age sixty-two.17  These “early” retirees cannot, however, 
access Medicare before age sixty-five unless they satisfy the Social 
Security program’s functionality-based criteria for being “disabled”  
namely, that they are unable to perform “any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.”18 
Moreover, they must have received disability payments under this standard 
for twenty-four months before they become eligible for Medicare 
coverage.19 If they cannot qualify under these requirements, they must wait 
until their sixty-fifth birthday to enroll in Medicare and therefore must 
secure health insurance from some other source before then.20  
Proposals were made near the end of the Clinton Administration to 
allow retirees who were not yet sixty-five years old to buy into Medicare at 
actuarially fair prices, but those proposals were soon eclipsed by the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal and the ensuing presidential impeachment 
battle.21 The last time this issue was seriously considered was in the context 
of the major health care reform legislation enacted during President 
Obama’s first term,22 known variously as the Affordable Care Act or 
ObamaCare.23 That legislation actually jettisoned the prospect of early-
access Medicare in favor of universally available health insurance 
exchanges that are scheduled to begin next year.24 Although the new law 
did include a very modest program to subsidize employers that maintained 
                                                                                                                                      
17 See Dan Muldoon & Richard W. Kopcke, Are People Claiming Social 
Security Benefits Later?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES., JUNE 2008 at 1, 2, available 
at http:// crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/ib_8-7.pdf. 
18 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
19 Id. §§ 426(b)(2)(A)(i), 1395c(2). 
20 See Kaplan et al., supra note 11, at 336–37 (explaining the possible 
availability of “continuation” coverage from a former employer under certain 
specified circumstances). 
21 See id. at 343. 
22 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
23 See Richard L. Kaplan, Analyzing the Impact of the New Health Care 
Reform Legislation on Older Americans, 18 ELDER L.J. 213, 213–14 (2011). 
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1311(b), 124 
Stat. 119, 173 (2010)). 
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their existing health insurance programs for pre-Medicare retirees,25 that 
program disappears entirely in 201426 when the state-organized health 
insurance exchanges will presumably be operational.27  
In any case, if Medicare’s eligibility age is reconsidered amidst the 
current efforts to tackle America’s long-term fiscal dilemma, it is more 
likely that this age will be raised then lowered.  Indeed, coordinating 
Medicare’s eligibility age with Social Security’s age for full retirement 
benefits has been seriously considered for some time.28 That change would 
boost Medicare’s eligibility age to sixty-six currently and eventually to 
sixty-seven.29  For what it’s worth, if Medicare’s eligibility age of sixty-
five were adjusted for changes in life expectancy that have occurred since 
the program was enacted, it would be seventy-three years.30 The bottom 
line is that retirees who are not yet sixty-five years old cannot enroll in 
Medicare, presently or in the foreseeable future. 
 
III. MEDICARE’S COVERAGE COMPONENTS 
 
Retirees who can enroll in Medicare confront an uncoordinated 
“system” of separate coverages and confusing options that does not 
correspond even remotely to what they had during their working lives.  The 
elemental separation of Medicare’s disparate coverages into hospital costs 
(Part A), physicians’ charges (Part B), and prescription drug expenses (Part 
D) is unfathomable to new retirees who are accustomed to the all-inclusive 
                                                                                                                                      
25 Under this program, the federal government paid eighty percent of claims 
for medical services costing between $15,000 and $90,000 that were incurred 
between June 22, 2010 and December 31, 2013. 42 U.S.C. § 18002(c)(2), (3) 
(Supp. IV 2007-2011) (enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1102(c)(2), (3), 124 Stat. 119, 145 (2010)). The 
maximum benefit per claim, in other words, was $60,000 (maximum claim of 
$75,000 × 80%). Among other limitations, this program had a global budget cap of 
$5 billion, after which no further claims were payable. 42 U.S.C. § 18002(e). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 18002(a)(1). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b). 
28 See Richard L. Kaplan, Taking Medicare Seriously, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 
777, 791–92. 
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1) (2006). 
30 Life expectancy when Medicare was created (1965) was 70.2 years and was 
78.7 years in 2010.  Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2010, INFO. 
PLEASE (2011), http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html. Therefore, 78.7 ÷ 
70.2 =  1.12108 × 65 = 72.9 years. 
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health care plans that characterize the modern workplace.  To be fair, when 
Medicare was created in 1965, its designers self-consciously mimicked the 
“major medical” plans that private health insurance companies were then 
offering.31 But those plans evolved over time, while Medicare’s 
fundamental organizational components have not.  As a result, a newly 
retired person faces a program that seems designed for a time long ago and 
in fact was. 
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of this programmatic 
ossification involves prescription drugs.  When Medicare was created in 
1965, such medications were few and relatively inexpensive and were used 
primarily to treat specific maladies over very short time courses.  In the 
ensuing decades, however, pharmacological innovations have brought forth 
a veritable cornucopia of amazing treatments that control and ameliorate a 
wide range of common chronic conditions including heart disease, 
hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, asthma, osteoporosis, and the like.  These 
drug regimens are not cheap and generally must be followed for the rest of 
a patient’s life, but they extend people’s lives and improve the quality of 
the lives they live.  Yet, by the time that Medicare was changed to cover 
outpatient prescription drugs, it was the only health care insurance program 
in the country that lacked such coverage – a situation that typifies the 
anachronistic nature of Medicare’s basic structure. 
 
IV. MEDICARE’S COST EXPOSURES  
 
Unbeknownst to most pre-retirees, Medicare is not a 
comprehensive health care plan.32 It exposes its beneficiaries to a dizzying 
array of deductibles and co-payments that can be understood only as 
historical accidents lacking any sense of medical coherence.  
 
A. HOSPITALS 
 
Medicare Part A covers most of a retiree’s hospital costs for up to 
sixty days in a single “spell of illness” after payment of a per-admission 
deductible.33 A “spell of illness” for this purpose begins with the admission 
                                                                                                                                      
31 See THE CENTURY FOUND., MEDICARE TOMORROW: THE REPORT OF THE 
CENTURY FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON MEDICARE REFORM 47 (2001). 
32 See Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Medicare, 20 ELDER L.J. 1, 10–11 
(2012). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(b) (2006). 
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and ends sixty days after the patient has been discharged.34  Although a per-
admission deductible is a fairly common feature in health care plans, it 
usually is much lower; e.g., $250.  That is not the case with Medicare.  The 
per-admission deductible in 2014 is $1,216,35 and it increases every year 
based on increases in health care costs generally.  Moreover, retirees tend 
to use more health care services than the general population and could 
conceivably face two or even three hospitalizations in the same calendar 
year. 
For example, a retiree might be hospitalized on January 14, 
discharged two weeks later, and then readmitted in May and perhaps in 
October as well.  If that happened, this retiree would be liable for the per-
admission deductible twice or even three times that year.  In this context, it 
is extremely important to note that Medicare has no annual stop-loss 
provisions that cap an enrollee’s out-of-pocket costs once that person’s 
expenditures reach some pre-determined amount36 – again unlike many, if 
not most, health care plans that are available today to the pre-Medicare 
population. 
Medicare Part A also has a durational limitation on hospital stays 
that reflects its generally out-of-date orientation.  Medicare covers virtually 
all costs for up to sixty days and then covers costs in excess of a daily 
deductible for an additional thirty days within the same “spell of illness.”37 
That per-day deductible is adjusted annually and in 2014 is $304.38 The 
resulting cost exposure, however, is fairly inconsequential because a 
hospital stay exceeding sixty days is very uncommon, especially after the 
Diagnostic Range Groupings were implemented in 1987.39 These groupings 
limit how many hospital days Medicare will pay for specific treatments and 
as a result, the average hospital stay of a person age sixty-five and older is 
less than six days, according to the most recent data available.40   
                                                                                                                                      
34 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a) (2006). 
35Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, MEDICARE.GOV, 
http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/costs-at-a-glance/costs-at-
glance.html#collapse-4811 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
36 Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, The Insurance Value of Medicare, 367 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1773, 1773 (2012). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a) (2006). 
38 Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35. 
39 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE 
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?, 162–64 (1997). 
40 See ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A 
PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS: 2012 13 (2013), available at 
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B. NURSING HOMES 
 
Medicare Part A’s coverage of nursing home care is far more 
restrictive than its coverage of hospital charges but is similarly time-
warped.  Nursing home costs are covered by Medicare for the first twenty 
days within a “spell of illness,”41 and Medicare then pays all costs beyond a 
per-day deductible,42 which in 2014 is $152.43 This extended coverage, 
however, cannot exceed eighty days,44 so Medicare’s coverage stops after 
one hundred days in a nursing home.  This coverage design may have been 
appropriate when Medicare was created in 1965, when most people did not 
live long enough to develop conditions like Alzheimer’s Disease, which 
can require care in a nursing facility for three to five years or longer.  But 
today, the majority of older residents in nursing homes have such 
conditions, and a result, Medicare’s one-hundred-day coverage limitation 
seems archaic, if not downright cruel.  
Moreover, even this limited coverage of nursing home costs is 
subject to a major and poorly understood overarching restriction – namely, 
that the patient requires and receives “skilled nursing care” on a daily 
basis45 for the same or a medically related condition that was treated 
previously in a hospital.46  Most retirees and their families do not realize 
that much of the care these facilities provide is actually lower-level 
“custodial care” rather than “skilled nursing care,” which typically entails 
injections, gastronomy feedings, catheters, administration of medical gases, 
and the like.47 Consequently, Medicare does not cover the cost of such care. 
Moreover, the prior hospitalization must have lasted at least three 
days48 and must have occurred within the thirty days preceding admission 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.aoa.gov/aoaroot/aging_statistics/Profile/2012/docs/2012profile.pdf 
(reporting that persons aged sixty-five to seventy-four averaged stays of 5.4 days, 
persons aged seventy-five to eighty-four averaged 5.7 days, and persons aged 
eighty-five and over averaged 5.6 days). 
41 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d(a)(2)(A), 1395e(a)(3) (Supp. III 2007–2010). 
42 Id. § 1395e(a)(3). 
43 Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 1395e(a)(3). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 2007-2010); 42 C.F.R. § 409.31(b)(1) 
(2012). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 409.31(b)(2)(ii). 
47 42 C.F.R. § 409.33(a)-(c) (2012). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(i) (2006). 
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to the nursing home.49 So, if a retiree enters a nursing home directly from 
her home, for example, Medicare does not cover any of the ensuing 
expenses. 
Adding insult to injury, the Diagnostic Range Groupings that 
reduced the number of days that Medicare would pay for hospital care 
effectively eliminated Medicare’s coverage of many nursing home stays.  
That is, when a hospital stay for a particular medical condition is shortened 
from three days to two days, a subsequent nursing home stay will not be 
covered by Medicare because of that program’s three-day minimum.50  The 
bottom line is that Medicare’s coverage of nursing home care is much more 
limited than it first appears, which means that retirees who require such 
facilities face considerable financial exposure for the cost of care they 
receive there.  In this context, it should be noted that Medicare provides no 
coverage whatsoever for care in assisted living facilities, largely because 
those institutions did not exist when Medicare was created. 
 
C. DOCTORS’ FEES 
 
Physicians’ charges are another source of major expense for 
retirees and are covered by Medicare Part B.  Medicare pays eighty percent 
of a participating physician’s “approved charge,”51 and the patient then 
owes the remaining twenty percent.  Nonparticipating physicians can 
charge patients up to an additional fifteen percent of the “approved 
charge,”52 and increasing numbers of health care providers are switching 
from participating to nonparticipating provider status53 in response to 
repeated reductions in Medicare’s “approved charge” schedules – the most 
recent being the two percent reduction mandated by the Budget Control 
                                                                                                                                      
49 Id. § 1395x(i)(A). 
50 Exacerbating this problem is the practice of many hospitals to keep patients 
for several days in “observation” status.  See Christopher W. Baugh & Jeremiah D. 
Schur, Observation Care-High-Value Care or a Cost-Shifting Loophole?, 369 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 302, 303 (2013).  Such patients are not treated as being admitted into 
the hospital, so the days they spend in “observation” do not count toward the three-
day minimum.  See id. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(a)(1) (2006). 
52 Id. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(C). 
53 See Melinda Beck, More Doctors Steer Clear of Medicare, WALL ST. J., 
July 29, 2013, at A1, A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000 
1424127887323971204578626151017241898 (reporting a 2.9% increase in 
nonparticipating providers from 2010 to 2012). 
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Act’s sequestration provisions.54 In effect, such payment reductions can 
indirectly increase retirees’ health care costs as more physicians change 
their status to nonparticipating provider, a phenomenon that is likely to 
increase as federal budgetary pressures worsen.  
Moreover, it should be emphasized that doctors’ bills are not 
occasional expenditures for most Medicare beneficiaries.  Fully forty 
percent of Medicare’s population has three or more so-called “chronic 
conditions,” such as heart disease, asthma, osteoporosis, hypertension, 
arthritis, diabetes, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.55 These 
conditions typically require regular appointments with various medical 
specialists to control the patient’s health and to forestall expensive 
complications and hospitalizations.  Doctors’ visits, in other words, are far 
more frequent and less episodic for retirees than for pre-retirees as a 
general matter.  
 
V. MEDICARE PART B OPTIONS 
 
As noted previously in passing, the coverage for physicians’ 
charges just described is provided under Medicare Part B rather than Part 
A, a distinction that has significant financial implications for retirees. 
Medicare Part A is financed by a payroll tax of 1.45 percent imposed on an 
employee’s wages and salaries,56 with a comparable amount paid by that 
person’s employer.57 After that worker (or the worker’s spouse)58 has 
earned forty “quarters of coverage,”59 Medicare Part A is provided without 
any further premiums being charged.60 In contrast, Medicare Part B is a 
                                                                                                                                      
54 2 U.S.C. § 901a(8) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the Budget 
Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, § 302(a), 125 Stat. 240, 258 (2011)). 
55 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 fig. 1 (2012), available 
at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-15.pdf. 
56 I.R.C. § 3101(b)(6) (Supp. V 2007–2012). 
57 Id. § 3111(b)(6). 
58 42 C.F.R. § 406.10(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1), (c)(1) (2006). The 
divorced spouse of a Medicare-eligible worker is also entitled to Medicare Part A 
if the divorced spouse is at least sixty-five years old and if this person was married 
to the Medicare-eligible worker for at least ten years. 42 C.F.R. § 406.10(a)(1) 
(2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1), (c)(1), 416(d)(1) (2006). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2006). 
60 Persons who have not earned the requisite forty “quarters of coverage” may 
purchase Medicare Part A if they have lawfully lived in the United States at least 
five years. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2(a)(3) (2006). The monthly premium for such 
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separate program that requires annual enrollment and monthly premiums 
paid by the retirees themselves.61 In 2014, this monthly premium is 
$104.90,62 which is calculated to cover approximately twenty-five percent 
of the program’s projected expenditures.63 This monthly outlay, in other 
words, represents a seventy-five percent subsidy from general tax revenues. 
Since 2006, higher-income enrollees have been required to pay 
surcharges to reduce the extent of the subsidy that they receive.64 The 
amount of these so-called “means-tested” surcharges is based on an 
enrollee’s taxable income as determined for the second-preceding calendar 
year.65 Thus, the following table66 displays the monthly cost of Medicare 
Part B in 2014 as a function of a retiree’s income for federal income tax 
purposes in 2011: 
 
Income (if unmarried) Monthly Payment 
$85,000 or less $104.90 
$85,001 - $107,000 $146.90 
$107,001 - $160,000 $209.80 
$160,001 - $214,000 $272.70 
Over $214,000 $335.70 
 
                                                                                                                                      
coverage is adjusted annually and in 2013 was $441. Medicare 2014 Costs at a 
Glance, supra note 35. 
61 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2006). See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 
76–83. 
62 Medicare 2014 Costs at a Glance, supra note 35. 
63 42 U.S.C.§ 1395r(a)(1), (3) (Supp. V 2007–2012); see MEDICARE 
HANDBOOK § 6.02[C][1], at 6–11 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr. eds., 
2013). 
64 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(1), (4)(B)(i) (2006). 
65 See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Means-Testing Medicare: Retiree Pain for 
Little Governmental Gain, J. RETIREMENT PLANNING, May-June 2006, at 22.  
66 See Part B Costs, MEDICARE.GOV, http://medicare.gov/your-medicare-
costs/part -b-costs/part-b-costs.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
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Note that the applicable income thresholds are doubled for married 
couples.67 Moreover, these thresholds were frozen through the year 2019, 
rather than being adjusted for inflation, by the Affordable Care Act.68  
Accordingly, increasing numbers of retirees are likely to face income-based 
surcharges for Medicare Part B in the future.  
The principal point, however, is that Medicare Part B is optional 
coverage.  Thus, retirees must decide as an initial matter whether they want 
such coverage at all. Retirees who do not anticipate having many physician 
encounters might forego such coverage, but they will then be subject to a 
delayed enrollment penalty if they subsequently enroll in this program.69 
This penalty is ten percent of the regular Medicare Part B monthly 
premium for every twelve-month period in which the retiree did not enroll 
in the program when she was first eligible.70  
Assume, for example, that Denise delayed enrolling in Medicare 
Part B for forty months, so there are three twelve-month periods within that 
delayed enrollment period.  She will therefore owe a penalty of thirty 
percent (ten percent for each twelve-month delayed enrollment period) of 
the monthly Medicare Part B premium.  Most importantly, this penalty 
provision never ceases! That is, Denise will owe thirty percent more for her 
Medicare Part B benefits as long as she is enrolled in Medicare Part B. 
 
VI. “MEDIGAP” COVERAGE 
 
As noted previously, the various deductibles and co-payment 
obligations in Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B represent an open-
ended liability.  That is, there is no annual cap on the amount of such costs. 
For that reason, many Medicare beneficiaries decide to supplement their 
Medicare coverage with private insurance that is usually called “Medigap” 
insurance.71 Some retirees are able to purchase such supplemental coverage 
from their former employer or from their union, while others obtain such 
                                                                                                                                      
67 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(3)(C)(ii), (iii) (2006). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i)(6) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (enacted as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 3402(4), 124 Stat. 
119, 489 (2010)). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(b) (Supp. V 2007-2012). 
70 Id. 
71 See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 97–103. 
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coverage individually.72 In any case, the question of supplemental 
insurance presents retirees with further choices, each of which has financial 
implications.  
First, retirees must decide whether to purchase Medigap insurance 
at all. Such policies are not inexpensive and their cost is usually borne by 
the retirees.  The federal government does not provide any financial 
subsidies for Medigap insurance, although it does regulate its content73 and 
mandates that retirees cannot be denied Medigap insurance because of pre-
existing medical conditions if they purchase this insurance within the first 
six months of their enrolling in Medicare Part B.74  
Second, retirees must then select among the eleven different but 
standardized Medigap insurance packages that include various benefits.75  
Medigap insurers can determine what they will charge for particular 
policies, but the scope of any specific “plan” does not vary from one 
insurer to another.  Thus, a retiree must first determine which combination 
of specific benefits most closely fits his or her needs and then look for the 
best price from the insurers that offer that plan.  For example, a prospective 
retiree may choose Medigap coverage for the per-hospital-admission 
deductible under Part A or decide instead to self-insure for that liability by 
not obtaining such coverage.  Similarly, a retiree who expects to travel 
outside the United States might want to add the “foreign travel emergency” 
benefit. In general, the more extensive the coverages included, the higher 
the plan’s cost. But the point is that Medigap itself presents a series of 
distinct choices that a retiree must consider. 
To summarize, a retiree must decide first whether to enroll in 
Medicare Part B presently, whether to enroll at some later time and pay the 
corresponding delayed enrollment penalty, or whether to forego Medicare 
Part B entirely.  This retiree must then decide whether to buy a Medigap 
policy to cover the unlimited cost exposure of Medicare Parts A and B 
presently or to wait until some later time and lose the guaranteed 
                                                                                                                                      
72 See JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE 
CHARTBOOK 60 (4th ed. 2010), available at http://www.collaborationhealthcare. 
com/11-9-10KFFMedicareChartBook2010.pdf (stating that ninety percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries have some supplemental health insurance). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(o), (p), (w), (y) (2006 & Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
74 Id. § 1395ss(s)(2)(A) (2006). 
75 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE & YOU 67–72 (2014), available at 
http://www.medicare. gov/ Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf. 
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insurability that is available within the first six months of Medicare Part B 
enrollment.  Finally, the retiree must decide which specific Medigap policy 
to buy.  
 
VII. PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE OPTIONS 
 
The level of complexity and cost exposure described above 
actually pales in comparison to what is involved regarding Medicare’s 
coverage of prescription drugs.  Once again, the threshold decision is 
whether to buy prescription drug coverage at all, or whether to pay for 
prescribed drugs as the need for them arises.  While the private companies 
that provide Medicare Part D coverage cannot deny coverage because of a 
retiree’s pre-existing medical conditions, there is a delayed enrollment 
penalty in Part D that is structured similarly to the delayed enrollment 
penalty in Medicare Part B that was considered previously.76 To some 
extent, the decision to forego Medicare Part D coverage presently is a bet 
that one will not need such coverage any time soon – even though new 
medications are being developed every year to treat existing maladies and 
one never knows whether he or she might be diagnosed with such 
conditions in the future. 
If a retiree does decide to obtain prescription drug coverage under 
Medicare Part D, the next step is determining which plan to buy. This is no 
easy decision, because there is no single Medicare Part D plan or even 
standardized Medicare Part D plans comparable to the federally 
standardized Medigap plans described above.77 Instead, private insurers 
offer different plans in different states that cover some medications and not 
others, and some dosage amounts and frequencies but not others.  Thus, a 
given plan might cover 20 milligrams of Lipitor® twice a day, another plan 
will cover 40 milligrams of that drug once a day, and still another plan will 
not cover Lipitor® at all.  In essence, a retiree must gather the various 
medications that he or she is taking currently and then enter their names, 
dosage amounts, and dosage frequencies into Medicare’s website to find 
the available plans that cover these medications.78 Additional 
                                                                                                                                      
76 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-113(b)(1) (2006). For the mechanics of how this penalty 
is calculated, see FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 88. 
77 See supra text accompanying note 75. 
78 See Medicare Plan Finder, MEDICARE.GOV,  https://www.medicare.gov/ 
find-a-plan/ questions/home.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). (follow “General 
Search” hyperlink (entering zip code); enter basic information on next page (step 1 
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differentiating variables among the offered plans might include 
convenience of pharmacy locations and availability of mail order renewals. 
Most Medicare Part D plans impose an annual deductible that is 
fairly modest.  In 2013, for example, fifty-five percent of Medicare Part D 
plans had an annual deductible, usually $325.79 Such plans typically 
provide several distinct “tiers” of cost coverage.  That is, a plan might 
require a low or no co-payment for certain generic medications while 
charging a higher co-payment for a preferred brand-name drug and an even 
higher co-payment for a nonpreferred brand-name drug.  Most plans also 
have a coverage gap that is generally denominated the “donut hole” in 
which annual drug expenditures above a specified amount are covered to a 
lesser extent.80 In 2013, two out of three Medicare Part D plans had 
coverage gaps that began at $2,970 in annual drug costs.81 The Affordable 
Care Act purports to close this “donut hole,” but the closing process phases 
in over ten years and will still leave enrollees with a co-payment obligation 
of twenty-five percent when it is complete.82  Thus, retirees in 2014 are 
responsible for seventy-two percent of the cost of generic drugs and forty-
seven and a half percent of the cost of brand-name drugs for costs incurred 
within the “donut hole.”83 
In any case, the procedure for finding a Medicare Part D 
prescription drug plan must be repeated every year, because plan providers 
regularly change their formularies in advance of the annual enrollment 
process.  Thus, a Humana plan that reasonably met a retiree’s needs one 
year may not meet those needs the next year, may be much more 
expensive, or may not even be offered.  I am not making this up! 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
of 4), then see step 2 of 4 “Enter your Drugs” (plan selection and estimate can be 
generated by completing questionnaire)).  
79 JACK HOADLEY ET AL., MEDICARE PART D: A FIRST LOOK AT PART D PLAN 
OFFERINGS IN 2013 3 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.word 
press.com/2013/01/8375.pdf. 
80 For an explanation of how this curious provision came about, see Richard L. 
Kaplan, The Medicare Drug Benefit: A Prescription for Confusion, 1 NAELA J. 
167, 170–74 (2005). 
81 See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 79, at 3. 
82 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 2007-2012) (generic drugs); 
id. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(D)(i)(I), (ii)(VI) (brand-name drugs). For a graphic 
representation of the phase-in process, see Kaplan, supra note 23, at 219–220. 
83 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 75, at 91. 
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VIII. THE MANAGED CARE ALTERNATIVE 
 
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, retirees seeking to 
pay for their health care expenses in retirement confront a bewildering if 
not overwhelming array of disjointed coverages under Medicare, each with 
its own programmatic limitations and cost-sharing provisions.  There is an 
alternative approach, however, in the form of Medicare’s managed care 
component, which is legally designated as Medicare Part C, but is more 
popularly styled Medicare Advantage.84 For a single monthly premium and 
nominal co-payment obligations, one organization provides the sort of all-
inclusive health insurance arrangement that many retirees had when they 
were still working.  Such arrangements typically limit an enrollee’s access 
to specific hospitals, doctors, pharmacies, and other health care providers, 
while services obtained from “out-of network” providers are covered at 
substantially higher cost to the enrollee, or not at all.85 While such 
restrictions are endemic to managed care plans generally, the prospect of 
losing access to favored specialists is often very troubling to retirees who 
have established relationships with particular health care providers.  In fact, 
only twenty-eight percent of Medicare’s population was enrolled in a 
Medicare Advantage plan in 2013.86  
If a retiree is comfortable with the basic concept of managed care, 
that person must then select from among the Medicare Advantage plans 
that are available in that person’s geographic area.  This decision, 
moreover, will probably need to be revisited annually, because Medicare 
Advantage plans regularly change the array of health care providers that 
they include, adding some and dropping others, as well as the scope of 
benefits they provide and the monthly cost they charge to enrollees. This 
process is generally undertaken during the annual “re-enrollment period” 
that runs from October 15 to December 7,87 but certain changes can be 
made at other times as well, such as when an enrollee moves out of the 
geographic area that his or her current Medicare Advantage plan covers.88 
                                                                                                                                      
84 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2006). 
85 See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 104–06 (describing 
Medicare’s managed care component). 
86 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE FACT SHEET 1 (2013), 
available at http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet/. 
87 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(e)(3)(B)(v) (Supp. V 2007–2012). 
88 Id. § 1395w-21(e)(4)(B) (2006). 
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Near term, such plans may become less available or less appealing 
due to the Affordable Care Act.  The drafters of that legislation believed 
that Medicare managed care plans were overpaid by the federal 
government, so payments to these plans are to be reduced beginning in 
2014.89 In fact, more than a quarter of the cost savings in Medicare from 
ObamaCare come from cuts in payments to Medicare Advantage plans.90 
These plans, therefore, are likely to curtail some of the nonmandatory 
benefits that they provide currently, such as vision care and hearing aids, 
and some plans may terminate their participation in Medicare entirely. 
Little wonder, therefore, that Medicare’s Chief Actuary when the 
Affordable Care Act was being considered predicted that enrollment in 
Medicare Advantage would drop by half when the projected cuts are “fully 
phased in.”91 As even more retirees opt for the disjointed Medicare 
components examined previously instead of Medicare managed care, this 
population will likely face greater health care cost exposure and fiscal 
uncertainty.  
 
IX. THE PREMIUM SUPPORT ALTERNATIVE? 
 
The relatively recent and highly controversial enactment of health 
care reform in 2010 suggests that any serious effort to rethink how health 
care for older Americans should be financed is unlikely any time soon.  In 
fact, ObamaCare is a staggering testament to the power of path 
dependency.  Despite all the heated rhetoric that accompanied its gestation 
and the impassioned allegations of a government “takeover” of the health 
care system, rampant socialism, and even death panels, the Affordable Care 
Act left the basic structure of the Medicare program intact.  The 
noncoordinated components of Medicare Parts A, B, and D, though largely 
accidents of history, were not reformed or rationalized in any meaningful 
                                                                                                                                      
89 See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 239–40. 
90 See Memorandum of Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,” as Amended 2, 8 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http:// 
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/health/oactmemo1.pdf; see also Letter from 
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office to John Boehner, Speaker 
of the House 5 (July 24, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/43471-hr6079.pdf (showing that twenty-one percent of the 
projected Medicare savings in the Affordable Care Act derive from cuts to the 
Medicare Advantage program). 
91 Memorandum of Richard S. Foster, supra note 90, at 11. 
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way.  In fact, the only paradigmatic alternative to this basic structure – 
namely, Medicare managed care – was actually the focus of significant 
budget cuts. 
In 2011, the chair of the House Budget Committee, Congressman 
Paul Ryan, proposed transforming the Medicare program into a 
marketplace where beneficiaries could select from various comprehensive 
offerings, with the federal government providing premium support or 
“vouchers” for these offerings.92 Instead of the present one-size-fits-all 
approach, the retirement health care universe would look more like what 
Americans under age sixty-five typically have. Congressman Ryan’s plan 
included very few details, but the basic vision it propounded would look 
fairly familiar to persons who have never enrolled in Medicare. Be that as it 
may, the 2012 elections effectively sidelined that effort for the foreseeable 
future, and President Obama’s full-throated defense of entitlement 
programs such as Medicare in his Second Inaugural Address93 makes major 
systemic change unlikely.  
From the perspective of current and near-retirees, however, the 
Ryan proposal would have been irrelevant by its very terms.  His original 
proposal would have applied only to persons who first became eligible for 
Medicare in the year 2022.94 That provision essentially exempts the current 
Medicare population, as well as a significant portion of the vaunted Baby 
Boom generation that is gaining access to Medicare with each passing day. 
Even more to the point, Ryan subsequently adopted a feature suggested by 
Senator Ron Wyden that would retain the existing Medicare program as 
one of the alternatives in the marketplace that he intends to create.95 In 
                                                                                                                                      
92 See H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY 
RESTORING AMERICA’S PROMISE 46–47 (Comm. Print 2011), available at 
http://budget.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ PathToProsperityFY2012.pdf (primarily 
the work of Chairman Paul Ryan). 
93 See Barack H. Obama, Full Text of President Barack Obama’s Second 
Presidential Inaugural Address, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 2 (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/21/full-text-of-president-barack-
obamas-second-inaugural-address_print.html (“The commitments we make to each 
other: through Medicare, and Medicaid, and Social Security, these things do not 
sap our initiative; they strengthen us. They do not make us a nation of takers; they 
free us to take the risks that make this country great.”). 
94 H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 92, at 46. 
95 See SEN. RON WYDEN & REP. PAUL RYAN, GUARANTEED CHOICES TO 
STRENGTHEN MEDICARE AND HEALTH SECURITY FOR ALL 7 (2011), available at 
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/wydenryan.pdf. Senator Wyden 
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other words, the latest iteration of Ryan’s proposal would actually keep the 
existing discombobulated Medicare program in place as long as any 
Medicare-eligible retiree, now or in the future, selects it. 
 
X. IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREES 
 
As retirees contemplate the accumulated balances in their defined 
contribution retirement plans, they must consider how much of those 
balances they will need to spend on health care in retirement, which is 
likely to be one of their largest budget items.  Current cost projections are 
undoubtedly understated if past trends are indicative.  The history of 
medical, and especially pharmacological, progress makes conditions that 
were previously untreatable newly treatable if not curable.  Newly 
concocted drug regimens may be much less expensive than hospitalizations 
and their medically intensive therapies, but such drug regimens are not 
cheap either.  Even though the cost of pharmaceutical interventions is 
shared by retirees and the Medicare program, a significant portion of those 
costs is paid by the retirees themselves, so increasing drug costs represent a 
rising cost burden to retirees generally. 
By contrast, most of the money saved by fewer hospitalizations 
would have been paid by the Medicare program itself.  After the per-
admission deductible is paid, most other hospital costs are paid by 
Medicare, as noted previously.  And if future medical innovations translate 
into more nursing home stays instead of hospitalizations, the resulting 
nursing home care may not be the “skilled nursing care” that Medicare 
pays for.96 Even if it is, Medicare’s liability for such costs is limited to one 
hundred days, so any additional days in the nursing home is an expense of 
the retiree rather than of Medicare.  As a consequence, Medicare’s hospital 
expenditures may decrease, but retirees’ outlays for nursing home care will 
likely increase.  That phenomenon explains, in part, this graph from the 
New England Journal of Medicine,97 which shows that the cumulative cost 
of a person’s health care expenditures (solid line) increases the longer that 
                                                                                                                                      
subsequently distanced himself from this proposal. Sen. Wyden Distances Himself 
from Medicare Plan He Crafted with Ryan, THE HILL (Aug. 13, 2012, 04:43PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/politics-elections/243387-wyden-downplays-
medicare-plan-he-crafted-with-ryan. 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 45–47. 
97 Brenda C. Spillman & James Lubitz, The Effect of Longevity on Spending 
for Acute and Long-Term Care, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1409, 1411 (2000). 
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person lives, but the cumulative cost paid by Medicare (long dash/short 
dash line) does not.  
 
Figure 1. Cumulative Health Care Expenditures from the Age of 65 Years 
until Death, According to the Type of Health Service and the Age of Death: 
 
  
 
In other words, extended longevity may increase per capita medical 
expenditures, but much of that increase will not burden the Medicare 
program.  To put the matter bluntly, the additional medical costs associated 
with increased longevity will largely be on the retiree’s dime. 
 
XI. FUNDING LONG-TERM CARE 
 
Retirees’ responsibility for their own long-term care costs is a 
major and largely unrecognized variable in assessing retirement funding 
adequacy.  This is a huge point, as I explained in my article entitled 
“Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care.”98 Not 
                                                                                                                                      
98 See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: 
Funding Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407 (2007) (examining the 
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only is Medicare Part A’s coverage of nursing homes severely limited,99 its 
coverage of home health care is limited to no more than twenty-eight hours 
per week100 of specified types of care101 that are provided by Medicare-
certified home health agencies102 pursuant to a physician’s plan of care.103 
Moreover, only someone who cannot leave his or her home without 
assistance is eligible for this care.104 A joint federal and state government 
program called Medicaid105 does cover many forms of long-term care, but 
Medicaid has severe assets and income qualification standards106 and as a 
result, few retirees plan to avail themselves of its provisions.  Moreover, 
budgetary pressures on state governments result in ever-tightening 
eligibility standards, making Medicaid an increasingly unreliable source for 
funding future long-term care needs.107  From the perspective of retirement 
security, in other words, the cost of long-term care is essentially a private 
expense. 
And a considerable expense it can be. According to the most recent 
survey of long-term care costs in the United States,108 the median costs of 
long-term care are as follows:   
 
• licensed home health aide – $19 per hour 
• adult day care – $65 per day 
• assisted living facility – $3,450 per month, and  
• nursing home (private room) – $230 per day.  
                                                                                                                                      
major missing component of retirement planning: how to finance the potentially 
explosive cost of long-term care). 
99 See supra text accompanying notes 41–50. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (2006). 
101 Id. § 1395x(m)(1), (2). 
102 Id. § 1395x(m), (o). 
103 Id. § 1395x(m). 
104 Id. §§ 1395f(a)(2)(C), 1395n(a)(2). 
105 See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 110–38. 
106 See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 423–25. In addition, the value of the benefits 
received from Medicaid must be recovered when the Medicaid recipient dies. See 
id. at 429–30. 
107 See, e.g., Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together Act, 2012 Ill. 
Legis. Serv. 120 (enacting tightened restrictions on eligibility for Medicaid 
benefits). 
108 GENWORTH, GENWORTH 2013 COST OF CARE SURVEY 4 (10th ed. 2013), 
available at https://www.genworth.com/dam/Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer 
/corporate/130568_032213_Cost%20of%20Care_Final_nonsecure.pdf. 
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This last amount translates into an annual cost of $83,950.  These figures, 
moreover, represent national medians, and the cost differentials among 
states and within states are considerable.109 
 
A. LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 
 
Private long-term care insurance has been developed to respond to 
this need, but its problems are legion.  The cost of such insurance is high 
and premiums of current policyholders are regularly increased by fifty 
percent or more a year.110 Policy options are unstandardized and 
confusing,111 and insurer solvency is a major concern112 – especially as 
more long-term care insurance companies exit this marketplace.113 
Moreover, nearly a quarter of sixty-five-year-olds are medically ineligible 
to buy such insurance,114 even if they were willing to bear the associated 
expense. 
Just the briefest overview of what is involved in acquiring long-
term care insurance can be discerned from the following table115 of policy 
choices and premiums offered by one prominent insurer:  
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
109 See id. at 14–72 (compilations by cities and states for each care category). 
110 See Do You Need Long-Term-Care Insurance?, CONSUMER REP., Nov. 
2003, at 20, 22; see also Jennifer Levitz & Kelly Greene, States Draw Fire for 
Pitching Citizens on Private Long-Term Care Insurance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 
2008, at A1 (reporting a 260% increase in premiums in only three years); Kelly 
Greene & Leslie Scism, Long-Term-Care Insurance Leaves Customers Groping, 
WALL ST. J., July 2, 2013, at A1 (reporting a 77% increase in one year); see 
generally Kaplan, supra note 98, at 440–41. 
111 See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 438–39. 
112 See id. at 441-42; M.P. McQueen, Insurer Casts Off Long-Term-Care 
Policies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2008, at D1. 
113 See Kelly Greene, Long-Term Care: What Now?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 
2012 (noting that ten of the top twenty long-term care insurers by sales volume 
have left this market within the past five years). 
114 See Christopher M. Murtaugh et al., Risky Business: Long-Term Care 
Insurance Underwriting, 32 INQUIRY 271, 277 (1995). 
115 See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Your Needs, Plus Your Budget, Equals What to 
Pay on Long-Term Care Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1997, at C1 (rates for John 
Hancock Life Insurance Co.). 
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ANNUAL COST OF AN INDIVIDUAL POLICY 
Age at Issue 55 65 75 
$100 daily benefit for nursing-home;  
home-health coverage; 4 years coverage;  
100-day deductible period 
 $510  $990 $2,830 
Shorter coverage period: 2 years   380 720 2,010 
Lower home-health-care benefit: $50 
daily 
410 810 2,350 
Shorter deductible period: 20 days 643 1,247 3,566 
Richer benefits: $200 daily for nursing 
home and home-health care 
1,020 1,980 5,660 
Inflation-indexed benefits: annual 
increases at 5% compounded rate 
1,090 l,740 4,230 
 
The premiums quoted above are over a decade old, and premiums 
are undoubtedly higher today, but the long-term care insurance industry 
does not generally make price information available outside of a 
personalized – read, pressurized – presentation by a sales agent.116 Even so, 
this table can convey some of the complex choices that a prospective buyer 
of long-term care insurance must confront: 
 
• Whether to buy a long-term care insurance policy at all, or 
plan instead to fund long-term care needs as they arise by 
accessing the equity in one’s residence via a “reverse 
mortgage.”117  
• If an insurance policy is desired, how much should the 
daily benefit be? 
• How long should these benefits last? 
                                                                                                                                      
116 But see Long-Term Care Sample Rates, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., 
https://interactive.web.insurance.ca.gov/survey/survey?type=longTermCareSurvey
&event=longTermCareSearch (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (making rates available 
online for certain specified insurance packages in California); Long-Term Care 
Insurance Rate Gide Sample Policy 1, TEX. DEP’T OF INS., 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/consumer/lrg policy1.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2014) (making rates available in Texas). 
117 See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 212–22. Another 
possible funding source might be “accelerated benefits” on an existing life 
insurance policy that can be accessed for long-term care. See id. at 156–58. 
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• How long should the deductible or “elimination period” 
be? 
• Should home health care be covered and if so, at what 
daily rate? 
• Should the daily benefit be increased for inflation and if so, 
what metric (consumer price index, five percent simple, 
five percent compounded) should apply? 
 
There are other policy decisions as well that are not captured by the 
preceding chart, such as whether to have premiums waived when benefits 
begin, whether to have the premiums refunded if no benefits are ever paid, 
and so forth.118 But the main point is that securing insurance to cover 
possible long-term care expenses is not a simple or straightforward process. 
 
B. GOVERNMENTAL COVERAGE OF LONG-TERM CARE COSTS 
 
In this context, it is notable that the Affordable Care Act included a 
voluntary long-term care insurance program called Community Living 
Assistance Services and Supports, or CLASS.119 This program would have 
covered some – but not all – long-term care costs in various settings, but its 
benefits were targeted to less costly care environments, such as home 
health care and community-based services, rather than assisted living 
facilities and nursing homes.120 In any case, the enabling legislation 
mandated that the CLASS program be fiscally self-sustaining,121 a 
requirement that the Obama Administration’s Department of Health and 
Human Services determined was impossible to satisfy.  In October 2011, 
the Secretary of that Department declared that the CLASS program would 
not be implemented,122 and these now-moribund provisions were then 
                                                                                                                                      
118 See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 439. 
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll–300ll-9 (Supp. IV 2007–2011) (enacted as part of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 8002, 124 
Stat. 119, 828–47 (2010)). 
120 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll-1, 300ll-2, 300ll-4 (Supp. IV 2007–2011); see generally 
Richard L. Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care After Health Care Reform, J. 
RETIREMENT PLAN., July–Aug. 2010, at 7. 
121 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-7(a), (b) (Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
122 See Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
to Congress (Oct. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/blog/ 2011/10/class10142011.html. 
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repealed by the legislation that forestalled the “fiscal cliff” at the very 
beginning of 2013.123 In its place, Congress created that most 
quintessentially worthless alternative, a commission to study how long-
term care should be financed.124 The bottom line is that the federal 
government will probably not be increasing its role in financing long-term 
care outside the poverty-based space that is presently occupied by 
Medicaid any time soon. 
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
 
 Retirees are never more “on their own” than when they try to cover 
their retirement health care expenses.  In fact, a comprehensive analysis of 
twelve prominent online retirement calculators found that all but two did 
not even consider health and long-term care expenses.125 Yet, seniors who 
consulted a professional regarding retirement planning indicated that their 
number one concern was “the future of Medicare,” followed closely by 
“paying for long-term care” and “paying for healthcare.”126 With health 
care constituting one of the largest and the least predictable of all 
retirement expenses,127 retirees with defined contribution plans will be 
increasingly desperate as they contemplate the daunting challenge of 
covering these critical costs.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
123 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 642(a), 
126 Stat. 2313, 2358. 
124 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 643, 126 
Stat. 2313, 2358–62. 
125 BRYAN DOWD ET AL., AARP PUB. POL. INST., PLANNING FOR RETIREMENT? 
WEB CALCULATORS WEAK ON HEALTH COSTS 7–8 (2008), available at 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/ 2008_12_savings.pdf.  
126 ALLSUP, ALLSUP MEDICARE ADVISOR® SENIORS SURVEY: MEDICARE 
PLANNING AND TRENDS AMONG SENIORS WITH FINANCIAL PLANNERS 7 (2012), 
available at http://www.allsup.com/portals/4/AMA-Seniors-Survey-Financial Plan 
ners-Oct2012.pdf. 
127 See Allison K. Hoffman & Howell E. Jackson, Retiree Out-of-Pocket 
Healthcare Spending: A Study of Consumer Expectations and Policy Implications, 
39 AM. J.L. & MED. 62, 83–85 (2013) (comparing estimates of future health care 
spending of 1,700 near and current retirees with experts’ estimates). 
AN AFFORDABLE CARE ACT FOR RETIREMENT PLANS? 
 
AMY B. MONAHAN* 
 
*** 
 
In the United States, the availability of tax subsidies for retirement savings 
is largely based on an individual’s employment status and whether such 
individual’s employer has voluntarily chosen to offer a tax-favored savings 
vehicle.  Even where an individual has access to an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan, such plans are too often suboptimally designed.  This 
article proposes an incremental reform that ensures universal access to 
tax-favored retirement savings irrespective of employment status or 
employer decisions.  Borrowing from the model of the Affordable Care Act, 
the article calls for the creation of an optional, universally available 
retirement plan, which would be designed according to both retirement 
savings and behavioral best practices.  Such a plan would be designed to 
increase the number of Americans saving for retirement, as well as the 
likelihood that individuals will accumulate sufficient savings to maintain 
their standard of living throughout retirement.  After discussing the design 
details for such a plan, the article concludes by examining the legal and 
practical challenges of implementing a universal retirement plan at either 
the federal or state level. 
 
*** 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 Given the current challenges of implementing the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), it is perhaps unwise to suggest that the ACA’s model should be 
replicated in the retirement plan context, as the title of this article suggests.   
However, the basic structure of the ACA, which provides all Americans 
with access to health insurance regardless of their employment status or 
their employer’s choices, provides a promising model for enhancing 
retirement savings and security. 
 Many Americans are ill equipped for their retirement, having failed 
to save a sufficient amount to maintain their standard of living in 
                                                                                                                 
*Julius E. Davis Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful 
to Pat McCoy and the many participants in “The Challenge of Retirement in a 
Defined Contribution World” symposium at the University of Connecticut School 
of Law who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
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retirement.1 Much blame for this failure has been placed on the widespread 
shift in the design of employer-sponsored retirement plans.2 Instead of 
being offered traditional, defined benefit pension plans that offer a set level 
of lifetime income, most employees are now offered only a defined 
contribution plan, usually in the form of a 401(k) plan.3 These defined 
contribution plans depend for their success on individual participants 
making rational decisions and executing them in a timely manner.  Yet, 
there is significant evidence suggesting that many individuals fail to make 
rational decisions and implement them in a timely manner.  As one 
prominent scholar succinctly put it, “It’s crazy that we ended up with this 
as our retirement system.”4 The popular 401(k) plans, she explained, were 
meant to supplement traditional forms of lifetime income, such as social 
security and defined benefit pension plans.5 “It was supposed to be money 
that you could use to go to Paris.  Instead, it’s become our basic system.”6  
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The EBRI Retirement 
Readiness Rating: Retirement Income Preparation and Future Prospects, 334 
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1645412 (estimating that 47.2% of early baby 
boomers are at risk of not having sufficient resources to pay for basic retirement 
expenditures and uninsured health costs). One large administrator of 401(k) plans 
recently reported that average 401(k) plan balances for those age 65-69 were 
$136,800. Jill Schlesinger, The Latest on America’s 401(k)s, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 
2013, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-27/business/sns-
201302271600--tms--retiresmctnrs-a20130227-20130227_1_retirement-savings-
fidelity-plans-fidelity-investments. 
2 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 
YALE L.J. 451 (2004); James M. Poterba, Individual Decision Making and Risk in 
Defined Contribution Plans, 13 ELDER L.J. 285 (2005); Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time 
to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 305 (2007). 
3 Craig Copeland, Retirement Plan Participation and Asset Allocation, 2010, 
34 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 9, 11 (2013), available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_04_Apr-13_CDHPs-RetPart1.pdf (finding that among 
working heads of households who participated in an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan, 18.9% participated only in a defined benefit plan, 65% 
participated only in a defined contribution plan, and 16.1% participated in both). 
4 Jeff Sommer, Suddenly, Many Nest Eggs Look Fragile, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/your-money/suddenly-retiree-nest-eggs 
-look-more-fragile.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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 While the problems associated with individual retirement savings 
decisions are well documented, this article seeks to highlight another 
weakness of our current reliance on 401(k) plans to deliver retirement 
security – suboptimal employer decision-making.  Our retirement savings 
system relies on employers voluntarily offering retirement plans.  Some 
employees do not have access to tax-favored retirement savings plans 
simply because their employer does not offer one.  And even when 
employers do offer a plan, they often offer a plan that is not well-designed 
to help participants accumulate sufficient retirement savings.  These plans 
often minimize employer costs while failing to take into account the 
abundant literature on 401(k) plan designs that can help overcome some of 
the well-known weaknesses in individual retirement savings decisions.  To 
address the potential problems with employer decision-making in the 
401(k) plan context, this article suggests both federal and state solutions 
that borrow from the ACA model for health insurance to ensure that all 
Americans who wish to save for retirement have a well-designed option 
available to them in the event their employer either fails to offer a plan or 
offers a plan that is suboptimally designed.  The goal of this proposal is to 
minimize both suboptimal participant-level decisions regarding retirement 
saving and also suboptimal employer-level decisions regarding plan design. 
 
II.      WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT MODEL OF RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS 
  
The weaknesses in individual decision-making within participant-
directed 401(k) plans are well documented.  Individuals struggle to begin 
saving at an early enough age to meet their retirement goals, they often fail 
to contribute sufficient amounts, and have difficulty navigating investment 
and distribution options.  Less appreciated is the fact that many employers 
make poor decisions when they design their 401(k) plans.  This Part will 
review the weaknesses in the 401(k) plan model that might explain why so 
few Americans appear to be able to achieve financial security through such 
plans. 
 
 A.  INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING  
 
 Section 401(k) plans are premised on classic economic theory, 
which posits that welfare will be optimized where each individual makes 
his or her own rational savings and consumption decisions within a fully 
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functioning market.7 The success of a 401(k) plan in providing adequate 
retirement income depends on an individual making several important 
decisions: whether and when to participate in the plan, what amount of 
salary to defer to the plan, where to invest plan contributions, when (if at 
all) to access retirement savings prior to retirement, and the rate at which to 
withdraw savings once retirement age has been reached.  If an individual is 
perfectly rational, this type of retirement plan should work very well, as it 
can be customized to match the individual’s preferences.8 
 We have good reason to believe, however, that most individuals 
are not perfectly rational and do not make optimal decisions within the 
401(k) plan context.9 These problems with participant-level decision-
making have been well documented elsewhere,10 and therefore this article 
provides only a high-level overview of the key findings.  For plans that 
require an individual to take affirmative action to enroll in the plan, 
participants often procrastinate in implementing the decision to participate, 
thereby shortening the period of time they are saving for retirement.11 In 
addition, many studies have shown that once individuals elect to participate 
they are overwhelmed by the decisions they are required to make, such as 
selecting a contribution level and making investment decisions, and 
therefore stick to the defaults or allow the plan’s framing of choices to 
                                                                                                                 
7 See Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and 
Other Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 480–81 (2004). 
8 See id. 
9 See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and 
401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING (David 
A. Wise ed., 2004); Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and 
Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and 
Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 (2005); Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. 
Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 81 (2007); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of 
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 
1149 (2001); Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral 
Finance for Retirement Plan Design (Pension Research Council, Working Paper 
No. 2003-6, 2003). For a helpful overview of the literature on retirement savings 
decisions, see Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and 
Behavioral Decision Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. 
SEC. BULL. 1 (2010).  
10 See sources cited supra note 9. 
11 Knoll, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
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impact their decisions.12 There is also strong evidence that hyperbolic 
discounting affects retirement savings decisions causing individuals to give 
more weight to current consumption than to future needs, thereby under-
saving for retirement.13 Many studies have shown that simply changing 
plan defaults results in dramatic changes in behavior – which would not be 
predicted under standard economic theory.14 According to standard 
economic theory, a rational decision-maker will simply opt out of any 
defaults that do not maximize her preferences.15 Yet, the evidence on the 
impact of defaults in the retirement savings context suggests that cognitive 
biases are impacting many individuals’ decision-making.16 
 
 B.   EMPLOYER DECISION-MAKING 
 
 A less explored weakness inherent in relying on 401(k) plans to 
provide retirement security is the fact that they depend on sound employer 
decision-making.17  In theory, employers should act as effective agents for 
their employees and offer retirement plans that maximize their employees’ 
preferences.18  But there are various reasons why employers may not, in 
fact, offer plans designed to produce adequate retirement income.  The 
subparts below illustrate the ways in which employer decision-making can 
negatively impact employees’ retirement security. 
 
 1.  Failing to Offer a Plan 
 
 Employers are not required to offer any type of retirement plan to 
their workers.  It is a completely voluntary decision, driven by labor market 
                                                                                                                 
12 See, e.g., Agnew & Szykman, supra note 9, at 66; Choi et al., supra note 9, 
at 125. 
13 See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 
Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997). 
14 See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 9. 
15 See id. at 81. 
16 See id. See also Madrian & Shea, supra note 9. 
17 For an examination of the role of employers in employees’ health and 
retirement security, see Amy B. Monahan, Employers as Risks, 89 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 751 (2014). 
18 See Gregory Acs & Eugene Steuerle, The Corporation as Dispenser of 
Welfare and Security, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY: EXAMINING THE 
QUESTIONS OF POWER AND EFFICIENCY AT THE CENTURY'S END 360, 361 (Carl 
Kaysen, ed. 1996). 
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pressures.19 We would expect an employer to voluntarily offer a retirement 
plan in lieu of other forms of compensation where it believes that doing so 
will help it attract and retain workers.20 Indeed, pension formation is 
typically explained as a contract driven by worker demand to provide 
workers with security and income protection.21 But it is widely 
acknowledged that pensions also offer other benefits to employers, in 
addition to simply helping them attract and retain employees.  For example, 
pensions can help employers control their employees’ tenure and turnover 
by designing plans to encourage retirement at certain ages.22   
 But allowing labor market pressures to determine whether a 
retirement plan is offered has shortcomings.  It aggregates the preferences 
of employees.  If the majority of employees of a given employer do not 
value retirement benefits, the employer is unlikely to offer a plan.  For 
those minority employees that would value a retirement plan, their only 
option would be to find a different employer that offers the desired 
benefits.  Because many factors enter into a decision to work at one firm 
over another, it may be that many who desire a retirement plan are not 
offered one.  And bear in mind that a job switch is in fact the only complete 
solution if an employee’s current employer fails to offer a retirement plan.  
While there are individual tax-favored retirement accounts available 
outside of the employment context, none can duplicate the extent of the tax 
benefits available to employer plans.  An employee can currently defer up 
to $17,500 of her salary tax-free per year to a 401(k) plan,23 but can only 
contribute $5,500 annually to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA).24 
 Prior to health care reform, we saw the same dynamic at play in an 
employer’s decision to offer a health plan to employees.  Employers 
                                                                                                                 
19 See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 2 (1992). 
20 See Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A 
Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 417, 426 (1994). 
21 GHILARDUCCI, supra note 19. For alternative explanations of pension 
formation, see id. at 2–7. 
22 Id. at 2–3. 
23 I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86 (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
IRS-Announces-2014-Pension-Plan-Limitations;-Taxpayers-May-Contribute-up-
to-$17,500-to-their-401(k)-plans-in-2014. Participants who are age fifty or older 
are permitted to contribute an addition $5,500 each year, for a total of $23,000 per 
year.  Id. 
24 Id. Participants who are age fifty or older may contribute an additional 
$1,000 per year to an IRA, for a total annual contribution of $6,500. Id. 
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decided to offer a health plan based on labor market pressures,25 and 
employees had little ability to replicate the benefits of an employer plan by 
seeking individual level coverage.26 Health care reform will change this 
reliance on employers, as discussed in more detail in Part II. 
 
 2.  Offering a Suboptimal Plan 
 
 Even if an employer offers a retirement plan, it may nevertheless 
be the case that an employer offers a plan that, from an employee’s 
perspective, is suboptimally designed.  Employers offer retirement plans in 
order to recruit and retain valued workers.  Retirement plans help recruit 
and retain workers when workers find them to be a positive addition to 
their compensation package.  Employers should therefore structure their 
retirement plans in a way that employees find attractive.27 In other words, 
we would expect employers to be effective agents for their employees 
when they design their retirement plans.28 Employees, however, are 
unlikely to be familiar with all of the features of their retirement plan, and 
are likely, when evaluating an employer plan, to focus on only a few 
features that are highly salient to employees.29 For example, it seems 
plausible that employees would focus on whether a plan is offered at all, 
and the amount and structure of any employer contributions to the plan, 
such as matching or profit sharing contributions.  Most employees, when 
deciding whether to accept or retain an offer of employment from a firm, 
probably do not examine plan details such as plan defaults, the quality of 
plan investments, investment fees, or forms of distribution.  If employers 
believe or discover that employees focus only on a handful of highly salient 
features, employers are likely to respond by structuring their plans only 
around those features and otherwise acting to minimize their costs.  For 
example, an employer might offer a 401(k) plan with a matching 
                                                                                                                 
25 See, e.g., Michael Chernew et al., Quality and Employers' Choice 
of Health Plans, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 471, 472 (2004). 
26 See Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health 
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1944 (2013). 
27 For an overview of pension theories, see GHILARDUCCI, supra note 19, at 1–
7. 
28 See Chernew et al., supra note 24, at 472. 
29 See James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 
J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 199 (1998) (discussing that increased numbers of 
alternatives facing the consumer when choosing retirement products lead to a 
greater use of non-compensatory strategies which eliminate alternatives). 
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contribution that equals or exceeds that offered by its competitor firms, but 
in order to reduce its costs associated with the plan might select a plan 
provider that offers high fee investments, defaults that do not address 
participants’ likely cognitive biases, and distribution forms that do not help 
participants manage income in retirement.  The end result may be that even 
where employers offer plans, they offer plans that are not designed to 
maximize participants’ retirement security. 
 Again, much the same dynamic is at play in how employers 
approach health plan design.  Employees are likely to focus only on highly 
salient features when evaluating a health plan – in this case on premium 
levels, copays, and whether their current doctor is in-network.30 And 
employers are likely to respond to this employee focus by designing plans 
around the highly salient features, potentially at the expense of other 
important plan design features such as the quality of the plan or providers.31 
 If this hypothesis regarding employer plan design is correct, the 
implications for retirement and health security are significant.  In the 
retirement plan context, it would mean that even if every employer made a 
401(k) plan available to its workers, the problem of insufficient retirement 
savings would not be solved.  While we know relatively little regarding 
how employer plan design decisions are made and the factors that motivate 
those design decisions, data regarding plan features provide support for the 
hypothesis that the majority of employers do not offer plans that are 
optimally designed.  Plans often have defaults that work against retirement 
savings.  Individuals that desire to participate must take active steps to 
enroll in the plan, instead of being defaulted into participation.32 Even 
where participants are automatically enrolled in a plan, default contribution 
                                                                                                                 
30 See Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans?, 65 
TAX L. REV. 749, 764–765 (2012). 
31 See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient 
Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market 
Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1999) (explaining how health insurance 
companies are likely to structure health plans given consumers’ focus on only a 
handful of highly salient features). 
32 See Alicia H. Munnell, 401(k) Plans in 2010: An Update from the SCF, 
ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. C., Boston, MA), July 2012, at 1, 4, 
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IB_12-13-508.pdf 
(finding that fewer than half of all 401(k) plans offered automatic enrollment in 
2010). 
2014     AFFORDABLE CARE ACT FOR RETIREMENT PLANS?  467 
 
rates are often too low to provide adequate savings.33 Many plans allow 
easy access to savings prior to retirement,34 and nearly all have a lump sum 
distribution as either the default or the only form of distribution available.35  
 In addition, plans sometimes work against participants’ savings 
goals by offering poor investment choices and little investment advice.36  
As we have seen through countless class action lawsuits, many employers 
allegedly offer a menu of investments that charge excessive fees.37 
                                                                                                                 
33 See id. See also DELOITTE, ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 9 
(2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Consulting/us_cons_hc_401ksbecnchm
arkingsurvey2012.pdf (finding that the average default contribution rate was 3%, 
an amount unlikely “to support a comfortable retirement”). 
34 For example, approximately 90% of 401(k) plan participants participate in a 
plan that offers plan loans. John Beshears et al., The Availability and Utilization of 
401(k) Loans 2 (John. F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 11-023, 
2011), available at https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id 
=693. Sixty-six percent of all 401(k) plans permit participants to take hardship 
distributions prior to retirement. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SECTION 401(K) 
COMPLIANCE CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE FINAL REPORT 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/401k_final_report.pdf. Studies are, however, 
mixed on the extent to which such pre-retirement access threatens retirement 
security. See generally sources cited infra note 64. 
35 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 34, at 59 (finding that 99% of 
401(k) plans offer a lump sum distribution, while only 19% offer a qualified joint 
and survivor annuity). See also HEWITT ASSOC., TRENDS AND EXPERIENCES IN 
401(K) PLANS 7 (2009) available at http://www.retirementmadesimpler.org/ 
Library/Hewitt_Research_Trends_in_401k_Highlights.pdf (finding that all 401(k) 
plans offered a lump sum option, while 14% offered annuities). 
36 See, e.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for 
Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 511–12 (2013) (examining the weaknesses of 
401(k) investment options); Karen Blumenthal, Thanks but No Thanks on 401(k) 
Advice, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052970204346104576638933476020932 (finding that while a 
majority of 401(k) plans offer investment advice, only around a quarter of 
participants offered some form of investment advice utilize the service).  
37 For a detailed examination of this litigation and its effects, see Mercer 
Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideology and the Empirical 
Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 335 
(2014) and Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive 
Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans 13-20 (Feb. 
21, 2014 (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399531. See also Kelly 
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Employers often offer employer stock as an investment option, even though 
in many cases it is unwise for a participant who depends on an employer 
for her current income to invest in that employer’s stock for her long-term 
savings.38 And finally, plans are permitted to, and often do, pass along to 
participants nearly all of the administrative costs of running the plan, 
further reducing participants’ rate of return.39 
 There has been one area of plan design that has improved 
significantly over the last decade.  Beginning in the 1990s, several 401(k) 
plan sponsors began experimenting with automatic enrollment provisions, 
which provide that an eligible participant will automatically participate in 
the employer’s plan unless he or she takes affirmative action to opt out.40 
The number of employers utilizing automatic enrollment grew following 
the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which offered 
employers various incentives for putting such procedures in place.  
However, a well-known potential weakness of automatic enrollment 
provisions is that plan sponsors can choose default contribution levels and 
investment options that are too low and too conservative to produce 
adequate retirement savings.  When automatic enrollment provisions first 
gained traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s, default investment 
options were primarily conservative, capital-preserving investments.41 
However, a recent survey found that 82% of plans with automatic 
enrollment now had as their default investment option a lifecycle or target-
date fund, designed to invest appropriately given the participant’s years to 
                                                                                                                 
Greene, Letters About 401(k) Plan Costs Stir Tempest, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323971204578626103409
341648 (describing Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres’ letter writing campaign to 
401(k) plan sponsors regarding their fee levels, and the reaction such letters have 
provoked).  
38 See generally Ning Tang et al., The Efficiency of Sponsor and Participant 
Portfolio Choices in 401(k) Plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073 (2010). 
39 See DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 19 (finding that 51% of plans paid all 
administrative and recordkeeping fees through investment revenue). 
40 See Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Impact of PPA on Retirement 
Savings for 401(k) Participants, 318 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 4 
(2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-20087.pdf. 
41 See PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AMERICA, AUTOMATIC 
ENROLLMENT 2001: A STUDY OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT PRACTICES IN 401(K) 
PLANS available at http://www.pcsa.org/data/autoenroll2001.asp (finding that 
among plans with automatic enrollment, 66% had a conservative default 
investment option such as a stable value or money market fund). 
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retirement.42 Note, however, that this change was likely brought about by a 
change in Department of Labor regulations that protected plan fiduciaries 
from liability where they offered a “qualified investment” as the default 
investment option.43 This change does not appear to have been the result of 
employers independently making a decision to improve the quality of the 
plan’s default investment option.  As a result, this improvement does not 
provide significant evidence against the hypothesis that employers often 
lack motivation to design optimal retirement plans.  Indeed, when the state 
of 401(k) plan design is viewed as a whole, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that even when participants are lucky enough to be offered an employer-
sponsored retirement plan, that plan in many cases will not be designed to 
maximize retirement security. 
 
III.   THE ACA MODEL 
 
 While there is reason to be less than confident in our current 
retirement savings system, the structure of federal health care reform 
provides an interesting model of how dependence on employers can be 
reduced, and portions of its structure might successfully be borrowed to 
improve retirement savings.  As noted above, there are important 
similarities between employer-sponsored health and retirement plans.  Both 
types of plans depend on employer decision-making for their success.  An 
employer must decide to offer a plan if an employee is to have access to the 
benefit at all, since neither type of plan can be duplicated outside of the 
employment context.44 And the quality of the benefit provided depends in 
large part on how employers decide to structure the benefit plan.  If an 
employer makes suboptimal choices in a health plan, an individual’s health 
                                                                                                                 
42 See DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 11. 
43 Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed Individual 
Account Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2008). Each of the three qualified default 
investment options is diversified in order to minimize the risk of large losses but 
also to provide long-term growth potential. 
44 Health plans, like retirement plans, depend on employer sponsorship for the 
individual to receive the most favorable tax treatment. If an employee buys health 
insurance on her own, she must pay for the coverage with after-tax dollars, 
whereas an employee who participates in an employer plan may pay premiums 
with pre-tax dollars. This tax advantage did not change with the passage of the 
ACA. In addition, purchasing coverage through an employer gives the employee 
access to group coverage, which tends to be more affordable than individual 
coverage.  See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 26, at 1942–44. 
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security can be jeopardized, much the same way an individual’s retirement 
security can be compromised if an employer designs a suboptimal 
retirement plan. 
 For health plans, however, this should begin to change as the major 
reforms of the ACA take effect.45 Once the ACA’s provisions are fully 
effective, individuals who are not offered health coverage through an 
employer, or are offered a plan that does not satisfy their preferences, 
should have a meaningful coverage alternative.  Such individuals can freely 
purchase any individual coverage available on their state’s health insurance 
exchange46 and, assuming these markets function well post-reform, should 
have a broad variety of plan designs and premium levels from which to 
choose.47 The ACA requires all plans sold on the state exchanges (referred 
to as “qualified health plans”) to satisfy various plan design, content and 
quality requirements in order to ensure that the options available meet 
minimum standards.48 In other words, one underappreciated function of the 
ACA is to act as a backstop for employer choices that might be suboptimal 
from an employee’s perspective.  While not perfect (an employee 
purchasing health insurance on an exchange would have to purchase 
coverage with after-tax instead of pre-tax dollars), the ACA should give an 
individual a much greater ability to secure desired health care coverage 
without regard to his or her employer’s choices.49 For example, if an 
employee is offered health insurance coverage by her employer that has a 
deductible too high for the employee to afford, or that fails to offer a broad 
network of providers, that employee is no longer effectively stuck with 
what the employer offers, but will instead have the option of going to her 
state’s health insurance exchange and buying coverage that satisfies her 
preferences. 
 The ACA’s provision of a universal option available to all 
individuals without regard to employment status or employer decision-
making provides an interesting model that might be of use in improving 
retirement security in the United States.  Part IV below explores ways in 
                                                                                                                 
45 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
46 See 42 U.S.C. 18031(b) (Supp. V 2012). 
47 See 42 U.S.C. 18022 (Supp. V 2012). 
48 See id. 
49 For a discussion of some of the implications of these choices, see Brendan 
S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: Choice, Defaults, and the 
Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099 (2012). 
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which both the federal and state governments could borrow from the ACA 
to provide a meaningful alternative to suboptimal employer-sponsored 
retirement plans. 
 
IV.   A UNIVERSAL BACKSTOP RETIREMENT PLAN 
 
 Both the federal and state governments have the ability to use law 
to improve retirement security for many Americans.  This Part begins by 
exploring the use of a universal “backstop” retirement plan, similar to the 
concept of a qualified health plan under the ACA, which could help to 
address the problem of flawed employer decision-making.  It then discusses 
the possibilities and impediments associated with establishing such a 
backstop at either the federal or state level. 
 
 A.  BACKSTOP RETIREMENT PLAN DESIGN 
 
 There are myriad problems in our current retirement savings 
system.  Employer plans provide the greatest tax benefit for retirement 
savings, but are far from universal.50 Even when employer plans are 
available, they are often not designed to address the well-documented 
mistakes that individuals make in their retirement savings decisions.51 
While there are Individual Retirement Accounts universally available, these 
savings vehicles have much lower contribution limits than employer-
sponsored plans,52 involve even more complex participant decision-making 
                                                                                                                 
50 See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & MATHEW GREENWALD & ASSOCS., 
2013 RCS FACT SHEET #3, at 5 (2013), available at  http://ebri.org/pdf/surveys/ 
rcs/2013/Final-FS.RCS-13.FS_3.Saving.FINAL.pdf. (reporting that only 72% of 
workers are offered a retirement plan by their employer); See Emp. Benefit 
Research Inst., Pension Plan Participation, FAST FACTS (Emp. Benefit Research 
Inst., Washington, D.C.), March 28, 2013, available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/FF.225.DB-DC.28Mar13.pdf. (finding that in 2011, 3% of private sector 
workers participated in a defined benefit plan, 11% participated in both a defined 
benefit and defined contribution plan, and 31% participated only in a defined 
contribution plan). 
51 See supra Part II.B.2. 
52 See I.R.S. Notice 2012-67, 2012-50 I.R.B. 671 (stating that in 2013, 
individuals can contribute $17,500 to an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan, but can 
contribute only $5,500 to an IRA). 
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than employer plans,53 and are not designed to counteract cognitive biases 
in retirement savings decisions.54 
 There are many ways to address the perceived shortcomings of our 
current system.  We could reform Social Security so that it provided more 
complete income replacement in retirement.  We could implement a 
government-sponsored, universal pension plan.  We could raise 
contribution limits on IRAs.  The proposal offered in this article is an 
incremental reform that is based on the premise that 401(k) plans, and 
defined contribution retirement plans in general, are here to stay and that a 
wholesale shift away from either defined contribution plans or employer-
provided plans is unlikely to be politically viable.  Instead, the universal 
backstop retirement plan is designed to work within the existing employer-
based system to ensure that all individuals have access to a quality 
retirement plan designed to maximize the likelihood that a participant will 
have adequate income in retirement.  The goal is, as best we can, to 
minimize both suboptimal participant-level decisions regarding saving and 
investing and suboptimal employer-level decisions regarding plan design. 
 As the ACA will do for health plans, the idea of a backstop 
retirement plan is to have a plan available to all individuals, regardless of 
whether they are employed or have access to other retirement plans through 
an employer.  It is offering a new option, not supplanting the existing 
system.  One significant advantage of this type of reform is that it lets the 
backstop plan compete against employer offerings.  It lets participants 
choose the plan that best meets their needs.  In this way, a backstop 
retirement plan is superior to direct regulation of employer plan offerings.  
Employers remain free to design a plan that best meets the needs of their 
                                                                                                                 
53 The decision-making process to establish and fund an IRA is more 
complicated than participation in a 401(k) plan because there are a greater number 
of options. An IRA can be established with numerous investment firms, in contrast 
to an employer that would offer only a single plan. And once an IRA provider is 
selected, an individual can essentially invest her contributions in any publicly 
traded security – making the investment decision more complex compared with a 
401(k) plan that often offers a limited menu of investment options. 
54 Because IRAs must be initiated and established by an individual, design 
features such as automatic enrollment, automatically increasing contribution rates, 
and default investment options typically cannot be utilized. This could change if 
the law required the establishment of so-called payroll IRAs or automatic IRAs, 
recently proposed by President Obama. See Retirement Security for American 
Families, WHITEHOUSE.GOV 3, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/ 
Retirement_Savings_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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employees, or even forgo a plan, but employees will not bear any ill 
consequences of the employer’s decision.  In fact, the backstop retirement 
plan may incent some employers to improve their plan offerings.  It is 
possible, of course, that employers may drop their retirement plans if a 
backstop retirement plan becomes available.  It is important to note that this 
is not necessarily a bad outcome, if the backstop plan is appropriately 
designed.  Employers dropping retirement plans is only problematic if their 
doing so leaves employees worse off with respect to retirement savings.  
An appropriately designed backstop plan, as discussed in more detail 
below, should prevent such an outcome. 
While in reality designing a backstop plan would be a difficult 
process relying on input from many experts and stakeholders, I offer here 
some initial thoughts on basic approaches to the backstop plan and issues to 
be considered.  Some of the design features mentioned would require 
changes to either federal or state law, an issue I discuss in the next subpart. 
The first issue to tackle would be designing the plan to encourage 
participation.  The evidence seems clear that automatic participation, with 
the ability to opt-out, would be preferable to requiring affirmative action to 
begin saving.55 But given that this is a backstop plan, and not merely the 
plan of a single employer, implementing automatic enrollment is 
complicated.  We have three potential categories of participants: employees 
who have access to an employer-sponsored plan, employees without an 
employer plan, and self-employed individuals.  It would be easiest to 
implement automatic enrollment for employed individuals without access 
to an employer plan.  Those individuals could simply be defaulted into the 
backstop plan through required payroll deduction.  For those employees 
who are offered an employer plan, the question becomes which plan they 
should be automatically enrolled in – the backstop plan or the employer 
plan?  The best approach for an employee would depend on how the 
employer plan compares to the backstop plan, so that is of little help in 
determining the default.  One simple solution would be to default the 
employee into the backstop plan only if the employer plan does not provide 
for automatic enrollment.  For self-employed individuals, automatic 
                                                                                                                 
55 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: 
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 
S164, S169 (2004); John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for 
Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL 
SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167–95 (Jeffrey Brown et al. 
eds., 2009). 
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enrollment is impossible to implement because payroll deduction is not 
practical.  But there are other methods to encourage participation.  Self-
employed individuals could face a small fee for failing to participate in the 
plan (or an equivalent retirement savings vehicle), or they could be 
required to state when filing their federal tax return whether they wish to 
participate in the plan, and be given the ability to direct any tax refund to 
the backstop plan.  These are not ideal, of course, but illustrations of how 
participation can be encouraged without the ease of payroll deduction. 
After tackling the issue of getting individuals into the backstop 
plan, the next design issue is contributions, both participant and employer.  
Ideally, the default contribution level for participants would be a 
percentage of wages which, if contributed over an average working life, 
and taking into account an appropriate investment return assumption, 
would result in a level of income replacement at retirement that would be 
sufficient to provide seventy to eighty percent of pre-retirement income for 
the average life expectancy.56 Obviously, such a contribution level would 
not be ideal for everyone, and in fact may be so large as to result in 
participants either dropping out of the plan entirely or lowering their 
contribution rate.57 Further study would be necessary to select a 
contribution rate that would maximize plan participation and contribution 
rates.  One possibility would be to adjust the contribution rate based on a 
                                                                                                                 
56 Financial planners often suggest that, for most individuals, retirement 
savings should aim to replace 70% to 80% of pre-retirement income, although this 
is at best a rough guide. See, e.g., Jason Jenkins, The New Rule of Thumb for 
Retirement Savings, INVESTMENT U (2012), available at http://www.investmentu. 
com/2012/October/new-rule-of-thumb-for-retirement-savings.html. For a more 
sophisticated analysis of retirement savings needs, see Jonathan Skinner, Are You 
Sure You’re Saving Enough for Retirement? (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12981, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 
12981.pdf?new_window=1. 
57 See Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 55, at S169–72 (citing behavioral 
analysis which indicates that many individuals who perceive themselves as unable 
to meet current expenditures will not be interested in increasing their participation 
in savings plans if a rate above their perceived ability to save is suggested); See 
Beshears et al., supra note 55, at 171 (noting that employers often set automatic 
enrollment contribution levels low due to the commonly held belief that high 
contribution levels will encourage employees to opt out). 
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participant’s income.58 Another well-tested plan design would be to start 
participants at a low initial contribution rate, and increase that contribution 
rate automatically at specified intervals to gradually bring a participant to 
an adequate savings level.59 
It is important that employers be able to contribute to an 
employee’s account in the backstop plan.  It is easy to imagine that many 
employers would, if a backstop retirement plan were in place, no longer 
sponsor their own 401(k) plan.  But without the ability of employers to 
contribute directly to their employees’ retirement, an important source of 
savings would be lost.  Therefore, making it easy (and tax advantaged) for 
an employer to contribute to an employee’s retirement savings, whether 
through an employer-sponsored plan or the backstop plan, would be an 
important design feature. 
Assuming that participation is encouraged at an adequate savings 
rate, the next design issue, and potentially the most difficult one, is to 
determine both the default and alternative investment options.  The ideal 
default investment is likely a passive fund that offers the appropriate mix of 
risk and return characteristics appropriate for the individual’s savings 
horizon.60 Target date funds, which are designed to automatically shift the 
fund’s asset allocation as the target retirement date nears, are attractive 
because they are designed around the participant’s investment time 
horizon, and they offer one-stop shopping.61 Theoretically, a participant 
could put all of their savings in a single target date fund.  These funds are 
not without risks,62 but they may provide a better default option than others 
readily available.63 
                                                                                                                 
58 Varying contribution rates by income level may be more palatable to low-
income individuals, and could also be designed to reflect the fact that social 
security replaces a larger percentage of income for low-income individuals. 
59 A plan design with automatically increasing contribution rates was 
pioneered by economists Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi. See Thaler & 
Benartzi, supra note 55. 
60 See Kwak, supra note 36. 
61 Julie R. Agnew et al., What People Know About Target-Date Funds: Survey 
and Focus Group Evidence 4 (Fin. Sec. Project at B.C., Working Paper 2011-2), 
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/FSP-WP-2011-2.pdf. 
62 See Zvi Bodie et al., Unsafe at Any Speed? The Designed-in Risks of Target-
Date Glide Paths, J. FIN. PLAN. (March 15, 2010), available at http://www.fpanet 
.org/journal/CurrentIssue/TableofContents/UnsafeatAnySpeed/. 
63 Zvi Bodie et al., Life Cycle Finance and the Design of Pension Plans, 1 
ANN. REV. OF FIN. ECON. 249, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
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 An important issue worth considering is whether the backstop plan 
should not have participant-directed investment, but should instead operate 
as a cash balance plan, where participants are guaranteed a rate of return on 
their contributions.64 If a cash balance approach is taken, participants would 
not face significant investment risk, a distinct advantage over current 
401(k) plans.65 The price, of course, is that such plans typically have 
conservative rates of return, which may be insufficient to provide adequate 
retirement income given reasonable contribution rates.66 Another option 
would be to default participants into the cash balance plan and allow 
individuals to opt out of the cash balance plan and into a participant-
directed 401(k) plan if desired.  Doing so would allow more sophisticated 
investors to seek higher rates of return than the cash balance plan offers, 
while still offering unsophisticated or risk-adverse investors a guaranteed 
rate of return.   
 Another approach to participant investments would be to invest 
contributions in deferred life annuities, similar to a recent proposal by 
Senator Hatch for public pension plans.67 Investing contributions in 
annuities would both protect employees against investment risk and 
provide them with a guaranteed income stream at retirement.  However, 
like the cash balance option described above, such a structure would not 
necessarily guarantee that the amount of the income stream would be 
adequate. 
                                                                                                                 
abstract_id=1396835. For an interesting example of an investment option that 
utilizes both target date funds and annuities that provide a guaranteed level of 
lifetime income, see Tara Seigel Bernard, A 401(k) That Promises Never to Run 
Dry: [Your Money], N.Y. TIMES Nov. 14, 2012, at F.4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/11/14/your-money/a-401-k-that-promises-income-
for-life.html?r=0. 
64 Kevin E. Cahill & Mauricio Soto, How Do Cash Balance Plans Affect the 
Pension Landscape?, AN ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. For Ret. Research. Bos. Coll., 
Boston, MA), Dec. 2003, at 1, 1. 
65 See id. at 3; Richard W. Johnson & Cori E. Uccello, Cash Balance Plans: 
What Do They Mean For Retirement Security?, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 315, 316–18 
(2004). 
66 See Cahill & Soto, supra note 64 at 3 (noting that cash balance plans on 
average offer a 5.6% rate of return, compared to a market-average rate of return of 
7.6%). 
67 See The Secure Annuities for Employees Retirement Act, S. 1270, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
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 The final major design decision concerns plan distributions, both 
before and during retirement.  Allowing easy access to retirement savings 
prior to retirement may significantly endanger retirement security.68 
However, individuals may be more likely to participate in the first place if 
they know that they can access their savings in the event of a financial 
hardship.69  To balance these competing concerns, the plan could offer pre-
retirement distributions only for specific financial hardships,70 instead of 
offering relatively unrestricted pre-retirement access as many employer 
401(k) plans do currently.71 Consideration should be given to whether pre-
retirement access should only be the form of plan loans,72 or whether an 
outright distribution will be permitted, and in what circumstances. 
 The other major design decision with respect to distributions will 
be the form of retirement distributions.  Most participants in 401(k) plans 
receive lump sum distributions.73 However, what most individuals require 
                                                                                                                 
68 See Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén, 401(k) Plans Are Still Coming Up 
Short, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research Bos. C., Boston, MA), Mar. 2006, at 
1, 5, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2006/03/ib_43.pdf. 
69 The evidence regarding whether or to what extent access to funds pre-
retirement increases participation are mixed. Compare Alicia H. Munnell et al., 
What Determines 401(k) Participation and Contributions? 16 (Ctr. for Ret. 
Research Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2000-12, 2000), available at http:// 
crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2000/12/wp_2000-12.pdf (“the ability to borrow 
increases the contribution rate by about 1 percentage point”), with U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: LOAN PROVISIONS ENHANCE 
PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECT INCOME SECURITY FOR SOME 5 (1997), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98005.pdf (“[p]articipation rates 
in plans with loan provisions are about 6 percentage points higher than plans with 
no loan provisions”). 
70 The IRS publishes a list of “safe harbor” reasons for hardship distributions, 
which could be used in the loan context as well. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-
1(d)(3)(iii) (2011). 
71 PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AM., PLAN LOAN RESTRICTION STUDY 
(1999), available at http://www.psca.org/RESEARCHDATA/PlanLoanRestriction 
Study/tabid/176/Default.aspx (reporting that 82% of plans did not place restrictions 
on the purposes for which a plan loan would be granted). 
72 Loans have the advantage of allowing the participant to return the retirement 
savings to the plan with interest, but loan repayment may not be possible in some 
financial circumstances. 
73 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 
2749, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: HEALTH AND RETIREMENT PLAN 
PROVISIONS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 125 (2010), 
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in retirement is lifetime income.74 For this reason, having a life annuity as 
the default form of retirement distribution likely makes the most sense, 
with notice and consent required for other forms of distributions such as 
lump sum or installments.75 
 
1.  A Federal Backstop? 
 
 With the design basics in place, the next issue to consider is 
whether a backstop plan is best offered at the federal or state level.  A 
backstop retirement plan created at the federal level has some advantages 
over state-based plans.  Assuming there is political will to put such a plan 
in place, the federal government could easily pass a law establishing the 
backstop plan that has the basic design features described above.  States, on 
the other hand, would have to work around existing federal law to put such 
a plan in place, as is discussed in more detail below.  A federal plan may 
also make sense given that retirement savings goals and related plan design 
likely do not vary significantly by state, as some other types of programs 
might, and there are also likely to be economies of scale associated with a 
single backstop plan, versus fifty individual plans. 
 The biggest impediment to establishing a federal backstop plan, in 
addition to political will, is the cost.  Assuming that the backstop plan 
would involve extending the tax benefits of employer-sponsored plans to 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2009/ebbl0045.pdf 
(finding that 90% of plan participants had a lump sum distribution option, while 
27% were offered installments and 15% were offered an annuity); VANGUARD, 
DISTRIBUTION DECISIONS AMONG RETIREMENT-AGE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PLAN PARTICIPANTS 6 (2010), available at https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/ 
pdf/CRRDDP.pdf (finding that only 2% of retirement-aged participants elected 
installments, whereas 47% took a lump sum distribution and the remainder left 
their account in the plan). 
74 See Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 401(k) 
Accounts into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
277, 285–86 (2010) (explaining the process of managing retirement wealth to 
produce an income stream in retirement). 
75 While legislative action to require annuities does not seem imminent, the 
Department of Labor has recently proposed regulations that would require defined 
contribution plans to provide on participant’s benefit statements an estimated 
lifetime income stream based on current retirement savings. Pension Benefit 
Statements, 78 Fed. Reg. 26727, 26737–38 (proposed May 8, 2013) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2520). 
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the backstop plan, the cost of an already expensive tax expenditure would 
increase.76 Given our current fiscal realities, it may be difficult to persuade 
Congress to spend money now in order to save money on supporting 
retirees in the future. 
 One potentially revenue-neutral way to expand tax benefits to the 
backstop plan would be to lower the current 401(k) deferral limits.  In other 
words, to shift some of the current tax benefits available exclusively to 
employer-provided plans to a wider population.  While there are sound 
equity-based arguments for lowering the tax benefit but extending it to a 
wider population, objections might be raised that doing so would have the 
perverse effect of lowering existing rates of retirement savings by those in 
employer plans.  Further study would be necessary to better understand the 
effects of shifting the tax benefit.  The maximum salary deferral in 2014 is 
$17,500, but historical data shows that few participants contribute the 
maximum amount.77 Not surprisingly, the number of participants 
contributing the maximum amount to a 401(k) plan is closely correlated to 
income level.78  While twenty-eight percent of those earning $100,000 or 
more contribute the maximum amount to a 401(k) plan, only one percent of 
those earning between $40,000 and $60,000 do so.79 On average, 
participants contribute between 7.5 and 8% of their income.80 These data 
suggest that the maximum pre-tax deferral to 401(k) plans could be 
lowered without adversely affecting the majority of participants, and the 
minority that would be affected would be relatively high-income 
                                                                                                                 
76 The tax expenditure for employer-sponsored defined contribution plans is 
estimated to be $57 billion in 2013. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 39 
(Comm. Print 2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=start 
down&id=4503. 
77 See Munnell, supra note 32, at 5. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See Craig Copeland, 401(k)-Type Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs), EBRI NOTES (Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2007, 
at 1, 6, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_Notes_10a-2007.pdf (reporting 
average deferral rate of 7.5%); Fidelity Average 401(k) Balance Climbs to Record 
High at End of 2012, FIDELITY.COM (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.fidelity.com/ 
inside-fidelity/employer-services/fidelity-analysis-finds-record-high-average-401k-
balance (reporting 8% average annual deferral rate among Fidelity 401(k) plan 
participants). 
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participants (who are likely to save for retirement even in the absence of a 
tax benefit).81 
 Another way to address the tax issue would be to structure the plan 
as an after-tax plan.  One way to do so, which would require no change to 
tax laws, would be to have contributions to the plan be made on an after-tax 
basis and have participants subject to capital gains taxation when gains or 
losses are realized.82 Another option would be for Congress to make the 
plan operate like a Roth IRA, where contributions are after-tax, but 
distributions are tax-free.83 
 
2. A State Backstop? 
 
  Theoretically, states could take legislative action to do much the 
same thing as the federal solutions described above.  States could create 
their own state-based retirement plan available to all workers, designed to 
produce adequate income replacement for the average worker.  But 
implementing a state-based solution is difficult because of current federal 
limitations.  First, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), preempts any state law that “relates to” an employee benefit 
plan.84 Without getting into the complex details of ERISA preemption, 
suffice it to say that a state law that required employer participation in a 
retirement plan or significantly penalized an employer for failing to 
participate in a retirement plan would be preempted by ERISA.85 As a 
                                                                                                                 
81 See generally Eric M. Engen et al., The Illusory Effects of Saving Incentives 
on Saving, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1996) (examining whether and to what extent 
tax incentives increase the level of retirement savings). 
82 Depending on the investment strategy pursued, conventional savings 
accounts without tax deferral can be just as tax efficient as tax-favored accounts 
that tax gains at ordinary rather than capital gains rates. See generally, John B. 
Shoven & Clemens Sialm, Asset Location in Tax-Deferred and Conventional 
Savings Accounts, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 23 (2003) (describing how locating assets 
optimally can significantly improve the risk-adjusted performance of retirement 
saving). 
83 For an overview of the relative tax advantages of Roth IRAs, see Leonard E. 
Burman et al., The Taxation of Retirement Saving: Choosing Between Front-
Loaded and Back-Loaded Options, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 689 (2001). 
84 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
85 For a more detailed overview of ERISA preemption in this context, see 
Edward A. Zelinsky. California Dreaming: The California Secure Choice 
Retirement Savings Trust Act, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 547 (2014). 
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result, states would be unable to require employer contributions to a state 
retirement plan, although they should be able to require employers to 
facilitate payroll deduction contributions to a state retirement plan. 
  In addition, the federal tax code currently grants tax benefits for 
retirement savings in limited circumstances – either when an employer plan 
is utilized, or when a qualified individual retirement account is used.  As a 
result, if a state were to adopt a state-based retirement plan, it may not be 
able to take advantage of federal income tax preferences.  A state backstop 
retirement plan would not be an employer-provided plan, and therefore 
would be ineligible for existing federal tax benefits for employer plans.  
And while the state plan might be able to qualify as an IRA, structuring the 
plan in such a way would likely prohibit the use of a cash balance design,86 
and would only provide the lower tax benefits available to IRA holders.87 
  Still, there is some reason to believe that this is an area where 
states may be more interested and nimble than the federal government.  
Indeed, California has passed a law requiring employers to either sponsor a 
retirement plan or participate in a state-based retirement plan.88 That law, 
however, is effectively on hold until the state can get favorable ruling from 
the federal government on the tax and ERISA issues noted briefly above 
and described in more detail in Professor Zelinsky’s article in this issue.89 
 States could, of course, design a plan that avoids ERISA 
preemption and does not depend on federal tax benefits for its success.  As 
mentioned in the previous section regarding a federal backstop plan, a state 
plan could allow individuals to invest on a post-tax basis, with any gains 
then being taxed at capital gains rates when realized.  Alternatively, the 
state could offer state-tax benefits to attempt to offset, at least in part, the 
absent federal tax benefits.  For example, a state could exempt from its 
income tax retirement savings contributions regardless of whether such 
contributions were made to an employer-based or state-based plan.90  While 
this would help improve the tax advantage of the state plan, it would not 
                                                                                                                 
86 See id. 
87 See I.R.S. Notice 2012-67, 2012-50 I.R.B. 671. 
88 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20139 (2013). 
89 See generally Zelinsky, supra note 85. 
90 While states often adhere to the federal definition of income for tax 
purposes, they are of course free to define income for state income tax purposes in 
any manner they see fit.  For an in-depth discussion of federal-state tax conformity, 
see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity to the Federal Tax Base, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013). 
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put participants in the same tax position they would be in if they 
participated in an employer plan.  A state could, however, offer a state 
matching contribution equal to the estimated value of the federal income 
tax benefit if the contribution had been made to an employer-plan.  Doing 
so could put the individual in the same position as she would have been in 
if federal income tax law treated employer and individual retirement 
savings equally, but it would obviously do so at a cost to state 
governments.  If a state were to expend money on a retirement plan through 
the use of state tax benefits it would likely want to address how to treat 
participants in the state plan who move to a different state either before or 
during retirement.  One possibility would be to have a claw back provision 
that would require repayment of the tax benefit upon losing state residency. 
On the whole, while states may be good laboratories for experiments in this 
area, existing federal law may make it difficult for states to meaningfully 
pursue retirement savings improvements. 
 
 3.  Which Plan Provider? 
 
 Regardless of whether the backstop retirement plan was established 
at the federal or state level, thought would need to be given to which entity 
would most appropriately administer the plan and any investment options.  
One approach would be to designate either a governmental agency or an 
independent agency to administer the plan.  For example, the California 
law establishing a state retirement plan for all workers allows the state to 
designate CALPERS (the California Public Employee Retirement System) 
as the plan administrator.91  Another approach would be to take a free 
market approach, and allow any licensed investment firm to offer a 
retirement plan structured around legal design and investment 
requirements. Providers could also be made subject to basic fiduciary 
duties with respect to participants’ accounts.  While this option involves 
less direct government action than the first proposal, it would also be in 
many ways harder to implement, and may cost participants more if fees are 
not very closely regulated.  If there were numerous providers for these 
plans, it would be difficult to auto-enroll participants, unless some entity 
wanted to take responsibility of assigning individuals to certain providers.  
In addition, it would complicate payroll deduction significantly, given that 
employers would be responsible for transferring contributions to many 
different providers instead of a single entity. 
                                                                                                                 
91 See CAL. GOV’T CODE Sec. 20139 (2013). 
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B.   CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO ALLOW STATE INNOVATION 
 
 There may not be political will at the federal level to implement a 
backstop retirement plan, and states may be hampered in their reform 
efforts by existing federal laws that constrain their options.  One available 
compromise would be for Congress to amend ERISA to allow state 
governments to require automatic enrollment in state retirement plans and 
allow employer contributions to such plans without triggering ERISA 
preemption. Doing so would significantly broaden states’ reform options.  
If this reform is perused, careful thought should be given to whether 
ERISA should apply to such state plans and, if so, whether any of its 
requirements should be modified.92 
 In addition to addressing the ERISA barriers to state action, 
Congress could also amend the tax code to provide tax benefits for state-
based plans that are equivalent to those afforded to private-employer plans.  
There would again be the issue of increased cost, but perhaps Congress 
would be willing to do so in order to see the results of state-based 
retirement plan experiments. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The system of retirement savings on which many Americans 
currently rely does not generate sufficient capital for most individuals to 
adequately replace their income in retirement.  While a widespread shift to 
401(k) plans has likely contributed to this outcome, this article has 
suggested that it is not 401(k) plans per se that are to blame, but rather a 
bad combination of flawed individual decision-making and poor employer 
plan design. The federal government could take a lesson from the ACA and 
create a universally available retirement plan designed to reflect the many 
lessons learned from behavioral economics about encouraging retirement 
savings.  If it is unwilling to do so, it could at the very least make it 
possible for states to meaningfully experiment with universal retirement 
savings options. 
 
                                                                                                                 
92 Historically there has been little political interest in subjecting state 
retirement plans to ERISA regulation.  See Amy B. Monahan & Renita K. Thukral, 
Federal Regulation of State Pension Plans: The Governmental Plan Exemption 
Revisited, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 291, 297 (2013). 

REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS: EMPLOYERS AS 
MONITORS? 
 
DANA M. MUIR* 
 
*** 
 
This article presents a discussion of the use of revenue sharing by mutual 
funds and 401(k) plan service providers.  The author engages in a 
historical exploration of how revenue sharing has been used in 401(k) 
plans and highlights how regulators have taken an increased interest in 
ensuring disclosure of fund monies diverted for revenue sharing purposes.  
In addition, the article discusses how the current federal regulatory 
framework for employee benefits has not adapted to the increased use of 
401(k) plans.  The author challenges how ERISA places the burden of 
monitoring compensation to service providers on the employers who make 
the 401(k) plan available to their employees and instead, presents several 
alternative frameworks that would decrease employer responsibility and 
liability for investment selection. 
 
*** 
 
Employees have maligned the use of revenue sharing1 in 401(k) 
plans2 as a burden on investment returns and a hidden source of wealth for 
plan service providers.3  A few commentators have been shrill in their 
                                                                                                                                      
*Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Business Law, Stephen M. Ross School of 
Business at the University of Michigan.  dmuir@umich.edu. 734.763.3091. I 
appreciate the research support provided by Michigan Ross.  Thank you to the 
organizers of the 2013 symposium at the University of Connecticut School of Law, 
The Challenge of Retirement in a Defined Contribution World, which helped me 
sharpen my thinking on a variety of issues, including those I discuss in this Article.  
I have served as an expert witness in a 401(k) case that involved revenue sharing.   
1 For a discussion of the nuances of the definition of revenue sharing, see infra 
text accompanying notes 23–27. 
2 401(k) plans are employer-sponsored benefit plans that permit employees to 
contribute a portion of their future earnings to the plan. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 
6–15 (Jeffrey Lewis et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2012).  
3 See, e.g., Healthcare Strategies, Inc. v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., No. 
3:11-CV-282, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184544, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 2012) 
(ruling on various motions in a case where plaintiffs alleged that revenue sharing in 
a 401(k) plan violated federal law); see also Matthew D. Hutcheson, Uncovering 
and Understanding Hidden Fees in Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 ELDER L.J. 323, 
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criticism of revenue sharing.4 Service providers have responded that 
traditionally they did not have any obligation to report or limit the amount 
of revenue sharing they received and that revenue sharing has supported 
growth and innovation in 401(k) plans.5  Policy groups have concluded that 
the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans is widespread and not 
necessarily pernicious.6  Given the varying perspectives of the parties, none 
of that is surprising or particularly troubling. 
What is troubling, however, is the extent to which responsibility 
for alleged misuse of or failure to monitor revenue sharing in 401(k) plans 
is laid at the feet of employers who voluntarily sponsor those plans.  In my 
view, this assignment of responsibility for decision making and oversight is 
just one example of a larger issue – an antiquated regulatory model of 
employer responsibility in 401(k) plans.7  To maximize the opportunity of 
employees to build lifelong financial security through the United States 
paradigm of voluntary plan sponsorship, it is imperative that the regulatory 
system properly allocate responsibility and liability.  My goal in this 
Article is modest; I will evaluate the way in which the federal law that 
                                                                                                                                      
328 (2007) (“‘Revenue sharing’ is a euphemism for kickbacks from one financial 
services firm to another and is a common economic driver of conflicts of 
interest.”). 
4 See Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328 (“‘Revenue sharing’ is a euphemism for 
kickbacks from one financial service firm to another . . . .”); Cris de la Torre & 
Rutilio Martinez, Mutual Fund Revenue Sharing: A Case of Pay to Play, 4 J. PERS. 
FIN. 47, 48 (2005) (“‘[R]evenue sharing’ . . . looks very much like a ‘pay to play’ 
practice associated with the supermarkets and shelf space . . .”). 
5 See, e.g., Leimkuehler v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 713 F.3d 905, 914 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (finding that plan administrator was not a fiduciary with respect to 
revenue sharing it received). 
6 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVENUE SHARING PRACTICES (2007), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC-1107b.html (“[R]evenue-
sharing in a broad sense allows the market ‘to develop efficiencies and innovations 
that have enhanced the quality of services of products available to [defined 
contribution] and 401(k) plans.’”).   
7 See Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary 
Obligation in Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2013) (criticizing 
assignment of responsibility to employers for selection and oversight of plan 
investment options). 
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regulates benefit plans, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA),8 applies to the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans.   
I begin this Article with a discussion of the history of revenue 
sharing in 401(k) plans and how that history relates to the use of revenue 
sharing outside plans.  The discussion shows that revenue sharing has 
become an integral part of 401(k) plan history.  In Part II, I assess the 
limited information that has been available on the prevalence of revenue 
sharing in 401(k) plans.  Until the early-to-mid 2000s, little attention 
appears to have been paid to revenue sharing except by those who pay and 
receive it.  That Part also considers innovations in 401(k) plans, which may 
have been supported by the use of revenue sharing.   
In Part III, I briefly explain the extent to which federal employee 
benefits regulation applies to the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans.  In 
contrast to federal disclosure requirements, the governing fiduciary 
framework has not adapted to the increased importance and complexity of 
401(k) plans.  ERISA’s fiduciary standards do not impose any 
responsibility or liability regarding revenue sharing on the mutual funds 
that pay it or the plan service providers that receive it.  Instead, employers 
bear the burden of assessing the practice.  The potential liability of 
employers regarding revenue sharing is comprised of two primary 
responsibilities: employers must (1) ensure that compensation to plan 
service providers is reasonable and (2) act loyally and prudently when 
choosing and monitoring the investments that employees may make 
through the 401(k) plan.  In Part IV, I raise the question of whether 
employers are the best-positioned actors among the constellation of plan-
related actors to monitor revenue sharing.  I end by briefly outlining 
alternative regulatory structures that would reallocate responsibility away 
from employers. 
 
I. HISTORY OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS 
 
The development and expansion of 401(k) plans supported growth 
in the mutual fund industry and has been linked from the relatively early 
days of those plans with the use of revenue sharing.  The addition of 
                                                                                                                                      
8 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93–406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 
U.S.C.). 
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subsection (k)9 to Section 40110 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in 
1978 first permitted what have come to be known as 401(k) plans.  At that 
time, defined benefit (DB) plans, which typically provide guaranteed 
lifetime incomes, were the paradigmatic type of retirement plan in the 
United States.11 The original purpose of the 1978 amendment was to clarify 
that employees could contribute to benefit plans through salary reductions, 
not to remake the U.S. system of private sector retirement plans.12 
 The number of 401(k) plans grew after the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) issued explanatory regulations in 1981.13 As of 1996, 401(k) 
plan accounts held $1 trillion in assets.  By the end of 2005, 401(k) plans 
had surpassed DB plans in terms of numbers of participants (employees 
and their beneficiaries who are entitled to plan benefits) and assets.  401(k) 
plans continue to be the most prevalent type of retirement plan sponsored 
by private sector employers.  401(k) plan assets grew from $2.4 trillion in 
2005 to almost $3.8 trillion as of March 31, 2013.14 
According to one report, in the early days of 401(k) plans, some 
employers were reluctant to handle plan administration services such as:  
(a) communications,; (b) acting as the liaison between participants, mutual 
                                                                                                                                      
9 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §135(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2785 
(Nov. 6, 1978).  
10 I.R.C. § 401(k) (2006). 
11 Other types of retirement plans were so insignificant at that time that they 
were not even included in the National Compensation Survey. See EMP. BENEFIT 
RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS Table 10.1(a) (2005), 
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter% 
2010.pdf.  
12 See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., HISTORY OF 401(K) PLANS: AN UPDATE 
(2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0205fact.a.pdf. 
13 Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment 
Education:  Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
1, 6 (2002).  
14 SARAH HOLDEN ET AL., 401(K) PLANS: A 25-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 3 
(2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per12-02.pdf; SARAH HOLDEN & 
DANIEL SCHRASS, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PARTICIPANTS’ ACTIVITIES, 
FIRST QUARTER 2013 2 (July 2013), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_13_rec_survey_q1.pdf. Comparatively, in 2005, DB 
plans held $1.9 trillion in assets and $2.7 trillion as of March 31, 2013. Holden et 
al., supra; Robert Steyer, ICI: Retirement Assets Total $20.8 Trillion in First 
Quarter 2013, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June 26, 2013, 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20130626/ONLINE/130629908/ici-us-retirement-
assets-hit-record-208-trillion. 
2014  REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS  489 
 
funds; and (c) trading.  While there is no data on why employers decided 
not to handle these functions themselves, the administration of investment 
accounts is not among the core competencies of most employers.  It makes 
sense that third parties could perform the functions more efficiently than if 
each employer had to develop and maintain its own staff and capabilities.  
Consulting firms apparently spotted the business opportunity and began to 
perform the necessary administrative plan functions.  Perhaps to compete 
on the direct costs that were most visible to employers choosing among 
service providers, in the early 1990s, those service providers began to seek 
payments – revenue sharing -- from the mutual funds that were offered as 
investments in 401(k) plans.15  
In theory, instead of making payments to consulting firms, the 
mutual funds themselves could have developed the expertise to provide 
administrative services to 401(k) plans.  Eventually, as the industry and 
401(k) plans grew, large fund families developed the capabilities needed to 
offer plan administrative services.16 During the 1990s, however, it appears 
that at least some mutual funds concentrated on their investment expertise 
and chose not to deal directly with investors or employers that sponsored 
401(k) plans.  For sales to investors who were not 401(k) plan participants, 
mutual funds relied on brokers and personal investment advisers to handle 
the interactions with investors, including communications, customer 
service, and trading.  The mutual funds compensated the brokers and 
investment advisers for those services by paying them a portion of the 
funds’ revenue (an early form of revenue sharing).17 The revenue sharing to 
the service providers that fulfilled parallel functions in 401(k) plans 
mirrored the practice used by the funds outside 401(k) plans. 
Modern mutual funds pre-date 1940, when the Investment 
Company Act of 194018 was enacted to regulate the industry.  In 1981, 
                                                                                                                                      
15 McHenry Consulting Group, Revenue Sharing in the 401(k) Marketplace: 
Whose Money Is It?, 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.plansponsor.com/pdfs/ 
White%20Papers/McHenry_Rev_Share_Report.pdf.   
16 See, e.g., Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 45240, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) (discussing the various plan-related 
roles played by affiliates of Fidelity Investments). 
17 John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail Sale of 
Mutual Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 685, 687-94 (2007). 
18 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-64 (2006)).  
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when the IRS issued the first 401(k) regulations, U.S. mutual funds held 
assets of just over $241 billion.19 As 401(k) plans grew in assets and 
popularity, so did mutual funds.  The fate of the two is linked because a 
significant percentage of the assets invested in mutual fund assets are 
typically held in retirement plan accounts.  By the end of 2005, mutual 
funds held almost $8.1 trillion in assets, and that number grew to more than 
$13 trillion at the end of 2012.20  At that time, $2.7 trillion of those assets 
were held in defined contribution plans.21 
In 1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
promulgated Rule 12b-1,22 which formalized the ability of mutual funds to 
use fund assets to pay for marketing and distribution costs.  Here, a brief 
detour into terminology is warranted.  The securities industry and its 
commentators typically break payments made from mutual funds into more 
categories than is typical of the employee benefits industry and its 
commentators.  For example, in an article focused on securities law, 
Professors Howat and Reid discussed a variety of “enhanced compensation 
arrangements”23 used by mutual funds.  They explained revenue sharing as 
“occur[ring] when a fund manager agrees to pay a brokerage firm cash 
compensation not otherwise disclosed in the prospectus fee table to 
promote the mutual fund to the broker’s clients.”24 They separately define 
12b–1 fees, which are paid by mutual funds out of fund assets rather than 
by the fund manager, as a separate category of fees.25 As for other 
categories of enhanced compensation practices they discuss “directed 
brokerage,” “soft dollar practices,” and “differential cash compensation.”26 
Often, the employee benefits community includes any payments made from 
mutual funds or their managers in its use of the term revenue sharing.27 In 
                                                                                                                                      
19 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2013 Investment Company Fact Book 
142 (2013), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 132. The report does not break out 401(k) account holdings from the 
more inclusive category of defined contribution accounts. Id. 
22 Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 11,414, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,898 (Nov. 7, 1980). 
23 Howat & Reid, supra note 17, at 687. 
24 Id. at 689–90. 
25 See id. at 694 (stating that the expense ratio of a fund typically includes an 
advisory fee, administrative fee and 12b-1 fees). 
26 Id. at 688–91. 
27 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-12-325, 
401(K) PLANS:  INCREASED EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH AND BROADER OVERSIGHT 
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employee benefits parlance, revenue sharing includes both its narrow 
securities law definition and other amounts paid by mutual funds, such as 
12b-1 fees.  Unless otherwise specifically noted, in this Article, I use the 
term “revenue sharing” in this broad sense, as defined by the employee 
benefits community.  
The now well-known brokerage company, Charles Schwab 
Corporation (Schwab), is credited with using the concept of revenue 
sharing to establish a 401(k) plan paradigm that remains in widespread use 
today.  In 1992, it first offered what it described as an “innovative service,” 
which allowed investors to choose among multiple mutual funds from a 
variety of fund families rather than being limited to a single fund family 
and to do so without paying any direct fees to Schwab for administering 
their accounts.28 As with other mutual fund practices, such as revenue 
sharing where mutual funds used parallel approaches for individual 
investors and 401(k) plans,29 Schwab offered its new innovation to 401(k) 
plan sponsors as well as to individual investors.  In the 401(k) offering, 
Schwab provided record keeping services, including a single statement for 
participants showing their investments in all funds.  Schwab originally 
referred to this as a “no transaction fee” (NTF) program.  Reportedly, 
“Schwab eliminated transactions costs, supporting the platform on revenue 
generated by fund distribution commissions and servicing fees.”30 In simple 
terms, Schwab’s NTF model relied on revenue sharing to pay for all of the 
services that Schwab provided to 401(k) plans or to individual investors.  
As discussed below, the use of revenue sharing to offset plan costs 
continues to be in widespread use to this day.   
 
                                                                                                                                      
MAY HELP REDUCE PLAN FEES 10 (2012), available at http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/600/590359.pdf (defining revenue sharing “in the 401(k) plan industry, 
[as] generally referr[ing] to indirect payments made from one service provider, 
such as the investment fund provider, to another service provider in connection 
with services provided to the plan, rather than payments made directly by the plan 
sponsor for plan services.”). 
28 Charles Schwab, Schwab’s Mutual Fund OneSource® at 20:  How a Single 
Idea Transformed the Way America Invests at 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.aboutschwab.com/images/press/071612MFOSWhitePaper.pdf. 
29 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
30 McHenry Consulting Group, supra note 15, at 3. 
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II. REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS – SCOPE AND 
 EFFECT 
 
Little reliable historical data exists on the growth and amount of 
revenue sharing that has been paid within 401(k) plans.  However, as the 
first subsection below discusses, the available evidence indicates that the 
dollar volume of revenue sharing is substantial and the practice is widely 
used.  To provide some context for the way revenue sharing may redound 
to the benefit of 401(k) plan participants, the following subsection 
discusses the complexity of plan administration and services. 
 
A. SCOPE OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS 
 
Plans were not required to report revenue sharing until 2009, when 
the Department of Labor (DOL) began requiring reporting of those 
payments as part of large plans’ annual reporting.31 To this day, securities 
law requires reporting of 12b-1 fees, but not those fees paid by fund 
managers that are known as revenue sharing in the securities law 
community.32 As one data point in 2006, 12b-1 fees paid by all mutual 
funds, not just those held in 401(k) accounts and excluding revenue sharing 
as used in the securities context, totaled $11.8 billion.33  
It appears that plan fees and employer responsibilities for 
understanding those fees started to become of interest to regulators in the 
late 1990s.  The DOL commissioned a study of 401(k) fees which 
culminated in a report entitled “Study of 401(k) Plan Fees and Expenses.”34 
That report explicitly discussed 12b-1 and other types of fees35 but did not 
use the term “revenue sharing.”  However, it recognizes the general 
concept that “[i]n the case of mutual fund expense ratios or where the 
investment management fees are otherwise incorporated in net asset 
                                                                                                                                      
31 See Michele A. Rivas, Fee Disclosures by Service Providers to Benefit 
Plans:  How to Protect Your Clients, 34 MI. TAX L. 11, 12-13 (2008). Plans do not 
always need to report revenue sharing separately from other types of compensation 
paid to plan service providers. Id. at 13. 
32 See Howat & Reid, supra note 17, at 689–96. 
33 John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 739, 744 (2007). 
34 PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, INC., STUDY 
OF 401(K) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES (1998), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/401kRept.pdf. 
35 See id. at 3.3.5. 
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valuation computations, participants pay all of the fees.”36 In addition to the 
study, in 1997, the DOL held hearings on the transparency of fees in 401(k) 
plans.  The extent to which employers and participants would benefit from 
increased transparency was somewhat controversial.37  
In spite of the amount of revenue sharing changing hands and its 
role in 401(k) plan innovation, the first report I have found that explicitly 
refers to revenue sharing as such in the context of 401(k) plans was issued 
by the McHenry Consulting Group in 2001.38 That report, titled “Revenue-
Sharing in the 401(k) Marketplace,” explained that U.S. securities laws 
permit mutual fund companies to share their revenues with service 
providers to 401(k) plans.  According to the report, “Almost every 
investment and administration service provider engages in this activity to 
some degree.  It is virtually impossible to compete in the 401(k) 
marketplace without subsidies to help offset service costs, as provided by 
asset-based revenues.”39 It also provides some general information about 
the costs of plan services and the kinds of services that affect costs.40  
A policy advisory group to the DOL, known as the ERISA 
Advisory Council,41 of which I was a member at the time, studied revenue 
sharing in 2004.  In my experience, each year, the ERISA Advisory 
Council members choose approximately three issues to consider.  Working 
groups are constituted to study those issues.  ERISA Advisory Council 
members then volunteer to serve on any or all of the working groups, 
according to interest and expertise.   
The 2004 working group on plan fees and reporting on Form 5500 
(Fees and Reporting Working Group) heard testimony over multiple days 
from a number of industry participants about plan fees, and some of those 
                                                                                                                                      
36 Id. at 5.3.2. 
37 See id. at 5.3.3 (reporting that the disclosure to sponsors and participants of 
fees and expenses imposed on 401(k) plans is often not complete and that this lack 
of information may affect the costs to the plans).   
38 McHenry Consulting Group, supra note 15. 
39 Id. at 4. 
40 Id. at 5–6. 
41 ERISA Advisory Councils are comprised of fifteen member groups of 
citizens appointed for staggered three-year terms by the Secretary of Labor. Pub. L. 
93-406, tit. I, § 512, 88 Stat. 895 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1142 (2006)). I 
was a member of the ERISA Advisory Council from 2002–2004, and was a 
member of both the working group that studied plan fees and reporting and the one 
that studied fee and related disclosures to participants. 
494      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
witnesses discussed revenue sharing.42 As is typical, the working group’s 
final report includes summaries of the testimony of each witness and the 
group’s overall findings based on the testimony.  The report confirms that 
the data available to the employee benefit plans community on revenue 
sharing were limited.  A number of the witnesses discussed the lack of 
transparency of plan fees and revenue-sharing arrangements.43 None of the 
witnesses that I remember advanced a legal theory under which service 
providers had any obligation to disclose revenue sharing unless asked by an 
employer.  Nor were revenue-sharing disclosures required as part of plans’ 
annual reporting to the DOL.  
 In spite of the lack of specific data, the working group’s 
conclusions reflect the testimony that 401(k) plan service providers often 
relied on revenue sharing to compensate them in full or part for the services 
they provided to the plan.44  In its findings, the Fees and Reporting 
Working Group wrote:  “[t]he testimony established that explicit charges in 
many plans have been substantially reduced or nearly completely 
eliminated and the majority of costs associated with administering many 
retirement plans are now embedded in the form of asset-based fees and 
borne by the plan participants.”45  The report recommended that the DOL 
study regarding the reporting of plan fees, including the use of revenue 
sharing, should be required.46 
At least two other direct or indirect references to revenue sharing 
and 401(k) plans date to 2004.  A second working group of the 2004 
ERISA Advisory Council focused on the somewhat different issue of how 
fee disclosures related to participant investment elections.47 That group’s 
final report did not directly discuss revenue sharing, except to the extent 
that specific witnesses used the term and it became part of the summaries 
                                                                                                                                      
42 See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON PLAN FEES AND REPORTING ON FORM 5500 
(2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa 
/publications/AC_111804_report.html. 
43 See, e.g., id. at 10. 
44 Id. at 2. 
45 Id. at 5.  
46 Id. at 3.  
47 See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFITS PLANS, 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEE AND RELATED DISCLOSURES TO 
PARTICIPANTS (2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC_ 
111704_report.html. 
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of the individual testimony.48 In addition, the New York Times quoted an 
employee of a prominent benefits consulting firm as stating that “90% of 
401(k) plans engage in revenue sharing.”49   
Interest in and discussion about the prevalence of revenue sharing 
in 401(k) plans has continued.  In 2007, another working group of the 
ERISA Advisory Council studied fiduciary responsibilities and revenue-
sharing practices.  In introducing its findings on revenue sharing, the report 
states, “[t]he Working Group recognized that there was a considerable 
amount of consensus with respect to the concept of revenue sharing, how it 
can benefit plan sponsors and their participants.”50  The first of its four 
consensus thoughts was that “[r]evenue sharing is an acceptable practice.”51 
The prevalence of revenue sharing is implicit in those statements and 
throughout the report.  The report also reflects a belief that revenue sharing 
pays for plan services that would have to be paid for in some other way in 
the absence of revenue sharing. “[T]he Working Group recognized that 
revenue sharing was a common and considerable practice used to offset 
plan expenses with respect to [defined contribution] plans.”52  
Today, revenue sharing continues to be widely used in 401(k) plans 
and to attract the attention of commentators and policy makers.  In a 2011 
report on fees in the 401(k) plan marketplace, Deloitte reported survey 
results showing that 55 percent of the responding plan sponsors reported 
that “all of the record-keeping and administrative fees are paid through 
investment revenue.”53 In 2012, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) released the results of its study of 401(k) plan fees, which is 
discussed in more detail below.54 The DOL has also imposed a variety of 
mandatory reporting requirements regarding plan fees and the use of 
revenue sharing.55  
                                                                                                                                      
48 Id. at 13, 18.  
49 Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1961, 2004 n.269 (2010) (quoting Lynn O’Shaughnessy, A 401(k) 
Picks a Mutual Fund.  Who Gets a Perk?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at BU5). 
50 ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 6, at 3. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1-2. 
53 DELOITTE ET AL., ANNUAL 401(K) BENCHMARKING SURVEY 24 (2011), 
available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/ 
Documents/us_consulting_Deloitte%20401k%20Survey_2011%20edition_120820
11.pdf. 
54 GAO, supra note 27; see also infra text accompanying notes 114-17.  
55 See infra text accompanying notes Part III.A. 
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B. EFFECT OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS 
 
Since Schwab created the NTF model in 1992, 401(k) plans have 
added services to participants, increased the average number of investment 
options they offer participants, and complied with increasing regulatory 
obligations.  Plans now face far more extensive regulatory requirements 
than at the time 401(k) plans began.56  
The costs of these elaborate and extensive services may be shared 
between employers and employees, but employees usually pay the largest 
share.  One survey shows that 83 percent of all fees associated with 401(k) 
plans are paid by plan participants.  Most of those payments are made 
through revenue sharing.  The survey also notes that some of the revenue 
sharing may pay for plan administration, including recordkeeping.57  
The main concern that seems to be expressed about the effect of 
revenue sharing on 401(k) plan participants is the lack of transparency 
associated with revenue sharing.  According to one commentator, Matthew 
Hutcheson,58 “[r]evenue sharing is the ‘big secret’ of the retirement 
                                                                                                                                      
56 See, e.g., DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL REGULATION RELATING TO SERVICE 
PROVIDER DISCLOSURES UNDER SECTION 408 (B)(2): FACT SHEET (2012), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fs408b2finalreg.html (explaining 
the obligation of service providers to disclose compensation to plan fiduciaries, 
which implies the obligation of plan fiduciaries to evaluate those disclosures); 
DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL RULE TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND 
EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE RETIREMENT PLANS: FACT SHEET (2012), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule.html 
(explaining final regulations requiring plans to disclose plan fees to participants); 
DEP’T OF LABOR, REGULATION RELATING TO QUALIFIED DEFAULT INVESTMENT 
ALTERNATIVES IN PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS (2008), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsQDIA.html (explaining the 
effect of and requirements for a 401(k) plan offering a "qualified default 
investment alternative."). 
57 DELOITTE, INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN 
FEES:  A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE ‘ALL-IN’ FEE 5 (2011), 
available at https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/ 
Documents /us_consulting_StructureofDefineContribution_112411.pdf. 
58 In 2013, Mr. Hutcheson was sentenced to prison after being convicted of 
wire fraud in connection with his service as a retirement plan fiduciary. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Eagle Man Sentenced to Over 17 Years in Prison for Theft from 
Retirement Plans (July 31, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/id/news/2013/jul/ 
hutcheson07312013.html. 
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industry.”59 Some witnesses to the ERISA Advisory Council’s 2004 Fees 
and Reporting Working Group expressed the view that neither participants 
nor plan sponsors had a good understanding of revenue sharing.60 Mr. 
Hutcheson feared that revenue sharing “impair[s] the retirement income 
security of participants,”61 and could result in fiduciary liability for plan 
sponsors who fail to consider these costs when making decisions regarding 
plan service providers.62 
However, to the extent that sponsors with that plan face fiduciary 
liability because of the lack of transparency in revenue sharing, one 
response – and the one I advocate later in this Article – is that the system 
has it wrong when it allocates fiduciary responsibility for revenue sharing-
related decision making to plan sponsors.63  If, as the 2007 ERISA Working 
Group found, revenue sharing has encouraged the development of 
important services to participants and enhanced the popularity of 401(k) 
plans, then it would seem to have accomplished the opposite of impairing 
retirement security.   
It is important to recognize that the array of functions provided by 
401(k) plan service providers is very broad.  Those functions include 
account statements, educational programs and materials, investment 
transactions, call centers, web sites, etc., that provide information and 
receive transaction orders, process plan loans, distributions, roll-overs, 
contributions, and court orders to divide 401(k) plan accounts upon a 
participant’s divorce, etc.  Some of these services, such as account 
statements, are required by law.64 Others, such as call centers and websites, 
are not required but provide participants with enhanced access to 
information about their accounts and efficient methods of implementing 
investment decisions.  Service providers may perform a variety of other 
services, such as preparing annual reports the plan must file with the DOL65 
                                                                                                                                      
59 Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328.  
60 ERISA Advisory Council, supra note 42, at 9-10, 12.  
61 Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 328. 
62 Id. 
63 See infra text accompanying notes 146-48. 
64 See, e.g., ERISA § 105(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) 
(requiring plans that permit participants to choose their investments to provide a 
benefits statement at least quarterly).  
65 See, e.g., ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (2006) (requiring plans to file 
annual reports). Filing Form 5500 with the DOL fulfills this reporting requirement. 
See Fisch, supra note 49, at 1986 (briefly discussing Form 5500 filing obligations). 
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and holding account assets in trust66 to enable plans to comply with legal 
requirements.  Finally, 401(k) service providers may undertake functions 
such as investment recordkeeping and serving as the interface between 
participants and investment providers such as mutual funds.  One 
commentator identified fourteen different entities or people that may 
receive payments from 401(k) plan assets for services provided to those 
plans.67    
The complexity of plan recordkeeping, participant 
communications, and similar services may also be affected by the 
investment choices offered to plan participants.  The investment options 
from which participants may choose, often referred to as the investment 
menu, have increased from an average of six in 1995 to fourteen in 2005.68 
When new financial products are developed, that can raise the question of 
whether those products are suitable for 401(k) plans.69 
The services provided by 401(k) plans redound to the benefit of 
plan participants and enable them to build wealth in those plans.  Providers 
of those 401(k) plan services must be compensated in some way for their 
services.  As explained above, the norm has become to pay for some or all 
of the costs through revenue sharing.  One prominent scholar explained it 
this way: “the employees bear the costs of running the plan but pay those 
                                                                                                                                      
66 ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. §1103 (2006). 
67 Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 344-47; see also GAO, supra note 27, at 7-9 
(discussing the variety of plan service providers and how services may be 
combined, which is referred to in the industry as bundled services). 
68 Holden et al., supra note 14, at 17. It is useful to note, however, that work 
by behavioral economists indicates that it is better for retirement participants to 
have only a small number of investment options because too large a set of options 
may discourage participants from participating in the plan. Sheena S. Iyengar et al., 
How Much Choice Is Too Much?: Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in 
PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE, 83-95 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004). One important 
strategy that has been successful in increasing plan participation is to automatically 
enroll participants in plans while also providing them the opportunity to actively 
opt out. See Dana M. Muir, Default Settings in Defined Contribution Plans: A 
Comparative Approach to Fiduciary Obligation and the Role of Markets, 28 
A.B.A. J.  LAB. & EMP. L. 59, 60-61 (2012) (outlining the use of defaults in 401(k) 
plans). 
69 See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-
Traded Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 74 (2008) (discussing the possibility that 401(k) plan menus 
might include exchange-traded funds (ETFs)). 
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costs indirectly through the fees charged to them by the participating 
mutual funds.”70   
Arguably, revenue sharing has had a positive effect on the 
popularity of 401(k) plans and on the breadth of services the plans provide 
to participants.  This was the view of the 2007 ERISA Working Group, 
which wrote: “revenue-sharing in a broad sense allows the market ‘to 
develop efficiencies and innovations that have enhanced the quality of 
services of products available to [defined contribution] and 401(k) 
plans.’”71 The report also states: “[t]he witnesses generally testified, and the 
Working Group recognizes that revenue sharing supports a wide variety of 
distribution and shareholder servicing activities, including administrative 
record keeping and sub-transfer agent services that were traditionally 
viewed as investment fund responsibilities.”72   
   
III. THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS IN MONITORING REVENUE 
 SHARING 
 
Federal pension regulation applies a two-prong approach to 
revenue-sharing.  One component relies on disclosure and the other on 
substantive fiduciary obligation.  This Part addresses each of those in turn.  
The analysis shows that employers bear the primary fiduciary burden vis-à-
vis the use of revenue sharing in 401(k) plans.  It further reveals that 
employers’ fiduciary obligation with respect to revenue sharing is 
comprised of two main components: (i) the obligation to ensure that 
compensation to plan service providers is reasonable; and (ii) the need to 
act loyally and prudently when choosing and monitoring products for the 
plan’s investment menu.  
 
A. DISCLOSURE OF REVENUE SHARING IN 401(K) PLANS 
 
 During the past five years, the DOL has overhauled the reporting 
of the compensation received by employee benefit plan service providers, 
including their receipt of revenue-sharing.  The first disclosure obligation 
became effective in 2009 when large plans73 were required to identify in 
                                                                                                                                      
70 Fisch, supra note 49, at 2004-05. 
71 ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 6. 
72 Id. 
73 Large plans typically are those with at least one hundred participants. As of 
2005, approximately 86 percent of those participating in a 401(k) plan were in a 
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the annual reports they file with the DOL all service providers who directly 
or indirectly receive more than $5,000 compensation during the plan year 
covered by the reporting.74 Although this increased the transparency of 
service provider compensation, gaps remained.  The definition of 
compensation was broad enough to include revenue sharing.75  However, in 
certain situations, revenue sharing can be included with other types of 
compensation rather than being separately reported.76  Second, nothing in 
this annual reporting requirement required service providers to disclose 
their compensation to plan sponsors.77  When plan sponsors did not have 
compensation information from the service providers, the plan sponsors 
could meet their disclosure obligation by identifying service providers and 
noting the lack of information.78 
 The next prong of the DOL’s effort to increase the transparency of 
401(k) fees became effective in 2012 when it issued final regulations 
requiring plan service providers that receive at least $1,000 annually in 
plan-related compensation to disclose their total compensation to plan 
fiduciaries.79 In turn, the plan now must disclose administrative fees and 
expenses to plan participants.80 Guidance issued by the DOL makes clear 
that both sets of disclosure requirements include revenue sharing.81   
 In addition to providing information to plan sponsors and 
participants, disclosures of plan administrative fees and expenses may be of 
                                                                                                                                      
large plan. See Debra A. Davis, How Much is Enough? Giving Fiduciaries and 
Participants Adequate Information About Plan Expenses, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
1005, 1022 (2008).  
74 Id. at 1023. 
75 See DEP’T OF LABOR, Frequently Asked Questions: The 2009 Form 5500 
Schedule C, Q14, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_scheduleC .html. 
76 See id.  
77 Davis, supra note 73, at 1023. 
78 See id. 
79 DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL REGULATION RELATING TO SERVICE PROVIDER 
DISCLOSURES UNDER SECTION 408(B)(2): FACT SHEET 2 (2012),  available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fs408b2finalreg.html. 
80 DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL RULE TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF THE FEES 
AND EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE RETIREMENT PLANS: FACT SHEET 2 
(2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule. 
html. 
81 See DEP’T OF LABOR , FEE DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, FIELD ASSISTANCE 
BULLETIN 2012 – 02 (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/ 
fab2012-2.html. 
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value to other interested parties.  The tax-advantaged nature of 401(k) plans 
means that a variety of government agencies, including the Internal 
Revenue Service, may have an interest in the information.  Securities 
analysts, independent researchers, and competitors of both plan sponsors 
and plan service providers may also find the information useful.  
It is too early to tell whether the benefits of increased disclosure 
outweigh its costs.  The reporting is complex82 and commentators question 
the extent to which it is understood by either employers or employees.83 As 
described below, plan service providers have an interest in making it 
difficult for employers to compare fees across plan providers.84 The GAO’s 
2012 report discusses the extent to which employers have been comparing 
fees and, even after 2009, remain confused about plan fees and the role that 
revenue sharing plays in compensating plan service providers.85 
 
B. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY AND REVENUE SHARING IN 
401(K) PLANS 
 
In addition to the relatively recent disclosure obligations just 
discussed, ERISA’s fiduciary standards apply to revenue-sharing.  This 
subsection explains ERISA’s basic fiduciary requirements and how those 
requirements apply to the various parties involved in the use of revenue-
sharing in 401(k) plans.  It then explains the extent to which employers 
bear the primary fiduciary obligation in authorizing and monitoring the use 
of revenue-sharing in those plans. 
When functioning as an ERISA fiduciary, individuals and entities 
must act loyally86 and in accordance with a standard of care defined as that 
of a prudent person familiar with the benefit plan matters at issue.87 To 
                                                                                                                                      
82 See, e.g., Reasonable Contract or Arrangement Under Section 408(b)(2) –  
Fee Disclosure, 77 C.F.R. § 5632 (containing a preamble in excess of 18 pages 
before the regulatory impact analysis). 
83 See Mark Mensack, The Moral Hazard of Too Big to Jail, J. COMP. & 
BENEFITS 42, 45 (2013) (discussing the frustration of some plan sponsors in trying 
to evaluate the feed disclosures). 
84 See infra text accompanying notes 118-20. 
85 GAO, supra note 27, at 24-28. 
86 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) ("solely in 
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose 
of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries."). 
87 See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1997) (explaining the application of the prudence standard 
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supplement these trust law-based, general fiduciary standards, ERISA 
contains what are known as prohibited transactions provisions.  One set of 
those provisions bars transactions between a plan and certain specified 
parties that have relationships with plans, including plan service providers, 
unless an exemption applies.88 
ERISA utilizes a functional definition of fiduciary, which means 
that any person or entity that engages in actions involving discretionary 
plan administration, asset or plan management, or investment advice acts as 
a fiduciary.89 This broad definition could lead a reasonable person to think 
that the mutual funds that pay revenue sharing, the service providers that 
administer plans and receive revenue sharing from account assets, and the 
employers who sponsor plans all act as ERISA fiduciaries.  ERISA has a 
way, however, of confounding the expectations of reasonable people. 
ERISA’s fiduciary definition explicitly excludes from its scope the 
mutual funds that pay revenue sharing.  Although the functional definition 
of fiduciary includes persons or entities that engage in discretionary asset 
management, the definition clarifies that investments of plan assets in 
mutual funds do not cause the mutual fund or its advisor to become an 
ERISA fiduciary.90  It appears that Congress’ rationale for the exclusion 
when it enacted ERISA, which was well before the existence of 401(k) 
plans, was that existing federal regulation of mutual funds was sufficient.91  
Plan service providers, including those that receive revenue-
sharing, typically avoid ERISA fiduciary status in one of two ways.  First, 
they may not exercise the discretion that is required by the statute for 
fiduciary status.  For example, entities that provide recordkeeping and 
similar services may successfully argue that they merely administer the 
                                                                                                                                      
to investment duties). ERISA’s other fiduciary standards require benefit plan 
fiduciaries to minimize the risk of large losses by diversifying plan investments, 
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2006), and to act in accordance 
with plan documents, ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2006). 
88 ERISA § 406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (2006). 
89 ERISA § 3(21)(a)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a)(ii) (2006). 
90 See ERISA § 3(21)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(b) (2006). 
91 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor Adv. Op. 2009-04A (Dec. 4. 2009) (stating that 
“Congress concluded that it did not need to apply ERISA’s fiduciary rules to the 
operation of mutual funds in addition to the Investment Company Act’s regulatory 
scheme.”). 
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terms of the plan and that does not constitute the fiduciary exercise of 
discretion.92   
Second, some providers of investment advice to plans and 
participants may rely on an early DOL regulation that narrowly defined the 
provision of fiduciary investment advice.  Under that regulation, issued in 
1975 when DB plans were typical, an investment adviser is not a fiduciary 
when giving advice regarding benefit plan assets or an Individual 
Retirement Account (IRA) unless the adviser (1) advises on securities 
valuation or makes recommendations on the purchase or sale of securities, 
(2) on a regular basis, (3) according to a mutual agreement with the plan or 
a plan fiduciary, (4) that provides the advice will serve as the primary basis 
for decisions on investments, and (5) the advice is individualized to the 
plan’s needs.93  For example, entities that provide advice to employers on 
the selection of plan investments can avoid fiduciary status by providing 
the advice on a one time, rather than ongoing, basis.  
The DOL recognizes that this narrow definition of fiduciary 
investment advice no longer has currency in the 401(k) plan environment.  
In 2010, the agency proposed regulations that would have dramatically 
increased the scope of financial advisory activities that result in a provider 
becoming a fiduciary when giving investment advice regarding benefit plan 
or IRA assets.  The proposed regulatory definition tracked the general 
statutory definition and specifically stated that investment advice or 
recommendations given to a plan participant or beneficiary or to an 
investor regarding an IRA are a fiduciary act.94 After widespread objection 
from the financial services sector, the DOL withdrew the proposed 
regulations.95 Current indications are that the agency plans to revise and re-
propose the regulations.96 
                                                                                                                                      
92 See e.g., Hecker v. Deere, 556 F.3d 575, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the plan’s service provider was not a fiduciary because it did not exercise 
discretion in plan administration or with respect to plan management); cf. Tussey 
v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45240, at *100-01 
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012). 
93 Definition of the Term ‘Fiduciary’, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,265 (proposed 
Oct. 22, 2010). 
94Id. at 65,277. 
95 Labor Department’s EBSA to repropose rule on definition of a fiduciary, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/ 
EBSA20111382.htm. 
96 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Conflict of Interest Rule – Investment Advice, FEDERAL 
REGISTER (2013), available at http://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/1210-
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ERISA’s exclusion of mutual funds from fiduciary status and de 
facto exclusion of nearly any service provider that wants to be excluded 
leaves employers holding the fiduciary bag for 401(k) plans.  Jurisprudence 
and DOL authority make clear that ERISA’s fiduciary definition 
encompasses certain acts of employers that sponsor a benefit plan, 
including the selection and monitoring of plan investments.97 Employers 
may form a committee of employees to select and monitor plan investments 
or otherwise delegate those functions.  In such an instance the employer 
remains a fiduciary for the appointment and monitoring of its agents and 
the agents are ERISA fiduciaries for the discretionary functions delegated 
to them.98  
In September 2006, employees began alleging that fiduciary 
violations by employers resulted in inappropriately high 401(k) plan fees 
that in turn negatively affected the employees’ account balances.99 A 
complete analysis of the litigation involving plan fees is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  It is useful, though, to consider one of the more prominent 
cases in order to categorize the types of responsibility employers face with 
respect to the use of revenue sharing in their 401(k) plans. 
                                                                                                                                      
AB32/conflict-of-interest-rule-investment-advice (targeting October 2013 for 
reproposal). 
97 See, e.g., Quan v. Computer Sci. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 880-81 (9th Cir. 
2010) (finding that employer-fiduciary’s choice of investments was entitled to 
deference); Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account 
Plans (ERISA Section 404(c) Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 16, 
1991) (“Thus . . . the plan fiduciary has a fiduciary obligation to prudently select 
such [investment options], as well as a residual fiduciary obligation to periodically 
evaluate the performance of such [investment options].”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 
2550.404c-5(b)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in this [regulation] shall relieve a fiduciary 
from his or her duties under . . . ERISA to prudently select and monitor any 
qualified default investment alternative under the plan or from any liability that 
results from a failure to satisfy these duties, including liability for any resulting 
losses.”). But see Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586 (leaving open the issue of “whether [the 
plan sponsor’s] decision to restrict the direct investment choices in its Plans . . . is 
even a decision within [the plan sponsor’s] fiduciary responsibilities.”), order 
denying rehearing en banc, 569 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2009). 
98 See Mark Casciari & Ian Morrison, Should the Securities Exchange Act be 
the Sole Federal Remedy for an ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation of the Value 
of Public Employer Stock?, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 643 (2006). 
99 See Chris Thixton, A 401(k) Fee Lawsuit First, PENSION CONSULTANTS INC. 
(Nov. 17, 2009), http://pension-consultants.com/2009/11/fee-lawsuit/. 
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In Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 401(k) plan participants alleged, among 
other things, that their employer, ABB, Inc. (ABB), violated its fiduciary 
duties when making decisions on matters that involved revenue sharing.100 
First, ABB allegedly permitted Fidelity Trust, the 401(k) plan’s 
recordkeeper, to receive such extensive revenue sharing payments that 
Fidelity Trust’s compensation became excessive.101 The excessive 
compensation allegedly subsidized work on non-401(k) plans that Fidelity 
Trust did for ABB.  ABB failed to convince the court that it appropriately 
monitored the fees Fidelity Trust received.102 According to the court, ABB 
was primarily concerned with minimizing its own costs rather than with 
ensuring the plan participants did not overpay Fidelity Trust.103   
Second, the participants argued that ABB had violated its fiduciary 
obligations when it deleted one mutual fund offering and selected or kept 
other funds as part of the plan’s investment menu.104 The court determined 
that ABB inappropriately considered the “effect of the fund selected on 
recordkeeping fees, and what changes to the fee structure were in [ABB’s] 
best interest” when replacing one fund with another.105 ABB also decided 
to offer some share classes in the plan that charged higher fees to 
participants, and thus paid more in revenue sharing, than paid by other 
lower-fee share classes of the same funds that were available to the plan.106  
The court held the ABB fiduciaries jointly and severally liable for $34.2 
million as a result of these fiduciary breaches.107 
The Tussey decision illustrates that employers have two primary 
responsibilities when considering the use and scope of revenue sharing.  
First, the duties of loyalty and care require employers to ensure that any 
compensation paid by the plan, directly or indirectly, to its service 
providers is reasonable.  Second, employers must act loyally and prudently 
when choosing and designating the investments offered to employees.   
                                                                                                                                      
100 Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45240, at *100-01 (Mar. 31, 2012). 
101 See id. at *28. 
102 Id. at *29. 
103 Id. at *31.  
104 See id. at *47-48. 
105 Id. at *57. 
106 See id. at *79. 
107 Id. at *116.  The court awarded the plaintiffs an additional $1.7 million due 
to ABB’s failure to monitor the way a Fidelity entity administered float income.  
Id. 
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In sum, ERISA’s fiduciary framework, which was developed 
during an era of DB plan dominance, imposes significant responsibility on 
employers who sponsor 401(k) plans.  Among those responsibilities is an 
obligation to select both plan service providers and the investments offered 
in the plan in accordance with fiduciary standards of loyalty and prudence.  
In contrast, ERISA generally does not impose fiduciary duties on either 
plan service providers or the providers of mutual funds offered as plan 
investments.  Revenue sharing, which is frequently used to pay some or all 
of the costs of 401(k) plan administration, illustrates the challenges and 
burdens this regulatory approach poses for employers. 
 
IV. EMPLOYERS AND 401(K) FIDUCIARY DUTIES  
 
In this Part, I briefly explain the way employers’ roles have 
changed as a result of the transition from a DB pension system to one that 
primarily relies on DC plans such as 401(k) plans.  The basic alignment of 
interests that supported the choice of an employer-centric fiduciary 
framework for DB plan investments no longer exists.  Furthermore, 
employers do not inherently have the expertise to select and monitor 
financial products targeted to individual investors or the way in which the 
product providers interact with other actors in the financial and 401(k) 
systems.  Contributing to the task for employers are information 
asymmetries between employers and providers of 401(k) services and 
investment products.  The Part concludes with a brief discussion of 
alternative regulatory approaches. 
 
A. EMPLOYER INTERESTS AND EXPERTISE IN THE 401(K) PLAN 
SYSTEM 
 
The role employers play in the retirement plans that they 
voluntarily sponsor has shifted significantly since ERISA’s fiduciary 
provisions were enacted in 1974.  ERISA requires employers to fund DB 
plans they sponsor to whatever degree necessary to enable the plans to pay 
promised benefits.108  That means that employers with DB plans have a 
direct interest in plan investments and in the fees charged to the plans.  
                                                                                                                                      
108 See Dana M. Muir, Counting the Cash:  Disclosure and Cash Balance 
Plans, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 849, 869 (2004) (“[E]mployers retain the 
obligation to fully fund a DB plan should investment returns not meet expectations 
. . .”). 
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Positive investment returns reduce an employer’s funding obligation, and 
every dollar of cost the plan pays in fees is a dollar that the employer must 
contribute to the plan.  In addition, employers have full control over DB 
plan investment decision-making.  The alignment of the employer’s 
interests with the plan beneficiaries’ interests favors treating the employers 
as plan fiduciaries. 
In the 401(k) paradigm, employers’ interests are less closely 
aligned with the retirement plan policy goal of maximizing employee 
opportunity to achieve lifelong financial security.  Most 401(k) plans 
delegate to employees the decision on how to invest their account assets.109 
As a result, employers no longer control how plan assets are invested.  Nor 
do employers have any direct interest in the investment returns.  The 
investment vehicles used in 401(k) plans may be significantly different 
from those in DB plans.  401(k) investments must be suitable for the varied 
needs of participants, which depend on demographic and risk factors as 
well as plan scale.  Since the plan service provider fees are typically paid 
either directly or indirectly by the participants, employers may be largely 
indifferent to the amount of those fees or the way in which they are charged 
to participants.  
The change in the alignment of interests is not the only factor that 
favors reallocation of the fiduciary obligations in 401(k) plans.  Employers, 
especially small ones, may not have the expertise to evaluate the financial 
products offered on their 401(k) plan menu.  There is nothing in the 
business model of non-financial sector employers to lead a reasonable 
observer to believe that employers have the professional proficiency in 
financial planning necessary to decide on the appropriate set of investment 
choices to be offered to employees.  Nor are employers necessarily 
knowledgeable about the increasing complexities of financial products and 
how those products operate within the larger 401(k) system that 
encompasses a range of service providers such as broker-dealers, financial 
planners, and record keepers.   
A variety of factors contribute to the complexity involved in 401(k) 
plans.  One is the number of different services and providers that the plan 
may need.110  The size of a 401(k) plan can cut both ways in terms of 
complexity.  The problem for small plans is that they need many of the 
                                                                                                                                      
109 See Davis, supra note 73, at 1028 (explaining that approximately 96% of 
all individuals actively participating in 401(k) plans have both the right and the 
responsibility to choose how to invest their account assets). 
110 See Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 344-47. 
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same services and must meet many of the same compliance requirements as 
large plans but have fewer participants and lower levels of plan assets to 
bear those costs.111 Larger plans tend to have lower per-participant fees 
because of the economies of scale those plans can achieve.112 Large plans 
may be challenged, though, to meet the diversity of interests that naturally 
occurs among a large participant population.  Finally, as employers 
examine their plan costs and compare those costs with those of other plans, 
the employers must consider the qualitative differences among the plans.  
An employer’s fiduciary obligation does not require it to offer a low-cost 
plan.  Instead, it requires the employer to act prudently and to ensure the 
plan service providers are not overcompensated for the services that they 
render.113 
A concern related to complexity and limited employer expertise is 
that employers suffer from information asymmetry on revenue sharing and 
other compensation and fees in the investment industry as compared to plan 
service providers and mutual funds.  The 2012 GAO report found that some 
plan sponsors were not aware of financial arrangements among service 
providers and investment products or, if generally aware, did not 
understand the amount or use of those fees.114 Some of the GAO’s findings 
are astonishing in the extent to which employers are unaware of or do not 
consider revenue-sharing when making plan-related decisions.  Almost half 
of the surveyed plan sponsors did not know if revenue-sharing occurred in 
their 401(k) plan.115 And a number of employers that knew revenue sharing 
occurred within their plan admitted they did not consider the revenue 
sharing compensation when selecting plan service providers.116 In some 
instances, the GAO cross-checked the fee data reported by the employers 
who participated in its study.  One example the GAO gave is that of a large 
plan that paid 16 times more in fees for administrative services and record-
keeping during one year than the employer had reported.117  Presumably, 
                                                                                                                                      
111 See GAO, supra note 27, at 15. 
112  See id. 
113 See DEP’T OF LABOR, Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities 5 (2012) 
(“[F]iduciaries will want to understand the fees and expenses charged and the 
services provided”), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/meetingyour 
fiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf. 
114  See GAO, supra note 27, at 13-14, 16-21. 
115 Id. at 25. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 27. 
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the employer did not understand the extent of the fees being paid within its 
plan.  
One might assume that the disclosure obligations imposed by the 
DOL on plan service providers beginning in 2012 would eliminate this 
asymmetry.  However, experts in retirement system fees and the new 
disclosures explain that service providers are going to considerable lengths 
to make the mandated fee disclosures difficult for employers to 
comprehend and analyze.118  One commentator refers to the disclosures as 
“dizzyingly complex.”119 Discussing plan sponsor obligations in evaluating 
the disclosures, one plan consultant said “[t]he time it takes – and the 
attention to detail it takes – is more than sponsors can handle.”120 
Fewer than 60% of full time U.S. workers in the private sector 
have any access to a retirement plan.121 A well-functioning regulatory 
system would encourage employers to increase their sponsorship of 
retirement plans.  Assigning fiduciary obligation and liability for 
investment selection and monitoring to employers who voluntarily sponsor 
401(k) plans does not take advantage of a strong alignment between the 
interests of employers and employees because no such alignment exists.  
Nor does designating employers as fiduciaries utilize expertise that they 
naturally have in running their businesses because few employers naturally 
develop expertise in the complexities of investment products intended for 
individuals.  It appears that even extensive disclosure requirements may not 
entirely eliminate information asymmetries that increase the challenges 
participants face in meeting their ERISA fiduciary obligations. 
The observation that employers may not be the best-placed of the 
entire constellation of actors in the 401(k) plan system to bear the 
responsibility and liability associated with approval and monitoring of the 
                                                                                                                                      
118 See Mark Mensack, The Moral Hazard of Too Big to Jail, J. 
COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, May/June 2013, at 42, 44-45. The DOL did not 
mandate a particular format for these disclosures although it did provide a sample 
guide for preparation of the initial disclosures. See generally Reasonable Contract 
or Arrangement under Section 408(b)(2) – Fee Disclosure, 77 Fed. Reg. 5632, 
5658-59 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).    
119 Mensack, supra note 118, at 45. 
120 Lee Barney, The Moment of Truth, PLANADVISER (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.planadviser.com/MagazineArticle.aspx?id=10737418889&magazine=
10737418887. 
121 Alicia Munnell et al., The Pension Coverage Problem in the Private Sector, 
CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. (Sept. 2012), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/IB_12-16.pdf.   
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use of revenue sharing is not incompatible with a regulatory system that 
appropriately protects employees.  Instead the observation provides a 
rationale for a careful examination of that constellation of actors and the 
various roles they should play in a properly performing 401(k) system.   
 
B. PROPOSALS TO REALLOCATE FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Numerous commentators and policy makers have offered proposals 
intended to improve the 401(k) system.  Some of those suggestions are 
incremental and would have little or no effect on employer responsibility 
for the use of revenue sharing.122 Other suggestions, some of which I 
categorize below based on their approach to investments and briefly 
discuss, would dramatically change the DC plan landscape.  All of the 
proposals discussed below address broad, systemic problems in the U.S. 
DC system.  However, I only discuss their implications for employer 
fiduciary responsibility for plan investments. 
In one category of proposals the federal government, or a 
committee appointed by the government, would assume total or primary 
responsibility for selection of the investments to be held in DC accounts.  
Professor Theresa Ghilarducci has offered a schematic for a system that 
would entirely replace the current DC system, which she calls Guaranteed 
Retirement Accounts (GRAs).123 The board of the Thrift Savings Plan 
(TSP), which administers and invests the DC accounts of federal 
employees, would invest GRA assets.124 Professor Ghilarducci’s plan 
would guarantee a three percent investment return in GRAs.125  During 
periods of economic stress, GRA assets and the three percent return would 
                                                                                                                                      
122 See, e.g., Colleen E. Medill, Targeted Pension Reform, 27 J. LEGIS. 1, 3 
(2001) (proposing closure of loopholes in the tax system that result in benefits 
being lower than they otherwise would be for lower wage workers); Michael W. 
Melton, Making the Nondiscrimination Rules of Tax-Qualified Retirement Plans 
More Effective, 71 B.U. L. REV. 47, 50 (1991) (arguing that tax incentives are not 
sufficient to induce low-income workers to save for retirement); see also Paul M. 
Secunda, 401(k) Follies: A Proposal to Reinvigorate the United States Annuity 
Market, 30 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N NEWSQUARTERLY, Fall 2010, at 13, 14-15 (arguing 
for tax law changes to require 401(k) plans to offer annuitized distribution 
options). 
123 TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST 
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 262 (2008). 
124 Id. at 264-65. 
125 Id. at 265. 
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be protected.  On the other hand, the accounts would receive only limited 
returns during robust financial market periods.  Employers would have no 
responsibility or liability for the investments held in GRAs. 
Professor Jeff Schwartz has proposed a government-run system of 
individual accounts that, like Professor Ghilarducci’s, would replace 401(k) 
plans.126  One role of the government would be to designate a private sector 
fund manager to invest account assets, although Professor Schwartz allows 
that the system may provide some opportunity for employees to select their 
own investments.127 The default investment product to be managed by the 
government-appointed manager would consist of a portfolio made up of a 
U.S. equity index fund and treasury-inflation protected securities (TIPS).128 
While not formally promising a guaranteed minimum investment return, 
the use of TIPS is intended to provide a “guarantee[d] return of principal in 
real terms at retirement.”129 The allocation between the equity index fund 
and TIPS, and thus the effective guarantee, would vary according to 
employee age.130 As with Professor Ghilarducci’s plan, employers would 
not have any role or liability in the selection of account investments. 
  A second category of reform proposal would retain many of the 
contours of the existing 401(k) plan system but would make changes to the 
investment component of the system.  One plan receiving significant 
attention is sponsored by Senator Tom Harkin.131 If adopted, his proposal 
would require any employer not offering a DB or DC plan that meets 
minimum criteria to enroll employees into a newly-created type of private 
sector pension plan, a Universal, Secure, and Adaptable (USA) Retirement 
Fund.132 Senator Harkin’s proposal only provides the broad details of how 
USA Retirement Funds would work.  There are indications that employees 
would have individual accounts because the proposal states that “[t]he 
amount of a person’s monthly benefit would be determined based on the 
total amount of contributions made by, or on behalf of, the participant and 
                                                                                                                                      
126  Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 74-78 
(2012). 
127 See id. at 85. 
128 Id. at 83. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See generally TOM HARKIN, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., 
LABOR & PENSIONS, THE RETIREMENT CRISIS AND A PLAN TO SOLVE IT (2012), 
available at http://www.harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/5011b69191eb4.pdf. 
132 Id. at 1, 6-7. 
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investment performance over time.”133  However, the proposal also 
contemplates risk sharing, the type and amount of which is ambiguous.  
The risk sharing delegates to the trustees of each fund the flexibility to 
gradually increase or decrease benefits depending on investment 
performance.134 Such sharing of risks is incompatible with a system that 
calculates individual benefits based purely on account balances.   
The fiduciary responsibility for USA Retirement Funds would lie 
with the fund trustees charged with plan management.135 Trustees would 
represent various constituencies: employees, retirees and employers.136 
USA Retirement Funds would be licensed by an unspecified entity.137 
Employers would not have any fiduciary liability for the selection of a 
USA Retirement Fund for their employees and, in fact, would be permitted 
to “use the ‘default’ fund identified for the region, industry, or through 
collective bargaining.”138 Presumably a federal agency would determine the 
default fund for various regions and industries.  Senator Harkin’s plan does 
not seem to address the responsibility and liability for investments of 
employers that choose to offer their own DC plan rather than enrolling their 
employees in a USA retirement fund. 
Elsewhere, I have proposed a system that is similar to Senator 
Harkin’s in that it would leave intact much of the present 401(k) 
framework.139 It would decrease employer liability for investment selection 
and provide added incentives for plan sponsorship by offering additional 
liability protections for small employers.140 My proposal is centered on a 
new type of investment product, Safe Harbor Automated Retirement 
Product (SHARPs).141 In lieu of employer fiduciary obligation for 
SHARPs, I propose a two-part mechanism consisting of: (1) assigning 
fiduciary responsibility to the investment managers and fund directors that 
determine and implement a SHARP’s investment strategy; and (2) 
licensing by and reporting to a federal regulatory agency.  Disclosure 
                                                                                                                                      
133 Id. at 6.   
134 Id. at 7. 
135 Id. at 6. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 7. 
138 Id.  
139 Muir, supra note 7, at 49. 
140 Id. at 50. 
141 Id. at 7. 
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requirements would promote the ability to make competitive comparisons 
among SHARPs.142 
The investment strategy of SHARPs is critical to employees’ 
wealth accumulation.  SHARPs would be permitted to use any investment 
strategy that would currently meet the Qualified Default Investment 
Alternative requirements imposed by the DOL as part of a safe harbor for 
default plan investments in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans.143 To drive 
investor-focused performance and low fees, the investment managers of 
SHARPs would have fiduciary liability to act in the best interest of the 
participants, including determination, disclosure, and implementation of an 
appropriate asset allocation strategy.144 As a final check, the board 
members of a SHARP would be responsible for its compliance with 
regulatory standards and its disclosed strategy.145 
My SHARPs proposal is based, with appropriate adaptations for 
the U.S. system, on Australia’s implementation of MySuper investment 
products.  Elsewhere, I have described Australia’s approach to private 
sector pension provision in greater detail.146 Relevant here is that after the 
global financial crisis Australia undertook a review of its retirement 
system.147 The final reform recommendations were extensive.148 One 
component addressed the default investment vehicles used for the accounts 
of employees who do not designate their investment choices.  Default 
investment products are in extensive use in Australia because many 
Australians are passive with respect to their investments, do not make 
active plan choices, and have limited financial literacy.149 In the reformed 
system, MySuper products will be the only permitted type of default 
investment product.  In addition, employees who wish to make explicit 
                                                                                                                                      
142 Id. at 51.  
143 For an explanation of both QDIAs and automatic enrollment 401(k)s, see 
id. at 53. 
144 Id. at 51. 
145 Id.  
146 For a discussion of the system and the values it represents, see Dana M. 
Muir, Building Value in the Australian Defined Contribution System: A Values 
Perspective, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 93 (2011). 
147 SUPER SYS. REVIEW PANEL, SUPER SYSTEM REVIEW FINAL REPORT pt. 1 
(2010), available at http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/content/downloads/ 
final_report/part_one/Final_Report_Part_1_Consolidated.pdf.  
148 Id. at 24–60.  
149 Id. at 8–9. 
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investment decisions may designate a MySuper product to receive their 
retirement plan contributions.150 
The regulatory framework is relatively simple.  The Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) will gather and make public data 
on MySuper product performance and fees to facilitate competition among 
the offerings.151 The regulatory approach to MySuper default products 
imposes an enhanced set of duties on MySuper fund entity trustees 
(sometimes referred to as corporate trustees)152 and on the boards that 
govern the entity trustees.153 Employers play no significant role and have 
no significant liability in this system.  The enhanced obligations of 
MySuper entity and individual trustees essentially will operate as an 
additional layer of duties on top of the basic set of requirements that applies 
to all entity trustees of funds that hold retirement assets.154 In addition, 
trustees must be licensed and meet specific standards with respect to the 
operation of a MySuper product.155 
Unlike the employer-based retirement system in Australia, the U.S. 
regulatory system currently relies on employers as the primary gatekeepers 
and decisionmakers for 401(k) plan investments.  This approach is a relic 
of the period when DB plans were the predominant type of retirement plan.  
In the context of the current DC system, employers’ interests do not 
                                                                                                                                      
150 Id. at 10. 
151 See TREASURY, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., STRONGER SUPER: 
INFORMATION PACK 4 (2011), available at http://strongersuper.treasury.gov.au/ 
content/publications/information_pack/downloads/information_pack.pdf. 
152 See Mark Blair & Ian Ramsay, Collective Investment Schemes: The Role of 
the Trustee, 1 AUSTL. ACCT. REV. 10, 17 (1992) (noting that a trustee is required in 
order to receive certain tax benefits); Jeremy Cooper, Super for Members: A New 
Paradigm for Australia’s Retirement Income System, 3 ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION 
MGMT. 8, 13 (2010). 
153 See SUPER SYS. REVIEW PANEL, SUPER SYSTEM REVIEW FINAL REPORT pt. 
2, at 12–14 (2010), available at http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/content/ 
downloads/final_report/part_two/Final_Report_Part_2_Consolidated.pdf;  
TREASURY, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., supra note 151, at 19–20. 
154 MySuper entity trustees will be required to: promote the financial interests 
of MySuper members, in particular net returns; annually assess sufficiency of 
scale; and include in their investment strategy an investment return target and level 
of risk for MySuper members. Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee 
Obligations and Prudential Standards) Act 2012 (Cth) div 6 (Austl.). 
155 See Superannuation Legislation Amendment (MySuper Core Provisions) 
Bill 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011 
B00234. 
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strongly align with the interests of employees who invest through those 
plans, typically do not have specialized expertise in investment products 
targeted to individual investors, and suffer from information asymmetry as 
compared to 401(k) plan service providers and entities such as mutual 
funds that invest account assets.   
A number of the proposals for reform of the U.S. 401(k) system 
advocate decreasing the responsibility and liability employers face in 
offering their employees the opportunity to use DC plans as a component 
of the employees’ pursuit of lifelong financial security.  Revenue-sharing is 
a good example of the challenges employers confront in establishing 
401(k) plan investment menus, monitoring those menus, and overseeing the 
compensation of plan service providers.  None of the proposals discussed 
here would leave plan participants unprotected.  Instead, the proposals 
divide responsibility for investment oversight in various ways among the 
federal government and the providers of investment products and 401(k) 
services. 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
 Revenue sharing in 401(k) plans dates at least to the early 1990s.  
It took some time, though, before revenue-sharing began to receive 
significant attention from others than those who paid or received it.  The 
DOL recently has increased disclosure obligations to provide more 
transparency on the compensation, including from revenue-sharing, which 
service providers derive from 401(k) plans. 
 In addition to the disclosure obligations, ERISA imposes fiduciary 
obligations and liability on employers for the selection and monitoring of 
401(k) plan investments and service providers.  Cases brought by 
participants alleging excessive investment fees and service provider 
compensation have highlighted these obligations, including the role played 
by revenue sharing.  But workers struggling to meet their survival needs 
and save for the future deserve a better system.  The current fiduciary 
structure serves to discourage employers, particularly small employers, 
who have neither the expertise nor the time to understand financial 
products targeted at individual investors and the compensation practices, 
including revenue-sharing, used in the financial sector, from establishing a 
401(k) plan.  In today’s competitive business environment, even large 
employers may be reluctant to develop the expertise necessary to meet 
ERISA’s substantive fiduciary standards.  In short, revenue-sharing is but 
one example, albeit an important one, of why the US needs to carefully 
evaluate its approach to building retirement wealth for its workers. 

RETIREMENT POLICIES AND RELATED SOCIAL CHANGES 
IN THE LIFECYCLE 
 
RUSSELL K. OSGOOD* 
 
*** 
 
This Essay argues that retirement policies, including retirement income 
and healthcare sufficiency, should be crafted in light of demographic and 
lifestyle changes rather than as a means to solve a larger fiscal problem.  
The author studies work force demographics and life expectancy in the 
decades following WWII as compared to today and discusses how other 
nations have attempted to solve the same problems currently facing the 
United States.  As a means of addressing the increasing fiscal demands of 
paying for retirement, the article proposes an “omnibus” plan that extends 
the retirement age, introduces “means testing” for certain benefits as well 
as cutbacks and proposes changes to the taxable wage base.  
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This Essay1 is an effort to establish a framework for action in 
dealing with the issues in a great debate that is not happening, but should 
be, about retirement, retirement policy and retirement income, and health 
care sufficiency.  Lots of ideas have been floated and much ink and paper, 
and many cyber impulses, expended, discussing various aspects of this set 
of issues but those ideas have typically been generated by reference to a 
single policy perspective, including most frequently national fiscal 
necessity, health care adequacy, or social security solvency.  This is 
                                                                                                                 
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Washington University School of 
Law. The author thanks Merton Bernstein, Jonathan M. Brand, Lucas Deppermann 
‘15, Carol A. Fichtelman, Richard L. Kaplan, Fred C. Little, Kathryn Moore, 
Robert Pollak, Spencer Reynolds ’14, Liz Sepper, and Peter Wiedenbeck for 
reading drafts of this paper and the participants in the spring 2013 Insurance Law 
Journal Symposium at the University of Connecticut School of Law for listening to 
a speech setting forth the proposals made here. 
1 The word “Essay” is used intentionally to connote a looser style of 
argumentation and also fewer footnotes than conventional law review articles.  
Almost every sentence in this Essay could be footnoted to the mountain of 
technical material and the reams of commentary on this set of complex subjects.  
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essentially how the retirement proposals by the well-known Bowles-
Simpson Commission2 were generated as part of a larger proposal aimed at 
solving problems of national fiscal policy.  That set of proposals has 
languished for lots of reasons and this Essay will argue that the set of 
related retirement issues cannot be “solved” by reference to a set of 
proposals focused only on fiscal needs.  It is said that these retirement 
issues cannot be solved at all because they are too “political.”  The matters 
are obviously political (and politicians have difficulty solving big 
problems), but these matters also reflect deep changes in the underlying 
social order and in longevity that make changes in the relevant policies 
exceptionally difficult to resolve when looked at in a short-term political 
framework.  
 This Essay will review the following: 1) the shape of the various 
component retirement and health policies (and demographic facts) in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s as a reference point, 2) the policies in place 
right now (with imminent changes), and 3) a brief summary of related 
policies in Germany, Britain, Canada, and Singapore.  The Essay will then 
make an omnibus proposal not aimed primarily at solving the fiscal 
problem, but developed by reference largely to the changes in longevity 
and labor force participation.  This omnibus proposal would, however, if 
implemented, contribute to an amelioration of the fiscal problem.  
 
A. A NOTE ON STATISTICS AND PROJECTIONS 
 
 The arena of retirement and healthcare policies has a huge 
statistical component, but I will start with several cautionary notes about 
statistics in this area.  First, statistical projections that go very far into the 
future, say twenty years or more, are extraordinarily unreliable.  Mortality 
statistics are an exception, but projections of costs, etc. turn out frequently 
to be overstated.  When Medicare Part D was added during the presidency 
of George W. Bush, virtually all statistical projections were wrong on the 
high side.3 This was the case because no one was sure how adding drug 
                                                                                                                 
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM: THE 
MOMENT OF TRUTH, (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter BOWLES-SIMPSON]. 
3 See Edwin Park, Refuting, Once Again, the Medicare Part D Myth, OFF THE 
CHARTS BLOG: POLICY INSIGHT BEYOND THE NUMBERS, CENTER ON BUDGET AND 
POLICY PRIORITIES (March 11, 2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.offthechartsblog.org/  
refuting-once-again-the-medicare-part-d-myth-2/. 
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benefits would affect hospitalization and other costs.  In retrospect it seems 
to have reduced them (this is logical).  Second, human, social and economic 
behavior is dynamic and hard to predict.  For instance, many people believe 
that there will be (or is) a significant increase in delayed retirements due to 
the rise of retirement living costs (and longevity) and the failure of private 
savings and employer provided retirement income to increase 
commensurately (or at all).  Current data fails to show this because the 
current data can, due to exogenous factors, mask what is going on.  For 
instance, just as many people may wish to work longer, but we have had a 
major employment contraction with many attendant “early” retirements. 
These people are not retiring early because they wish to but because it was 
forced on them individually or in large groups.  Third, health care cost 
projections continue to be based on what has been a norm created during a 
period of sustained healthcare inflation (1965 to the present).  This inflation 
was fueled by massive resource infusions by employer plans and 
government transfer payments.  No one is predicting an end to this inflation 
in part because the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is slowly coming into 
effect and it will increase the demand for healthcare services.  But the rate 
of inflation has to change.  There literally will not be resources available to 
provide for health care at the quantities projected if the inflation continues 
at a very elevated level.  How it will come to an end is not yet understood, 
but it is beyond doubt going to end. 
 
I.  A LOOK BACK 
 
One of the problems in thinking about how to resolve the many 
pending “crises” in the areas of retirement and related retirement healthcare 
has been a failure to study methodically what has changed or led to our 
present situation.  Typically, it is assumed that the problems have sprung 
from: 1) increases in longevity and/or 2) government intervention in the 
health care market.  But the story is more complicated and multifaceted 
than these two phenomena, and in the next few paragraphs I will sketch our 
situation as of 1960, and then in the following section describe our situation 
today.  
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A. OASDI4   
 
The Social Security system is comprised of various benefits and it is 
widely assumed that these have not changed much and that the threat of 
insufficiency of funds today is a function of an aging workforce, lower 
birthrate, and increased longevity.  This is not true.  The primary insurance 
benefit (of OASDI) has changed in a number of ways since 1960.  First, the 
minimum benefits were much lower then.  Second, there were no 
automatic, only episodic, COLA (“Cost of Living Adjustment”) 
adjustments to benefits until 1972.  Third, there was no Social Security 
Disability Insurance scheme until 1956 and the number of participants had 
not ballooned as it did in the 1970s and 1990s.5  Fourth, since the wage 
base was lower the amount of higher end and maximum benefits were 
relatively smaller.  Fifth, a significant number of workers, including 
governmental, charitable, farm and ecclesiastical organization workers, 
were not included in the system.  The system was funded, as it is today, by 
a dual employer/employee tax on “wages and salaries” (without any offset 
for the various income tax deductions) that was intelligently premised on 
the notion that all people should at all times and all income levels put aside 
a portion of wages (matched by the employer) for support during old age.  
 
B. HEALTHCARE “SYSTEM”    
 
In 1960 there was no Medicare and no ACA.  A significant number of 
workers had employer- or union-provided health insurance but many did 
not.  A few people (usually wealthy) bought individual policies.  
Healthcare inflation had begun to increase as medicine modernized and 
began to add procedures and medications and machines that prolonged life 
or tested for sickness.  Healthcare insurance was a state matter. 
 
                                                                                                                 
4 This discussion of Social Security was informed by a recent, comprehensible 
and careful description of the system’s current provisions and its origins. Kathryn 
L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System and the 
Principles and Values it Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5 (2011).  
5 See Disability Policy & History: Statement Before the H. Subcomm. on Soc. 
Security of the Comm. on Ways and Means (July 13, 2000) (statement of Edward 
D. Berkowitz). 
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C. LONGEVITY 
 
Longevity for males in 1960 was 66.6 years and for females was 73.1 
years.6 It was higher in developed European countries, but it had been 
creeping up in all developed nations during the post-World War II epoch, 
particularly for women.  
 
D. PRIVATE PENSIONS 
 
Private employer and union plans covered approximately forty-one 
percent of the full time workforce in 1960.7 This group was largely male 
and had shorter life expectancies.  The pensions were generally defined 
benefit plans paying annuity type benefits that were set at retirement and 
generally did not increase automatically with inflation.  Defined 
contribution plans had become popular in the private (non-union) sector, 
but not in the case of public plans.  The rate of coverage of employees had 
increased from 1945 until 1960 significantly.  Private pension plans 
sometimes had disability insurance features that covered a disabled worker 
until he or she attained age sixty-five.  
 
E. LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
In 1960 83.3% of males aged sixteen to sixty-five participated in the 
labor force with females at 37.7%.8 Labor market participation immediately 
after age sixty-five by males was 35%.9 Employment was concentrated in 
full-time forty hour a week jobs reflecting the norms of the Federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act, (supervisors, overtime, etc. etc.) devised to regulate 
industrial and other large employment employers.  To be sure, there were 
large numbers of small employers, and many rural employers, including 
                                                                                                                 
6 Health Data Interactive: Life Expectancy at Birth, 65 and 85 Years of Age, 
US, Selected Years 1900-2010, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS (Jun. 25, 
2013), http://205.207.175.93/HDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=169. 
7 S.A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 139 (1997).   
8 Current Population Survey Database, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2013) 
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk2/art03.txt.   
9 Robert S. Szafran, Age-Adjusted Labor Force Participation Rates, 1960-
2045, 123 MONTHLY LAB. REV.  25, 30 (2002).  
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farms, that existed outside the industrial model, but they were not a focus 
of federal regulation.    
 
F. MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
 
For employees or most employers there was a mandatory retirement 
age, generally age sixty-five.  There was no Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”) and, as mentioned above, not a large number 
of disabled workers.  Some employers, including police, fire, and the 
military provided for retirements typically before age sixty-five.  Colleges 
and universities typically had a mandatory retirement age for faculty, but 
occasionally it was somewhat higher than sixty-five.  
As we shall see shortly, the world shown by these facts is different, in 
significant ways, from the world our retirement programs now confronts. 
Most of the changes have added costs to these programs, so part of what 
this excursus into the past shows is that there are multiple contributing 
factors to our now heavy costs of retirement.  This suggests that no single 
change will alter the cost “crisis.”  
 
II. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
 
A. OASDI  
 
Today the primary insurance benefit is significantly higher than 
projected in 1960.  This is attributable to indexed increases, increases in 
minimum benefits, and increases in wages and salaries and the social 
security wage base.  The Social Security Trust Fund reserves, which are 
entirely composed of IOUs from the United States Treasury because all 
past and current FICA payments have been or will be expended by the 
Trustees, are being depleted, and the most recent data suggests that only 
about seventy-five percent of projected benefits are funded (counting future 
FICA taxes) and that the Social Security Trust Fund reserves will be 
exhausted in 2035.10 Early retirement (with reduced benefits) continues to 
                                                                                                                 
10 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2013 ANNUAL 
REPORTS 2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 SUMMARY TRUSTEES REPORTS]. The 
exhaustion of the reserves does not mean there will be nothing to pay benefits for 
there will be a continuing accrual of future employment taxes and these taxes are 
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be available at age sixty-two, and normal retirement (depending on one’s 
birth date) is at sixty-six or sixty-seven.  Participants may elect to defer the 
regular commencement of benefits at this age, and if they do, their later 
benefits are increased by a set percentage.  The Social Security Disability 
Insurance Trust Fund is projected to be exhausted in 2016, and there has 
been a large increase11 both in those claiming and securing disability 
benefits, due in part to the employment contraction of the recent 
recession.12 There has been active discussion of this “crisis” and no action 
on a solution.  There seems to be consensus on a modest recalibration of 
the COLA (using a “chained” CPI versus the current CPI13) measuring 
point for the primary insurance amount but, even that has not yet been 
approved by Congress and the President.     
 
B. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 
 
Medicare participants are eligible to enter at age sixty-five, whether 
retired or not.  (Disabled Social Security annuitants may qualify early in 
                                                                                                                 
projected to cover seventy-five percent of the projected future benefits if no 
changes are made.  
11 From 1998 to 2012 the number of disabled individuals receiving benefits 
increased from 4,698,319 to 8,853,614. Selected Data from Social Security’s 
Disability Program, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Dec. 2013), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ 
STATS/dibStat.html. 
12 2013 SUMMARY TRUSTEES REPORTS, supra note 10. The Bowles-Simpson 
Commission made a suggestion that people “unable to work” but not disabled be 
permitted to receive an actuarially reduced payment of their primary insurance 
benefit at age sixty-two (augmented to 100% at their regular retirement date). One 
would be more sanguine about this proposal except for the history of difficulty in 
policing the definition of “disabled” under the current system. “Unable to work” is 
apparently a lower standard. BOWLES-SIMPSON supra note 2, at 51. It is worth 
noting that the Social Security Administration has been concerned, from the 
beginning of this benefit, about the administrability of the concept of disability. 
See Berkowitz, supra note 5. The parallel Railroad Retirement System has had 
similar, or even more difficulty, in assessing correctly disability status. See 
William K. Rashbaum, 600 Long Island Railroad Retirees Lose Disability Pay in 
U.S. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A18.  
13 BOWLES-SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 51-2. Yale Sterling Professor of 
Economics, Robert J. Shiller, has recently proposed that social security benefits be 
indexed to GDP changes to align retirees’ interests with society’s as a whole. 
Robert J. Shiller, Want to Fix Social Security? Use the Right Wrench, N.Y. TIMES , 
June 8, 2013, at  4.     
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certain circumstances for Medicare.14) The costs of participation include: 1) 
substantial premium payments for Part B (physician and related services) 
and 2) in connection with the newer Part D certain payments.  Individuals 
commonly obtain wrap-around policies that in turn do not cover all of these 
costs.15 The Medicare Trust Fund’s (which technically only relates to Part 
A (hospitalization) of Medicare) reserves are projected to be exhausted 
sooner than the Social Security Trust Fund.  The wage base for this system 
is unlimited, unlike the one for OASDI, but the foreseeable tax revenues 
leave this system even more underfunded.16 Some Medicare eligible 
individuals are, due to their low income, also eligible for Medicaid.17 
Many employees are (before Medicare eligibility) covered by employer 
or union provided health insurance and a smaller number also have post-
retirement, employer-provided wrap-around (Medicare) coverage.  The 
passage of ACA in 2010 portends significant changes in (and an 
augmentation of) this, but at this time all of this seems dicey at best.18 The 
core feature of the augmentation, a series of state exchanges, seems in 
doubt.  The related expansion of Medicaid19 is on track in many states but 
has been rejected in other states.  The theory of a fully implemented ACA 
was that affordable near universal coverage would be obtained by 
collecting premiums from many young and relatively healthy people, but 
this theory has yet to be tested in the United States except in 
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Hawaii.  There are predictions that many 
employers will drop their employer plans as ACA Exchange policies 
                                                                                                                 
14 Disability Planner: Medicare Coverage if You’re Disabled, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN. (2013), http://www.ssa.gov/dibplan/dapproval4.htm.  
15 The relatively high costs and confusing structure of Medicare is well 
described in the companion piece to this article by Richard Kaplan. YOYO of 
course means, “you’re on your own,” an appropriate acronym for the current 
financial aspects of Medicare. Richard Kaplan, Desperate Retirees: The Perplexing 
Challenge of Covering Retirement Health Care Costs in a YOYO World, 20 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 433 (2014). 
16  2013 SUMMARY TRUSTEES REPORTS, supra note 10, at 3. 
17 Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries of Medicare and Medicaid: Characteristics, 
Health Care Spending and Existing Policies, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44308. 
18 Susan E. Cancelosi, What to do, What to do: Employer Health Benefit Plans 
During and After 2012’s Uncertainty, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 569 (2013).  
19 Medicaid is a joint federal-state system that provides healthcare for 
individuals and families below a certain level of income. It has been steadily 
expanded but the states vary significantly in what is covered.  
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become available, and it is even clearer that many employers are already 
dropping employer provided wrap-around post-retirement plans (even 
though Medicare coverage and costs are not directly changed by the 
ACA).20 Finally, the CLASS (“Community Living Assistance Services and 
Support Act”) (or long term care) feature of ACA has been declared dead 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.21 
One of the major changes in the healthcare environment since 1960 is 
the widespread social perception that health care is a “right,” or an 
“entitlement,” and “someone” else should pay for it.  This perception 
extends to the feeling that insurers and employers, or Medicare, is, or are, 
greedy if they deny coverage for a therapy or an additional test or other 
medical procedures.  In the campaign around ACA the supporters never 
confronted this but in fact traded on it and the opponents only obliquely 
hinted that not all health care can, or will, be available under any system.  
Finally, healthcare inflation, while bending slightly down, remains high 
from almost any reference point.  New technology and insistent demands 
for, and provision of, experimental and other high-cost, or arguably 
duplicative procedures, continue to drive up cost.  
 
C. LONGEVITY  
 
In 2010, male life expectancy was seventy-six years and female was 
80.9 years.22 Many serious illnesses that were quickly fatal in 1960 are now 
managed over long periods of time, including cancer, heart disease, and 
dementia.  At the same time there is no reliable data that shows individuals 
are not “wearing out,” or physically declining, at a rate consistent with the 
recent past.  Finally, the CLASS ACT (a long term care program that 
proved fiscally unsound) of ACA, and its recent abandonment, reflects 
concern about what is thought to be a tsunami of baby boomers needing to 
be nursed for long periods of declining health in long term care facilities.  
This last prediction is one of the statistical projections that is hard to feel 
certain about.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
20  See generally Cancelosi, supra note 18. 
21 The Bowles-Simpson Commission had previously recommended its 
abandonment. BOWLES-SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 37. 
22  Health Data Interactive, supra note 6. 
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D. PRIVATE PENSIONS 
 
In 2012 fifty-four percent of the civilian workforce participated in a 
public (non-Social Security), private, or union pension or other deferred 
compensation plan or plans.23 See Table I inset.  Compared to 1960 there 
has been a large scale change24 from guaranteed, defined benefit plans to 
§401(k) defined contribution plans which are likely to produce lower levels 
of lifetime contributions for retirement income purposes and ultimately 
lower benefits.25 See Figure 1 inset. Amounts accumulated in defined 
contribution plans can be rolled over into Individual Retirement Accounts 
(“IRAs”) which permit withdrawals for non-retirement purposes before 
retirement.26 Many §401(k) plans and IRAs have employee direction of 
investments which adds risk in many cases and also has produced high 
maintenance and investment advisor fees (which have produced litigation 
and some corrective rule-making).27  
About midway in the period from 1960 to the present the United States 
considered, but did not adopt, a minimum universal (employer paid for) 
pension (“MUPs”)28 designed to produce a higher level of private pension 
                                                                                                                 
23 Retirement Benefits: Access, participation, and take-up rate, civilian 
workers, National Compensation Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
(Mar. 2012), http://bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2012/ownership/civ_all.pdf (last 
visited June 25, 2013). 
24 This change has many causes but one of the leading ones has been the  
inflexible funding obligations and the massive funding deficiencies in many 
defined benefit plans. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Ratings Service Finds 
Pension Shortfall, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, at B1 (Moody’s recomputes state 
and local pension liabilities showing larger deficiencies in a number of states). 
25 There is no good data for 1960 because the Labor Department was not yet 
charged with regulating deferred compensation plans but data from the passage of 
ERISA in 1974 to the present shows the dramatic move to §401(k) plans. See, e.g., 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Defined Contribution Plans: Method of Contribution, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://bls.gov/ncs/eba/detailedprovisions/2010/ 
ownership/private/table20a.txt (viewed on June 25, 2013). Currently eighty-six 
percent of those who participate in a defined contribution plan participate in a 
§401(k) (perhaps alongside another defined contribution plan in some cases).  
26 26 U.S.C.A. §§72 (t)(6), (7), (8) and 408 (d). 
27 See Tara Siegel Bernard, Limiting the 401(k) Finder’s Fee, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 21, 2013, at B1.  
28 See P. WIEDENBECK & R. OSGOOD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS 84 (2d ed. 2013). MUPs were recommended by the President’s 
Commission on Pension Policy in 1981.  
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plan benefits to a larger number of workers, particularly the low paid. 
While a few other developed countries have done this, there was no 
political support for this expensive idea that would have loaded another 
expense on employment.  
The confluence of the decline of regular pension plans and the rise of 
the highly discretionary §401(k) plans will likely cause private pensions to 
recede as a percentage contributor to retirement income.  This can be 
attributed to a number of factors, including the ferocious legal complexity 
of this area of the law and the need on the part of employer to reduce 
employment related costs as the social insurance costs of social security 
and health care have risen dramatically.  Private plans are voluntary and 
inflexible and in the environment of oscillating economic growth they are 
disfavored. 
FIGURE 1:29 
 
 
Y axis = number of plans 
 
                                                                                                                 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and 
Graphs 25 (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historical 
tables.pdf. 
528      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
Table 1. Retirement Benefits: Access, participation, and take-up 
rates, civilian workers, National Compensation Survey, March 
201230 
 
 
E. LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
EMPLOYMENT  
 
Women have tremendously increased their participation in the labor 
force (37.7% to 58.6%)31 while male participation remains at historic 
                                                                                                                 
30 Retirement Benefits, supra note 23. 
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levels.  Participation by the elderly (sixty-five or older) is rising 
significantly (currently 18.5%) after a drop to an all-time low in the mid-
1980s (11%) but due to the employment contraction of the recent recession 
it is hard to be sure how much of the current rise is permanent,32 (see 
Figure 2 inset).33 Labor force participation by younger people has dropped 
recently to 54.9% in 2012 due to high levels of post-high school 
educational enrollment and also the depth of the recession of 2007-09.34  
An equally significant set of changes seems to be occurring in the 
structure of employment.  The industrial (and FLSA) model of full work 
weeks, a single employer, supervisors, and overtime is changing.  As in the 
18th century,35 it now looks like more people are working at home, holding 
multiple jobs simultaneously, not working forty hours a week for any 
single employer, and changing employers more frequently.  See Figure 3 
inset on the rise of regular part-time employment.  Some of these changes 
may reflect profit-maximizing employers shifting to short-term contract 
labor (to avoid regulatory and health care costs), but they also reflect the 
effect of new technologies on the place and nature of employment.  These 
trends seem likely to continue and perhaps even to accelerate.  
 
F. MANDATORY RETIREMENT  
 
In 1986 Congress passed and President Reagan signed an amendment 
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) banning 
mandatory retirement for virtually all employees.36 This change, when 
added to the increased costs of retirement and changes in labor force 
participation by women and heavy immigration, have added significantly to 
                                                                                                                 
31 See Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Participation: 75 years of 
change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 (Dec. 1999). 
32 Id. at 4. 
33 See id.  
34 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Projections to 2022: The Labor 
Force Participation Rate Continues to Fall, MONTHLY LAB. REV.  1, 12, 18 (Dec. 
2013). 
35 See generally ROY PORTER, ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE 18TH CENTURY 185-
213 (Rev. ed. 1991); T.C.W. BLANNING, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: EUROPE 
1688-1815, 91-130 (2000) (Europe). As to our current situation, see Editorial, 
Part-Time America, WALL STREET J., July 7, 2013, at A12.   
36 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986).  
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the labor force37 and created a significant downdraft on wages and 
salaries.38  
 
FIGURE 2:  Labor Force Participation Rate – 65 years and over39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
37 Mitra Toossi, A Century of Change: The U.S. Labor Force, 1950-2050, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 15, 20, 25-27 (May 2002). 
38 Lawrence Mishel & Heidi Shierholz, A Decade of Flat Wages: The Key 
Barrier to Shared Prosperity and a Rising Middle Class, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
BRIEFING PAPER 365, Aug. 21, 2013, at 3, available at 
http://s1.epi.org/files/2013/BP365.pdf. 
39 Fullerton, supra note 31, at 3-4.  
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FIGURE 3:  Employed part time40 
 
 
 
III. COMPARATIVE RETIREMENT AND HEALTH SYSTEMS 
 
Table II41 inset in the text, compares the health and retirement policies 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and 
                                                                                                                 
40 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS: SUMMARY 
08-08 (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils71.pdf. 
41   This chart is constructed from information gleaned from a number of law 
review articles about the foreign nations’ systems. See Steven Ney, Pension 
Reform in Germany (ICCR Vienna/PEN-REF Project, Feb. 2001); Lillian Liu, 
Retirement Income Security in the United Kingdom, 62 SOC. SEC. BULL., no.1, at  
24, 26, 27, 29 (1999); Donald W. Light, Universal Health Care: Lessons From the 
British Experience, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, no.1, at 25, 29 (2003) (United 
Kingdom’s universal health care program); United Kingdom, Retirement Age, 
GOV.UK (last updated Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/retirement-age; Michael 
Wiseman & Martynas Yčas, The Canadian Safety Net for the Elderly, 68 SOC. SEC. 
BULL, no. 2, at 55, 56, 64 (2008); DAVID MCCARTHY ET AL., ASSET RICH AND 
CASH POOR: RETIREMENT PROVISION AND HOUSING  POLICY IN SINGAPORE   3, 4, 
5, 9, 28 (2001), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ 
documents/APCITY/UNPAN018299.pdf. It is worth noting that the rates and the 
base of taxation for social insurance benefits are and have been quite variable 
among these and other countries. (United States: employee (7.3%), employer 
(7.3%); Germany: employee (17.3%), employer (17.3%); Canada: employee 
(6.2%), employer (10.5%)). International Comparisons of Charitable Giving 
November 2006, CAF BRIEFING PAPER (CAF), 9 (2006). http://www.cafonline.org/ 
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Singapore.  Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, like the United 
States, have an aging workforce and face significant fiscal challenges in 
paying for the obligations of their health and retirement benefits.  At the 
same time each of the foreign nations is funding supplemental retirement 
income (in various ways) at higher levels than the United States.  They 
have not experienced such high health care inflation and all cap or ration 
health coverage in ways that has led to significant use by citizens who are 
using private alternative systems while employed or after retirement. 
Germany alone retains a mandatory retirement age of sixty-seven.  
Germany’s primary social security retirement benefits are more variable 
than the United States, and depending on income and other factors, but all 
of these nations use general revenues to support the basic social security 
system at least in part.  In sum, these systems will likely produce, if 
solvent, a higher level of retirement income and lower health care costs for 
retirees. 
The comparative chart shows, however, that there is no quick, unitary 
or easy solution to the United States’ multiple “crises” for it demonstrates 
the significant parallels in the approaches of the five nations.  To the extent 
that there are parallels, the chart also fails to demonstrate the major 
challenges that they face in common which is that as life expectancy 
increases, the likelihood that a national economy will generate enough 
“surplus” labor income to fund thirty years of retirement (and all health 
costs for a lifetime) after only forty-plus years of covered employment is 
low. More workers will need to work beyond age sixty-five to ensure the 
solvency of these promises.  Finally, the increase in longevity when 
coupled with the fracturing of employment into smaller and less stable 
components requires a re-conceptualization of how to amass sufficient 
retirement resources for the population.  
                                                                                                                 
PDF/International%20Comparisons%20of%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
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TABLE II: Pension, Retirement Age & Health Coverage Comparison 
 United States United Kingdom Canada Germany Singapore 
Basic S/S 
Retireme
nt 
System 
Yes 
 
Employer/Employee 
Contribution 
National Insurance
Fund 
 
(Based on years of 
contribution) 
Employer/Employe
e/ State Funded 
Old Age 
Support 
(OAS) 
 
Employer/E
mployee/ 
State Funded, 
Flat Rate 
GRV 
Employer/Emplo
yee/ 
State Funded 
Central 
Pension 
Fund (CPF) 
 
Multiple 
Distinct 
Accounts 
 
Employer/Emp
loyee 
Funded 
Mandato
ry 
Suppleme
ntal 
Retireme
nt System 
No Second State 
Pension 
(SSP or S2P) 
 
Earnings-related 
Redistributive 
Mandatory 
CPP/QPP 
 
Earnings-
related 
Employer/E
mployee 
Contributions 
Not Mandatory 
 
Supplemental 
Employer-run, 
Defined-benefit 
Not 
Mandatory 
Voluntar
y 
Suppleme
ntal 
Retireme
nt Option 
(Employe
r) 
Yes 
 
Moving to 401(k) 
Employer/Employee 
Yes 
 
Tax Incentives 
Yes 
 
Tax 
Incentives 
Yes 
 
Employer-
funded More 
Emphasis on this
as GRV 
weakens 
Yes 
 
Voluntary SRS 
Tax Incentives 
Ma
ndat
ory 
Retire
ment 
Age 
No No after 2011 No 
 
65 Can Be 
NRA under 
OAS and 
CPP/QPP 
Yes, age 67 
(Rest of EU is 
65) 
No 
 
Minimum 
Age: 62 
Health 
Coverage 
Before Age 65: 
Private 
Employer Ins. 
& ACA—2014 
Age 65+: Medicare 
State Provided State 
Mandated 
State Insurance 
Mandate 
Yes 
 
Under CPF 
 
IV.  AN OMNIBUS PROPOSAL 
 
All recent efforts to reform or alter the various retirement and 
healthcare provisions relating to older Americans have failed.  The last 
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successful set of changes occurred during Ronald Reagan’s presidency 
when in 1983, on a bipartisan basis, Congress and the President agreed to 
move the OASDI full retirement eligibility age from sixty-five to sixty-six 
and finally to sixty-seven.42 No change was made in the early retirement 
age (sixty-two) or in the year of Medicare eligibility.  During George W. 
Bush’s presidency he proposed making a portion of a person’s OASDI 
contributions be eligible to be invested in actual external (to the 
Government) investment vehicles.43 Politicians derided and rejected this 
idea, but a number of our developed peers, including the United Kingdom 
and Singapore, have adopted a feature like this or are actively considering 
it.  
 In the following paragraphs, labeled as in the discussion above, I 
will make a set of linked proposals that are designed to deal with an aging 
and expanded workforce, fiscal deterioration of both OASDI and Medicare, 
the absence of a norm of retirement, changes in the structure of work, and 
health care developments.  The overall theory of the proposals is that 
individuals and the governments are not able to amass enough resources to 
pay for elongated retirements and people should work beyond the 
conventional retirement age of sixty-five to contribute to the labor force 
and for continuing professional stimulation.   
  
A. OASDI  
 
The year for retirement eligibility with full benefits should be moved 
gradually to age seventy.  Bowles-Simpson also proposed an increase in the 
regular and early retirement ages for the primary benefit eligibility, but this 
was couched in terms of making that system, and the entire federal 
government, more solvent.44 This was not an adequate reason for most 
                                                                                                                 
42 Janice M. Gregory et al., Strengthening Social Security for the Long Run, 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS.: SOC. SEC. BRIEF, no. 35, Nov. 2010, at 3,4. 
43 Elizabeth D. Tedrow, Social Security Privatization In Other Countries – 
What Lessons Can Be Learned For the United States?, 14 ELDER L.J. 35, 36, 39 
(2006); see also Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided 
Reform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131, 148-50 (privatization entails investing funds in 
non-governmental entities). 
44 BOWLES-SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 50. A commission chaired by then Sen. 
Kerrey of Nebraska recommended in 1995 delaying further the full retirement 
eligibility age but not the early retirement age. J. ROBERT KERREY & JOHN C. 
DANFORTH, Reform Proposal of Commissioners, in BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON 
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people. Why? A primary cause of the parlousness of the Social Security, 
Disability and Medicare Trust Funds has been Congress’s penchant for 
liberalizing benefits without paying for them.  The payroll taxes and the 
wage base have increased but in each case not enough to finance the 
addition of COLAs, larger minimum benefits, and the disability income 
feature and program.  It is true that the aging of the workforce and the drop 
in the birthrate45 have also contributed to this situation, but the trust funds 
(except the Disability Insurance Trust Fund) would have years of solvency 
ahead of them without the congressional giveaways. 
  The only convincing reason to delay for three years (to age 
seventy) the year for full retirement eligibility is that the population is 
living longer and is healthier.  These changes mean that if the average 
person goes to work at, say, age twenty and retires at sixty-four, he or she 
has forty-five years to accumulate resources (in government solution and in 
various qualified and non-qualified savings vehicles) for a likely retirement 
period of twenty five years (or more if the couple is married).  The 
elongated period of retirement requires more working and productive years 
to save adequately and also to contribute to the mandatory government 
plans (OASDI and Medicare).  
 Four additional changes should also be considered.  First, the early 
retirement age of sixty-two should be raised (probably to age sixty-five) 
because the pre-retirement age should parallel the full retirement age and 
also the discounted (from age seventy to age sixty-two) primary retirement 
benefit would be too small.  Second, for retirees in the top income46 
quartiles (say $250,000 or more) the portion of the primary retirement 
benefit attributable to employer contributions and the income on them 
(logically fifty percent) should be means tested.  Some resist this on the 
ground that it is a breach of the OASDI “social contract” but Congress’ 
many liberalizations of that system eliminated any implied promise of 
noninterference with the equilibrium (which never existed) of sufficiency.  
If the breach argument was convincing, then the change could be 
                                                                                                                 
ENTITLEMENT AND TAX REFORM: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 7, 16 (Dec. 
1994). 
45 Mark Mather, World Population Data Sheet 2012: Fact Sheet: The Decline 
in U.S. Fertility, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (July 2012), 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2012/world-population-data-sheet/ 
fact-sheet-us-population.aspx. 
46 The figure used for these purposes should not be federal taxable income but 
a more robust computation of income including exempt municipal bond interest.  
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prospective in effect, but intellectually it is not convincing because the 
employer contributions are mandated and could be applied logically to 
anyone’s primary retirement benefit.  Third, the previously eliminated 
earnings test set at a high level for workers who work beyond the age of 
primary retirement benefit eligibility (to be age seventy) and are receiving 
benefits should be reinstated.47 Fourth, the cutback of benefits (currently 
5/9% for each month before full retirement eligibility that one retires early) 
applicable to those who commence benefits between ages sixty-five and 
seventy should be modestly reduced.48 Delayed retirement increases the 
monthly retirement pension, when taken, by eight percent for a year’s delay 
or 2/3% per month of delay (for those with birthdays in or after 1943) up to 
retirement at age seventy.  The eight percent figure should be reduced 
modestly as part of the system-wide belt-tightening proposed here.49 This 
reflects the fact that the labor market is less stable than before and older 
workers will likely find it harder to find new employment during this 
period.  Such a modification of the cutback should also take some pressure 
off of the disability income fund.  This reduction in the cutback is 
obviously something that will “add” cost but the fact that it is part of a 
further pushing back of the age of full retirement eligibility indicates that it 
                                                                                                                 
47 This test was eliminated in 2000 for individuals who have attained their 
normal retirement age. Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-182, 114 Stat. 198 (2000); see Office of the Chief Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
Automatic Determinations: Exempt Amounts, 1975-1999, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/rteahistory.html (last modified Oct. 16. 2008). 
48 The current actuarial reduction (5/9% per month) is said to be actuarially 
“fair” and my proposal would depart from that standard (at some cost to the trust 
fund) by reducing it to say 5/12% per month. This is justifiable taking into account 
the various equities of this delay in benefit commencement and the variability of 
the health of people over age sixty-five. 
49 See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Retirement Planner: Delayed Retirement Credits 
http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/delayret.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (“social 
security benefits are increased by a certain percentage (depending on date of birth) 
if you delay your retirement beyond full retirement age”); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
Summary of P.L. 98-21, (H.R. 1900) Social Security Administration Amendments 
of 1983 – Signed on April 20, 1983, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, IN-DEPTH RESEARCH, 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/1983amend.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (Act 
increases delayed retirement credit). 
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is really a softening of that decision.50 Fifth, there are a plethora of 
proposals to increase the taxable wage base to include up to ninety percent 
of all wages and salaries or even investment or capital gains income.51 The 
historic reason for limited social security taxation of wages or salaries is 
that the primary insurance benefit is intended as a jointly funded employee 
pension.  However, since some people, in effect, earn investment income as 
their self-employment income, it seems appropriate to include an amount of 
investment income above say $30,000 and below the current social security 
wage base as analogous to salary or wage income.  
 There will be some who will condemn any further delaying of 
primary retirement eligibility.  In an editorial52 entitled “What’s Next for 
Social Security?” published on June 9, 2013 the New York Times lambasted 
the “cuts” already taking place in Social Security.  It specifically referred to 
the delay from age sixty-five to sixty-seven as a “cut”.  The Times opined 
that Social Security “benefit cuts…cannot go much further.”  Putting aside 
the Times’ current tendency for rhetorical excess, the editorial is an 
example of how difficult it is to discuss social security when ad hominen 
statements that ignore the many changes that have liberalized benefits 
decry other changes that slow or defer benefits.  The full truth as to whether 
any “cuts” are taking place would have to take into account that if the 
social security regime of the fairly recent past was in effect, many of the 
people (who are now working beyond age sixty-five) would have lost (due 
to the very low earnings test) their entire benefit without having the option 
of deferring commencement and increasing it.  A further system-wide 
                                                                                                                 
50 This would also be consistent with the Bowles-Simpson proposal to allow 
greater benefits to those who are unable to work after age sixty-five but not 
disabled within the meaning of the law. BOWLES-SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 50-51. 
51  In 2005 (due to growth in income equality) only eighty-five percent of 
wages and salaries, were taxable for FICA purposes. Proposals to tax one hundred 
percent of wages and salaries would, if implemented, significantly delay the 
exhaustion of the Social Security trust fund (for up to forty more years if benefits 
are not similarly increased) but they have not been legislatively feasible due to a 
disagreement over whether the benefits of the high-income earners should be 
increased in a parallel fashion.  An increase of both taxable wages and benefits 
would retain the historic character of the system but be less fiscally positive. See 
JANEMARIE MULVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32896, SOCIAL SECURITY: 
RAISING OR ELIMINATING THE TAXABLE EARNINGS BASE, at 1-3 (Sept. 24, 2010). 
52 Editorial, What’s Next for Social Security?, N.Y TIMES, June 9, 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/opinion/whats-next-for-social-
security.html?_r=0. 
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deferral of benefits is obviously a serious move that should not be 
undertaken lightly, but the increase in longevity coupled with past benefit 
liberalizations since 1960 justifies a revision of the current rules contrary to 
the Times editorial.  
 It is possible that one might see the proposal to establish a 
mandatory retirement age of seventy as in tension with the overall 
conclusion that people can, and should, for societal and for individual 
reasons, work beyond age sixty-give.  This perception misses the fact that 
the change in the social security eligibility age for primary retirement 
benefits from sixty-five to seventy will constitute a powerful incentive to 
work until age seventy for most people in the workforce.  That incentive is 
appropriately limited to working until age seventy. After age seventy 
individual health considerations and society’s interest in accommodating 
young labor force entrants suggests the advisability of a mandatory 
retirement option for employers.  As mentioned above, no employer would 
be required to adopt such a mandatory retirement rule but many would, 
particularly if the demographic trend of people seeking to work beyond age 
sixty-five continues or increases. 
 Under current labor title pension and federal income tax law, a 
qualified plan may, in some cases, set a normal retirement date under the 
age of sixty-five.53 Such a plan provision does not mean that a participant 
must retire at age sixty-five but it does trigger (usually) possible benefit 
distribution eligibility, vests any unvested benefits, and a few other things. 
 It is possible that this private pension age sixty-five option should 
be rethought in light of the other proposals made here, if adopted.  At the 
same time it is not necessary to change this now and in view of the increase 
in instability of employment particularly for older workers, it should not be 
changed simultaneously but it should be looked at again after a period of 
time has passed for the other changes to settle in.   
  
B. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM  
 
In line with the proposal on moving full primary retirement benefit 
eligibility to age seventy, it would seem logical to gradually, and over time, 
move full Medicare eligibility to age seventy also.  Those between ages 
sixty-five and seventy would be covered, if they come into effect fully, by 
the provisions of ACA including in some cases continuing employer-
provided healthcare.  This ACA coverage begins to address the large issues 
                                                                                                                 
53 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(8) (2006). 
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coming to the fore as a result of the change in the structure of employment 
and also the difficulties of those losing coverage employed later in life due 
to industrial dislocations and/or a significant recession.  The changes in 
eligibility will bring extra revenues to the Trust funds but likely increase 
ACA costs (when they are honestly calculated).  It would almost certainly 
increase the cost of Medicaid.  It is not clear, given the prior commitment 
to ACA, as febrile as it is, that this change will affect healthcare inflation.  
It might, in fact, increase it a bit by taking five years out of the Medicare 
(low fee) system and putting it in the higher fee insurance and less high fee 
(Medicaid) system.  
 This change in the Medicare eligibility age will help retirees in that 
it delays for five years entry into the confusing, multiple fee, and 
compartmentalized Medicare system, a system that provides low payments 
to providers, few incentives to economize, and absurdly pays the most to 
the highest cost providers without regard to outcomes.  But all of these 
problems with Medicare would better be handled by moving it either to be 
a unified state-controlled system or to a system in which providers and 
insurers have to compete to win contracts to provide services to 
beneficiaries.  The beneficiaries currently have no motive to diminish 
expenses and the government has devised a Rube Goldberg system 
comprised of components only fit to be understood as a rolling steel ball 
sculpture in an airport waiting room.  
 
C. PRIVATE PENSIONS  
 
It is not clear that this omnibus proposal will lead to any increase in 
the costs (or change the viability) of private or other governmental pension 
or §401(k) plans.  At the same time Congress should reconsider the ease of 
making early withdrawals from all such plans for any but the most worthy 
purposes.54 Why should the assets of a §401(k) account, if rolled over into 
an IRA, be withdrawable to buy a new or larger home or to send a child to 
college when, in general, people are not saving adequately for retirement? 
Other related changes could be made to refocus qualified plan treatment on 
                                                                                                                 
54 Dan Halperin, among others, has endorsed limitations on the allowable 
reasons for distributions. See infra note 54-58 and accompanying text. See, e.g., 
Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the Curious Evolution of Individual 
Retirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 283, 283, 293-303 (1999). 
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retirement needs.  Why should Roth IRA’s even exist?55 Why should roll-
over distributions from IRAs to charities permanently escape income tax?56 
 Daniel Halperin has made a series of thoughtful proposals (divided 
into “ideal” and “possible” categories) to improve the retirement income of 
lower paid57 people participating in qualified plans.58 He proposes changes 
in the coverage and substantiality of benefits of the low paid, including full 
and immediate eligibility and vesting.59 He also suggests that employees 
should be protected against market declines in their accounts in defined 
contribution plans.60 He admits that all or most of his “ideal” proposals 
would discourage adoption or even trigger terminations of such qualified 
plans.61 In sum, his proposals resemble the MUPs62 proposal which never 
was adopted or even widely supported.  
Halperin’s proposals are particularly unlikely to be adopted when 
the social security system itself is underfunded in the longer term.  The 
most sensible set of changes to the qualified plan rules would be those 
which facilitate less complex alternatives like the SEP-IRA option or a 
Simplified Retirement Plan (“SIMPLE” Plan) which allows employers to 
adopt a plan composed of linked IRAs for each employee and then perhaps 
to add a governmental match contribution for certain low paid workers.63 
                                                                                                                 
55 See id. at 303-04 (a Roth IRA does not require lifetime distributions, which 
“undercuts the very notion that it is a retirement funding vehicle at all.”). 
56 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(8)(E) denies a charitable deduction of any such amount 
if excluded from the income of the participant. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(8) 
for this extraordinary loophole from the tax base. 
57 It is important to note that these changes could potentially advantage very 
wealthy people who have never earned wages or salaries and hence have low or 
even the minimum social security primary insurance benefit.  
58 Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income – The Ideal, the 
Possible and the Reality, 11 ELDER L. J. 37 (2003). 
59 See also Russell K. Osgood, Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plan 
Vesting: Revolution Not Reform, 59 B.U. L. Rev. 452 (1978) (calling for full and 
immediate vesting for all private pension plan participants). 
60 Halperin, supra note 58, at 45. 
61 Id. at 67. 
62 MUPs (“Minimum Universal [Private] Pension”) were proposed by the 
President Commission on Pension Policy in 1981 as a way to increase for all 
people retirement income by mandating universal private pension coverage. See 
WIEDENBECK & OSGOOD, supra note 28, at 84.   
63  In 1983 Congress added SEPs (“Simplified Employee Pensions” which are 
company-wide employee linked IRAs) in I.R.C. § 408(k) (2006). SEPs have not 
been widely adopted perhaps because of Congress’ nearly simultaneous creation 
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This alternative would also create a vehicle (each IRA) that would be fully 
portable and that would permit contribution during periods of unstable, 
part-time employment or for several part-time employers, a trend that is 
occurring. 
 
D. MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE 
 
 To help employers deal with increased costs of some of this 
proposal, Congress should amend ADEA to permit an employer (including 
the government) to impose a mandatory retirement age of seventy.  Many 
employers, particularly colleges and universities, struggle with the 
propensity of some faculty and other highly paid workers to stay on beyond 
seventy.  Many of these people are capable of performing their jobs but 
some are not, and a majority has experienced some diminution of 
productivity.  
 Allowing a mandatory retirement age of seventy helps address the 
problem of the lack of skilled jobs for new entrants to the labor force.  It 
also would remove, for electing employers, the cost and anguish of dealing 
with the weakening but not yet fully debilitated employee.  Finally, 
allowing an employer to do this would not coerce them to do it (consistent 
with pre-ADEA law and practice).  
 The only significant objection to allowing a mandatory retirement 
age is that most people already retire at or before age seventy64 and it is not 
clear whether this change will save employers much or do much for labor 
market flexibility.  But, going back to the unreliability of statistical 
projections, we are only at the beginning of the changes (in employee 
behavior at age sixty-five) that might come as economic needs grow and 
the propensity to retire after sixty-five changes dramatically.  
                                                                                                                 
and favoring (in many ways) of the even more flexible § 401(k) alternative. I.R.C. 
§ 401(k). Most recently the Simplified Retirement Plan (SIMPLE plan) was added 
in 1996 and can be in the form of a SEP or a § 401(k) plan. See WIEDENBECK & 
OSGOOD, supra note 28, at 382–91.   
64 It is hard to establish this, but it can be shown by looking at the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Data on Labor Force Participation at age 70 and beyond; for 
instance, labor force participation, while growing for those aged 70 to 74 is about 
19%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS 
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2013), available at http://www.bls. 
gov/cps/cpsaat03.htm. 
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 Some will object to the notion that there is no human right to work 
beyond age seventy but the European Court of Justice has held that the 
Union’s Human Rights Convention and related directives of the European 
Council validly permit mandatory retirement at age sixty-five and the 
Germans still permit it, but at age sixty-seven.65 Reinstatement of the 
possibility of a mandatory retirement age would not prohibit anyone from 
working beyond age seventy but it would permit electing employers to end 
employment in those enterprises or entities at age seventy.  If an employer 
thinks that is not justifiable then it does not have to elect to impose a 
mandatory retirement age.  It would be important in crafting the repeal of 
the current ADEA rule to ensure that employers could be given flexibility 
to phase down on a non-discriminatory basis an employee’s employment 
starting at age seventy (or perhaps a little sooner) as long as employment 
continues for a reasonably short period of time after age seventy, say, no 
more than a five-year phase down.  This would also fit with the changes 
occurring in the structure of employment and not require employers to 
forfeit suddenly all of the accrued experience of employees attaining age 
seventy. 
 Finally, this change in mandatory retirement contributes to the 
creation of a coherent and sensible set of policies for employees, 
employers, and the government.  Age seventy would be the target for 
retirement for all purposes.  One possible addition to this proposal might be 
to impose an additional employer payroll tax of say one percent on the 
wages of any employee who works beyond age seventy.  This tax would be 
collected and split between the Medicare and Social Security trust funds. 
Why impose it on the wages of those who work over age seventy?  Because 
this reinforces the goal of retirement at seventy.  Alternatively or perhaps 
additionally, employers who impose a mandatory retirement age of age 
seventy could be required to contribute an additional amount to a mandated 
private pension fund for all of its qualifying employees (a form of MUPs) 
for the privilege of mandatory retirement.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
65 See Case C-388/07, The Queen v. Sec’y of State, 2009 E.C.R. I-01569, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
62007CJ0388:EN:HTML; Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortifiel 
Servicios SA, 2007 E.C.R I-8531, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 62005CJ0411:EN:HTML. 
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E. LABOR MARKET AND STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 I have argued that the changes we are seeing in the structure of 
employment may well accelerate and certainly will continue.  This should 
be watched closely for it would seem that the employment tax model, 
relying on taxes on wages and salaries for both Medicare and OASDI, may 
need to be reconsidered in light of these changes.  Wages and salaries, the 
current wage base, presuppose conventional, industrial model employment, 
not piece work or independent employment based in the home.  They were 
conceived in a world in which an employee had only one employer.  The 
entire structure of the employment tax trust funds are derivative of the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) which again is premised on an 
employee having only one employer.  In a world in which people might 
work for a number of employers on a part-time basis, the FLSA rules about 
over-time, supervision, etc., are outmoded and may, in fact, encourage 
unrelated employers to use even more part-time workers.66   
 There has been a fair amount of anguish, by commentators67 and 
the Labor Department68, about the move to episodic, multiple part-time 
employment.  It certainly has a negative financial impact for many workers, 
but the old norm of sustained very long-term employment by a single large 
employer did not frequently produce long-term satisfaction on the part of 
workers.  Very long-term employment can produce stagnation on the part 
                                                                                                                 
66  In recent years the Labor Department has fought valiantly to police the line 
between true “independent” contractors and part-time employees called 
independent contractors. See Susan N. Houseman,  A Report on Temporary Help, 
On-Call, Direct-Hire, Temporary, Leased, Contract Company, and Independent 
Contractor Employment in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Aug. 1999), 
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/herman/reports/futurework/conferenc
e/staffing/exec_s.htm.  
67 See generally Julia J. Bartkowiak, Trends Toward Part-Time Employment: 
Ethical Issues, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 811 (1993). ACA creates another Incentive to 
limit workers to “part-time” status (30 hours of work a week or less). This was one 
of the reasons that the Obama Administration recently deferred the implementation 
of the employer mandate for a full year. Avik Roy, White House to Delay 
Obamacare’s Employer Mandate until 2015; Far-Reaching Implications for the 
Private Health insurance Market, FORBES (July 2, 2013, 6:21 PM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/07/02/white-house-to-delay-obamacare’s-
employer-mandate-until-2015-far-reaching-implications-for-the-private-health-
insurance-market/. 
68 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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of the employer and its cadre of employees.  Of course, this was not always 
the case but economic changes beginning in the 1980s are not reversible 
and those changes require enterprises to be more nimble in hiring 
employees (and in making major capital investments) and require 
employees to be more aggressive in seeking out multiple, sometimes 
simultaneous work opportunities.      
 
V.  SUMMATION AND FEASIBILITY 
 
I have argued in this Essay that the problems with our retirement and 
health policies for the aging are so deep and the politics so heavy, that the 
only solution that might succeed is an omnibus solution devised in light of 
the long-term trends in employment, longevity, and the nature of 
employment or work.  The proposals that I have made require contributions 
by employees in the form of more work and possibly diminished benefits 
and by employers of potentially additional years of healthcare premiums 
and retirement plan contributions all aimed at creating a retirement norm of 
age seventy.  This is a reasonable proposal and one that will help both the 
OASDI and the Medicare trust funds.  
A great uncertainty in the foregoing is the future of ACA.  It certainly 
rests on a foundation of sand that the ocean of events is eroding.  On the 
other hand, the changes in the structure of employment suggest that 
healthcare coverage needs to be decoupled from the model of the large 
employer providing employees (and their families) healthcare coverage.  
ACA is a move in that direction, but it may not survive after coming out of 
the regulatory incubator it was placed in when it was crafted legislatively.  
If it does not survive, however, the combination of the social sense of 
healthcare entitlement along with the changes in the structure of 
employment will dictate some way to provide additional, affordable health 
care coverage that eliminates exclusions based on age, pre-existing 
conditions, or employment status.   
In sum, I propose that in light of major demographic changes, 
including increased labor force participation, increased longevity, and the 
absence of adequate retirement saving, we should gradually move primary 
social security retirement to age seventy, increase the age of Medicare 
entry also to age seventy, permit optional (with the employer) mandatory 
retirement at age seventy, and make a number of smaller changes designed 
to soften the effects of these changes.  Workers now seem to wish (or feel 
the need) to work beyond age sixty-five and this additional period of work 
will improve the financial viability of the two trust funds.  In the longer run 
additional retirement savings are needed either in the form of additional 
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non-social security employer retirement plan contributions or amounts in 
other tax-favored retirement vehicles external to the employment 
relationship.  Finally, these changes do not address in a systematic way the 
developments in the structure and nature of employment.  Perhaps the 
current range of tax favored structures, modified by moving to more 
portable and employee focused retirement savings accounts rather than 
qualified plans, can accommodate this change but that is not at all sure. 
 

CALIFORNIA DREAMING: THE CALIFORNIA SECURE 
CHOICE RETIREMENT SAVINGS TRUST ACT  
 
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY* 
 
*** 
 
Half of American workers are not covered by employer-sponsored 
retirement arrangements.  The recently passed California Secure Choice 
Retirement Savings Trust Act seeks to solve this problem by mandating 
retirement savings arrangements for California employers, coupled with a 
public investment vehicle for investing these private retirement savings. 
The Act is important because of California’s size and status as a 
trendsetter for other states. 
 
This Article is the first to examine the important legal questions the Act 
raises under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA.  Contrary to the 
drafters’ intent, the savings accounts authorized under the Act do not 
qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code.  Hence, 
employees participating in savings arrangements established under the Act 
will not receive the income tax benefits associated with individual 
retirement accounts. 
 
If the Act were to be amended to make its accounts individual retirement 
accounts, the Act would survive ERISA preemption under New York State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 
514 U.S. 645 (1995), though not under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U.S. 85 (1983).  Since Travelers is the Court’s more recent and more 
compelling construction of ERISA preemption, the Act should survive 
ERISA preemption if the Act is amended to have true individual retirement 
accounts. 
 
                                                         
* Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. For comments on prior 
drafts of this article, he thanks Professors Jonathan Barry Forman, Paul 
Secunda, and Norman Stein and Attorney Alvin D. Lurie. For research 
assistance, Professor Zelinsky thanks Richard Gove and Louise Loeb, both 
of the Cardozo Class of 2013, and Gulsah Senoh and John R. Doran of the 
Cardozo Class of 2014. 
548      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
A final section of this article addresses the choices other state legislatures, 
as well as Congress, confront if they elect to follow part or all of the path 
on which California has embarked to encourage private retirement 
savings.  President Obama has recently proposed a federal mandate under 
which employers with more than ten employees would be required to 
maintain either retirement plans or IRA coverage.  The President’s 
proposal ensures public debate about the appropriate function of 
government in encouraging retirement savings.  The Golden State’s Act 
will play an important role in that debate.  In that debate, I favor state-by-
state experimentation rather than any single approach to the task of 
encouraging greater retirement savings. 
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 By signing the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust 
Act (“the Act”), Governor Edmund (“Jerry”) Brown, Jr. took an important 
step toward establishing a retirement savings mandate for Golden State 
employers, coupled with a public investment vehicle for private retirement 
savings.1 By simultaneously signing S.B. 923,2 Governor Brown 
guaranteed further debate about the Act and its provisions since S.B. 923 
requires an additional vote of the California legislature before the Act can 
be implemented.3 The Act represents the first tentative success of 
nationwide efforts to create state-sponsored private retirement programs.4 
                                                         
1 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); see Laura Mahoney, California 
Governor Signs Bills to Create Pension Mandate for Private Employers, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BNA) No. 190, at H-2 (Oct. 2, 2012). 
2 S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); Mahoney, supra note 1. 
3 See S.B. 9232012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043.5 to the 
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2013)). 
4 See Florence Olsen, California Leads, No State Has Green Light For State-
Based Private Retirement Accounts, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) (Aug. 7, 
2013). For examples of other states’ efforts, see Brent Hunsberger, Oregon House 
Passes Bill to Examine Statewide Retirement Savings Plan, OREGON LIVE (June 
24, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/finance/index.ssf/2013/06/oregon_house 
_passes_bill_to_ex.html; National Conference of State Legislatures, State 
Sponsored Retirement Savings Plans for Non-Public Employees, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-sponsored-retirement-plans-for-
nonublic.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
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The Act is important, not only because of California’s size and status as a 
trendsetter, but because the task the Act addresses is pressing: increasing 
the retirement savings of the half of American workers not currently 
covered by employer-sponsored retirement arrangements.5 
 I write to explore the legal status of the Act, in particular the Act’s 
standing under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA)6 and the Internal Revenue Code (Code).7 The Act raises three 
important questions under ERISA and the Code: Are the accounts 
established by the Act individual retirement accounts for purposes of the 
Code?  Does ERISA preempt the employer mandate established by the 
Act?  Does ERISA preempt the Act’s provisions authorizing supplemental 
employer contributions to employees’ accounts established under the Act? 
The drafters of the Act were acutely sensitive to all three of these 
questions.8 
 The accounts created by the Act do not qualify as individual 
retirement accounts under the Code.  The hallmark of an individual 
                                                         
5 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 124 (Apr. 2013) 
(“Tens of millions of U.S. households have not placed themselves on a path to 
become financially prepared for retirement. In addition, the proportion of U.S. 
workers participating in employer-sponsored plans has remained stagnant for 
decades at no more than about half the total work force . . . .”).  
6 ERISA was originally adopted as the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) and has repeatedly been 
amended. Many provisions of ERISA were adopted twice, once as tax law 
additions to the Internal Revenue Code and once as additions to Title 29 of the 
United States Code, enforced by the Department of Labor. It is today customary to 
refer to the labor provisions codified in Title 29 as “ERISA” and to refer to the tax 
provisions of ERISA by their respective designations in the Internal Revenue Code. 
This article follows this convention. On the dual tax/labor structure of ERISA, see 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 97 (5th ed. 
2010). 
7 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
8 See S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043 to the 
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012) (program not to be implemented “if it is determined that 
the program is an employee benefit plan under” ERISA or if the employees’ 
accounts under the program “fail to qualify” as IRAs) and §§ 100004(e) and 
100012(k) (supplementary employer contributions to be permitted only if such 
contributions “would not cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit 
plan under” ERISA)). 
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account for retirement planning purposes is the direct and unmediated 
assignment to the account holder of the rewards of good investment 
performance and the costs of investment loss.  In contrast, the accounts 
created under the Act are notional in nature, formula-based cash balance-
style defined benefit claims against a collective trust fund.  These notional 
accounts are credited with an assumed rate of return determined before the 
beginning of the year, regardless of the Trust’s actual investment 
experience during the year.  The Trust established by the California Act 
(not the individual employee/account holder) bears investment risk and is 
liable for underfunding.  The formula-based, cash balance-style accounts 
created by the Act do not qualify under the Code as individual retirement 
accounts as these accounts will not be decreased to reflect investment 
losses and will not directly benefit from current investment gains. 
 Suppose, however, that the Act is amended to make its accounts 
individual retirement accounts for purposes of Code § 408 by shifting 
investment reward and downside to the account holder.  In this case, the 
ERISA preemption status of the Act’s employer mandate reflects the 
Court’s contradictory guidance on ERISA preemption: ERISA § 514(a)9 
preempts the Act’s employer mandate under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.10 
but not under the Court’s later decision in New York State Conference of 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.11 Since 
Travelers is the Court’s more recent and more persuasive approach to 
ERISA preemption, Travelers should control.  Thus, assuming amendment 
of the Act to convert the Act’s accounts into individual retirement 
accounts, the Act’s employer mandate should not be ERISA-preempted. 
 My conclusion is similar as to the third legal issue raised by the 
Act, whether ERISA preempts the provisions of the Act which authorize 
supplementary employer contributions to employees’ accounts established 
under the Act: this provision of the Act is ERISA-preempted under Shaw 
but survives § 514(a) scrutiny under Travelers’ more recent, more flexible, 
and more compelling approach to ERISA preemption.  
 In light of the foregoing, if Travelers controls (as it should), the 
Act could, as a legal matter, be salvaged by recasting the Act’s accounts as 
individual retirement accounts under which the employee/individual 
account holders bear investment risk and thus benefit directly from 
                                                         
9 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
10 See 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). 
11 See 514 U.S. 645, 701 (1995). 
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investment gains and incur the costs of investment losses.  However, as the 
Act is currently structured, the Act fails muster under the Code because the 
notional accounts created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement 
accounts. 
 There is, thus, a road map for amending the Act to make it Code 
and ERISA-compliant under Travelers: reformulate the accounts 
established under the Act as individual retirement accounts with 
investment reward and investment loss assigned to the account holder, 
rather than the current notional, formula-based design of the Act’s 
accounts.  However, under Shaw, there is no equivalent road map.  Since 
Travelers is the Supreme Court’s more recent and more convincing 
approach to ERISA preemption, the Act should be salvageable by 
converting its accounts to individual retirement accounts that allocate 
investment gain and loss to the account holders.  
 This Article first outlines the Act and then identifies five 
noteworthy features of the Act including the Act’s linkage of its employer 
mandate for retirement savings with a public investment vehicle for those 
savings as well as the Act’s characterization of the interests it creates as 
“accounts” rather than as annuities.  Part IV then discusses ERISA 
preemption, focusing upon the tension between Shaw and Travelers, and 
next introduces payroll deduction IRA arrangements.  In Part VI, this 
article explains its conclusions as to the three major issues raised by the 
Act under ERISA and the Code: the notional cash balance-style accounts 
created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since 
the accounts established by the Act create a defined benefit-type, formula-
based claim against a collectively-managed fund.  Individual retirement 
accounts instead allocate investment gain and loss directly to the individual 
account holder.  If the Act were amended to recast its accounts as 
individual retirement accounts, the Act’s employer withholding mandate 
and the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions should 
survive ERISA preemption under Travelers.  
 Legality, of course, is not the same as wisdom.  Thus, the final 
section addresses the choices other state legislatures, as well as Congress, 
confront if they elect to follow part or the entire path on which California 
has embarked to encourage private retirement savings.  Among these 
choices are an employer mandate without a state-sponsored savings vehicle 
like the California Trust, the augmentation of the federal tax credits for 
retirement plans and retirement savings with supplementary state tax 
credits, and the promotion of retirement savings through public education. 
Other legislatures may reasonably conclude that there is no role for the 
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states to play in light of both the robust market for retirement savings 
products and the federal government’s support for such savings. 
 President Obama has recently proposed a federal mandate under 
which employers with more than ten employees would be required to 
maintain either retirement plans or IRA coverage.12 However, the Obama 
proposal would not create the kind of public investment vehicle established 
under the California Act.  The President’s proposal ensures public debate 
about the appropriate function of government in encouraging retirement 
savings.  The Golden State’s Act will play an important role in that debate. 
In that debate, I favor state-by-state experimentation rather than any single 
approach to the task of encouraging greater retirement savings. 
 
II.  THE ACT, THE TRUST AND THE PROGRAM DESCRIBED 
 
 The Act13 creates a nine-member board14 (“the board”) to 
administer the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust15 (“the 
Trust”).  The Trust will “offer . . . a retirement savings program” to be 
known as the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program16 
(“the program”).  Integral to the program is an employer mandate, 
requiring California employers to maintain for their employees a “payroll 
deposit retirement savings arrangement.”17 Under these mandated 
arrangements, employees in the Golden State otherwise without 
employment-based retirement savings options will be able to contribute to 
                                                         
12 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 5, at 125. 
13 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012). 
14 Id. at § 3 (adding § 100002 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). In its original 
incarnation, the Act established a seven member board consisting of the Treasurer 
of California, California’s Director of Finance “or his or her designee,” the 
Controller of California, “[a]n individual with retirement savings and investment 
expertise appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules,” two gubernatorial 
appointees (one “[a] small business representative,” the other “[a] public member”) 
and “[a]n employee representative appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly.” Id. 
Senate Bill 923 then amended the Act to add two additional members to the board 
appointed by the Governor with no restrictions. See S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 1000002(a)(1)(H) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2013)). 
15 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100004(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2013)). 
16 Id. (adding § 100000(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
17 Id. (adding §§ 100000(g) and 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
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accounts managed by the Trust through employer withholding from 
employees’ paychecks.18 
 Within nine months “after the board opens the program for 
enrollment,”19 private and nonprofit employers20 in the Golden State must 
have such a payroll “arrangement to allow employee participation in the 
program”21 through payroll deductions unless one of several statutory 
exemptions applies.  Under one of these exemptions, an employer need not 
maintain a state-sponsored payroll deduction arrangement if the employer 
has fewer than five employees.22 Moreover, employees cannot participate 
in the California program if they are covered by the Railway Labor Act23 
or by a multiemployer pension plan.24 In addition, a California employer 
need not enroll employees in the state-run program established by the Act 
if the employer sponsors its own retirement program for its employees25 or 
if the employer has in place an IRA payroll deduction plan for its 
employees.26 
 Thus, when it takes effect, the Act will promulgate an employer 
retirement savings mandate for California employers.  Under the Act’s 
mandate, Golden State employers with five or more employees will be 
required to have one of three forms of retirement savings arrangements for 
their employees, i.e., an employer-sponsored plan (including a 
multiemployer or railroad pension), a payroll IRA deduction plan or, as the 
default option, a state-sponsored “payroll deposit retirement savings 
arrangement”27 under the California program established by the Act.28  
                                                         
18 Id. (adding § 100012(j) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
19 Id. (adding § 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). During this nine-
month period, larger employers must offer payroll deposit retirement savings 
arrangements. Id. (adding §§ 100032(b) and 100032(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
20 Id. (adding § 100000(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). Public employers 
are specifically exempted from the requirements of the Act. Id. 
21 Id. (adding § 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
22 See id. (adding § 100000(d) to the CL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
23 Id. (adding § 100000(c)(2)(A-B) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
24 Id. (adding § 100000(c)(2)(B) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
25 Id. (adding §§ 100032(d) and 100032(f) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (adding § 100000(f) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
28 Employers employing four or fewer employees can participate in the 
program, though they are not required to do so. Id. (adding § 100032(a) to the CAL. 
GOV’T CODE (2012) (“[A]ny employer may choose to have a payroll deposit 
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 When a California employer maintains a payroll savings deposit 
arrangement pursuant to the state-sponsored program, any of the 
employer’s employees will be able to affirmatively elect against 
participation in such arrangement.29 Absent such an election of 
nonparticipation, each California employee covered by the state-run 
program will “contribute 3 percent of the employee’s annual salary or 
wages to the program”30 through employer withholding.  However, the Act 
provides that an employee may specify a contribution rate other than 3%.31 
The Act also provides that the board “may adjust the contribution” rate 
under the program to as little as 2% of an employee’s compensation and as 
much as 4% of an employee’s compensation”32 and may “vary” the 
program’s contribution rate between 2% and 4% “according to the length 
of time the employee has contributed to the program.”33 
 Employee contributions pursuant to the program will be withheld 
by employers and remitted to the Trust.34 The Act also permits employers 
to make supplementary contributions from their own funds to employees’ 
accounts under the program as long as such employer contributions “would 
not cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit plan under” 
ERISA.35 
 The Trust will provide a public vehicle for the investment of 
employees’ retirement savings.  The Trust and the program, governed by a 
public board,36 will collect and provide for the investment of those 
                                                         
retirement savings arrangement to allow employee participation in the program.”)). 
29 Id. (adding §§ 100032(e)(1) and 100032(g) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
30 Id. (adding § 100032(h) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (adding § 100032(i) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (adding §§ 100000(g) and 100012(j) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
35 Id. (adding §§ 100004(e) and 100012(k) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
Employer contributions cause the California program to become an employee 
benefit plan for ERISA purposes since such employer contributions transform a 
payroll deposit IRA arrangement limited to employees’ contributions into an 
employee benefit plan with employer contributions. However, such employer 
contributions do not trigger preemption under ERISA § 514(a) as explicated by 
Travelers. See infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text 
36 Id. (adding § 100002 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012), as subsequently 
amended by S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2012)). 
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savings.37 The monies held in the Trust may, at the board’s election, be 
invested by the treasurer of California.38 Alternatively, the board can 
arrange for the Trust’s funds to be invested by the board of the California 
state pension plan39 (commonly known as CalPERS)40 or by “private 
money managers,”41 or by some combination of CalPERS and private 
managers.42 Among the board’s other powers in its “capacity of trustee”43 
of the Trust, the board can “[p]rocure insurance against any loss in 
connection with the property, assets, or activities of the trust, and secure 
private underwriting and reinsurance to manage risk and insure the 
retirement savings rate of return.”44 
 If the board does not purchase such insurance to protect against 
losses, the board must instead provide an “annuity, or other funding 
mechanism . . . at all times that protects the value of individuals’ 
accounts.”45 
 Withholding by participating employers under the program is 
intended to qualify as “payroll deposit IRA arrangements.”46 Each 
employee contributing to the Trust through employer withholding will 
have a notional account in the Trust.47 These notional accounts are 
intended to qualify as individual retirement accounts under Code § 408.48 
The Act specifically prohibits the board from implementing “the program 
if the IRA arrangements” offered under the program “fail to qualify for the 
favorable federal income tax treatment ordinarily accorded to IRAs under 
the Internal Revenue Code . . . .”49 This favorable treatment includes the 
                                                         
37 According to the Act, the Trust is intended to be financially self-sustaining, 
paying its administrative costs from the assets contributed to the Trust. See id. 
(adding §§ 100004(c) and 100042 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
38 Id. (adding § 100004(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
39 Id. 
40 See CALPERS, www.calpers.ca.gov (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
41 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100004(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (adding § 100010(a) introductory language to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
44 Id.  
45 Id. (adding § 1000013 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
46 Id. (adding § 100008(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
47 Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
48 Id. (adding § 100043 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
49 Id. An interesting issue that need not be addressed today is whether the Trust 
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tax-free growth of investments held within individual retirement 
accounts,50 the deductibility of contributions to traditional individual 
retirement accounts,51 and the exclusion from income taxation of qualified 
distributions from Roth individual retirement accounts.52 
  Each employee’s account under the program is notional in 
nature.53 Each such account will be credited with the employee’s 
contributions54 through the employer’s payroll withholding as well as with 
the “[S]tated interest rate”55 selected annually and prospectively by the 
board and with the Trust’s “excess earnings”56 which the board may, but 
not need, allocate to employees’ accounts.  During each year, the board is 
“to declare the stated rate at which interest shall be allocated to program 
accounts for the following program year.”57 
  There is no provision in the Act for allocating investment losses to 
employees’ accounts or otherwise adjusting such accounts downward to 
reflect such losses.  The employee’s “retirement savings benefit under the 
program”58 will be a claim against the Trust in “an amount equal to the 
balance in the [employee’s] program account.”59 
  As I discuss infra,60 since the Trust’s investment gains will not 
directly pass through to the notional accounts created under the Act, those 
accounts will not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code. 
The Trust, when it sets “the stated interest rate,” can pass through some, 
all, or none of the Trust’s prior investment earnings.  Similarly, the board 
can retroactively credit accounts with some, all or none of the Trust’s 
“excess” earnings above the stated rate of return.  The board has no 
                                                         
would be tax exempt under I.R.C. § 115 (2006) as a governmental agency if the 
accounts established by the Act do not qualify as IRAs. Since the Act will not go 
into effect unless the accounts created by the Act are IRAs, this issue need not be 
confronted, at least for now. 
50 I.R.C. § 408(e)(1) (2011). 
51 I.R.C. § 219 (2011). 
52 I.R.C. § 408A(d)(1) (2011). 
53 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100008(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
54 Id. (adding § 100008(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
55 Id. (adding §§ 100000(h) and 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
56 Id. (adding § 100006(a-c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
57 Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
58 Id. (adding § 100008(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
59 Id. 
60 See infra notes 134-35. 
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authority to reduce account balances to reflect the Trust’s investment 
losses.  These features of the accounts created under the Act preclude those 
accounts from constituting individual retirement accounts under the Code 
since the Trust’s investment gains and losses do not pass directly to 
accounts, but are instead mediated through the decisions of the board and 
through the formulas the board determines. 
  The Act provides that the State of California has no “liability in 
connection with funding retirement benefits pursuant to” the program.61 
 The board is not to implement the program if employees’ accounts 
under the program “fail to qualify” as IRAs under the Internal Revenue 
Code62 or “if it is determined that the program is an employee benefit plan 
under” ERISA.63 Moreover, under S.B. 923, the provisions of the Act will 
go into effect only if another vote of the California legislature approves the 
program and the Trust.64 
 
 III.  FIVE NOTEWORTHY FEATURES OF THE ACT, THE TRUST 
AND THE PROGRAM 
 
 Five features of the Act, the Trust and the program are noteworthy. 
First, the Act links its employer mandate to withhold and remit employees’ 
retirement contributions to the state-created (but not state-guaranteed) 
Trust holding and investing such contributions.  However, an employer 
mandate need not be adopted together with a public investment vehicle like 
the Trust. 
A state legislature determined to mandate employee retirement 
saving could instead require all employers to maintain a qualified plan or 
an IRA payroll deduction arrangement without establishing the kind of 
                                                         
61 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), and 100036 to 
the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
62 Id. (adding §§ 100043 and 100010(a)(11) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012), 
authorizing the board “in the capacity of trustee” to “[s]et minimum and maximum 
investment levels in accordance with contribution limits set for IRAs by the 
Internal Revenue Code.”). Presumably, the individual employee will be given the 
choice between conventional IRA tax treatment under I.R.C. § 408 or Roth IRA 
treatment under I.R.C. § 408A – if the Act’s accounts are modified to qualify as 
individual retirement accounts. 
63 Id. 
64 S.B. 923, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. at § 2 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043.5 to the 
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
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state-sponsored accounts to be managed by the California Trust.  This is 
the approach embodied in President Obama’s proposal to establish a 
national employer mandate requiring retirement savings opportunities in 
the workplace without establishing any public investment vehicle for such 
savings.65 
 One could also envision a legislature creating a voluntary state-
sponsored investment trust for retirement savings (like current section 529 
college savings programs)66 without the legislature simultaneously 
enacting an employer mandate requiring workplace savings arrangements.  
However, the California Act links its employer mandate to a public 
investment vehicle by sending to the Trust all employee contributions 
withheld by employers pursuant to the program established under the Act.  
  A second notable feature of the California Act is the Act’s attempt 
to qualify employees’ accounts under the Act as individual retirement 
accounts.  Individual retirement accounts are today ubiquitous instruments 
for holding employees’ retirement wealth.67 However, as I discuss infra,68 
employees’ accounts under the California program are not individual 
retirement accounts, defined contribution devices under which account 
owners benefit directly from the gains earned by those assets while bearing 
the losses incurred by those assets.  Instead, the employees’ interests in 
their notional accounts in the California Trust resemble participants’ 
entitlements under cash balance pension plans.  Cash balance plans are 
defined benefit arrangements.  An employee covered by a cash balance 
pension has a notional account to which is credited contributions and an 
assumed rate of interest.69 
  On retirement, the cash balance participant is entitled to receive 
the balance in his notional account, rather than an amount which reflects 
                                                         
65 See supra note 5. 
66 See EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW 
THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 64-70 (2007) 
(discussing Section 529 plans). 
67 See id. at 39-42 (discussing IRAs). 
68 See infra notes 134-35. 
69 See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan: A 
Critique, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-1—1-19 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2007); Alvin D. Lurie, 
Murphy’s Law Strikes Again: Twilight For Cash Balance Design?, 101 TAX 
NOTES 393 (Oct. 20, 2003); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 
19 VA. TAX REV. 683 (2000). 
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the value of the underlying assets held by the plan.  If the employees’ cash 
balance accounts aggregate to more than the assets in the plan, the 
sponsoring employer is obligated to fund this difference.  Conversely, if 
the assets held by a cash balance pension exceed the total of the 
employees’ notional accounts, those extra assets may revert to the 
employer.70 Thus, as a defined benefit plan, a cash balance pension assigns 
the benefits and downsides of investment performance to the sponsoring 
employer. 
  The accounts created by the Act resemble this kind of cash 
balance arrangement rather than an individual retirement account under 
which investment risk is, for better or worse, assigned to the account 
holder.  The Act does not authorize the allocation of investment losses to 
the accounts authorized by the Act.  Under the Act, there is no direct 
connection between the Trust’s investment gains and the balances of such 
accounts.  Rather, the Trust’s investment gains will be mediated through 
the board’s selection of a stated rate of return for employees’ accounts and 
by the board’s decisions to allocate (or not) some or all of the Trust’s 
“excess” investment gains above the stated rate of return.  That stated 
return, to be picked before the year begins, may prove higher, the same or 
lower than the Trust’s actual investment performance.  As I discuss infra,71 
because the cash balance-style accounts established under the Act do not 
assign investment risk to the employee/account holders, such accounts do 
not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code. 
 Third, the Act repeatedly and specifically characterizes 
participants’ interests under the programs as “accounts” rather than as 
annuities.72 The Act does not subject the Trust to California’s regulation of 
insurance companies73 or purport to characterize the Trust as an insurance 
company.  Thus, as I discuss further infra,74 the notional accounts 
established by the Act not only fail to qualify as individual retirement 
accounts under the Code, but they also are not individual retirement 
annuities for purposes of Code § 408(b).75 
 A fourth notable feature of the Golden State’s program is its 
                                                         
70 Such a reversion is subject to an excise tax. 26 I.R.C. § 4980(a) (2010). 
71 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. 
72 See generally S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 
100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE). 
73 See generally CAL. INS. CODE. 
74 See discussion infra 166-176 and accompanying text. 
75 See 26 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2006). 
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automatic enrollment of eligible employees, subject to each employee’s 
ability to opt out of the program if the employee so chooses.  The 
program’s automatic enrollment feature reflects the influential 
observations of behavioral economists that individuals are often subject to 
inertia and procrastination in making important decisions like the decision 
to save for retirement.76 From the premise of inertia and procrastination, 
many commentators conclude that higher participation rates can be 
achieved in 401(k) and similar retirement savings arrangements if 
employees are presumptively included in such arrangements and required 
to elect out, rather than being obligated to affirmatively elect coverage 
under such arrangements.77 Just as procrastination and inertia discourage 
employees from electing to save for retirement, procrastination and inertia 
discourage employees from electing against such saving when saving is 
presumptive and must be affirmatively rejected. 
 This insight of behavioral economics led Congress to amend Code 
§ 401(k) to authorize sponsoring employers to adopt automatic enrollment 
provisions.78 Under these provisions, employees contribute from their 
salaries to their retirement accounts unless such employees choose not to 
contribute.  Initial “[s]tudies have shown that automatically enrolling 
people into 401(k) plans can achieve higher levels of participation.”79 In 
this spirit, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act mandates that 
large employers must automatically enroll their covered employees into 
employer-sponsored health plans, subject to the employees’ ability to opt 
out.80 The California Act and the program the Act creates embrace this 
                                                         
76 Hanming Fang and Dan Silverman, Distinguishing Between Cognitive 
Biases, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 51, 55-56 (Edward J. McCaffery and Joel 
Slemrod eds., 2006). 
77 See id.; WILLIAM J. CONGDON ET AL., POLICY AND CHOICE 77-79 (2011); 
James J. Choi et al., Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance, in 
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 76, at 304; Annie Lowrey, Tax Breaks 
and Savings Play Role in Budget Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, at A19 
(“policies that automatically saved a portion of a worker’s income increased total 
savings by a substantial amount.”). 
78 26 I.R.C. § 401(k)(13) (2006). See also Fran Hawthorne, Heading for 
Retirement on Autopilot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013. 
79 Jonathan Barry Forman & Gordon D. Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for Defined 
Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian Pension 
Systems 36 (Austl. Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954879. 
80 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1511, 
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increasingly fashionable pattern of automatic enrollment under which 
eligible employees presumptively contribute to their respective program 
accounts unless they affirmatively reject such contributions.81 
 A fifth notable feature of the Act is the acknowledgment of the 
problem of implicit government guarantees and the Act’s explicit 
repudiation of any such guarantees.  Recent discussion about implicit 
government guarantees has occurred in the context of banks and other 
financial institutions deemed “too big to fail,” as well as government-
sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.82 Important 
commentators suggest that these large institutions and entities benefit from 
an unstated but widely-accepted understanding that the federal government 
could not permit any of these institutions or entities to become insolvent.83  
From this vantage, there is an implicit guarantee that the federal 
government will again bail out many of these institutions and entities, as 
the federal government did during the Great Recession. 
 The Act explicitly and repeatedly warns that the State of California 
is not liable to the employees who participate in the program.84 According 
to the Act, participating employees must be paid from the assets of the 
Trust including any private insurance coverage the Trust may purchase to 
guarantee the program’s promises to such employees.85 While the Act 
reiterates that the treasury of the Golden State does not stand behind the 
Trust or the program, some critics suggest that, despite the Act’s 
disclaimer of state liability to the employees who participate in the 
program, in a crunch, no future governor or legislature of California could 
in fact stand by idly if the Trust lacked the financial ability to pay the 
                                                         
124 Stat. 119, 252 (2010) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 by 
adding § 18A, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 218A (2010)). 
81 President Obama takes a similar approach in his proposal for a federal 
employer mandate for workplace retirement savings. See supra text accompanying 
notes 4-5. 
82 See, e.g., SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS (2012); ANDREW ROSS 
SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND 
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS – AND 
THEMSELVES (2009); Gretchen Morgenson, One Safety Net That Needs to Shrink, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012, at BU1.   
83 See, e.g., Bair, supra note 82, at 28 (“The moral hazard problem is worse for 
very large institutions that the market perceives as being too big to fail.”). 
84 See S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100013, 
100014(c)(3) and 100036 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
85 Id. (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
562      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
account balances of such employees.86 In discussion of S.B. 1234, the 
California Department of Finance expressed this concern that California’s 
treasury might ultimately wind up responsible for the program’s 
commitments.87 However, the text of the Act is explicit that the Golden 
State’s public treasury does not stand behind the Trust.   
 
IV. ERISA PREEMPTION: Shaw v. Travelers  
 
 ERISA’s preemption clause, ERISA § 514(a),88 is extremely broad: 
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” regulated by ERISA.  
Starting with its decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.89 through District 
of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,90 the U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreted § 514(a) expansively.91 Under the case law developed 
during this period, § 514(a) preempts any state law which “has a 
connection with or reference to” an employee benefit plan.92 Under this 
                                                         
86 See, e.g., Frank Keegan, Private Pension Plan Would Raid Taxpayers to Fill 
Public Pension Gap, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 29, 2012, at A13 (“But the 
overriding question left answered on the issue of `guaranteed’ retirement income is: 
guaranteed by whom? Answer: taxpayers, the same people now stuck with the 
insurmountable debt of a retirement system in an accelerating death spiral.”); Rich 
Danker, California Doubles Down on Pension Promising, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2012, at A13 (The Act “confuses retirement as an expectation, rather than 
an objective.”); Judy Lin, The Problems with SB1234, ASSOC. OF CAL. LIFE & 
HEALTH INS. CO., May 30, 2012 (“Funding shortfalls and huge taxpayer 
liabilities.”). 
87 See Kevin DeLeon, Department of Finance Bill Analysis (May 2, 2012) (on 
file with the California Department of Finance) (“Despite the bill’s stated intent to 
shield the state from financial liability, the state ultimately could be responsible for 
benefit payments under federal law, putting the state at serious risk of billions of 
dollars in unfunded liabilities if investment performance falters under the 
Program.”). 
88 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
89 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
90 See D.C. v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992). 
91 For a detailed discussion of this initial stage of the Court’s interpretation of 
ERISA § 514(a), see Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the 
New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 815-27 
(1999). 
92 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97. 
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unforgiving standard, ERISA preemption is nearly automatic.93 
 The Court subsequently retreated from Shaw’s formulation of 
ERISA preemption, without (so far, at least) acknowledging that retreat.  In 
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Insurance Co.,94 the Court formulated a more restrained (though still quite 
broad) understanding of ERISA § 514(a), presuming “that Congress does 
not intend to supplant state law.”95 
 Travelers involved surcharges New York State imposed as part of 
its regulation of hospital rates.  Pursuant to this regulation, hospitals 
charged patients covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, by Medicaid, or by an 
HMO only basic billing rates for their hospital stays.  Other patients, e.g., 
those covered by commercial insurers, by self-insured funds, or by 
volunteer firefighter benefits, paid to the hospital a 13% surcharge for their 
hospitalizations.  Hospitalized patients covered by commercial insurance 
also paid a second surcharge of 11%, which the hospital remitted to the 
state.  The impact of these surcharges was to encourage employers to 
switch their medical plans from commercial insurance and self-funding to 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage to achieve lower net costs for their 
employees’ hospitalizations. 
 In a straightforward application of Shaw and its expansive test for 
ERISA preemption (“connection with or reference to”), the Second 
Circuit96 held that ERISA § 514(a) preempted New York’s hospital 
surcharges.  These surcharges, the appeals court concluded, improperly 
burdened employers’ ERISA-regulated health care plans with higher costs 
if such plans declined to use Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance coverage. 
 In a sharp (but, so far, unacknowledged) break with Shaw, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the Empire State’s 
hospital surcharges against ERISA preemption challenge.  The 
interpretation of § 514(a) in any situation, Travelers declares, starts with 
the “presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”97 
Through § 514(a), Congress sought “to avoid a multiplicity of [state] 
regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of 
employee benefit plans.”98 The danger to such national uniformity is 
                                                         
93 See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 816. 
94 514 U.S. 645 (1995) [hereinafter Travelers]. 
95 See id. at 654. 
96 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1993). 
97 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654. 
98 Id. at 657. 
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greatest when a state law dictates “employee benefit structures or their 
administration”99 or provides “alternative enforcement mechanisms.”100 A 
state law is not ERISA-preempted under § 514(a) merely because of its 
“indirect economic influence” on employee benefit plans.101 
 It is hard to reconcile Travelers’ more forgiving approach to 
ERISA preemption with Shaw.  The Court has, so far, declined to confront 
the tension in its ERISA preemption case law.102 
 Often, the tension between Shaw and Travelers does not matter. 
For example, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart” Act is ERISA-preempted under 
either approach.103 However, as I discuss below, the California Act 
presents a case where the two different formulations of ERISA preemption 
lead to two different outcomes.  ERISA preempts the Act’s employer 
mandate and the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions 
under the Shaw standard with its near automatic preemption of state law.  
However, the Act’s employer mandate and optional employer contributions 
survive under the revised and more compelling approach to ERISA § 
514(a) later embodied in Travelers. 
 
V. THE PAYROLL DEDUCTION IRA SAFE HARBOR  
 
 ERISA preempts state laws as such laws “relate to any employee 
benefit plans”104 governed by ERISA.  ERISA identifies two kinds of 
employee benefit plans,105 “welfare” plans,106 which provide fringe 
benefits such as medical, sickness and death benefit coverage, and 
“pension” plans,107 which provide “retirement income to employees”108 or 
otherwise result “in a deferral of income by employees for periods 
                                                         
99 Id. at 658. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 659. 
102 See Zelinsky, supra note 93, for a discussion on the tension within the 
Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption case law. 
103 Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart” Act: Policy and Preemption, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 847, 851-70 (2006). 
104 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
105 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2006). 
106 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). 
107 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006). 
108 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
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extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.”109 
 The regulations of the Department of Labor (DOL) create a safe 
harbor from ERISA regulation for what have come to be called “payroll 
deduction IRA” arrangements.110 Per the regulations,111 a payroll deduction 
IRA arrangement is not a “pension” plan for ERISA purposes, chiefly 
because only the employee contributes to his IRA under such an 
arrangement; there are no employer contributions.  Since it is not a pension 
plan, a payroll deduction device is not an “employee benefit plan” and thus 
is not regulated by ERISA.  Consequently, ERISA § 514(a) does not 
preempt a state law relating to a payroll deduction IRA arrangement 
because such a payroll deduction arrangement is not an employee benefit 
plan for purposes of ERISA.  The drafters of the California Act attempted 
to qualify the Golden State’s program for this safe harbor112 so that the 
program will constitute a payroll deduction IRA arrangement, subject to 
state regulation, rather than an ERISA-regulated pension plan with respect 
to which state law is preempted. 
 The DOL regulations define a payroll deduction IRA arrangement, 
outside ERISA’s coverage, as a “completely voluntary”113 scheme which is 
                                                         
109 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
110 Announcement 99-2, 1991-1 CB 305; see also EBSA & IRS, Payroll 
Deduction IRAs for Small Businesses, www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/ 
PayrollDedIRAs.pdf. 
111 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2013). 
112 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100032 to the CAL. 
GOV’T CODE (2012), describing the Act as permitting and requiring “payroll 
deposit retirement savings arrangement[s].”). 
113 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii). Employees’ participation in the withholding 
program created by the Act would be “completely voluntary” because every 
employee under the Act would have the option to opt out of the program. S.B. 1234 
§3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100014(c)(3), 100032(e)(1) and 100032(g) to the CAL 
GOV’T CODE (2012)). There is a counterargument that participation in the program 
would not be “completely voluntary” since the employee would have the burden of 
opting out. However, this burden does not seem weighty enough to conclude that 
employees’ participation in the program would be less than voluntary. The 
Department of Labor (“DOL”) came to a similar conclusion in the context of health 
savings accounts (“HSAs”). Specifically, DOL’s Employee Benefits Security 
Administration concluded that “the establishment of an HSA by an employee [is] 
‘completely voluntary’” when an employer creates and funds an HSA as long as the 
employee “may move the funds to another HSA or otherwise withdraw the funds.” 
Robert J. Doyle, Health Savings Accounts – ERISA Q&As, FIELD ASSISTANCE 
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solely employee-financed.  No contributions can come from the 
employer.114 Under an IRA payroll arrangement, the “sole involvement of 
the employer” “is without endorsement to permit the sponsor to publicize 
the program,” “to collect contributions through payroll deductions,” and to 
remit such contributions to the employees’ respective IRAs.115 
 Payroll deduction IRA arrangements contrast with two other IRA-
based retirement savings devices, the “simplified employee pension” 
(SEP)116 and the “simple retirement account (SRA).”117 For purposes of the 
present discussion, the principal difference between these IRA-based 
savings devices and payroll deduction IRAs is that employers make 
contributions to SEPs and SRAs, but do not make contributions under 
payroll deduction IRA arrangements.  Because the employer contributes to 
a SEP or a SRA, a SEP or a SRA is (unlike a payroll deduction IRA) an 
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan.118 
 Under a SEP, the employer makes contributions to IRAs for its 
employees in proportion to such employees’ respective compensation.119 
SRAs require employer contributions emulating the safe harbor 
contributions for 401(k) plans.  Specifically, an employer sponsoring SRAs 
for its employees must either match employees’ salary reduction 
contributions to their IRAs120 or must contribute across-the-board to 
                                                         
BULL. NO. 2006-02, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fab2006-2.pdf. This 
conclusion is persuasive and confirms that employees’ participation in the 
withholding program created by the Act would be “completely voluntary” within 
the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii). 
114 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(i). 
115 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(iii). Moreover, the employer cannot receive 
“consideration in the form of cash or otherwise, other than reasonable 
compensation for services actually rendered in connection with payroll 
deductions.” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(iv). 
116 26 U.S.C. § 408(k) (2006). 
117 26 U.S.C. § 408(p) (2006). 
118 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006). 
119 26 U.S.C. § 408(k)(3) (2006). Before 1997, employers could establish so-
called “SAR-SEPs,” simplified employee pensions with salary reduction 
arrangements under which employees can also contribute to their respective IRAs 
subject to 401(k)-type deferral testing. While existing SAR-SEPs were 
grandfathered, new SAR-SEPs can no longer be created. 26 U.S.C. § 408(k)(6)(H) 
(2006). 
120 See infra notes 204-210 and accompanying text. 
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employees’ IRAs at a rate of 2% of each employee’s compensation.121 
 As I discuss infra,122 if a California employer were to make 
employer contributions under the provisions of the Act authorizing such 
optional employer contributions, these voluntary employer contributions 
would convert the California program for this employer from a payroll 
deduction IRA arrangement,123 limited to employee contributions, into an 
ERISA-regulated employee pension plan, namely, either a SEP or a SRA 
financed by employer contributions.  As I also discuss below,124 under 
Shaw, ERISA § 514(a) preempts the provisions of the Act authorizing 
employer contributions though those provisions are not preempted under 
Travelers. 
 
VI. THE ACT’S NOTIONAL ACCOUNTS ARE NOT INDIVIDUAL 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS   
 
A.  APPLYING THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF ERISA AND THE CODE 
 
 A fundamental question is whether the accounts established under 
the Act are individual retirement accounts for purposes of the Code.  The 
drafters of the Act labeled these as “accounts” and intended for these self-
proclaimed accounts to qualify as individual retirement accounts.125 The 
Act prohibits the board from implementing “the program if the IRA 
arrangements” offered under the program “fail to qualify for the favorable 
federal income tax treatment ordinarily accorded to IRAs under the 
Internal Revenue Code . . . .”126 
 The cash balance-style notional accounts established by the Act do 
not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code as the Act’s 
accounts do not benefit directly from investment gains nor do such 
                                                         
121 26 U.S.C. § 408(p)(2)(B)(i) (2006). The 2% employer contributions under 
simple retirement accounts are similar to the 3% employer contributions under one 
type of 401(k) safe harbor arrangement. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(12)(C) (2006). 
122 See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text. 
123 This assumes that the Act will be amended to convert its cash balance-style 
“nominal” accounts into true IRAs that allocate investment risk to the account 
holder. 
124 See infra notes 211-219 and accompanying text. 
125 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043 to the CAL. 
GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
126 Id. 
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accounts bear investment losses.  The accounts created by the Act are 
notional accounts that give the employee a formula-based defined benefit-
type claim against the assets held collectively by the Trust.  That claim is 
not based on the value of those Trust assets.  California’s program is not a 
defined contribution arrangement with individual accounts assigning 
investment risk and reward to the account holder.  Accounts under the Act 
will be credited with an assumed rate of return determined before the 
commencement of the year.127 For any year, the Trust’s actual investment 
performance may prove to be higher, the same as, or lower than the rate 
assumed before the year began.  The board can retroactively allot to the 
program accounts some, all, or none of the Trust’s “excess” investment 
gains above the stated rate of return.  In any event, accounts under the Act 
will not be decreased to reflect the Trust’s investment losses.  
Consequently, the cash balance-style notional accounts that the Act 
authorizes are not individual retirement accounts. 
 Internal Revenue Code § 408, which establishes the “individual 
retirement account” as a matter of federal law, does not define that 
statutory term.  However, as part of ERISA (which created the IRA),128 
Congress twice129 adopted a statutory definition to distinguish defined 
contribution arrangements, such as money purchase pensions130 and profit 
sharing plans,131 from defined benefit pensions.  The ERISA (i.e., Title 29) 
version of this definition makes clear that the term “individual account 
plan” is synonymous with “defined contribution plan” and provides that,  
 
[t]he term “individual account plan” or “defined 
contribution plan” means a pension plan which provides 
for an individual account for each participant and for 
                                                         
127 Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
128 See An Act to Provide Pension Reform, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002(b), 88 
Stat. 829, 959-66 (1974) (adding § 408 to the United States Code, creating the 
individual retirement account). 
129 As observed supra, many provisions of ERISA were adopted twice, once as 
additions to the Internal Revenue Code and once as additions to Title 29 of the 
United States Code, enforced by the Department of Labor. See supra note 6. 
130 On money purchase pension plans, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 2; 
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 50-51; LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. 
MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 33 (3d ed. 2012). 
131 On profit sharing plans, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 2, 4, 14; LANGBEIN 
ET AL., supra note 6, at 51-52; FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 130, at 33-34. 
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benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the 
participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and 
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants 
which may be allocated to such participant’s account.132 
 
The Internal Revenue Code version of this definition, today part of the tax 
statute as 26 U.S.C. § 414(i),133 is identical except that the tax law 
exclusively uses the term “defined contribution plan.”       
  Under this twice-enacted definition, an account exists for 
retirement savings purposes only when a participant’s interest in his own 
account is “based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s 
account, and any income, expenses, gain and losses, and any forfeitures of 
accounts . . . which may be allocated to such participant’s account.”134 An 
individual account does not exist for retirement savings purposes if an 
external formula, operating independently of actual earnings and losses, 
determines a participant’s entitlement under the retirement plan.  Thus, a 
retirement account (in contrast to a defined benefit arrangement) exists 
only when investment risk is placed directly on the account holder so that 
all investment gain automatically inures to the advantage of the account 
holder and investment losses decrease the account holder’s entitlement 
under the plan.   
 In contrast, the Act’s notional, cash balance-style accounts do not 
reflect the Trust’s actual investment experience but instead implement a 
defined benefit-style formula, namely, contributions augmented by an 
assumed rate of return unreduced by any losses.  Under the California Act, 
the account holder is entitled to this formula-established amount, 
regardless of the Trust’s actual investment performance.  The account 
holder’s interest does not derive directly from the value of the assets held 
by the Trust.  Rather, the account holder has a defined benefit-style, 
formula-based claim against the collective fund held by the Trust.  This 
formula ignores losses and automatically credits each account with an 
assumed rate of return, regardless of the Trust’s actual investment 
performance.  Hence, the accounts to be created under the Act do not 
comply with the statutory mandate that IRAs must provide “benefits based 
solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any 
                                                         
132 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006). 
133 26 U.S.C. § 414(i) (2006). 
134 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006). 
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income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures . . . .”135 
 Suppose, for example, a year for which the California board 
assumes a return of 3% while the Trust established by the Act actually 
experiences a net investment gain of 5%.  The board could retroactively 
allocate this “excess” investment gain to the program’s accounts or could 
consider this superior investment performance in setting the stated return 
for the following year.  The board may also do both or neither.  Under any 
of these scenarios, there will be no direct connection between the Trust’s 
investment performance and the accounts’ balances.  Any investment gain 
is mediated through the board and its implementation of the statutory 
command to assume a rate of return before the beginning of each year. 
 Suppose, moreover, a year in which the Trust losses money on the 
investments it holds.  The Act does not authorize a decrease in account 
balances to reflect these losses.  Following a loss year, the board might 
assume a 0% return so that account balances stay the same in the face of 
the prior year’s investment losses.  However, the statutory definition of an 
individual account requires that losses reduce account balances.136 As the 
Act is written, there is no provision for such loss-based reductions to 
account balances under the California program.   
 In short, as a statutory matter, all retirement accounts, including 
individual retirement accounts, must directly reflect investment gains and 
losses.  The formula-based, cash balance-style accounts fashioned by the 
California Act do not and thus cannot constitute individual retirement 
accounts under Internal Revenue Code § 408.  
 
B.  APPLYING THE CASE LAW ON RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
 
 Also instructive in this context is the seminal decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Connolly v. Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp.137 Connolly, and its progeny,138 confirm that the defined 
                                                         
135 Id.; I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006). 
136 Id. 
137 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1978). 
138 Connolly has been cited and followed in three subsequent decisions 
addressing the distinction between defined benefit pensions and defined 
contribution/individual account plans: Concord Control, Inc. v. Int’l Union, United 
Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 647 F.2d 701, 704-05 
(6th Cir. 1981); Matter of Defoe Shipbuilding Co., 639 F.2d 311, 313 (6th Cir. 
1981); In re Gray-Grimes Tool Co., Inc. Pension Plan, 546 F. Supp. 102, 107-09 
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benefit-style accounts established by the Act are not individual retirement 
accounts for purposes of the Code. 
 The question before the court in Connolly was whether a 
multiemployer139 pension plan was a defined benefit plan, subject to the 
plan termination insurance administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (“PBGC”), or was a defined contribution/individual account 
plan, outside the coverage of the PBGC and its insurance program.140 
Starting with ERISA’s statutory definition of a defined 
contribution/individual account plan,141 the appeals court concluded that 
the plan at issue in Connolly was a defined benefit pension because 
benefits were based on a formula rather than the actual investment 
experience of any particular individual account. 
 The appeals court noted that, under the Connolly plan, 
“[c]ontributions on behalf of participants are pooled in a general fund . . . 
[T]he participant has no right, title, or interest in these [contributed] 
amounts.”142 Rather, the participant’s entitlement under the plan was based 
on a specified formula.  Such a formula is a feature of a defined benefit 
plan, which, as its name implies, defines for each participant a retirement 
benefit by applying a formula established in the plan.  This formula applies 
irrespective of the plan’s actual investment performance. 
 In Connolly, the plan’s formula utilized the participant’s years of 
service to determine the participant’s retirement benefit.  Under the 
California program, a cash balance-type formula creates a notional account 
consisting of cumulative contributions adjusted by an assumed rate of 
return, unreduced by any losses.  The board can, but need not, retroactively 
credit accounts with some or all of the Trust’s “excess” investment 
earnings.  As is true of the cash balance accounts that the Act’s accounts 
emulate, actual investment performance will not directly increase the 
participants’ benefits in their accounts in the California program, nor will 
investment losses decrease such benefits. 
 Also instructive in this context is the supplementary test deployed 
by the Connolly court, the possibility of underfunding.  “[B]y definition, an 
                                                         
(E.D. Mich. 1982). 
139 For discussion of multiemployer pension plans, see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 70-77. 
140 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2006) (PBGC insurance does not apply to “an 
individual account plan”). 
141 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006). 
142 Connolly, 581 F.2d at 733. 
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individual account plan can never be underfunded”143 since the account 
holder is entitled to whatever total his account grows or falls, based on the 
account’s actual investment performance.  In contrast, there can be 
underfunding with cash balance notional accounts since these are defined 
benefit devices; if plan assets are less than a cash balance participant’s 
notional account total, the participant is still entitled to this larger formula-
based total.  Conversely, if a cash balance plan has more assets than are 
necessary to pay every participant the amount in his notional account, that 
excess can revert to the employer.144 
  Like the plan at issue in Connolly, the California program creates 
a defined benefit-type cash balance entitlement that may be underfunded 
(or overfunded).  Whether assets in the Trust are more or less than the 
amount in participants’ notional accounts, the California participants are 
entitled to their respective formula-based entitlements as reflected in those 
notional accounts.145 If assets in the Trust are insufficient to pay these 
amounts, the account holders will have a claim against the Trust’s 
collective assets for the holders’ respective formula-based benefits.  The 
California account holder under the Act has a defined benefit-type claim 
against this total pool of Trust assets, a claim for the formula-based total in 
his notional account. 
 Significant in this context is the Act’s authorization of the board to 
purchase insurance to guarantee against underfunding.146 As the Ninth 
Circuit observed in Connolly, individual account plans cannot be 
underfunded.  Insurance against underfunding is the hallmark of a defined 
benefit pension that promises a benefit-based formula independent of the 
value of the assets actually financing the pension.  Today, defined benefit 
insurance is administered by the PBGC, established by ERISA.147 If a 
defined benefit pension plan is covered by such insurance148 and if the 
                                                         
143 Id. 
144 Such a reversion is subject to the excise tax of Code § 4980.  I.R.C. § 4980 
(2006). 
145 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2011) (adding § 100008(c) to 
the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
146 Id. (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
147 The PBGC and its insurance program are established in ERISA § 4001, 29 
U.S.C. § 1301 (2006). For background on the PBGC, see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 238-40; FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 130, at 626-30. 
148 Certain defined benefit plans are not subject to the PBGC and the insurance 
it provides. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)-(c) (2006). 
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assets held by the plan’s trust are inadequate to pay promised benefits, the 
PBGC’s insurance coverage makes up the difference for basic, insured 
benefits.149 
  Under California’s Act, the board administering the program and 
Trust is authorized to obtain similar insurance from a private insurer.150 
This authorization indicates the risk of defined benefit underfunding under 
the Act.  Underfunding insurance is not purchased for a defined 
contribution account since there is no promised benefit to insure and thus 
no risk of underfunding against which to insure. 
 In short, under the statutory definition of a retirement account as 
explicated by Connolly, an individual account benefits directly from 
investment gain, loses value from investment losses, is not controlled by a 
formula separate from such gains and losses, and cannot be underfunded 
since the account holder is entitled to whatever his account balance may 
be.  Hence, the notional accounts under the Act are not individual 
retirement accounts.  Rather, the accounts created under the Act reflect a 
defined benefit-style formula that gives the account holder a fixed claim 
against a collectively-invested trust fund.  The Trust’s investment gains 
will not automatically pass through to participants’ program accounts but 
rather will be mediated by the board through its choice of an assumed rate 
of return and its decision whether or not to credit accounts with the Trust’s 
“excess” earnings.  Since the Act’s accounts can be underfunded (why else 
should the board buy insurance against the risk of underfunding?), those 
accounts are not individual retirement accounts. 
 The same conclusion emerges from the appeals courts’ decisions 
under the Code version of the definition of a defined contribution plan, 
Code § 414(i).151 The most recent of these appeals court decisions is 
George v. United States.152 In George, the taxpayers were retirees from 
federal service who, while working, had participated in the Civil Service 
Retirement System (CSRS).  These taxpayers had contributed to the CSRS 
from their salaries with after-tax dollars while the federal government, as 
employer, matched those contributions.  When they retired, the George 
taxpayers elected to receive their own after-tax contributions as lump sum 
distributions while the remainder of their respective CSRS retirement 
                                                         
149 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322-1322a (2006). 
150 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
151 I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006). 
152 90 F.3d 473 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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benefits (attributable to employer contributions and earnings) were paid 
over time as annuities. 
 The issue in George was whether the lump sum and the annuity 
constituted a single, integrated contract or whether the lump sum 
(consisting of the employees’ own contributions) was a separate defined 
contribution pension plan, treated for tax purposes apart from the annuity.  
Under the former characterization, the lump sum (deemed to be integrated 
with the annuity) was taxable for income tax purposes.  Under the latter 
characterization, the lump sum (deemed to be a separate defined 
contribution plan) was a tax-free refund of the taxpayers’ own, already 
taxed contributions.153 The George taxpayers, relying on Code §§ 72(d) 
and 72(e)(5)(E), claimed that their contributions to the CSRS constituted a 
separate defined contribution plan.  From this premise, the lump sum 
payments were the tax-free return of their respective after-tax 
contributions.  The IRS, relying on Code § 72(e)(2)(A), asserted that the 
lump sum payments to the CSRS retirees were linked to the ongoing 
annuity payments and were thus fully taxable.  The resolution of this issue 
turned on the applicability of Code § 414(i): were the taxpayers’ after-tax 
contributions a separate defined contribution pension plan or were they 
part of the annuity paid by the CSRS? 
 The Federal Circuit, agreeing with two other courts of appeals,154 
held that the taxpayers’ after-tax contributions did not constitute a separate 
defined contribution plan with a “separate account”155 because a defined 
contribution plan must have an “investment-performance feature,”156 i.e., 
                                                         
153 “Employee contributions...under a defined contribution plan may be treated 
as a separate contract.” I.R.C. § 72(d) (2006). A lump sum distribution “received 
on or after the annuity starting date” is fully includable in gross income.  I.R.C. § 
72(e)(2)(A) (2006). However, I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(E) provides the counter rule for a 
lump sum “in full discharge of the obligation under the contract which is in the 
nature of a refund of the consideration paid for the contact.” I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(E) 
(2006). Such a lump sum in the nature of a refund is not taxable, but rather a return 
of the employees’ consideration.  
 The taxpayers in George, relying on Code §§ 72(d)-(e)(5)(E), claimed that 
their contributions to the CSRS constituted a separate defined contribution plan. 
Hence, the lump sums they received were in the nature of a tax-free return of the 
taxpayers’ own contributions.  90 F.3d at 477. 
154 Montgomery v. United States, 18 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1994); Malbon v. 
United States, 43 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994). 
155 I.R.C. § 414(k) (2006). 
156 George, 90 F.3d at 477. 
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investment gains and losses must be allocated to the alleged account 
holder. 
Since the George taxpayers were not allocated any investment 
gains and losses attributable to their after-tax contributions, those 
taxpayers did not participate in any separate defined contribution pension 
plan with individual accounts.  The lump sum payment from the CSRA did 
not come from a true individual account that grew from investment gains 
and incurred investment losses. 
 Particularly helpful in this context is the George Court’s 
discussion of Guilzon v. Commissioner,157 the only appeals court decision 
holding that the lump sums received by CSRS retirees derive from a 
defined contribution plan separate from the annuities paid by CSRS to 
these retirees.  Rejecting Guilzon, the Federal Circuit correctly observed 
that, contrary to the conclusion of Guilzon, “[u]nder the concept of a 
defined contribution plan . . . if income is earned, that income is to be 
added to the participant’s account.”158 In contrast, the Act’s notional 
accounts are not true accounts directly absorbing investment risk.  Hence, 
such notional accounts are not individual retirement accounts under Code § 
408.  
 
C.  CONSIDERING CRITIQUES 
 
 Consider in this context seven potential critiques of my conclusion 
that the program accounts established by the California Act are not 
individual retirement accounts for purposes of the Code.  First, an 
individual retirement account can be invested in a fixed income instrument. 
The individual retirement account so invested resembles the notional 
accounts established under the Act.  Thus, this initial critique would 
continue, the accounts under the Act are not so different from conventional 
individual retirement accounts after all. 
 To explore this challenge, let us suppose that an individual 
retirement account with a balance of $100 is invested in a corporate bond 
that pays interest of 2% annually.  At the end of the year, this account 
predictably has $102, reflecting the original principal and the first year’s 
interest.  Suppose now that an account established under the Act is credited 
with $100 in employee contributions and that, for the year, the board 
                                                         
157 985 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1993). 
158 George, 90 F.3d at 478. 
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assumes a rate of return of 2%.  At the end of the year, this account under 
the California Act will also have a balance of $102.  This similarity, the 
argument goes, implies that the Act’s accounts are individual retirement 
accounts for purposes of Code § 408 since the Act’s accounts simulate 
individual retirement accounts invested in fixed income instruments. 
 As far as it goes, in this example the individual retirement account 
resembles the notional account under the Act.  However, this resemblance 
evaporates upon further consideration of investment risk and reward.  
Consider, for example, a scenario in which interest rates spike mid-year.  
In this case, the principal balance in the individual retirement account 
automatically declines as the bond decreases in value.  In contrast, the 
California account holder has a formula-based, fixed dollar claim against 
the collective assets of the California trust.  If those assets go down, or up, 
in value, the account holder has the same claim for $102 against the Trust 
since the assumed rate of interest for the year (2%) was fixed by the 
California board before the year began. 
 The story is similar if interest rates decline.  In this case, the value 
of the bond in the individual retirement account rises to the financial 
advantage of the account holder as the account’s balance grows in tandem 
with the increase in the bond’s value.  In contrast, the California account 
holder’s entitlement under his notional account is the same fixed, formula-
based amount of $102 even as the value of the bond spikes due to lower 
interest rates.  Under the Act, any investment gain from falling interest 
rates inures to the Trust and its collective pool, not to any account holder.  
The board may elect to retroactively allocate some or all of this gain to 
participants’ accounts or may for the following year increase the stated 
investment return to reflect the prior year’s increase in the Trust’s assets.  
But the board need not do so. 
  Even if the board takes these retroactive steps, there will be no 
direct link between the Trust’s investment performance and participants’ 
account balances.  Under the California Act, any connection between 
investment performance and account balances is mediated by the board 
through its selection of a stated rate of return and the board’s decision 
whether or not to credit to accounts the Trust’s “excess” earnings.  At the 
end of the day, there is a significant difference between an individual 
retirement account, the value of which is tied directly and automatically to 
investment gains and losses, and a formula-driven account under the Act, 
which is not linked directly or automatically to investment gains or losses. 
  A second rebuttal to the conclusion that the accounts created by 
the Act are not individual retirement accounts under the Code would assert 
2014      CALIFORNIA DREAMING  577 
 
that the definition of “account” is different for IRAs than for defined 
contribution plans, such as money purchase pensions and profit sharing 
arrangements.  If so, Code § 414(i)159 and the case law decided under it are 
irrelevant to IRAs. 
  However, Code § 414(i) is, by its terms, applicable, not only to 
money purchase and profit sharing plans, but to § 408160 as well; § 414(i) 
applies to the “part” of the Code that includes § 408.161 As a textual matter, 
the term “account” in § 408 is most plausibly read to mean the same thing 
for IRAs as for other defined contribution plans covered by the same part 
of the Code, i.e., a retirement account where investment gain and loss 
automatically and directly inure to the benefit (or detriment) of the account 
holder. 
 A third challenge, related to the second, would assert that, in the 
context of IRAs, it is not in practice important to define rigorously the 
concept of an “account.”  In the context of employer-sponsored retirement 
plans, the distinction between defined contribution/individual account 
plans and defined benefit pensions is crucial for many purposes.  For 
example, employers guarantee the benefits promised under defined benefit 
pensions but do not guarantee outcomes under individual account plans.162 
Congress has imposed limits on the employer stock a defined benefit 
arrangement may own, but has levied no equivalent restrictions on defined 
contribution plans.163 There are different vesting schedules for defined 
contribution and defined benefit plans.164 In these and other settings, it is 
                                                         
159 I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006). 
160 I.R.C. § 408 (2006). 
161 That part of the Code is Part I of Subchapter D which extends from Code § 
401 through Code § 420, inclusive, and thus includes Code § 408, governing IRAs. 
See I.R.C. §§ 401-420 (2006). 
162 Despite its relatively narrow focus, Justice Stevens’ Nachman opinion is 
generally cited as confirming that employers guarantee defined benefit pensions. 
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359 (1980). As 
a statutory matter, it is today the minimum funding rules and the PBGC insurance 
arrangement which lock employers into the defined benefit commitments they 
make. I.R.C. §§ 412, 430, 431, 436, 4971 (2006); ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081 
(2006) (minimum funding rules); ERISA § 4062, 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) 
(sponsoring employers liability to PBGC in case of distress termination). 
163 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006). 
164 Compare I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A) (2006), and 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A) 
(2006) (vesting schedules for defined benefit plans), with I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(B) 
(2006), and 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (2006) (vesting schedules for defined 
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critical to determine which plans have “accounts” and which do not.  
However, the argument would conclude, there are no similar consequences 
in the context of individual retirement accounts and thus no need to define 
such accounts with particular rigor. 
 However, the term “account” does play an important role in the 
context of individual retirement arrangements as the Code distinguishes 
individual retirement accounts from individual retirement annuities: such 
annuities can only be issued by insurance companies complying with state 
regulation of insurance.165 It is, moreover, unconvincing to read the term 
“account” differently at different places within the same statute.  Code § 
408 was enacted as part of ERISA, which simultaneously embedded the 
definition of an account in both Code § 414 and the labor, i.e., Title 29, 
version of ERISA.  
 A fourth argument would contend that California could defend the 
Act in its current form by asserting that the Act’s notional accounts fall 
within the Code’s authorization of individual retirement annuities.  If the 
Act’s notional accounts can, for purposes of the Code, be characterized as 
such annuities, then it is unnecessary for those accounts to comply with the 
Code and ERISA requirement that accounts allocate investment gains and 
losses to account holders.  
  It is no accident that the drafters and sponsors of the Act elected 
to characterize the participants’ interests in the California program as 
“accounts.”  By labeling those interests as “accounts,” the proponents of 
the Act appealed to the broad public acceptance of the now-established 
defined contribution paradigm with its emphasis on account-based 
ownership devices166 such as 401(k) accounts,167 individual retirement 
accounts,168 Section 529 accounts,169 and health savings accounts.170 In 
contrast, despite the persuasive argument for annuities as savings and 
retirement devices,171 such annuities do not resonate the same way with the 
public today.  Would a majority of the Golden State’s legislators have been 
                                                         
contribution plans). 
165 I.R.C. § 408(b) (2006). 
166 Zelinsky, supra note 66, at 31-37. 
167 Id. at 49-52. 
168 Id. at 52-58. 
169 Id. at 64-69. 
170 Id. at 62-64. 
171 Id. at 15-23; TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT 
AGAINST PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 122-25 (2008). 
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willing to impose mandatory “annuities” on their constituents?  I’m 
skeptical.  Framing matters.172 
 Against this background, it is unpersuasive for California to call 
the notional accounts created in the Act “accounts” when addressing the 
California populace through the Golden State’s statute books while 
simultaneously telling the IRS, the DOL, and, ultimately, the courts that 
these “accounts” are really “annuities” under the Code. 
 Moreover, if the Act’s accounts are individual retirement annuities 
for purposes of the Code, those putative annuities cannot be offered by the 
Trust created under the Act.  As a statutory matter, individual retirement 
annuities must be underwritten by insurance companies, complying with 
the state’s statutes and regulations pertaining to insurance.173 However, the 
Trust is not required to comply with the insurance statutes and regulations 
of the Golden State.174 
 Just as the defenders of the Act might be tempted in ipse dixit 
fashion to declare the Act’s accounts as annuities, they might also be 
tempted to proclaim arbitrarily that the Trust is an insurance company even 
though the Trust need not comply with the same rules as apply to 
commercial and nonprofit insurers operating in the Golden State.175 Such a 
formalistic, indeed hollow, relabeling of the Trust as an insurance 
company would be unpersuasive.  The evident purpose of the statutory 
                                                         
172 Scholars today give much attention to “framing effects.” At one level, the 
research on framing effects itself reframes the long-recognized reality that it 
matters how issues are defined. For contemporary research on framing effects, see 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer 
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and The Paradox of Tax Expenditure 
Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 807-11 (2005); Edward J. McCaffery & Joel 
Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVORIAL 
PUBLIC FINANCE 3, 7-8 (Edward J. McCaffery and Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). For a 
classic instance of an astute politician who understood what we today call framing 
effects in the context of retirement policy, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 113 
(discussing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to finance Social Security through 
payroll taxes so “no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.”). 
173 See I.R.C. § 408(b) (2006) (individual retirement annuities must be “issued 
by an insurance company”); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-3(a) (1986) (individual retirement 
annuities must be “issued by an insurance company which is qualified to do 
business under the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract is sold.”); see 
generally CAL. INS. CODe. 
174 See generally CAL. INS. CODE. 
175 Id. 
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requirement of Code § 408(b) is to assure the holders of individual 
retirement annuities that those annuities receive the substantive protections 
of state insurance law.  That purpose is eviscerated if an entity, like the 
Trust, is by ipse dixit declared to be an insurance company while relieved 
of the substantive requirements governing all other insurers.  
 At the end of the day, California’s legislature elected to 
characterize the Act’s accounts as accounts rather than as annuities and 
chose to offer those accounts through a state-sponsored Trust rather than 
through insurance companies complying with California’s insurance laws.  
California should be held to those choices.  And the notional accounts 
created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since 
they do not allocate gains and losses to account holders.176 
 Yet a fifth challenge to my conclusion that the Act’s accounts are 
not individual retirement accounts would dispute the similarity of the 
California program to a cash balance-style defined benefit plan.  If the 
assets funding a cash balance pension are inadequate to pay promised 
benefits, the sponsoring employer is liable for the shortfall.177 However, 
California has explicitly disclaimed responsibility for any liabilities of the 
Trust or the program178 – a disclaimer not available to the private sector 
sponsor of a defined benefit plan.  Similarly, if there are surplus assets in a 
cash balance plan when the plan terminates, these assets may revert to the 
sponsoring employer.179 
 An analogy need not be perfect to be persuasive.  Even if we take 
at face value California’s declaration that the Golden State’s treasury does 
not stand behind the Trust and the program,180 the accounts to be 
established under the Act are notional in nature.  Like a participant in a 
cash balance pension, a participant in the California program will have a 
formula-based claim against the Trust rather than a true individual account 
under which investment gains automatically flow through to the 
                                                         
176 As I discuss infra, another state (or even California itself) could pursue a 
different course from the Act by openly declaring that private sector employees 
otherwise without work-based retirement savings coverage must purchase 
individual retirement annuities. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
177 See ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 14. 
178 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), and 100036 (2012)). 
179 Subject to the potential reversion tax of I.R.C. § 4980 (2006). 
180 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100013, 
100014(c)(3), and 100036 (2012)). 
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participant’s account and losses reduce the participant’s account balance.  
 The Act is silent as to the distribution of surplus assets if the Trust 
were to terminate in overfunded condition.  Perhaps the Trust’s extra funds 
would be distributed to present and/or former participants in the program. 
Or perhaps these surplus assets would go to the California treasury in a 
manner analogous to a reversion to an employer sponsoring a defined 
benefit plan.  We don’t know.  In any event, the program and its accounts 
need not perfectly mimic a private sector cash balance pension for such a 
pension to be the most useful analogy.  That is the case, given the cash 
balance-style, formula-based entitlement of account holders under the 
California Act.  
 A sixth argument is that there is no policy reason to deny 
individual retirement account status to the accounts to be established under 
the Act. A believer in the ownership society would disagree, arguing that 
true individual accounts correspond with cultural norms about ownership 
and give the account holder a direct stake in the American economy as a 
result of his unmediated participation in the upside and downside of 
investment performance.181 
 Had the 93rd Congress foreseen the possibility of cash balance 
accounts, it might have drafted Code § 408 to include within the definition 
of an individual retirement account the kind of defined benefit, notional 
account established under the California Act.  But Congress did not.  It is 
anachronistic to blame Congress for this omission (assuming it was an 
omission) because the cash balance plan was far in the future and could not 
have been anticipated in 1974.  It is, moreover, not apparent that, had the 
drafters foreseen the possibility of formula-based cash balance accounts, 
they would have included them within the definition of individual 
retirement accounts for purposes of Code § 408.  In any event, Congress 
did not draft Code § 408 in a way which qualifies cash balance accounts as 
individual retirement accounts since cash balance accounts are formula-
based and do not allocate investment gains and losses directly to 
participants’ respective accounts.  
 Consider finally my argument that the private insurance the Act 
authorizes the board to purchase is analogous to the insurance the PBGC 
issues to defined benefit pension plans to protect against the underfunding 
of promised benefits.  This similarity, I argue, indicates that the accounts 
authorized by the California Act are defined benefit devices, insurable like 
                                                         
181 ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 97-101. 
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defined benefit pensions, and thus outside the statutory definition of an 
individual retirement account: insurance is only needed against the risk of 
underfunding when underfunding can occur.  Defined contribution 
accounts cannot be underfunded since account holders are entitled to 
whatever their respective accounts are worth, based on actual investment 
performance. 
 The counterargument is that the insurance authorized by the Act is 
similar to an insurance-type product purchased inside an individual 
retirement account.  Such accounts, for example, can invest in guaranteed 
income contracts (GIC), which, the argument goes, are similar to the 
insurance the board can buy under the Act. 
 The controlling difference is the nature of the claim created by an 
insurance-type product inside an individual retirement account, as opposed 
to insurance protecting a formula-based benefit.  When an individual 
retirement account is invested in a GIC or similar device, the account 
holder’s entitlement is defined and limited by that contract.  If the insurer 
or other financial institution issuing the GIC defaults, the account holder 
has no further claim against the account.  The GIC (or similar insurance-
type device) is an investment like a bond or stock: if the GIC goes belly-
up, the loss falls on the individual account holder. 
 However, the insurance to be purchased under the Act is designed 
to guarantee a cash balance-style defined benefit formula, i.e., the 
employees’ contributions increased by a stated rate of return, unreduced by 
investment losses.  If the issuer of the insurance acquired by the board 
defaults, the account holder still has a claim against the Trust for his 
formula-based benefit.  Again, the analogy, while not perfect, is 
instructive. The insurance to be purchased by the California board 
underwrites a cash balance-style benefit just as the PBGC issues insurance 
to protect the equivalent formula-based promises made by defined benefit 
plans.    
 
D. SUMMARY 
 
 In sum, the Act imposes investment reward and risk on the Trust 
and the collective funds the Trust will hold.  The cash balance-style 
accounts created by the Act are proclaimed by the Act to be “accounts.” 
However, these notional accounts are not individual retirement accounts 
since the account holder has a formula-based defined benefit-type interest 
in his account and does not himself benefit directly from good investment 
performance or suffer from poor investment performance. 
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VII. NO ERISA PREEMPTION UNDER TRAVELERS OF THE ACT’S 
EMPLOYER MANDATE  
 
 Under the Act, the board can only implement the program if the 
accounts implementing the program qualify as individual retirement 
accounts under the Code.182 This caveat reflects the drafters’ intent for the 
program to qualify as an IRA payroll deduction arrangement, subject to 
state regulation because such an arrangement is not an employee benefit 
plan for ERISA purposes.183 This caveat also assures the participants in the 
program that they will receive the tax benefits associated with IRAs.184 
 Because the accounts established under the Act are not individual 
retirement accounts, the most compelling course for California’s 
legislature would be to abandon the cash balance-style formula currently 
embedded in the Act by amending the Act to recast the accounts to be 
offered by the program as true individual retirement accounts which assign 
investment risk and reward directly to the participating employees.  It is 
thus necessary to consider whether, if the Act were so amended,185 the 
Act’s employer mandate would be ERISA preempted. Shaw says “yes” 
while Travelers says “no.”  Travelers, as the Court’s more recent and more 
compelling construction of § 514(a) and ERISA preemption, should 
control and should thus protect the employer mandate of the California Act 
from ERISA preemption – if the Act’s accounts are reformulated as bona 
fide individual retirement accounts.  
 The Act’s employer mandate explicitly refers to employer-
sponsored retirement plans, exempting from the mandate all Golden State 
employers who sponsor such plans.186 Under the unforgiving Shaw test 
(“connection with or reference to”), ERISA § 514(a) preempts the Act’s 
employer mandate since that mandate refers to employers’ retirement plans 
by exempting from the mandate employers sponsoring retirement plans for 
                                                         
182 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100013, 
100014(c)(3), 100036 (2012)).  
183 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-2(d) (2007). 
184 I.R.C. §§ 219, 408(e)(1) and 408A(d)(1) (2006). 
185 In order for the program accounts established under the Act to qualify as 
individual retirement accounts, it is also necessary for the Trust to satisfy the IRS 
that the Trust will be administered in a fashion “consistent with the requirements 
of” I.R.C. § 408. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(2) (2006). It should not be difficult for the 
Trust to satisfy this standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(e) (1986). 
186 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d) (2012)). 
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their respective workforces. 
 Consider in this context the last of the Shaw line of cases, District 
of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade.187 In that case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court declared as ERISA-preempted a District of Columbia 
law requiring employers to provide to injured employees receiving 
workers’ compensation the same health insurance employers provide to 
their active workers.  Since employer-provided medical coverage 
constitutes an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan,188 the Court held, 
the D.C. law impermissibly “refer[red] to” such ERISA-regulated 
employee benefit plans by requiring that injured employees receive the 
same medical coverage as furnished by the ERISA-regulated employee 
benefit plans in effect for active employees. 
 The application of Greater Washington Board of Trade to the 
California Act’s employer mandate is straightforward: like the D.C. statute 
the Court held to be preempted, the California Act explicitly refers to 
employers’ ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans, exempting from the 
obligation to participate in the Act’s state-sponsored withholding program 
any employer which maintains a retirement plan for its employees.189 Thus, 
under the unforgiving Shaw test (“reference to”), the Act’s employer 
mandate is ERISA-preempted as the mandate refers to employer-sponsored 
retirement plans by exempting employers maintaining such plans – just as 
the District of Columbia statute referred to employer-sponsored medical 
plans for active employees as the standard for medical coverage to be 
provided to injured employees. 
 Travelers, however, undermines Shaw.  Under Travelers’ approach 
to § 514(a), the Act’s employer mandate is not ERISA-preempted.  
Underlying Travelers’ approach to ERISA § 514(a) are a variety of themes 
which cannot be reconciled with Shaw: the interpretation of § 514(a) in 
any situation, Travelers declares, starts with the “presumption that 
Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”190 The legislative purpose 
animating ERISA’s preemption provision was “to avoid a multiplicity of 
[state] regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration 
of employee benefit plans.”191 Such national uniformity is particularly at 
risk when a state law dictates “employee benefit structures or their 
                                                         
187 506 U.S. 125 (1992). See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 826. 
188 29 U.S.C. 1002(1) (2006). 
189 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d) (2012)). 
190 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654. 
191 Id. at 646. 
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administration”192 or provides “alternative enforcement mechanisms.”193 A 
state law is not ERISA-preempted under § 514(a) merely because of its 
“indirect economic influence” on employee benefit plans.194 Starting from 
these Travelers premises, the Act’s employer mandate is not ERISA-
preempted because there is a presumption that Congress preferred not to 
supplant the Act, the Act’s employer mandate has no effect on employers 
maintaining their own retirement plans for their employees, and the Act’s 
mandate does not impair national uniformity in the administration or 
content of employer-sponsored retirement plans.  Indeed, the Act says 
nothing about such administration or content. 
 To explore further the contrast between Shaw and Travelers, 
consider the Supreme Court’s first ERISA preemption decision after 
Travelers, California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.195 Separately-funded apprenticeship 
programs are ERISA-regulated employee welfare plans.196 On public 
construction projects, California law permits contractors to pay lower than 
prevailing wages to apprentices only if the state approves the 
apprenticeship program.  Under Shaw, this California statute refers to and 
has a connection with ERISA-governed welfare plans, namely separately-
funded apprenticeship programs.  Hence, applying Shaw, the California 
wage law should be preempted under ERISA § 514(a). 
 However, following Travelers, the Dillingham Court sustained the 
California wage statute as that statute merely had an “indirect economic 
influence”197 on ERISA-regulated apprenticeship programs in the Golden 
State.  The impact of the California law was “quite remote”198 from 
concerns about plan benefits and plan administration.  Hence, the 
Dillingham Court declared, ERISA did not preempt the California statute 
challenged in that case. Dillingham thus buttresses the conclusion that, 
under Travelers’ more forgiving approach, the Act’s employer mandate is 
not ERISA-preempted. 
 While less sweeping than Shaw, post-Travelers ERISA preemption 
still has substantial bite in particular cases.  In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex. rel. 
                                                         
192 Id. at 658 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 659. 
195 519 U.S. 316 (1997). 
196 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). 
197 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 329. 
198 Id. at 330. 
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Breiner,199 for example, the Court held that § 514(a) prevents the 
application to any ERISA-governed employee benefit plan of a 
Washington State statute that, on a participant’s divorce, automatically 
revokes any beneficiary designation of the participant’s former spouse.  
The Washington law, the Egelhoff Court declared, “interferes with 
nationally uniform plan administration” of ERISA-regulated plans200 by 
requiring an employee benefit plan operating in Washington State to 
disregard a beneficiary designation on file with such plan if the designation 
names a former spouse as beneficiary.  
In contrast, the Act has no impact on California employers 
maintaining retirement plans or payroll deduction IRA arrangements.  
These employers can with impunity ignore the Act, the Trust, and the 
program.  The Act does not regulate the content or processes of a 
California employer’s retirement plan or an employer’s IRA payroll 
deduction arrangement.  If a California employer is required to enroll in 
the program (assuming the Act is amended to qualify the Act’s accounts as 
individual retirement accounts), the employer will thereby participate in a 
program which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes: 
California’s state-sponsored program (assuming amendment of the Act) 
will qualify as a payroll deduction IRA arrangement which is not an 
employee benefit plan under ERISA.201  
 For ERISA preemption purposes, the Act (if amended to establish 
bona fide individual retirement accounts) is more like the California 
apprentice wage statute sustained in Dillingham than the Washington State 
divorce-related law stricken in Egelhoff.  The latter unacceptably impinged 
upon the administration of ERISA-regulated plans by requiring 
                                                         
199 532 U.S. 141 (2001). For discussion of Egelhoff, see Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Employer Mandates and ERISA Preemption: A Critique of Golden Gate 
Restaurant Association v. San Francisco, 50 STATE TAX NOTES 503, 512 (2008) 
(hereinafter Zelinsky, Golden Gate II); Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff, ERISA 
Preemption and the Conundrum of the `Relate To' Clause, 91 TAX NOTES 1917 
(2001). 
200 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148. 
201 By way of contrast, an employer subject to the employer mandate of the 
San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance must provide specific health care 
benefits under its own, ERISA-regulated program, or, in the alternative, must 
participate in the City’s Health Access Program (HAP), which establishes an 
ERISA-governed health care program. See Zelinsky, Golden Gate II, supra note 
199, at 4-7. 
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administrators to run their respective plans in accordance with Washington 
State law rather than the pre-divorce beneficiary designations on file with 
the plan.  The California Act, in contrast, does not impinge upon 
employers’ retirement plans or such plans’ operations.  The Act just 
requires employers without such plans or IRA withholding arrangements to 
participate in a state-sponsored IRA withholding program, a program 
which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes.202  
 As the Court’s later and more persuasive203 interpretation of 
ERISA preemption, Travelers should prevail over Shaw. Thus, the Act’s 
employer mandate should survive ERISA preemption if the Act’s accounts 
are recast as individual retirement accounts.  Per Travelers, the Act has no 
direct effect on employers’ retirement plans and does not affect the content 
or administration of such plans.  The Act will merely require employers 
without retirement plans to maintain their own IRA payroll arrangements 
or to participate in the California program, a publicly-administered IRA 
payroll arrangement which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA 
purposes.   
  
VIII. NO ERISA PREEMPTION OF EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS 
UNDER TRAVELERS 
 
 Similar observations apply as to the provisions of the Act 
authorizing employers to make voluntary contributions204 to employees’ 
program accounts: under Shaw, this portion of the Act is ERISA-
preempted, but, under Travelers, the Act’s authorization of optional 
employer contributions survives § 514(a) scrutiny.  Travelers is the Court’s 
later and more compelling interpretation of § 514(a) and thus should spare 
from ERISA preemption the Act’s authorization of supplemental employer 
contributions.  The Act neither requires employers to make contributions 
nor requires employers to affirmatively elect against such contributions. 
 The employer who makes voluntary contributions under the Act to 
employees’ accounts will, by virtue of such contributions, convert the 
                                                         
202 29 CFR § 2510.3-2(d) (2010). 
203 Despite these rulings the author continues to believe that there is an 
interpretation of ERISA § 514(a) which is better than either Shaw or Travelers, 
namely, to treat § 514(a) as creating a rebuttable presumption of ERISA 
preemption. See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 839-58. 
204 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100004(e) and 100012(j) (2012)). 
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program for such contributing employer from a payroll deduction IRA 
arrangement into an ERISA-regulated employee benefit pension plan. 
Payroll deduction IRA arrangements retain that classification only if the 
employees make all contributions pursuant to such arrangements.205 If a 
California employer makes contributions under the program, the program 
would for ERISA purposes thereby become an employee pension plan for 
that employer, an employer-financed plan which both “provides retirement 
income to employees”206 and which “results in a deferral of income by 
employees.”207 Employers making supplemental contributions to 
employees’ accounts under the Act would need to comply with the rules 
for either a simplified employee pension208 (SEP) or a simple retirement 
account209 (SRA).  Either way, an employer’s contributions to the program 
would result for that employer in a pension plan for ERISA purposes, an 
employer-financed arrangement providing retirement income and deferring 
income.210 
 Shaw preempts the Act insofar as the Act would take California 
employers down the path of employer contributions.  As to contributing 
employers, the state-run program and the Trust will be an ERISA-governed 
pension plan because of such employers’ contributions to the program. 
Under Shaw and its nearly automatic standard for ERISA preemption, the 
Act would have the ultimate “connection with” an ERISA-regulated 
employee benefit plan: the Act would create such a plan whenever 
employers make supplemental contributions to employees’ accounts as 
                                                         
205 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2010). 
206 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
207 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
208 I.R.C. § 408(k) (2006). S.B. 1234 adds to the Government Code § 
100010(b), which requires the board to promulgate regulations “to ensure that the 
program meets all criteria for federal tax-deferral or tax-exempt benefits, or both.” 
S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100010(b) (2012)).  This 
statutory requirement would mandate regulations qualifying voluntary employer 
contributions under the program to take the form of either simplified employee 
pensions or simple retirement accounts. 
209 I.R.C. § 408(p) (2006). 
210 While governmental plans are largely immune from regulation under 
ERISA, the program created under the Act is not a governmental plan for purposes 
of ERISA since the program covers employees in the private and nonprofit sectors, 
not the employees of governments. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1974)  (defining 
governmental plans as covering government employees); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) 
(1974) (stating that Title I of ERISA does not apply to governmental plans). 
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such employers’ contributions under the Act would, for ERISA purposes, 
convert their payroll deduction arrangements into employee benefit plans. 
 Consider in this context the Supreme Court’s Shaw-based decision 
in FMC Corp. v. Holliday.211 In FMC Corp., the Court held that ERISA § 
514(a) preempts Pennsylvania’s anti-subrogation law from applying to 
self-insured212 welfare plans.  If, as FMC Corp. holds, a state law 
regulating employee benefit plans impermissibly “relate[s] to”213 the plans 
the law regulates, a fortiori a state law that creates employee benefit plans 
is similarly ERISA-preempted as relating to the plans it creates.  Hence, 
under the Shaw framework, the California Act, insofar as it establishes an 
ERISA-governed pension plan for employers’ contributions, has an 
impermissible “connection with”214 the employee pension plans the Act 
thereby establishes.  
 Again, however, the Travelers approach to ERISA-preemption is 
more forgiving, permitting state laws which have “indirect economic 
effects” on employers’ retirement plans as long as such laws do not impair 
the nationally uniform content or administration of such plans.  The Act’s 
authorization of supplemental employer contributions does not impair 
national uniformity in the structure or administration of employee benefit 
plans.  Any California employer can ignore the Act’s authorization of 
optional employer contributions.  The Act thus has no impact, indirect or 
otherwise, on such employers. 
 In two respects, Egelhoff is instructive in this context and confirms 
that, under the more forgiving approach to ERISA preemption inaugurated 
in Travelers, the provisions of the California Act authorizing supplemental 
employer contributions are distinguishable for ERISA preemption 
purposes from the Washington State statute the Court struck in Egelhoff.  
First, writing for the Egelhoff Court, Justice Thomas observed of the 
Washington State statute revoking beneficiary designations on divorce that 
“[u]niformity is impossible . . . if plans are subject to different legal 
obligations in different states.”215 In contrast, the California Act’s 
authorization of voluntary employee contributions imposes no “legal 
obligations” on any California employer, as the Act does not require a 
                                                         
211 498 U.S. 52 (1990). See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 822-23. 
212 The Pennsylvania law survived preemption as to insured ERISA plans as a 
permitted regulation of insurance. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60. 
213 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
214 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
215 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001). 
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California employer to make contributions.  The Act simply permits 
supplemental contributions by an employer that elects to make such 
optional contributions.  No California employer is legally obligated to 
make voluntary contributions – unlike the Washington State employers in 
Egelhoff who were legally required to follow that state’s law revoking 
beneficiary designations of former spouses. 
 Second, an employer in Washington State can elect “to opt out”216 
of the Washington State statute revoking beneficiary designations on 
divorce.  As Justice Thomas pointed out, this “opt out” option, if replicated 
by other states, would threaten nationally uniform administration of 
ERISA-regulated plans by requiring an interstate employer to opt out state-
by-state.  Thus, if the Washington State statute at issue in Egelhoff were 
reproduced nationwide, “the burden” of opting out of each state’s statute 
would be “hardly trivial”.217 As to the Washington law, 
  
[i]t is not enough for plan administrators to opt out of this 
particular statute.  Instead, they must maintain a familiarity 
with the laws of all 50 States so that they can update their 
plans as necessary to satisfy the opt-out requirements of 
other, similar statutes.218 
 
 In contrast, a California employer need not elect against 
supplementary contributions under the Golden State’s Act.  A California 
employer who is ignorant of the optional contributions authorized by the 
Act suffers no consequences.  A nationwide employer could similarly 
ignore the voluntary employer contributions permitted by any other state 
statute modeled on the California Act.  An employer need not “opt out” of 
a statute when compliance with that statute is voluntary – as is compliance 
with the California Act’s provisions permitting, but not requiring, 
supplementary employer contributions. 
 Thus, at the end of the day, whether ERISA preempts the 
California Act’s authorization of optional employer contributions depends 
(as does the ERISA preemption status of the Act’s employer mandate) 
upon the standard used to interpret ERISA § 514(a).  Under the older, more 
sweeping Shaw test (“reference to or connection with”), ERISA 
                                                         
216 Id. at 150. 
217 Id. at 151. 
218 Id. 
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preemption of state law is nearly automatic.  By authorizing optional 
employer contributions, the California Act connects with employers’ 
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans by creating such plans when 
employers make optional contributions.  Shaw thus counsels that § 514(a) 
preempts the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions as 
such employer contributions would convert the program created under the 
Act from an IRA payroll deduction arrangement without employer 
contributions into an ERISA-regulated employee pension plan with such 
contributions. 
 However, Travelers’ more forgiving approach to ERISA 
preemption protects the Act’s authorization of supplemental employer 
contributions under § 514(a).  The California Act neither obligates 
employers to make voluntary contributions nor requires employers to 
affirmatively reject an obligation to make such contributions.  Thus, the 
Act’s authorization of optional employer contributions survives under the 
Supreme Court’s more recent and more persuasive articulation of ERISA 
preemption in Travelers: employer contributions convert the program into 
an employee pension plan for ERISA purposes, but the Act imposes no 
obligations on employers which, under the more forgiving standards of 
Travelers, would trigger ERISA preemption. 
Just as it is necessary to amend the Act to convert its notional, cash 
balance-style accounts into individual retirement accounts, it is also 
necessary to amend the Act’s prohibition on supplementary employer 
contributions if such contributions “cause the program to be treated as an 
employee benefit plan under” ERISA.219 The drafters of this provision 
evidently concluded that, if employer contributions convert the Golden 
State’s program into an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes, ERISA 
preemption necessarily follows.  
 Travelers points to a different conclusion: even though for ERISA 
purposes employer contributions convert the California program into an 
employee benefit plan for the employers making such optional 
contributions, the Act is not ERISA-preempted under Travelers.  The 
employer contributions authorized under the Act are purely voluntary.  The 
Act imposes no burden on California employers with respect to their 
retirement plans or with respect to the design or administration of their 
retirement plans.  Hence, per Travelers, ERISA does not prohibit employer 
                                                         
219 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §100004(e) (2012); CAL. GOV’T CODE §100012(k) 
(2012). 
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contributions under the program, even though such contributions convert 
the program to an employee pension plan for ERISA purposes.  The Act 
should accordingly be amended to delete the Act’s current requirement that 
employer contributions be suspended if they would “cause the program to 
be treated as an employee benefit plan under” ERISA.   
 
IX.  OTHER CHOICES 
 
 The foregoing analysis indicates that the Act would survive 
ERISA-preemption under Travelers were the Act amended to recast the 
California program’s accounts as individual retirement accounts which 
allocate investment reward and loss to the individual account holder.  If the 
Act were so amended, an employer’s withholding under the California 
program would qualify as an IRA payroll deduction arrangement which is, 
for ERISA purposes, not an employee benefit plan since only amounts 
withheld from the employees’ wages would be paid to the Trust.  If any 
California employers make optional contributions under the Act, for those 
contributing employers, the program would become an employee pension 
plan, but would survive ERISA-preemption under Travelers.  Under the 
older and tougher Shaw standard, the Act’s employer mandate is ERISA-
preempted, whether or not the employer makes supplementary 
contributions under the program.  However, Travelers is the Court’s later 
and more compelling construction of ERISA § 514(a);220 the Act, if 
amended to convert its formula-based notional accounts into individual 
retirement accounts, should survive ERISA preemption under Travelers 
since the Act would impose no obligations or burdens on employers and 
their retirement plans. 
 That the Act, as amended, would be legal does not mean that the 
Act, as amended, would be sound policy.  In this final section, I outline 
some of the alternatives available to a state legislature (or a Congress) that 
contemplates following California’s lead in encouraging retirement 
savings.  
 Any such outline starts with the fact that there is, as the Act’s 
advocates observe, a serious problem, namely the failure of moderate and 
low-income workers to save for retirement.  Some critics of the California 
                                                         
220 However, I continue to believe that there is a better approach to ERISA § 
514(a) than either Shaw or Travelers, namely, construing § 514(a) as creating a 
presumption of preemption. See Zelinsky, supra note 102, at 839-58. 
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Act portray the Act as an effort to grab private savings to rescue 
underfunded pensions for public employees. 221 Even if that is so, the Act 
on its face is aimed at a real shortcoming in our national retirement system. 
Our defined contribution culture places the burden of retirement saving on 
the worker himself.  Most low- and moderately-paid workers save little or 
nothing for retirement.222 
 Other commentators on the Act raise the opposite fear, namely that 
California’s taxpayers will be seen as implicitly guaranteeing the cash 
balance-style defined benefits promised to participating employees under 
the Act in its current form.223 From this vantage, the ultimate risk down the 
road is not using private retirement savings to rescue public pensions, but 
requiring the public treasury to make good future underfunding of the 
notional, cash balance-style accounts created under the Act. 
 Both risks are mitigated if, as I urge, the Act’s current notional, 
cash balance accounts are changed to true individual accounts which 
allocate directly investment risk and reward to the employee/account 
holders.  If the Act’s accounts are converted to individual retirement 
accounts, there would be no underfunding for California’s taxpayers to 
finance since an individual retirement account holder is simply entitled to 
his or her account’s current total, whatever that total may be in light of 
investment gains and losses.  Moreover, it would be more difficult 
politically for a future legislature to divert funds from a Trust consisting of 
accounts under which each account holder, as an individual retirement 
account owner, has a claim for his particular investment-based balance 
rather than a fixed, formula-based benefit.  As noted above, framing 
                                                         
221 See, e.g., Mimi Walters, The Government Seizure of Private Retirement 
Plans, FOX & HOUNDS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.foxandhoundsdaily.com/2012/ 
09/the-government-seizure-of-private-retirement (“SB 1234 looks like nothing 
more than a cynical effort to prop up the floundering public employee pension debt 
with new funds from private investors . . . .”). 
222 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 26-27; FROLIK AND MOORE, supra note 
103, at 5; see DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 5, at 124; see also S.B. 1234, 
2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100008(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). (“[O]ver 6.3 million California workers, 75 percent of whom earn less 
than $50,000 per year, do not have access to retirement savings opportunities 
through their jobs.”). 
223 Keegan, supra note 86; Danker, supra note 86; Lin, supra note 86; 
DeLeon, supra note 87. 
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matters.224 And it would matter to an account holder if his balance were 
reduced by a future legislature’s diversion of assets to buttress public 
employees’ pension plans. 
 Not every problem has a solution nor is the solution to every 
problem a statute or a public program.  However, the supporters of the Act 
raise a compelling concern when they point to the systematic failure of less 
affluent workers to save adequately for retirement. 
 I conclude that, in this area, Brandeisian experimentation225 by the 
states is desirable, both to test different models (including the model of no 
state action) and to respond to different preferences (including a preference 
for no state action).226 
 To take one example, automatic enrollment is an area where state-
by-state experimentation could prove productive.  It is plausible for the 
California Act to let workers opt out of the program’s coverage.  If a low- 
or moderate-income worker finds her current cash needs too pressing to 
make retirement savings, that is a regrettable decision with long-term costs, 
though it is reasonable to let the worker make that decision for herself.  On 
the other hand, if a state legislature with more paternalistic instincts were 
to make retirement savings mandatory with no ability to opt out, the 
resulting experiment might produce useful information.  While I am 
skeptical of such paternalism, a preference for state experimentation entails 
an openness to experiments about which one is not particularly 
enthusiastic. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, an equally plausible choice is for 
states to continue to do nothing about the problem of private retirement 
savings.  There is a vigorous market in retirement products, plans, and 
services;227 the federal government gives tax credits to both small 
                                                         
224 See sources cited supra note 172. 
225 The classic statement of the states as laboratories for experimentation is 
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932). 
226 My predisposition for state experimentation leads me to skepticism about 
ERISA preemption, which, even under Travelers, emphasizes national uniformity. 
See Zelinsky, supra note 102, at 865-68; Zelinsky, Golden Gate II, supra note 199, 
at 514. 
227 Indeed, the financial services industry has been the sales force for the 
defined contribution paradigm, providing services, investments and plans. 
Zelinsky, supra note 66, at 51-52, 96-97. 
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employers establishing qualified plans228 and to low-income individuals 
undertaking retirement savings.229 A state legislator concerned about the 
negligible retirement savings of rank-and-file workers could reasonably 
conclude that these market-based alternatives and federal tax credits 
occupy the field to the exclusion of any state-based policies. 
 Alternatively, that legislator could conclude that the state, instead 
of enacting a California-style Act, should supplement the federal tax 
credits for employers and workers with state tax credits, just as some states 
supplement the federal earned income tax credit230 with an additional state 
tax credit on earned income.231 Or that legislator could instead define the 
problem as lack of knowledge and conclude that the appropriate state 
policy is to publicize the federal tax credits for small employers 
establishing qualified plans and for low-income workers who save for their 
respective retirements.232 
 Among the interesting features of the California Act is the 
prospect233 (some would say, inevitability)234 that CalPERS, the state 
pension plan for the Golden State’s public employees, will invest part or 
all of the funds held by the Trust for private sector workers.  If the 
legislature proceeds with the Trust retaining the Act’s notional, cash 
balance-style accounts, having a state pension fund take responsibility for 
the Trust’s investments increases the risk that a future legislature will be 
compelled to use taxpayer funds to cure any shortfall.  Even though the 
California legislature has explicitly disclaimed any state guarantee of the 
program’s accounts,235 if CalPERS (or another public agency) oversees the 
investment of employees’ withheld wages, at least some participants in the 
                                                         
228 I.R.C. § 45E (2006). 
229 I.R.C. § 25B (2006). 
230 I.R.C. § 32 (2006). 
231 See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(d) (McKinney 2014); Marc Heller, State 
Battles Loom on Earned Income Tax Credit, Consultants Tell Staffers, 
BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX REPORT, Jan. 25, 2013, at G-1. 
232 The California Act authorizes the board in charge of the program and Trust 
to “[d]isseminate information” about these federal tax credits. S.B. 1234, 2012 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100012(e) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
233 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100004(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
(2012)).  
234 Keegan, supra note 86. 
235 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), 100036 to the 
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
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state-sponsored program will conclude that the state which, through its 
pension fund, directs the investment of their retirement savings stands 
behind the investment performance of the state’s own agency.  The 
disclaimer of state liability the California legislature placed in the Act236 
can be eliminated by a future legislature.  There will be greater political 
pressure to cure any future shortfall with tax-generated funds if the 
California’s own pension fund fails to achieve the stated, cash balance-
style return promised to program participants by the board.   
  Even if the California legislature amends the Act to create true 
individual retirement accounts or another state’s legislature modifies 
California’s approach to create such accounts, state pension funds have not 
been without their own problems.237 Moreover, if bona fide individual 
retirement accounts were invested by CALPERs or another state agency, 
some account holders will likely conclude that the state is, at some level, a 
guarantor of adequate investment performance.  
 On the other hand, prominent invoices, including David 
Swenson,238 Professor Forman,239 and Professor Munnell,240 argue that 
rank-and-file employees will never be good investors.  From this premise, 
it is a potentially valuable service for the state to provide to these 
employees state pension plans’ professional investing skills to manage 
                                                         
236 Id. (adding § 100013 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
237 Peter Lattman, Ex-Chief of Calpers is Charged with Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 19, 2013, at B3; Reuven Fenton and Carl Campanile, Jailbird Hevesi is 
Free Out after 20 Mos,  N.Y. POST, Dec. 13, 2012, at 8; Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Public Pensions’ Unrealistic Rate of Return Assumptions, OUPBLOG (Aug. 6, 
2012, 8:30AM), http://blog.oup.com/2012/08/public-pensions-unrealistic-rate-of-
return-assumptions/; Edward A. Zelinsky, Public Pensions, Private Equity, and the 
Mythical 8% Return, OUPBLOG (March 5, 2012, 8:30AM), 
http://blog.oup.com/2013/03/public-pensions-private-equity-return/. 
238 DAVID F. SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL 
APPROACH TO PERSONAL INVESTMENT 4 (2005) (“Even with a massive educational 
effort, the likelihood of producing a national of effective investors seems small.”). 
239 Jonathan Barry Forman & Gordon D. Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for 
Defined Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian 
Pension Systems, 66 TAX LAWYER 613, 633 (2013) (“On average, individual 
workers tend to be pretty poor investors.”). 
240 ALICIA H. MUNNELL, STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: WHAT NOW 187 (2012) 
(“Since employees shoulder all the risks in a 401(k) system, they have to make 
good decisions for tehse plans to work well. But employees make mistakes at every 
step along the way.”). 
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such employees’ retirement accounts. 
 Here again my personal preference is for state experimentation, 
despite my skepticism about some of the possible experiments.241 A state 
could plausibly mandate that every private employer maintain an 
retirement savings arrangement for its employees (whether a qualified plan 
or a payroll deduction IRA program) without the state itself getting into the 
business of investing private employees’ retirement savings.242 This is the 
approach embodied in President Obama’s proposed employer mandate, 
i.e., employers with more than ten employees would be required to 
maintain retirement plans or IRA savings programs, but there would be no 
public investment vehicle like the California Trust.243  
 The argument for investing retirement funds privately (rather than 
through a public entity like the Trust) is reinforced by both the DOL’s 
recently-adopted regulations requiring fee disclosure244 and soon-to-be 
proposed regulations heightening the fiduciary obligations of investment 
advisors.245 If successful, these regulations should reduce the fees paid by 
pension plans and participants and should better align the interests of 
investment counselors with the interests of these plans and participants.  
The skeptics246 could retort that, even with these desirable changes, most 
employees will never be good investors and thus would benefit from the 
investment services of CalPERS and other professionally-run state pension 
funds.  Different states’ experiments would help determine who is right. 
 Yet a final alternative for a legislature favoring the kind of cash 
                                                         
241 Edward A. Zelinsky, State-Administered Retirement Plans for the Private 
Sector: A Bad Idea, OUPBLOG (May 21, 2008, 12:55 PM), 
http://blog.oup.com/2008/05/private_sector_retirement_plans/. 
242 See JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 234 (Kathleen 
Courrier et. al. eds., 2006) (“Employers without a retirement plan should be 
required to offer payroll-deduction IRAs to interested employees.”). 
243 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 5, at 125. 
244 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5(c) (2013). While there is substantial merit to these 
new regulations, the adoption of these (and other) new regulations should be offset 
by countervailing reductions of other, less productive regulatory burdens. Edward 
A. Zelinsky, The Paternalistic Ideology of ERISA and Unforgiving Courts: 
Restoring Balance Through a Grand Bargain, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 341, 
350-53 (2009). 
245 Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, Fiduciary Re-Proposal “Not Finished,” Will Go To 
OMB Next Year, Borzi Says, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Nov. 16, 2012, at 4.     
246 Swensen, supra note 237, at 4; Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 238, at 
633; Munnell, supra note 239, at 187. 
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balance formula embodied in the Act would be to mandate that employers 
purchase for their otherwise uncovered employees individual retirement 
annuities247 offered by insurance companies.  State-mandated annuities are 
likely to meet greater popular resistance than state-mandated accounts.  In 
our defined contribution culture, the norm for savings is today based on the 
account model.248 But cultures change and can be changed. 
 A particular interesting variant of the mandatory annuity 
alternative is for the state requiring such annuities to charter a state-
sponsored insurance company to provide annuities.  A state-run company 
could be the exclusive purveyor of annuities for those employees 
participating under the state retirement savings program or the state 
provider of annuities could instead be a TVA-style public option, 
competing against private insurers.  While my personal enthusiasm for this 
possibility is limited, a commitment to Brandeisian experimentation 
implies that I could be surprised. 
 
X.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act is 
important both because of California’s size and status as a trendsetter and 
because the Act targets a pressing problem, the lack of retirement savings 
by low-income workers.  The notional cash balance-style accounts created 
by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since the 
accounts authorized by the Act create a defined benefit-type, formula-
based claim against a collectively-managed fund.  Under the Code and 
ERISA, individual retirement accounts directly allocate investment gains 
and losses to the individual account holder. 
  The Act could be amended to recast its accounts as true individual 
retirement accounts that assign investment risk and loss directly to the 
account holder.  If so, the Act’s employer mandate and supplemental 
employer contributions should survive ERISA-preemption under Travelers.  
Legality does not equate with wisdom and thus the Act, along with President 
Obama’s proposed federal mandate, should provoke debate about the need 
and best means to encourage greater retirement savings by the less affluent.  
In that debate, I favor state-by-state experimentation rather than any single 
approach to the task of encouraging greater retirement savings.  
                                                         
247 I.R.C. § 408(b) (2012). 
248 Zelinsky, supra note 66, at 31-37. 
MINDING THE GAP: SEEKING AUTISM COVERAGE IN 
CLASS ACTIONS WHEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS FAIL 
 
DANIELLE M. JAFFEE* 
 
*** 
 
This Note examines the recent trend towards class actions to challenge 
insurers’ denial of autism treatment coverage.  The author examines how 
state and federal laws regarding insurance coverage of autism treatment 
creates a gap allowing insurers to deny coverage, even in spite of the 
overwhelming proof of the beneficial nature of autism treatment for autistic 
individuals.  Past individual challenges of insurers’ actions gave 
little guidance to consumers about the legal obligations of insurers for 
autism treatment and recent collective action has done little to provide 
more.  The author examines the decisions of three courts determining the 
certification of class challenges to insurers' denials, and proffers how 
consumers can successfully challenge insurers' practices in class actions 
moving forward. 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently one in sixty-eight children in the United States is 
diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, a number that continues to 
increase nearly seventeen percent each year.1 These growing numbers have 
put increasing pressure on insurance companies to determine what, if any, 
coverage they provide for individuals living with autism and even more 
pressure on governments to enact laws ensuring assistance for thousands of 
citizens.2 The pressures and actions of insurers, though plentiful, have left a 
                                                                                                                                
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; American 
University, B.A. 2008. I would like to thank Professor Alexandra Lahav for her 
guidance and insight as I developed this Note. I am also sincerely grateful to my 
family for their many years of love and support. 
1 Autism Has High Costs to U.S. Society, HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 
(Apr. 25, 2006), http://archive.sph.harvard.edu/press-releases/2006-releases/press 
04252006.html [hereinafter High Costs]; CDC Estimates 1 in 68 Children has 
Been Identified with Autism Spectrum Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (March 27, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014 /p0327-
autism-spectrum-disorder.html.  
2 See generally Insurance Coverage for Autism, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/autism-
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clear gap of coverage for autism treatment in the self-insured market.  With 
no federal or state laws to fall back on, individuals are often forced to turn 
to the legal system for assistance.  While individual claims for autism 
treatment have been brought before the courts for over twenty years, a 
recent trend towards class actions has painted an unclear picture of the 
rights of the insured to challenge insurers and the ability of courts to allow 
class challenges in an area generally considered one of individual review 
by insurance companies.   
This Note examines the recent movement toward class action 
lawsuits against health insurance providers to ensure coverage for autism 
treatment.  Part II reviews what autism is, its growing prevalence in the 
United States, and its treatment.  Part III provides a brief overview of state 
and federal laws regarding insurance coverage of autism treatment and why 
it leaves the door open for courtroom battles.  Part IV examines past 
individual legal challenges for coverage that set the stage for current class 
actions.  Part V discusses several recent claims for coverage through class 
action lawsuits and the vastly different and contradictory rulings district 
courts issued regarding class certification.  Part VI compares the class 
actions and how the divergent court rulings fail to provide a legal bridge for 
the autism coverage gap created by federal and state laws.  Finally, part VII 
looks to establish an approach to determine class certification for future 
class action filings on autism coverage in light of the confusing precedent. 
 
II. AUTISM: WHAT IT IS, HOW TO TREAT IT, AND ITS 
GROWING PREVALENCE IN AMERICA 
 
Autism is a developmental disease that is being diagnosed at 
increasing rates in America.  It is generally held that early intervention and 
treatment of autism helps children better develop, however, disputes 
frequently arise between individuals, heath care providers, and insurers as a 
result of the nature of treatment championed for autistic children.  
 
                                                                                                                                
and-insurance-coverage-state-laws.aspx [hereinafter NCSL]; Essential Health 
Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-health-
benefits/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014); Preventative Care, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/preventive-care/index.html (last visited Feb. 
19, 2014). 
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A.  AUTISM, THE DISEASE 
 
The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development 
defines autism as a complex developmental disability that results in 
problems with social interactions and communication.3 Autism manifests 
itself in individuals differently and thus there are varying diagnoses that 
require different levels and amounts of therapy.4 Combined, “classic” 
autism, Asperger syndrome, and atypical autism (often diagnosed as 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder) are part of the Autism Spectrum 
Disorder5 (ASD).6   
Autism usually emerges in a child before the age of three and is 
diagnosable under the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-IV).7 
Although at one time it was believed that autism was a product of 
nurture rather than nature, recent research has shown a clear link between 
autism and genetics.  Several studies which examined familial relationships 
and autism diagnoses show that in families where one child has been 
diagnosed with autism there is an increased likelihood that a second child 
in the family will also be diagnosed with autism.8 While studies continue to 
shed light on certain factors that increase the risk of autism, including birth 
                                                                                                                                
3 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): Condition Information, NAT’L INST. OF 
CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEV. (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.nichd.nih.gov/ 
health/topics/autism/conditioninfo/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter NICHD]. 
4 Id. 
5 For purposes of this Note, the use of the term autism will encapsulate all 
Autism Spectrum Disorders. 
6 NICHD, supra note 3. 
7 Facts, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/facts.html; 
Diagnostic Criteria, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/hcp-dsm.html; 
THE DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, §299.00 (Am. 
Psychiatric Ass’n 4th ed.) (1994).  
8 Two studies have shown that parents who have a child diagnosed with ASD 
have a 2-18% chance of having a second child diagnosed with ASD; while other 
studies have shown an increased diagnosis rate of 36-95% in identical twins when 
one child is diagnosed with ASD. Research, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 19, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
ncbddd/autism/research.html#howmany. 
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to older parents9 and children with certain genetic or chromosomal 
conditions,10 there is still much unknown about what causes autism.  
Currently, the CDC is conducting a multi-year study to identify additional 
factors linked to autism diagnoses.11 
 
B.  THE GROWING PREVALENCE OF AUTISM 
 
In the last forty years the diagnoses of autism in the United States 
have increased substantially.  In 1975 the prevalence of autism diagnoses 
per person was 1 in 5,000; in 1985 it increased to 1 in 2,500 and in 1995 it 
reached 1 in 500.12 Since 2001 the number has increased from 1 in 250 to 1 
in 68 in 2014.13 Autism is now more common than Down syndrome or 
childhood cancer.14 Autism diagnosis trends also show a bigger impact on 
males.  The current diagnosis rates reflect boys are five times more likely 
to be diagnosed with autism than girls.15 
Currently, over 1.5 million Americans are diagnosed with autism.  
While the number is alarming, more alarming is that the rate of individuals 
diagnosed with autism is growing 10-17% per year, meaning in five years 
the number of individuals in America diagnosed with autism could be 
larger than the population of New Hampshire.16 
 
                                                                                                                                
9 Maureen S. Durkin et al., Advanced Parental Age and the Risk of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1268, 1268 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2638544/pdf/kwn250.pdf. 
10 Data and Statistics, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION  (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/ 
autism/data.html [hereinafter Data and Statistics]. 
11 SEED, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/seed.html. 
12 AUTISM SPEAKS, SELF-FUNDED EMPLOYER TOOL KIT 22, available at 
http://www.autismspeaks.org/sites/default/files/docs/gr/erisa_tool_kit_9.12_0.pdf 
[hereinafter Employer Toolkit]. 
13 CDC Estimates 1 in 68 Children has Been Identified with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (March 27, 2014), 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0327-autism-spectrum-disorder.html. 
14 Geoffrey Cowley, Understanding Autism, NEWSWEEK (July 30, 2000, 5:20 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/understanding-autism-161485. 
15 Boys are diagnosed at a rate of 1 in 54 while girls are diagnosed at a rate of 
1 in 252. Data and Statistics, supra note 10. 
16 High Costs, supra note 1; New Hampshire QuickFacts from the US Census 
Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 16, 2014), http://quickfacts.census.gov 
/qfd/states/33000.html. 
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C.  TREATING AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 
 
 Much of the discussion pertaining to insurance coverage for autism 
centers on insurance companies covering the treatment expenses that a 
family incurs as a result of the diagnosis.  Because autism is a 
developmental disorder, the treatment of the disease focuses on not only 
medication, but additionally, social skills, communication, speech therapy, 
and sensory integration training.17 Such therapies are often deemed by 
insurance companies to be either educational or experimental,18 thus 
eliminating their burden to provide coverage because insurance policies 
exclude “experimental” and “educational” treatments as terms of their 
contract.19  
The key to treatment for autism comes from research establishing 
that early intervention can dramatically improve a child’s development and 
therefore children with autism are encouraged to begin receiving services 
between birth and three years of age.20 Thus, the bulk of expenses for 
autism treatment come between the first few years of life when children are 
undergoing intensive treatment programs to ensure steady development.   
The most notable form of treatment and the central issue at hand in 
the pending class actions against insurers is Applied Behavioral Analytics 
(ABA).  ABA is defined as “the science in which tactics derived from the 
principles of behavior are applied systematically to improve socially 
significant behavior and experimentation is used to identify the variables 
responsible for behavior change.”21 ABA therapy is a highly structured 
one-on-one coaching led by a certified instructor in which a child engages 
                                                                                                                                
17 Treatment, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION,  (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/treatment.html 
[hereinafter Treatment]. 
18 Insurance companies commonly provide themselves a loophole that allows 
them to deny a request for coverage of experimental treatments, favoring instead 
that all procedures covered are thoroughly tested and proven effective. See 
generally  Jim Williams, When Insurers Won’t Pay for Experimental Treatments, 
ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131212 
&page=1. 
19 Angela Barner, Unlocking Access to Insurance Coverage for Autism 
Treatment, 6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 107, 108 (2009). 
20 Treatment, supra note 17. 
21 Paul Mooney et. al., Behavior Modification/Traditional Techniques for 
Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, in 22 BEHAVIORAL 
DISORDERS: IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND INSTRUCTION OF STUDENTS WITH 
EBD 173, 174 (Jeffrey P. Bakken et al. eds., 2012). 
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in positive reinforcement exercises targeting areas such as language, play, 
learning, and real-life functioning.22 Studies and advocates strongly 
encourage the use of ABA treatment in the early stages of life to ensure 
proper development for children with autism, often stating that if a child 
receives ABA therapy early there is a strong likelihood that the child will 
eventually be able to attend regular classes.23   
Behavior analysis treatment for children with autism started in the 
1960s when Ivar Lovaas and others at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, conducted a study amongst forty children diagnosed with autism 
and subjected them to various amounts of behavior analysis treatment.24  
The original study showed a substantial improvement in individuals that 
underwent forty hours of one-on-one ABA treatment, many of whom were 
successfully mainstreamed into a regular classroom.25 Further studies have 
also shown that ABA therapy results in long and short-term gains in 
intellectual function and educational progress.26 
 In 1999, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
issued a report of the Surgeon General on mental health showing 
substantial support for ABA therapy and its proven efficacy.27 Then again 
in 2001, the U.S. Surgeon General’s report on mental health further 
corroborated these findings, asserting that ABA therapy minimizes socially 
unacceptable behavior while increasing socially appropriate behavior, 
communication skills, and learning abilities for children with autism.28   
As a result of years of toting the advantages of ABA therapy, most 
autistic children participate in the intensive program.  Generally, the 
treatment is administered for thirty to forty hours a week for three to four 
years, costing families several thousands of dollars. 
 
                                                                                                                                
22 Iver Peterson, High Rewards and High Costs As States Draw Autistic 
Pupils,  N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/06/ 
nyregion/high-rewards-and-high-costs-as-states-draw-autisticpupils.html?page 
wanted=all&src=pm. 
23 Barner, supra note 19, at 110; Peterson, supra note 22. 
24 Beth Rosenwasser & Saul Axelrod, The Contributions of Applied Behavior 
Analysis to the Education of People with Autism, 25 BEHAV. MODIFICATION 671, 
672 (October 2001), available at http://bmo.sagepub.com/content/25/5/671.  
25 Id. at 672. 
26 Barner, supra note 19, at 111. 
27 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF 
THE SURGEON GENERAL 163-64 (1999), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ 
ps/access/NNBBHS.pdf. 
28 Barner, supra note 19, at 111. 
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D.  THE COSTS OF TREATMENT: HEAVY BURDENS ON FAMILIES AND 
STATES BUT POCKET CHANGE FOR INSURERS 
 
  In 2006, Harvard released a report by Michael Ganz, MS, PhD that 
examined the growing costs of autism coverage on individuals, families, 
and society.29 The report found that it costs society $35 billion annually to 
care for individuals with autism and $3.2 million for an individual to cover 
their own care over a lifetime. 
Further, Ganz and other studies have found, individuals with 
autism incur twice as many expenses for care as the typical American in 
their lifetime.  Reports have shown that it can total up to $81,900 for a 
family to provide adequate treatment to a child with autism, including 
speech therapy, occupational therapy, and ABA treatment.30 A child with 
autism will incur 2.5 times more outpatient costs and 2.9 times more 
inpatient costs in their lifetime than an individual without autism.31 These 
costs only increase if an individual’s insurance company fails to cover even 
some of the treatment. 
Ganz’s report also examined the cost to society as a whole for 
autism.  These figures considered the effect of autism on both individuals 
with the disease and their family/caregivers.  Considerations included the 
lower level of employment procured by autistic individuals, including 
decreased pay and benefits, as well as lower savings value due to increased 
expenses for medical treatment, therapies, and special programing 
requirements.32 The study also accounted for the loss or impairment of 
work time for family members of autistic individuals, including missed 
work, reduced hours, lower-paying jobs with more flexible requirements, 
or leaving the workforce entirely to care for their autistic family member.33  
While the numbers for individuals and families coping with autism 
are often staggering and equivalent to an individual’s annual income, the 
cost for insurers is far less.  The Council for Affordable Health Insurance 
(CAHI) released information in 2009 claiming that an autism mandate, 
                                                                                                                                
29 See generally Michael L. Ganz, The Lifetime Distribution of the Incremental 
Societal Costs of Autism, 161 ARCHIVES OF  PEDIATRIC  & ADOLESCENT  MED. 343 
(2007). 
30 Laura C. Hoffman, Ensuring Access to Health Care for the Autistic Child: 
More is Needed Than Federal Health Care Reform, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 435, 437 
(2012). 
31 Id. 
32 Ganz, supra note 29, at 348. 
33 Id. at 344.  
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legislation that requires health insurers to cover autism treatment, only 
increases the cost of health insurance by about 1%.34 CAHI cautions that 
the cost could increase if more services are mandated, but they still 
estimate only a one to three percent increase.35 
Further, in the absence of insurance coverage, many families that 
cannot carry the financial burden of treatment expenses move their children 
into the Medicaid system, which may cover autism treatment at a higher 
rate than private insurers.  Medicaid coverage is often superior to private 
insurance because state Medicaid programs offer some level of mental 
health services coverage and reimbursement,36 while private insurance may 
not.  With nearly 50% of Medicaid beneficiaries suffering from 
diagnosable mental health disorders in a given year,37 the pressure to keep 
citizens with access to private health insurance out of the state Medicaid 
programs is growing.  The more individuals with medical conditions that 
the Medicaid system absorbs, the greater financial burden placed on a state 
to finance the expanding costs of the program, an even heavier burden with 
many states struggling from significant state budget deficits. 
 
III.  WHAT THE LAWS SAY AND WHY IT IS A BATTLE FOR 
COVERAGE 
 
 Over the last few decades autism coverage proponents have 
experienced a number of victories in the quest to ensure coverage.  
However, even in light of moves by both the federal and state governments, 
efforts have fallen short of reaching millions of Americans, most notably 
those covered by employer-sponsored health plans.38  
 
                                                                                                                                
34 Victoria C. Bunce, The Growing Trend Toward Mandating Autism 
Coverage, 152 COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS. ISSUES & ANSWERS (Mar. 
2009), available at www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/n152AutismTrend. 
pdf. 
35 Id. 
36 Mental Health Services, MEDICAID.GOV,http://www.medicaid.gov/ Medic 
aid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Benefits/Mental-Health-Services-.html 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
37 BEHAVIORAL HEALTH IS ESSENTIAL TO HEALTH: PREVENTION WORKS, 
TREATMENT IS EFFECTIVE, PEOPLE RECOVER, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 1, 7, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ partnerships/ 
aca_act_and_community/aca_behavioralhealth.pdf. 
38 Employer Toolkit, supra note 12, at 33. 
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A.  FEDERAL  
 
The work on the federal level to guarantee autism coverage has 
been spotty at best.  The federal government has made broad strokes in an 
attempt to make mental illness and behavioral treatment a staple of health 
plan coverage.  However, while these efforts are admirable, each one falls 
short of truly providing coverage for such ailments. 
At the forefront of autism coverage is the Mental Health Parity 
Act, originally passed by Congress in 1996 and amended to fix certain 
loopholes in 2008.39 Together the laws require group health plans to 
establish financial requirements and treatment limits for mental health and 
substance abuse services that are no less restrictive than the requirements 
and limitations imposed on medical and surgical benefits.40 Mental Health 
Parity impacts autism coverage in that the DSM, which serves as the basis 
for the definition of mental health ailments for both laws and insurers, 
clearly classifies autism as a mental health disorder.  The problem with the 
act as it is structured is that it does not require mental health benefits 
coverage; it simply states that if, and only if, a health plan already covers 
mental health, such benefits shall be no less restrictive.  This in turn leaves 
the option open for health insurers to simply not offer mental health 
coverage to avoid being subject to such regulations.  
Another federal attempt at providing mental health coverage, and 
specifically autism coverage, to citizens can be found in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).  First, section 1302(b) of the 
ACA requires all individual and small group plans to provide coverage for 
“essential benefits.”41 Originally the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services was slated to establish a list of required essential benefits that each 
state must use as their minimum requirements, giving autism advocates 
hope that treatment would be covered under the mental health and 
behavioral health treatment category of “essential benefits.”42 However, in 
December 2011, the administration announced the intention that each state 
would be free to create their own list of “essential benefits” to serve as the 
                                                                                                                                
39 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006). 
40 Id. 
41 CENTER FOR CONSUMER AND INSURANCE OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 1-2 (2011), 
available at https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/ essential 
_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf. 
42 See generally AUTISM SPEAKS, COVERAGE OF AUTISM SERVICES UNDER THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS PACKAGE (Oct. 11, 2011). 
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benchmark for all small and individual plans sold within the state.43 
Resulting from the state flexibility approach, only eleven states deemed 
autism treatment coverage an essential benefit in their benchmark plans.44  
 Second, section 1001(5) of the ACA requires small group and 
individual health plans to provide preventative care services at no cost to 
the insured.45 As established by the Department of Health and Human 
Services, based in part on the recommendation and scoring of the U.S. 
Preventative Services Task Force, autism screenings for children aged 
eighteen to twenty-four months are considered a mandatory preventative 
service.46   
While the efforts of ACA will undoubtedly help provide coverage 
to many individuals, it still falls short of reaching the growing number of 
plans that are just outside of the federal regulations.  Large group plans are 
specifically exempt in the language of the ACA.47 Any employer-sponsored 
plan or individual health plan that was established prior to the passing of 
the ACA is deemed grandfathered, and thus protected from such 
requirements so long as they maintain grandfather status, which, for many, 
will be several years.48 Self-funded benefit plans are regulated by the 
                                                                                                                                
43 Christine Vestal & Matt McKillop, Health Law Explained: The States Gain 
New Flexibility in Setting Policies, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/health-law-explained-the-
states-gain-new-flexibility-in-setting-policies-85899375384. 
44 Christine Vestal, Q&A: How ACA Will Affect People With Autism, THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/ 
stateline/headlines/qa-how-aca-will-affect-people-with-autism-85899496217. 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012) (codifying § 1001(5) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)). 
46 What Are My Preventative Care Benefits?, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-are-my-preventive-care-benefits/#part=3 (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2013). 
47 Sarah Barr, FAQ: Grandfathered Health Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS 
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/december/ 
17/ grandfathered-plans-faq.aspx. 
48 The law is structured to remove grandfathered status once a plan makes 
“significant” changes that result in increased costs or decreased benefits to 
participants. This caveat ensures that inevitably most, if not all, plans will comply 
with the ACA requirements. Current studies state that the number of individuals 
covered by grandfathered plans has begun to steadily decline and will continue 
downward in the coming years. Current numbers show that 48% of those covered 
by their employers are enrolled in grandfathered plans in 2012, down from 54% in 
2011.  Id. 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act and exempt from all 
requirements described above under federal law.   
 
B.  STATE 
 
In the absence of comprehensive requirements on the federal level 
for autism coverage, many states have taken it upon themselves to 
implement legislation requiring insurers to cover autism.  Indiana passed 
the first meaningful piece of autism coverage legislation in 2001.  The law 
requires individual and group insurance plans to provide coverage for the 
treatment of pervasive developmental disorders, including autism, that have 
been prescribed by an individual’s treating physician.49 
It was not until several years later that the movement to require 
autism coverage took hold and laws began appearing in several states.  
Currently thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have laws that 
address autism coverage, with the bulk of states adopting such legislation 
in the last four to five years.50 
 The content of autism coverage laws varies from state to state, with 
thirty-one states specifically requiring insurers to provide for the treatment 
                                                                                                                                
49 IND. CODE §§ 27-8-14.2-3, 27-8-14.2-4, 27-8-14.2-5 (2013). 
50 Nine states adopted laws in the 2007-2008 legislative session, eight states in 
the 2009 legislative session, nine states in the 2010 legislative session, six states in 
2011, and three states in 2012. NCSL, supra note 2; ALA. CODE § 27-54A-2 
(2013); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.397 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-826.04, 
20-1057.11, 20-1402.03, 20-1404.03 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-418 (2013); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1374.72, 1374.73 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 
10-16-104 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3366 (2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 627.6686, 
641.31098 (2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.5/356Z.14 (2013); IND. CODE §§ 27-8-
14.2, 27-13-7-14 (2013); IOWA CODE § 514C.28 (2013); KAN. STATE. ANN. § 76-
6524 (2013); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 304.17A-142, 143 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
22:1050 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 2768 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. IV §§ 32A-22, 25 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1416e (2013); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1224 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-515, 33-22-706 
(2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0435, 689B.0335 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
417-E:1-2 (2013); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 17:48-6ii, 17:48-A-7ff, 17B:26-2.1cc, 
17B:27-46.lii, 17B:27A-7.16, 17B:27A-19.20 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-
22-49, 59A-23-7.9, 59A-46-50, 59A-47-45 (2013); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3216, 3221 
(2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27.20.11 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-280 (2013); 
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1355.015 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4088i (2013); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1:01 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 5-16B-6e (2013); WIS. STAT. 
§ 632.895(12m) (2013). 
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of autism.51 Overall, the laws implemented throughout the country establish 
varying annual cap limits on how much an insurer is required to pay out, 
from no limit to $50,000 a year, and also varying age limits that an insurer 
is required to cover, such as coverage for life or just for the first two to six 
years of life.52  
 While states have made great strides to ensure autism coverage for 
their citizens, it should be noted that because of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-emption discussed next, self-insured 
plans53 are exempt from these state level requirements.  This means that 
29% of children aged 0-18 that are covered by self-insured plans might not 
have autism coverage.54 While several self-insured plans, such as those 
offered by Microsoft, Eli Lilly, and Home Depot, voluntarily provide 
autism benefits,55 such actions are not mandated by law and therefore there 
is no guarantee as health care expenses rise that these companies will 
continue to provide these benefits. 
 
C.  ERISA 
 
One of the biggest roadblock to coverage for autism can be found 
in ERISA.  While efforts have been made on the federal level to establish 
requirements of coverage and equal treatment, and even on the state level 
to specifically require autism coverage, many plans can still be exempt 
from such mandates56 leaving millions57 without a safety net. 
ERISA applies to health benefit plans offered in the private 
industry, but its most notable impact on health insurance laws comes in its 
protection of self-insured plans – or plans where the employer has taken on 
                                                                                                                                
51 NCSL, supra note 2. 
52 Employer ToolKit, supra note 12, at 25. 
53 The term self-insured plan refers to health benefit plans in which the plan 
sponsor, an employer, directly funds the health benefits for its enrollees. In 
contrast, fully-insured plans refer to situations in which an employer purchases 
group health insurance from an insurer. Michael J. Brien & Constantijin W.A. 
Panis, Self-Insured Health Benefit Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 4 (Mar. 23, 2011), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACASelfFundedHealthPlansReport032811.pdf. 
54 Employer Toolkit, supra note 12, at 33. 
55 Id. at 35. 
56 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). 
57 Employer Health Benefits: 2013 Summary of Findings, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, 1 (Aug. 20, 2013), available at  
http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/2013-employer-health-benefits/.  
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the financial risk of funding, managing, and administering, its health plan.58 
Under section 514 of ERISA, self-insured health benefit plans are insulated 
from many state insurance laws, specifically state insurance mandates.  
While the first clause, section 514(a), establishes the broad preemption 
power of ERISA,59 specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the key 
term of section 514(a), “relate to,” should be given its “broad common-
sense meaning,” so as to displace all state laws that are in connection with, 
or making reference, to an employee benefit plan,60 section 514(b)(2)(A), 
the “savings clause,” reserves the right of states to regulate insurance 
generally.61 Under this provision even if a state law is preempted under 
section 514(a) it can still be allowed so long as it regulates insurance, or in 
other words, if the state law is “specifically directed toward entities 
engaged in insurance . . . [and] . . . substantially affect[s] the risk pooling 
arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”62 
However, the Deemer clause, section 514(b)(2)(B), establishes the 
one exception to the right of states to regulate insurance and is the pinpoint 
clause that exempts self-insured from state mandates.63 The Deemer clause 
restricts states’ regulation of insurance to only insurance companies and 
contracts, not plans themselves.  Therefore, a self-insured plan is neither an 
insurance company nor a contract, thus exempt from state regulations and 
mandates.  This loophole created by the ERISA is what allows many plans 
to be free from autism treatment requirements, thus creating a gap of 
coverage for millions of Americans. 
 
                                                                                                                                
58 Matt Leming, More Employers Weigh Self-Funded Health Plans, SOC’Y 
FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.shrm.org/ 
hrdisciplines/benefits/Articles/Pages/SelfFunded.aspx..aspx. 
59 ERISA shall “supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. §1144(a). 
60 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983). 
61 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  
62 Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003). 
63 This Deemer clause states that no employee benefit plan “shall be deemed 
to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of 
insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance 
companies [or] contracts.”  29 U.S.C. §1144(b)(2)(B). 
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IV.  THE PAST: PRIOR LEGAL BATTLES FOR AUTISM 
COVERAGE 
 
 The inability of federal and state laws to ensure coverage and the 
escalating cost of autism treatment has left many struggling for a way to 
hold insurers liable for treatment.  Some individuals have turned to the 
judicial system as a means to require insurers to provide coverage for 
treatment.  In these individual claims, courts have relied on the insurers 
inadequacies to establish individuals’ rights to autism treatment coverage, 
stating that insurers’ unsubstantiated rejections of treatment are not enough 
to uphold a denial of benefits.  However, while several individual cases 
exist, none of the courts have established a precedent that would extend 
beyond the individuals before them.  Each ruling was narrowly tailored to 
the case at hand, failing to establish a rule or guideline of when, and if, a 
court would require an insurer to provide specific coverage. 
The fight for health insurance coverage of autism is no stranger to 
the court system.  Dating back to the early 1990s, several individual claims 
against health insurers have been brought seeking coverage for autism 
treatment.  Collectively these individual claims show a deference of the 
courts to the needs and requirements of individuals over those of health 
insurers. 
The early predecessor to such claims came in 1990 when Kunin v. 
Benefit Trust Life Insurance was heard before the Ninth Circuit.64 Kunin 
was covered by an employer health plan, operated by Benefit Trust that 
refused to cover his numerous claims.  In 1986, Kunin’s son was diagnosed 
with autism and underwent thirty days of treatment, which cost over 
$54,000.65 The disagreement arose when Benefit Trust stated the policy 
only allowed for up to $10,000 for “mental illness or nervous disorders” 
reimbursement.66 The insurer held that autism was classified as a mental 
illness and therefore Kunin was responsible for costs beyond the 
reimbursement maximum.67 
In the opinion, the Court held that the classification of autism as a 
mental illness was an arbitrary and capricious decision by the insurer 
because they failed to substantiate the determination.  Specifically, the 
Court stated that the so-called expert the insurers relied on for such a 
classification had failed to disclose material information, including what 
                                                                                                                                
64 Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1990). 
65 Id. at 535. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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other doctors he had consulted or his experience or particular expertise 
concerning autism, to establish a well-founded reasoning behind the 
determination.68 Further, the Court noted that the insurer had failed to make 
any effort to talk with the boy’s own physicians to determine the basis for 
diagnosis and the recommended treatment before establishing the 
classification.69 In light of these facts and because the policy in question 
was vaguely worded as to not contain a definition or explanation of mental 
illness, the Ninth Circuit found that the insurer was obligated to pay the full 
amount of the claim.70 While the case brought the issue of coverage for 
autism treatment to the forefront, the fact that it turned on the definition of 
mental illness in the policy language only established a case-specific 
holding for an insurer’s liability. 
 Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the district court for the 
Northern District of Illinois again displayed the proclivity of courts to favor 
the insured over the insurers in the face of inadequate rationale.  In Wheeler 
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., the Plaintiff argued that Aetna wrongfully denied 
coverage of medical treatment for his son who suffered from numerous 
conditions, including autism.71 The majority of the argument centered on 
coverage for speech therapy, physical therapy, ABA therapy, and sensory 
integration therapy, most of which Aetna refused to cover, citing various 
reasons, specifically the lack of evidence that such therapies are effective.72 
Aetna argued that it had the right to reject coverage of certain therapies 
because the language of the policy granted them discretion to determine “to 
what extent employees and beneficiaries are entitled to benefits,” however 
the Court rejected this argument, stating that the discretionary decisions of 
Aetna must still be reasonable and must provide the insured with “every 
reason for [their] denial of benefits at the time of denial.”73   
 The Court then went on to examine three letters issued by Aetna in 
which “they utterly fail to consider the actual language of the plan at 
issue,” and thus had failed to provide adequate reasoning for their 
rejections.74 The Court found that the actions of Aetna were, in effect, 
classifying autism as a developmental disorder which was covered by the 
                                                                                                                                
68 Id. at 537-38. 
69 Id. at 538. 
70 Id. at 541.  
71 Wheeler v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 01 C 6064, 2003 WL 21789029, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. July 23, 2003). 
72 Id. at *3–4. 
73 Id. at *4–7. 
74 Id. at *9. 
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policy but then subsequently denying all treatment for developmental 
delays caused by autism.75 The Court held these actions by the insurer, if 
allowed, “[w]ould in effect render the provisions for coverage for autism 
meaningless.”76  
Although not a traditional individual claim, the Sixth Circuit issued 
another judicial opinion showing deference to protecting the rights of 
individuals to receive coverage of autism treatment in Parents’ League for 
Effective Autism Services v. Jones-Kelly.77 The guardians of three 
Medicaid-eligible children filed for a preliminary injunction against Ohio 
to prevent the state from implementing amendments that would effectively 
stop funding autism treatment.78 After the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) issued proposed rules that would limit Medicaid 
coverage for rehabilitative services, Ohio promulgated amendments to its 
own Administrative Code, one of which limited coverage by defining 
rehabilitative services as those that would restore an individual to their 
prior functioning level.79 The new amendments effectively eradicated state 
funding to programs that provided autism treatment to Medicaid children.  
The lawsuit claimed such actions violate federal Medicaid law that 
provides eligible children with such services.80 Plaintiffs in the case argued 
that these rules deny funding to facilities responsible for providing autism 
treatment to Medicaid-eligible children.81 The Court did not rule on the 
merits, but instead granted a temporary restraining order to prevent the 
state from implementing the amendments.82 The decisions, although not 
conclusive, signaled the judicial system’s hesitance to allow actions that 
would eliminate adequate coverage for autism treatment in state-run 
Medicaid programs.  
It was not until several years after these cases that a district court 
would consider the question that currently plagues the class actions for 
autism treatment: does an insurer’s designation of ABA therapy as 
“experimental” warrant their refusal to cover such treatment under the 
terms of their plans?  In McHenry v. PacificSource Health Plans, the Court 
                                                                                                                                
75 Id. at *13. 
76 Id. at *13. 
77 Parents’ League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 339 Fed. 
App’x. 542, 542 (6th Cir. 2009). 
78 Id. at 543. 
79 Id. at 545. 
80 Id. at 545-46. 
81 Id. at 551-52. 
82 Id. at 543-44, 552. 
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considered whether an insurance carrier was responsible to an ABA 
therapist after a child had been diagnosed with autism and his pediatrician 
prescribed ABA therapy.83 After seeing the therapist for four months, 
PacificSource denied payment citing its policy that allowed them to deny 
coverage for experimental or investigational procedures, as well as 
academic or social skills training.84 To support its rejection, PacificSource 
stated that there was “no ‘gold standard’ for the treatment of autism, and 
there is much debate in the literature regarding the efficacy of any one 
approach, including ABA . . . [thus] it [is] clear that ABA [is] not a well-
proven or evidence-based standard of medical care.”85 
 The Court rejected both arguments, holding that ABA is supported 
by decades of research and application, and stated that ABA is an 
acknowledged autism treatment by several government agencies, including 
the Department of Health and Human Services and the National Institute of 
Mental Health, and professional organizations, including the American 
Psychological Society.86 Further, the court stated that although ABA 
treatment may have incidental benefits related to education and social skills 
for autistic children, its main focus is modifying behaviors pertinent to 
every area of the child’s life and thus not solely an academic or social skills 
program.87 In the end, the Court found that ABA therapy was medically 
necessary for Wheeler’s autism treatment.88    
While the judicial prerogative has been to favor the insured and 
coverage for autism treatment, the Court’s failure to rule in a broader 
context leaves the critical question of all these claims unanswered: will, 
and should, insurers be required to provide coverage of autism treatment to 
their insured? 
 
                                                                                                                                
83 McHenry v. PacificSource Health Plans, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228-29 (D. 
Or. 2010). 
84 Id. at 1228. 
85 Id. at 1236. 
86 Id. at 1237-38. 
87 Id. at 1240-41. 
88 Id. at 1248. In the end, the Court ruled against a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, stating that a secondary reason for denial of payments based on the 
ABA therapists lack of credentialing was enough to support a refusal of 
PacificSource to reimburse. Id. at 1245-46.  
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V.  THE PRESENT: BANDING TOGETHER TO CHALLENGE 
INSURERS FOR AUTISM COVERAGE 
 
After years of individual claims against insurers, a new breed of 
cases regarding autism coverage began to appear before the courts.  In 2010 
and 2011, insured individuals, who had been denied insurance coverage for 
ABA, began banding together to challenge their individual carriers.  Three 
separate claims for class certification were brought before federal courts to 
directly challenge their insurer’s denial of coverage for ABA therapy.89 The 
carriers stated the same reasoning for denial in all cases: ABA is an 
investigative and experimental treatment.  The charges of the insured were 
the same: the insurance carrier should provide coverage under my policy 
for ABA treatment for autism.90 However, the similarities ended there.  In 
the three cases, often with nearly identical facts, the reasoning of the judges 
resulted in very different outcomes for class certification.  
The first judge reasoned that the presented class failed to establish 
commonality, or failed to establish that there was a common question of 
law or fact applicable to the entire class.91 The court reasoned that a claim 
for autism treatment would require individualized review of an insured’s 
claim and medical treatment to determine if ABA therapy is actually 
experimental,92 thus a “determination of [the common question’s] truth or 
falsity” would not have resolved the central issue of all claims “in one 
stroke.”93 The second judge found no such failure to establish 
commonality, and determined that an insurance company’s across the 
board determinations regarding ABA therapy meant a common question of 
if ABA therapy was a covered benefit existed.94 Further, the judge stated 
that even though the entitlement award for the denied benefit might require 
individualized review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), such 
determinations do not predominate over the common question plaguing all 
class members.95 Finally, the third judge found that such classes can easily 
be certified under common questions as the court is only seeking to 
                                                                                                                                
89 See generally Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 
2010 WL 670081 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010); Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL 9378789 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011); Churchill 
v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011). 
90 Id. 
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); Graddy, 2010 WL 670081, at *9. 
92 See Graddy, 2010 WL 670081 at *9. 
93 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
94 See Potter, 2011 WL 9378789, at *6. 
95 See id. 
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determine whether the denial of ABA claims are appropriate.96 However, 
limitations on relief apply in relation to who composes the class.97 These 
rulings create three distinct interpretations of the applicability of class 
adjudication of autism claims. 
 
A.  GRADDY, 2010 
 
First, in Graddy v. Blue Cross BlueShield of Tennessee Inc, a group 
of individuals covered by Blue Cross BlueShield of Tennessee (BCBST) 
moved for class certification in a claim against the insurer because of their 
denial of coverage for ABA therapy for autistic individuals.98 The Plaintiffs 
in the case claimed that the actions of BCBST violated ERISA, the 
Tennessee Autism Equity Act, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection 
Act.  Specifically, the claim stated that BCBST violated its fiduciary duties 
to the Plaintiffs when it failed to fairly and properly construe and interpret 
the language of the health plans for the exclusive purpose of providing 
benefits to the members of the plan.99 Further, they alleged that the 
Tennessee Autism Equity Act required BCBST to provide benefits and 
coverage for the treatment of autism at the same level it provided for other 
neurological disorders and that it had failed to do so when it rejected the 
claims.100 Finally, the Plaintiffs claimed BCBST had engaged in unfair and 
deceptive trade practices, violating the Tennessee Consumer Protection 
Act.101   
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 23(b)(2), 
the Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all insured under the BCBST 
policy who have, or will make, a claim for coverage for ABA therapy and 
                                                                                                                                
96 See Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 12, 2011). 
97 See id. at *4–6. In a subsequent amended complaint, Judge Sanchez allowed 
a second representative to be added to the class to capture all current Cigna 
members who had submitted ABA claims that were subsequently denied under 
Cigna’s current company-wide policy.  However, in the subsequent case Judge 
Sanchez denied the motion to certify a (b)(2) class because the class in its entirety 
sought individualized monetary damages, which were not certifiable under (b)(2).  
Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2012 WL 3590691, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 
21, 2012) [hereinafter Churchill II]. 
98 Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL 
670081, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).  
99 Id. at *1-4. 
100 Id at *6. 
101 Id. 
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BCBST denied such coverage on the basis that ABA is deemed 
investigative or experimental.102 The class argued that BCBST had 
established “a deliberate company-wide policy to deny all claims for ABA 
treatment, even though it knows the terms of its Plans provide coverage for 
the treatment” and further that such denials were made in bad faith and on 
baseless grounds.103     
The court rejected class certification on the basis that the class 
failed to meet the commonality requirement of FRCP 23(a)(2), requiring 
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”104 Here, the 
court reasoned, a claim of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA requires 
most questions be answered through individualized review of each class 
member’s claim, diagnosis, therapy and determination if ABA truly was 
experimental for their precise condition.105 Specifically, proving breach of 
fiduciary duty requires showing a connection between the fiduciaries 
actions and the harm caused to the individual.  The court focused on the 
varying degrees of autism and how each diagnosis was different.  The court 
reasoned that, “individuals suffering from . . . autism ‘may exhibit the 
characteristic traits of autism . . . in any combination, and in different 
degrees of severity,’” and therefore, “the varied behavioral disorders 
exhibited by patients with ASD, and the question of whether such behavior 
disorders may or may not be treated by ABA,” means that the class shares 
no homogeneity that would allow them to operate as a class.106   
The court specifically reserved ruling on the merits of the claim 
until the complaint could be amended by Graddy to establish an individual 
claim against BCBST’s decision to deny coverage for ABA treatment.107 
The concluding statements of the court in this opinion showed support for 
individual claims of autism coverage against insurers that had been stated 
in prior cases as well as the growing policy support found on the state and 
federal level for autism coverage, but stopped short of allowing a class 
action against an insurer.108 
It should be noted that in 2013 the District Court for Oregon 
addressed a similar class seeking only injunctive relief and, in contrast to 
                                                                                                                                
102 Id. at *4. 
103 Id. at *3, *5. 
104 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
105 Graddy, 2010 WL 670081, at *9-10. 
106 Id. at *8-10. 
107 Id. at *10. 
108 Id. at *9-10. 
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Graddy, was granted certification.109 In A.F. v. Providence, the Plaintiff 
class included all current members of Providence health plans who had 
been, or will be up to the time of certification, diagnosed with autism.110 
The class sought injunctive relief against Providence to prevent them from 
uniformly applying a policy exclusion that excludes all coverage for ABA 
therapy.111 After a lengthy discussion of the requirements of a proper class 
under Rule 23(a), the judge certified the class finding that “injunction 
would provide specific and meaningful relief to all named class 
members.”112 Particularly, the judge found that resolving the question 
raised by the Plaintiffs would provide “complete relief as to the specific 
issue raised by the [class], even if it does not ultimately address every class 
members’ needs or issues.”113 While AF is the most recent iteration of the 
autism class action, the opinion issued by the court offers little beyond 
what has already been expressed in the earlier autism class action court 
rulings.  The vast majority of the AF opinion focuses on the checklist 
requirements of class certification and therefore this author believes it does 
not warrant further discussion.  
 
B.  POTTER, 2011 
 
In the second class action claim, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan certified a class claim against Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Michigan (BCBSM) and its rejection of ABA treatment for autism.114 In 
Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, the class brought suit under 
ERISA claiming first, that BCBSM had improperly denied claims on the 
basis that ABA is deemed experimental or investigative and second, that 
BCBSM had denied them the opportunity for a full and fair review of the 
claim.115 
Michael Porter, acting as class representative, made a motion to 
certify a class containing two subclasses.  Subclass A was defined as all 
insureds under a BCBSM policy who made a claim, or will make a claim, 
                                                                                                                                
109 A.F. v. Providence Health Plan, No. 3:13-CV-00776-SI, 2013 WL 6796095 
(D. Or. Dec. 24, 2013). 
110 Id. at *4. 
111 Id. at *1. 
112 Id. at *10. 
113 Id. at *11 (emphasis in original).  
114 Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL 
9378789 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011). 
115 Id. at *2. 
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for ABA therapy and the claim was, or will be, denied on grounds that such 
treatment is investigative or experimental.116 Subclass B was defined as all 
insured under a BCBSM policy who did not make a claim for ABA “in 
light of Defendant’s policy that such treatment is deemed to be 
investigative or experimental.”117 
 The court found that the numerosity standard was easily met, 
determining that, based on the business size of BCBSM and the number of 
students diagnosed with autism in Michigan schools, joinder would be 
impractical, if not impossible.118 Further, the class shared a common 
question as all of the claims depended on the same contention: there is no 
reasonable basis for stating that ABA is experimental and not a mainstream 
medical treatment.  Therefore all claims of the class would be addressed 
when the court determines if the insurer had improperly deemed ABA 
treatment experimental.119 
 It was noted that the area of most difficulty on its face was 
determining the members of the class.  While subclass A was easily 
distinguishable based on the likelihood of BCBSM maintaining records on 
claims filed, subclass B would be theoretically difficult because of the 
subjective nature of ascertaining why an individual did not file a claim.  
However, the court rejected this obstacle, stating that they can assume that 
if an individual failed to file a claim for ABA treatment, it was a result of 
them either being told, or somehow learning, that BCBSM deemed all such 
treatment experimental and excluded from coverage.  Therefore, instead of 
going through the burden of processing an insurance claim only to have it 
rejected, the individual that received ABA treatment and did not submit the 
claim did so only because of the BCBSM policy.120 
The judge here explicitly disagreed with Graddy, noting that, 
although the cases are similar, determining the case would not require 
answering individualized questions.  BCBSM made an across-the-board 
determination that ABA treatment is experimental and therefore not a 
covered benefit, thus BCBSM’s determination was not made after 
considering each individual claim and medical need, but rather based on its 
uniform determination that ABA is experimental.121   
                                                                                                                                
116 Id. at *4. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at *5. 
119 Id. at *6. 
120 Id. at *4-5. 
121 Id. at *8. 
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The class was then certified under Rule 23(b)(3) with the 
presumption that, since the class claim was that ABA claims were 
improperly rejected by BCBSM because of an experimental classification, 
no member of this class would have another reason for being rejected by 
BCBSM and therefore the class would require no individualized 
determination.122 Further, the Court rejected BCBSM’s contention and the 
Graddy Court’s reasoning, that individual determinations would be needed 
to decipher how much each class member was entitled to under their claim, 
explaining that such determinations do not predominate over the common 
issue that BCBSM improperly denied their ABA claims.123  
 
C.  CHURCHILL, 2011 
 
 The third class action, filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
came to a very different conclusion than the other two courts.  In Churchill 
v. Cigna Corp., the Court differed from Graddy by choosing to certify a 
class action against an insurer for coverage of ABA treatment, but unlike 
Potter, the Court refused to include in the class members of the health 
insurance plan that had not filed claims for ABA.124 
 The Plaintiffs in Churchill charged that Cigna had improperly 
denied their claim for ABA treatment125 of autism in violation of ERISA 
and thus sought benefits and equitable relief.126 The complaint alleges that 
under Cigna’s uniform Medical Coverage Policy, Cigna excluded coverage 
of ABA on the basis that such treatment is deemed, “‘experimental, 
investigational or unproven’ for the treatment of [autism],” and therefore 
                                                                                                                                
122 Id. 
123 Id. On March 30, 2013, the district court issued judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff class. Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 10-CV-14981, 2013 
WL 4413310, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2013). The Court found that BCBS’ 
denials were arbitrary and capricious and therefore overturned the denial of 
benefits. Id. at *6. The Court remanded the claims for re-administration by BCBS, 
stating that “the remand is not an opportunity for BCBS to invent new bases for 
denial of claims that were not previously asserted.” Id. at *12-13.   
124 Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *1 (E.D. 
Penn. Aug. 12, 2011). 
125 Id. The original complaint stated that Cigna rejected both ABA and Early 
Intensive Behavioral Intervention treatment on the grounds that both treatments 
were experimental, however, the Court reasoned that Early Intensive Behavioral 
Intervention was encapsulated by ABA and therefore both treatments will be 
referred to simply as ABA. Id. at *1 n. 2. 
126 Id. at *1. 
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excluded from coverage.127 Kristopher Churchill, acting as the class 
representative, made a motion to certify two subclasses, similar to those 
proposed in Potter, under Rule 23(b)(2) and (3).128 The first group, subclass 
A, was defined as all insureds enrolled in a plan administered or offered by 
Cigna who had made a claim, or will make a claim, for ABA therapy which 
was denied, or will be denied, on the grounds that such treatment is 
investigative or experimental.129 The complaint also moved to have 
subclass B certified as all insured who were enrolled in a plan administered 
or offered by Cigna who did not make a claim for ABA therapy in light of 
Defendant’s policy that ABA is “deemed to be investigative or 
experimental.”130 
 The Court established that certification could only be granted to an 
amended version of subclass A.131 In its reasoning, the Court found that, 
although the entire class met the numerosity requirement,132 they failed to 
meet the typicality and adequacy of representation standards of Rule 23.133 
Under its determination, the Court found that the entirety of subclass A 
shared a common question revolving around if Cigna’s denial based on a 
claim that ABA therapy is investigative and experimental was a proper 
reasoning for denial.134 Therefore, answering a single question, common to 
all members of the class, would address the individual claims.135 
 However, the Court opted to narrow Subclass A in two ways.  
                                                                                                                                
127 Id. 
128 Id. at *1-2. Rule 23 (b)(2) states that “a class action may be maintained . . . 
if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 
23(b)(3) states that “a class action may be maintained . . . if . . . the court finds that 
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
129 Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *2. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at *5. 
132 The Court determined, based on the size of Cigna’s business coupled with 
the growing prevalence of autism diagnoses in America, that even if a small 
fraction of Cigna members had filed claims for ABA, subclass A would still be too 
large and too geographically diverse to “render joinder practical.” Id. at *3. 
133 Id. at *4-5. 
134  Id. at *4. 
135 Id. 
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First, because Churchill was no longer a member of a Cigna health plan he 
could not adequately represent the interests of current members as he 
lacked any discernible interest in seeking injunctive relief to prohibit Cigna 
from rejecting ABA claims.136 Therefore, the class would have to be 
limited to only individuals that were former members of Cigna’s health 
insurance plans.137 
Second, the Court rejected the reasoning that had been upheld in 
Potter, in that the class could not contain individuals who had failed to file 
a claim for ABA treatment.138 The Court found the logic of Potter 
unpersuasive, stating that individuals may have chosen to not file a claim 
for a variety of reasons, not simply because they knew of Cigna’s policy 
against ABA reimbursement, and in such cases Cigna’s policy can 
therefore not be held to cause harm.139 
In the end, the Court chose to certify a class of former Cigna 
members that had submitted claims for ABA treatments that had been 
rejected by Cigna.140 In doing so, the Court dismissed Cigna’s argument 
that it had rejected ABA claims for a variety of reasons, often noted on the 
rejection letters sent to plan members.  The Court found that, although 
Cigna listed a variety of reasons as to why it rejected the claim, including 
the argument that there might be differences in diagnoses and the type of 
ABA treatment received, Cigna had still made a class-wide determination 
that ABA was experimental in all cases and that was the basis for their 
continuous rejections.141 
 
                                                                                                                                
136 Id. at *4-5. In a subsequent filing the class was amended to capture current 
members of the health insurer by adding a second class representative who was 
currently enrolled in a Cigna health plan.  Churchill II, No. 10-6911, 2012 WL 
3590691, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
137 Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4-5.   
138 Id. at *8. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *6. On November 26, 2013 a Notice of Class Action Settlement was 
sent to class members. Notice of Class Action Settlement, Churchill v. Cigna 
Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.washingtonautismadvocacy.org/updates/wp-content/uploads/Notice-of-
ABA-Settlement-Cigna.pdf. The proposed settlement entitled class members to 
monetary damages for rejected ABA claims. Id. at 2. A fairness hearing was 
conducted on February 19, 2014. Id. at 3. At the time of publication, a final 
settlement was not yet approved by the court.  
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VI.  CONFLICTING RULINGS HIGHLIGHT THE SUBJECTIVE 
DETERMINATIONS THAT CREATE THE LEGAL TOOLS 
AVAILABLE TO CONSUMERS 
 
 While the movement to provide coverage for autism treatment has 
made great strides both in law and in the courtroom, many questions 
remain.  Can you bring a class action against an insurance company to 
require coverage for ABA treatment?  The answer depends on the district.  
Districts following Graddy require individual claims, not class actions, 
while districts following Potter and Churchill say certain class actions will 
work.  Can a certified class encapsulate all members of a plan, or only 
those who have filed a claim that was rejected?  A judge could find the 
presumption that an individual failed to file a claim because they knew of 
the insurance company’s policy applicable, while other judges may believe 
such a presumption is baseless.    
 On the face the three class actions look similar.  A group of 
individuals who could not receive health insurance coverage for autism 
treatment, all filing a claim under ERISA to answer a simple question: is a 
health insurer’s denial of ABA therapy on the grounds that it is 
“experimental” reasonable?  However, the judges in these three cases 
viewed what was before them in drastically different lights.  The 
contrasting rulings highlight the problems that arise from a class action 
against an insurance company for denial of benefits.  Such cases require a 
court to rule generally on issues that are very often individual: is this 
specific claim covered under this specific policy for this specific 
individual? 
 
A.  WHAT’S IN A DEFINITION 
 
 The first difference can be seen in the class definitions that were 
presented for certification.  Many may believe that minor differences in 
class definitions before the court can explain the conflicting rulings, but the 
differences were slight and easily malleable as demonstrated by the 
Churchill Court’s willingness to edit the class definition in its 
certification.142 
 In Graddy, the Court rejected the most basic class definition 
offered: current and former plan members who had submitted a claim for 
ABA therapy and were denied because of the company policy deeming 
                                                                                                                                
142 See Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *7. 
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ABA therapy experimental.143 Here, the Eastern District of Tennessee 
rejected the class on the basis that every class member would require an 
“individualized assessment as to the ultimate propriety of the benefits 
decision.”144 The Court reasoned that, although ABA treatment is beneficial 
to individuals diagnosed with autism, it is not always the preferred and 
appropriate therapy, nor is the amount required set in stone.  Rather, each 
individual diagnosis requires individual review to determine what therapy 
is needed, how much, and to what level it should be covered by the health 
insurance plan.145  
 On the other hand, the Potter Court found no such individualized 
assessment is required and went so far as to broaden the class definition.  
The Court certified a class that contained current and past members of the 
health plan who received ABA treatment regardless of whether they had or 
had not submitted a claim to the insurer.146 The Court directly disagreed 
with Graddy, determining that a company-wide policy deeming ABA 
therapy experimental had been applied across the board without individual 
assessment of claims, and therefore individual review of the claims, or not 
claims, was not necessary.  The company policy on its own was at it issue, 
and therefore the issue is capable of remedy without individual assessment. 
 Finally, Churchill was originally presented with the same broad 
class definition that occurred in Potter, a class that consisted of current and 
former members who had received ABA treatment regardless of if they had 
filed a claim.147 Rather than rejecting the class entirely or accepting the 
class definition, the Churchill Court opted to apply judicial discretion and 
narrow the class definition.  In doing so, limited the class to only those 
individuals who had made claims to their insurer, finding that such a 
definition was apt for class certification.148 The Churchill Court rejected the 
reasoning of the Graddy Court.149 Such discretion emphasizes the 
uncertainty regarding class actions against insurers and the ability to use 
general determinations against a business that relies on individual 
appraisals. 
                                                                                                                                
143 Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL 
670081, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).  
144 Id. at *9. 
145 Id. at *10. 
146 Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL 
9378789, at *1, *4 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011).  
147 Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *2. 
148 Id. at *8. 
149 Id. at *8, n. 13.  
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B.  HOW MUCH, IF ANY, RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE 
 
The second significant difference between the cases rested with 
what type of class-wide relief that would be appropriate.  In Graddy, the 
Court found that the class could not seek injunctive relief under Rule 
23(b)(2) because the class’ claim rested on a breach of the fiduciary duty 
imposed under ERISA which could only be proven by a clear link between 
the breach of duty and the harm experienced.  For the Court, such a link 
was dependent on the equities of each individual claim, which would in 
turn require an individual evaluation of each class member, their diagnosis, 
treatment plan, and specific claim.  With a lack of homogeneity within the 
class, final injunctive relief would not be appropriate for the class as a 
whole.150 
However, the Potter Court found such reasoning inapplicable, and 
determined that not only could the class of current and former members be 
extended to include individuals who had not even filed a claim, but also 
that they could seek both injunctive and monetary relief.151 For the Eastern 
District of Michigan, a class of individuals denied coverage of a specific 
treatment, as the result of a company-wide policy are entitled first, to 
injunctive relief152 to prevent the company from applying such a policy and 
second, to monetary relief153 that would provide reimbursement for their 
out-of-pocket expenses.154 The Court held that although individuals would 
be entitled to varying amounts depending on their claim, individual 
entitlement amounts did not predominate over the fact that all members of 
the health plan had been denied benefits solely on the company policy that 
deemed ABA therapy “experimental”.155 
Finally, in Churchill, the Court walked the line between the 
opposing opinions of the earlier courts when it ruled that a class of 
individuals who had made a claim for ABA that was denied could not seek 
injunctive relief, but could receive monetary relief.  The Court found that 
the question of what was owed to the consumers turned on the status of the 
individuals in the class.  Since one subclass contained former members of 
the Cigna health plans, injunctive relief was inappropriate because former 
                                                                                                                                
150 Graddy, 2010 WL 670081 at *8. 
151 Potter, 2011 WL 9378789 at *9-10. 
152 Id. at *9. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at *1. 
155 Id. at *9. 
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members would not be seeking a ruling requiring Cigna to change its 
company policy for they would receive no benefit from such a change in 
policy.156 However, the other class of current members who had filed 
claims could seek monetary damages rather than injunctive relief. 
 While all three classes commonly sought at least partial relief 
under Rule 23(b)(2), the rulings provided three contradictory holdings on 
whether such relief is applicable.  The competing approaches and reasoning 
leave individuals and lawyers without any clear answers.  Is a challenge of 
an insurance company for an unreasonable denial of benefits available as a 
class action, and if it is, what relief can be offered? 
 
VII.  HOW TO APPROACH AUTISM CLASS ACTIONS IN LIGHT 
OF AN UNCLEAR PATH FROM THE COURTS 
 
Autism coverage class actions paint a blurry picture at best.  The 
complicated web of federal and state laws striving to provide autism 
coverage is often sidestepped by ERISA’s distinction between insured and 
self-insured, leaving plans free to reject claims for treatment.  Individual 
challenges to these tactics, while often successful, have proven inefficient.  
In order to truly clarify answers, the insured have pursued claims 
collectively, but even collective action has resulted in three different 
judicial approaches.  First, courts have determined that individual questions 
matter in resolving the reasonableness of an insurer’s decision and 
therefore must be reviewed independently.157 Others have found that when 
a company applies an across-the-board determination regarding a benefit, a 
remedy may also be provided across-the-board.158 Still other courts have 
stated that although you may overcome the individualized nature of 
diagnosis and treatment plans, you cannot bind people who never acted, 
even if they were harmed by the actions of an insurance company.159 
  Even though the picture is complicated and the precedent 
confusing, moving forward courts can apply a standard that allows for 
individuals to collectively challenge insurance companies and fill the gap 
left by federal and state legislation of autism coverage.  Taking into 
                                                                                                                                
156 Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *6-7 (E.D. 
Penn. Aug. 12, 2011). 
157 Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL 
670081, at *9-10 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).  
158 Potter, 2011 WL 9378789, at *6, *8. 
159 Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *7-8. 
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consideration the requirements and policy basis of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2),160 
allowing class actions against insurers best serves the interest of an 
efficient judicial system and with proper limitations can strike the balance 
of providing global peace to all parties while still allowing for individual 
assessments that insurance companies rely on in business.   
 Determining if an insurance company’s decision to rule ABA 
therapy as experimental is reasonable does not require an individualized 
assessment of every claim.  Rather, the company-wide policy is in 
question, not the individual denials; therefore if a court were to determine 
reasonableness they would determine an answer to a common question to 
all class members.  As the advisory committee notes state, “necessity for a 
class action is greatest when the courts are called upon to order . . . the 
alteration of the status quo in circumstances such that a large number of 
persons are in a position to call on a single person to alter the status quo . . . 
.”161 Applicable here, the courts are being asked to evaluate the company 
policies regarding ABA therapy, rather than each individual rejection of 
such a claim.  Courts should not be looking at whether every denied claim 
was appropriate, nor should they conclude that anyone with an autism 
diagnosis is entitled to ABA therapy.  Rather, appropriate analysis of the 
court should focus on the company policy that hinders millions of 
Americans’ access to benefits they need.  If autism coverage class action 
                                                                                                                                
160 Pertinent subsections are as follows: 
 
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only 
if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class. 
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained 
if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . . 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
161 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note. 
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claims are accepted by the court as a challenge to insurers’ company-wide 
policies rather than individual claims for benefits, a court can sustain a 
class certification pursuant to the goals of Rule 23 outlined in the advisory 
committee notes.    
 However, while such questions can be answered for the class, two 
distinct limitations discussed in Graddy and Churchill must be established 
to ensure uniformity in application and adherence to the requirements and 
goals of class actions.  First, as the class action jurisprudence stands now, 
class actions challenging an insurer’s policy towards coverage of autism 
treatment should be limited to injunctive relief.  As Rule 23(b)(2) states, 
“[when] the party opposing the class has acted . . . on grounds that apply 
generally to the class . . . final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate [for] the 
class as a whole.”162 Specifically, this has been interpreted to establish two 
requirements.  First, that the party opposing the class, here the insurers 
have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the class as 
a whole, and second, any final injunctive relief settling the legality of the 
behavior is appropriate to the class as a whole.163 Applying such 
interpretation here, an insurance company who makes and enforces a 
company-wide policy, irrespective of each individual, that deems certain 
well-accepted procedures as experimental and thus never coverable, has 
acted on grounds applicable to all plan members who sought or are seeking 
such treatment and in turn, determination of a court regarding the legality 
of such a policy applies generally to the class.  
As the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he key to the (b)(2) class is 
the ‘indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted —
the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared 
unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’”164 
Under this principle, if the policy is deemed unreasonable, injunctive relief 
that prevents them from applying such policy applies generally for the 
entire class of effected individuals.  A Rule 23(b)(2) class grants members 
of an insurance plan the opportunity to collectively challenge insurers on 
the limited question of if a policy is reasonable.  This allows individuals to 
create a stronger driving force based in unity, while still preserving the 
right of insurers to make individual assessments.  Preventing an across-the-
board policy opposing a treatment does not strip from insurers the right to 
review claims for treatment and determine if it fits within the plan language 
                                                                                                                                
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
163 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 
4:11 (4th ed. 2002).  
164 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011). 
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and is appropriate.  Rather, review of a company-wide policy and its 
application prevents an insurer from establishing a policy that unfairly 
hurts and impedes the rights of consumers without consideration for the 
actual claim, plan language, or any other information relied on by insurers 
typically when reviewing a benefit claim. 
 While our current jurisprudence lays a clear and straightforward 
path towards injunctive relief, an area worthy of further exploration is the 
potential for success as a (b)(3) class seeking reimbursement.  Although 
some lower courts have begun to explore reasoning that would support a 
(b)(3) class against insurers for claim denials, the success is limited and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence signals a pushback.  Courts that have 
supported (b)(3) classes against insurers first find predominance in the 
form of the overriding legal issue of the class, rather than focusing on the 
individualized damages that would arise.  For example, in Bauer v. Kraft 
Foods Global, Inc., a local union and retired employees sued an employer 
under ERISA and their collective bargaining agreement because of the 
elimination of a health plan and increased cost of prescription drugs.165  
The district court reasoned that the “overriding legal issue” presented was 
whether the employer’s plan amendments violated the class members rights 
generally.166 Since that question predominated and the only subsequent 
issue would be damages, certification under (b)(3) was applicable.167  
Applied to autism class actions, the overriding legal issue, whether the 
insurer’s denial of coverage for autism treatment is reasonable, would 
predominate over any other issue presented. 
 Although such an argument could be made, in order to certify an 
autism class action as a (b)(3) class, courts must be willing to view 
individualized damages as secondary to the overriding legal issue, thus 
maintaining predominance.  As such, in order for a (b)(3) class to prevail a 
court must accept the argument that while the amount of individual 
damages may vary, the formula used to calculate them is consistent across 
the board.  The Fourth Circuit accepted a similar proposition in Ward v. 
Dixie National Life Insurance Co., a class action against insurers claiming 
that supplemental cancer insurance policies require payment to the insured 
at the rate of the actual charged treatment, rather than the lesser amount 
medical providers received from insurers.168 This reasoning is easily 
transferable to autism class actions in that the requested monetary damages 
                                                                                                                                
165 Bauer v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 558, 558 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
166 Id. at 563. 
167 Id. at 563-564. 
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of the class are simply the cost of treatment not covered by the insurer, a 
simple and standard equation for all members of the class. 
 Despite the fact that the argument may be made in favor of a (b)(3) 
class action against insurers, a recent decision of the Supreme Court in 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend raises concerns about the acceptance of such a 
“one formula for all” argument.169 While the Plaintiffs in Comcast 
developed a formula for damages that incorporated four theories of 
antitrust impact, it failed to distinguish which specific theory applied.170  
Thus, one segment of the class could have damages based on the theory 
that Comcast overcharged because of the elimination of provider 
competition, while another segment is entitled to damages because of 
Comcast’s increased bargaining power.171 Justice Scalia made clear that, 
while a uniform damages equation may exist, one must first ensure that 
there is a “translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an 
analysis of the economic impact of that event.”172 Under this principle, 
concerns about a universal formula for an autism class action may be 
raised.  Although an insurer has a company-wide policy of denial for ABA 
therapy, perhaps even absent such a policy, a claim may still be denied.  
For instance, an insured might receive ABA therapy from a non-covered 
provider, thus subject to a different reimbursement rate, or conceivably, 
although the child is on the autism spectrum, ABA therapy is not the 
recommended treatment and thus not covered.  Directly contrasted to the 
holding in Comcast, while uniform damages may apply, the harmful event 
of a company-wide policy does not directly translate to the economic 
impact; other factors may also contribute.  Under the Comcast precedent 
and the shaky ground on which a (b)(3) class for denied insurance claims 
rests, this author would hesitate without a clearer showing by the courts to 
pursue such a class. 
Further, there is concern and caution for a class action seeking 
monetary damages for a denial of benefits inherent in the insurance world.  
Insurance companies, as part of their business model for assuming risk, 
maintain the ability to review claims individually and determine in each 
case what is allowed.  If a class action were allowed to seek monetary 
damages, the individual question of how much each plan member was 
entitled to would be answered universally, removing from the insurer the 
business right to review the claim.  Normally, for an insurer, monetary 
                                                                                                                                
169  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
170 Id. at 1430-31. 
171 Id. at 1433-34. 
172 Id. at 1435. 
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relief would involve a close examination by the insurer of the claim, the 
policy, the diagnosis, and the treatment plan.  A class action would remove 
such independent review applied by insurers in all other claims.  Therefore, 
in allowing the insured to challenge insurance companies as a class action, 
they should be limited in injunctive or declaratory relief, which addresses 
these concerns and controls the reach of the class action. 
 Second, in allowing a class action for injunctive relief, the court 
must limit the class definition to capture only individuals who are currently 
part of the plan regardless of if they have filed a claim or not.  As discussed 
above, class actions for autism treatment should be limited to seeking 
injunctive relief, which sets the foundation for limiting class members to 
those currently enrolled in the plan.  The claims at issue in these class 
actions are similar to issues arising in employment class actions when a 
class includes present and former employees.  Under such circumstances, 
courts have reasoned that only current, and not former, employees would 
be affected, meaning the class would no longer fall within the perimeters of 
Rule 23(b)(2).173 Past members of an insurance plan cannot share the same 
interest as current members in seeking injunctive relief, for past members 
would receive no benefit from a ruling that prevents insurers from issuing 
uniform rejections of ABA therapy.174 Therefore, if only injunctive relief 
class actions are to be certified in regards to autism treatment claims, class 
members must be limited to those that would receive actual relief via an 
injunction, not open to all those who have been wronged in the past. 
 Finally, contrary to the rationale applied by Churchill to reject a 
broad class encompassing those who submitted claims and those who did 
not, the restriction to only injunctive relief claims requires no such 
separation.  As a result of being restricted to 23(b)(2) classes, any class 
action brought before a court would be considered a mandatory class and 
therefore, regardless of a claim’s status, all members of the plan and the 
                                                                                                                                
173 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:32 (5th ed. 
2011); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559-60 (2011); Chen-
Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (S.D.N.Y 2012) 
(interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes to reason that former 
employees “have no material stake in whether their former employer is or is not 
enjoined . . .. since they are no longer there.”). 
174 See Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4 (E.D. 
Penn. Aug. 12, 2011), where the Court notes why it cannot certify a class 
encompassing current and past plan members that is represented solely by a past 
plan participant.  The former plan participant has an “incentive . . . to seek only the 
highest amount of monetary relief possible, not injunctive relief from which he 
could not benefit.” Id. at *5.  
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class would receive the same relief.  A ruling that prevents an insurer from 
applying a company-wide policy prohibiting coverage of ABA therapy 
because of experimental status would have the same benefit for all insured.  
Whether they filed a claim or not, the insurer would no longer be allowed 
to enforce the policy that prevented coverage and all individuals would be 
free to submit claims as they see fit.  
Churchill’s final paragraphs sufficiently outline why a broad class 
approach is unpersuasive, stating a presumption that all insured failed to 
submit a claim based on the insurance providers company policy to deny 
ABA coverage is impractical.175 As the Churchill Court found, there are a 
“multitude of reasons why a beneficiary might fail to file a claim,” and 
depending on the situation, the insurer’s policy designating ABA therapy 
experimental would not be the actual cause of harm to the individual.176 By 
limiting remedies in these class actions a court removes the need to 
determine the motivations of each class member.  While there still remains 
a “multitude of reasons why a beneficiary might fail to file a claim,” such 
considerations no longer warrant examination by the courts to determine 
appropriate remedies.177  
Although judicial precedent has done little to pave a clear path for 
autism treatment class actions against insurers, future class certification and 
class action claims can be better analyzed.  Consideration can be given to 
the three recent holdings of Graddy, Potter, and Churchill, but the 
approach that will best serve individuals and insurers finds its base in no 
single case.  Individuals should be empowered to unify in challenges 
against their insurers when denied autism treatment coverage but within 
limits that respect and preserve insurers’ autonomy to maintain 
individualized review. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
With state laws unable to reach self-insured plans and federal laws 
failing to address the gap of required coverage that results from ERISA 
preemption provisions, it is unlikely we will see a decrease in courtroom 
battles for treatment coverage.  While individual claims will undoubtedly 
continue, the recent showing of three class actions focused on the same 
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question, presents the court system with a new challenge: establishing an 
understanding of the extent to which class actions can be brought to 
challenge insurers’ practices.  With a complicated web of state laws, 
federal regulations, and unclear judicial precedent, the court system must 
seriously examine its approach to complicated class action lawsuits.  In 
doing so, one must look no further than the most recent class certification 
rulings, which, although contradictory, can serve as a patchwork for future 
court decisions.  
 
NFL’S LITIGATION SKATES ONTO THE ICE 
 
MELANIE A. ORPHANOS* 
 
*** 
 
This article addresses the insurance implications of the pending concussion 
litigation between the National Hockey League and its current and former 
players.  The author draws comparisons to similar litigation brought 
against the National Football League and the NFL's interactions with its 
insurers to forecast the obstacles the parties in the NHL litigation will face 
in establishing coverage by the many insurance carriers who have insured 
the NHL over time.  The author identifies obstacles including determining 
the moment when coverage is “triggered” and whether certain actions by 
the NHL will preclude coverage and relieve the insurers of their duty to 
defend because of the policies’ “expected or intended” clauses. 
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Days before the National Football League (“NFL”) kicked off its 
2013 season, it took strides toward resolving the biggest legal threat in its 
ninety-four year history: concussion litigation.  The NFL made a 
preliminary settlement with approximately 4,500 former players and agreed 
to pay $765 million.1 In the settlement, the NFL included a specific 
provision explaining that the settlement “cannot be considered an 
admission by the NFL of liability, or an admission that plaintiffs’ injuries 
were caused by football.”2 While many assumed that this settlement would 
be accepted, the judge handling this litigation denied preliminary approval 
                                                                                                                 
* University of Connecticut School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2014. I 
would like to thank Professor Patricia McCoy for her invaluable assistance in 
writing this Note through multiple drafts. I would also like to thank my mother and 
best friend, Leona Chodosh, for her unwavering support and for inspiring me to 
always chase my dreams. 
1 Arthur L. Caplan & Lee H. Igel, What’s Unsettled About the NFL 
Concussions Settlement, FORBES.COM (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/ 
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of the settlement.3 In the coming months, the NFL will likely try to 
restructure this settlement, or at a minimum, prove that it is fair through 
appropriate documentation in order to put this case behind it.  
The settlement will be historic, as it will change all contact sport 
organizations and how they approach concussions, but its likely settlement 
is a bit unsettling, as it will allow the NFL to avoid answering numerous 
questions that could have resulted in a multi-billion dollar case.4 
Despite the NFL concussion litigation settlement being imminent, 
the NFL’s insurers’ responsibility for paying for this settlement is still 
uncertain.5 The insurers’ duty to indemnify is unlikely to be triggered 
because there is evidence that the NFL committed intentional torts that 
would be excluded from coverage.  Conversely, the insurers’ duty to 
defend seems more definite and it is likely that under the NFL’s current 
Comprehensive General Liability (“CGL”) policies, the NFL’s insurers’ 
duty to defend will be triggered through the settlement process thus far and 
through trial if the settlement negotiations are unsuccessful.  While it 
appears that, eventually, this litigation will be resolved in a settlement, 
some players may still choose to opt out of the settlement if one is 
reached.6 
As the NFL’s insurers’ duty to defend would likely be triggered, 
these insurers should take a closer look at their policies moving forward.  
However, the NFL’s insurers are not the only ones who should be 
evaluating their policies for potential exposure.  In fact, all insurers of 
contact sports in the United States must evaluate the policies they are 
offering to their contact sport insureds in this concussion era.  This includes 
the National Hockey League (“NHL” or the “League”) who, mere months 
                                                                                                                 
3 Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 
2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2014) at 10. 
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after the NFL and its players reached a preliminary settlement, are now 
facing similar concussion litigation.7 In the NHL, a similar class action 
lawsuit currently consisting of ten former players “seek[ing] to represent a 
class of more than 10,000 retired NHL players”8 is alleging, among other 
claims, fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment, fraudulent 
misrepresentation by nondisclosure, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
negligence.9 These types of large, player-led, class action lawsuits will 
undoubtedly change the face of contact sports forever and will require 
insurers to decide if they should change the policies they offer to their 
contact sport insureds or insure them at all. 
As some concussion litigation may proceed in the NFL, and as the 
NHL has its own upcoming litigation, both of these organizations will 
likely turn to their insurers to defend and indemnify them.  This Note 
focuses on the numerous insurance issues that will be addressed in both 
class actions by examining the progress made thus far in both cases.  More 
specifically, this Note discusses these insurance issues by examining some 
of the arguments that the NFL’s insurers did advance,10 which the NHL’s 
insurers may also advance, to potentially limit or nullify their liability to 
the leagues.  Additionally, this Note evaluates the likelihood that if 
concussion litigation does proceed to trial, courts will implement a 
continuous trigger theory to decide when the insured’s policies are 
triggered.  Due to the resulting potential liability of such a theory, insurers 
have an even stronger incentive to alter their policies going forward to 
avoid future exposure for millions of dollars to current and former injured 
players. 
Parts I and II discuss the medical background of concussions and 
the general history of the NFL concussion litigation.  Part III examines the 
arguments that were left unanswered in the NFL concussion litigation and 
how they are likely to unfold in the NHL concussion litigation. 
Part IV concludes that a continuous trigger theory would likely be 
used to determine insurance coverage in circumstances such as the 
                                                                                                                 
7 See, e.g., Paul D. Anderson, Concussion Litigation Strikes the NHL, NFL 
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/ ?p=1542. 
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League & NHL Bd. of Governors, No. 1:13-cv-01856 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2013) at 
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concussion litigation presenting latent harm.  Specifically, there are three 
competing theories about what triggers coverage for concussion injuries: 
the initial exposure trigger theory, the manifestation trigger theory, and the 
continuous trigger theory.  This Part argues that a CGL policy is triggered 
at the point of exposure to a mild traumatic brain injury (“MTBI”) through 
the time when a players’ neurological disease manifests itself.  
Accordingly, using either the point of exposure or the point of 
manifestation alone to trigger insurance policies would not align with the 
reasonable expectations of the insured, as the injury does not occur at either 
of these discrete moments.  Moreover, because it is extremely difficult to 
determine exactly when the players’ MTBIs occurred, the manifestation 
trigger theory and the initial exposure trigger theory would be too difficult 
to implement.  In cases presenting this type of latent harm, a continuous 
trigger would be the best approach to determine when an insurance policy 
is triggered, considering this difficulty of ascertaining when the players’ 
injuries “occurred.”  As such, insurers should address this in their policies, 
and some insurers may choose to do so by adding concussion exclusions or 
providing a definition for “trigger” in the event of a concussion. 
Part V considers that the insurers will likely argue that the League 
intended or expected the injuries that the players suffered, which may 
exclude these injuries from coverage.  Finally, Part VI explains that there is 
a strong likelihood that the insurers will be required to defend the League 
under their current insurance policies despite the fact that the players’ 
claims may potentially not be covered. 
 
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND 
The NFL concussion litigation greatly heightened concern for 
concussions in not only the NFL, but in all contact sports.  For this reason, 
it is likely that sports’ medical personnel nationwide will focus more on the 
causes and diagnoses of concussions for the foreseeable future.  The 
American Association of Neurological Surgeons (“AANS”) defines a 
concussion as an “injury to the brain that results in temporary loss of 
normal brain function, [which is typically] caused by a blow to the head.”11 
                                                                                                                 
11 See Concussion, AM. ASSOC. OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.aans.org/Patient%20Information/Conditions%20and%20Treatments/C
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The AANS notes that concussions are serious injuries and cautions that 
“[e]ven mild concussions should not be taken lightly.”12 When concussions 
are ignored or otherwise improperly treated prior to a player reentering a 
game or practice, that player is more likely to suffer another concussion.13 
This is especially troubling because sources suggest that the harm caused 
by concussions has a cumulative effect and can result in 
neuropsychological impairment and neurologic abnormalities.14 This link 
between concussions and neurologic abnormalities and diseases has been 
illustrated by numerous players’ stories.15 In fact, in 2012, researchers 
announced that thirty-four NFL players “whose brains were studied 
suffered from chronic traumatic encephalopathy (“CTE”), a degenerative 
brain disease brought on by repeated hits to the head that results in 
confusion, depression and, eventually, dementia.”16 
CTE has also been discovered in former hockey players’ brains.17 
For instance, in 2011 the brain of Derek Boogaard, a twenty-eight-year-old 
hockey player, was studied after he died from what was ruled an accidental 
                                                                                                                 
12 Id. 
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Pro Football Players, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Health/cte-degenerative-brain-disease-found-34-pro-football/story?id=17869457 
(“Researchers at Boston University's Center for the Study of Traumatic 
Encephalopathy published the largest case series study of CTE to date, according 
to the center. Of the 85 brains donated by the families of deceased veterans and 
athletes with histories of repeated head trauma, they found CTE in [sixty-eight] of 
them. Of those, [thirty-four] were professional football players, nine others played 
college football and six played only high school football.” Additionally, several 
NFL players have committed suicide in recent years whose brains contained CTE 
including former Kansas City Chiefs player Jovan Belcher, former NFL players 
Junior Seau, Dave Duerson, former Pittsburgh Steelers player Terry Long, and 
former Philadelphia Eagles player Andre Waters.). 
16 Id. 
17 See John Branch, Derek Boogaard: A Brain ‘Going Bad,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/sports/hockey/derek-boogaard-a-
brain-going-bad.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. (In the preceding two years, CTE was 
also discovered in the brains of two other former NHL players, Reggie Fleming 
and Rick Martin.). 
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overdose.18 The neuropathologist at the Boston University’s Center for the 
Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy, who has examined nearly eighty 
brains of former athletes, was shocked by how advanced the degree of 
brain damage was in such a young player.19 A few months after Boogaard’s 
death, two more young NHL players were found dead: Rick Rypien, a 
twenty-seven-year-old player who committed suicide, and Wade Belak, a 
twenty-seven-year-old player who reportedly hanged himself.20 At the time 
of this writing, it appears that neither player’s brain was studied for CTE.21 
 
A. NFL LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT 
As more news surfaced of past contact sports players who 
committed suicide and had CTE in their brains, numerous NFL players 
took a historic step and brought a class action lawsuit against the NFL.  In 
August 2011, the first professional football players filed lawsuits against 
the NFL alleging more than ten counts, including fraudulent concealment, 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence.22 The players’ claims 
centered around the premise that the NFL did know, or at least should have 
known, about the potentially serious implications of sustaining concussions 
and not only failed to inform players, but also intentionally hid this 
information from them.23 If these lawsuits proceed to court, the players 
would face numerous obstacles.  Obstacles include possible dismissal due 
to arbitration clauses in the collective bargaining agreements that they 
entered into with the League,24 difficulty proving that their injuries 
                                                                                                                 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Pat Hauldren, NHL Enforcers Deadly and Dying, EXAMINER.COM 
(Sept. 2, 2011) http://www.examiner.com/article/nhl-enforcers-deadly-and-dying. 
22 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-Form Complaint, In Re: 
Nat’l Football, No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 2012). 
23 See generally id. at 15-44. 
24 The League argued that the players’ claims were preempted by the 
arbitration clauses in the players’ collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”), 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, In Re: Nat’l Football, at 6, 7, 15. No. 2:12-md-
02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012), and up until the settlement made little effort 
to set forth arguments countering the players’ claims due to this CBA argument.  
See id. at 14-34. The validity of this preemption argument would have been crucial 
had the case not settled because if all of these claims were preempted by the CBAs 
the players will be forced to pursue their case through the “agreed-to arbitration 
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occurred while playing professional football in the NFL,25 and difficulty 
proving that they did not expect their injuries.26 
In a proactive response, many of the NFL’s insurers filed motions 
for declaratory judgment in which they asked a court to determine whether 
they had a duty to defend and/or indemnify the NFL.  For example, Alterra 
America Insurance Company (“Alterra”), one of the NFL’s insurers, filed a 
complaint seeking a declaration of relief with respect to both its duty to 
defend and its duty to indemnify the NFL against ninety-three different 
lawsuits brought by former players.27 Alterra contended that since the 
underlying claims filed by the players alleged that the NFL acted 
                                                                                                                 
procedures” in the CBAs.  Paul D. Anderson, The Almighty CBA, NFL 
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/ ?p=1080.  
This defense will also be available to the NHL in its upcoming class action. 
Anderson, supra note 7. 
25 Due to the pressure that players feel, fewer concussions are reported because 
players try to exude toughness and feign feeling healthy. Michael Farber, The 
Worst Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 19, 1994), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1006087/index/index/
htm. While many players deny having symptoms when playing, the plaintiffs still 
blamed the NFL for these attitudes and alleged that the NFL promotes football by 
glorifying the brutality of the sport and representing that “putting big hits on others 
is a badge of courage and does not seriously threaten one’s health.” Plaintiff’s 
Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 11. The plaintiffs’ complaint further asserts 
that the League professed to its players that collisions, regardless of the injuries 
they lead to, are a normal consequence of football and “a measure of the courage 
and heroism of players.”  Id. Due to these factors, it can certainly be argued that 
players intended and/or expected these injuries. 
26 Players would have trouble arguing that they did not intend and/or expect 
their injuries when players such as Al Toon, a former wide receiver for the New 
York Jets, who retired from football at age twenty-nine after sustaining his ninth 
diagnosed concussion stated that “[he] chose the profession and [he] understood 
the perils of the profession when [he] was playing.” William C. Rhoden, Two Ex-
Jets Have Moved On, but Concussion Effects Linger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/sports/football/concussion-effects-linger-for-
two-ex-jets.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. See also Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, 
supra note 22, at 13 (Ernest Givens stated, “I get knocked out a lot, I get 
concussions, I get broken noses, that is part of being a receiver, that’s what 
separates you from being a typical receiver than a great receiver.”)  
27 Alterra Balks at Defending NFL in Concussion Suits, INSURANCE 
JOURNAL.COM (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/ 
2012/08/16/259710.htm.  
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fraudulently, it should not be required to defend the League against the 
players’ lawsuits.28 Soon after Alterra filed its motion for declaratory relief, 
other insurers, including Travelers and Allstate, filed similar pleadings.29 
Allstate also sought declaratory relief in relation to any alleged duty to 
indemnify, claiming that “any past or future duty to indemnify the NFL 
Defendants may be limited or precluded by a number of factual or legal 
defenses.”30 
After these insurers filed declaratory relief motions in New York, 
the NFL brought a declaratory relief action in Los Angeles Superior Court 
regarding the coverage duties of thirty-two insurance carriers pursuant to 
187 commercial liability policies that were issued over a fifty to sixty year 
period.31 The NFL then moved to dismiss the New York lawsuits, which 
the defendant insurers argued against on forum non conveniens grounds.32 
The Los Angeles Superior Court ordered the California proceeding stayed 
pending the outcome of the New York actions and, despite the NFL’s 
appeal, this decision was affirmed.33 As such, the declaratory relief motions 
are ripe for decision in the Supreme Court of New York. 
                                                                                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Consolidated Reply of Defendants Nat’l Football League and NFL Props., 
LLC in Support of Motions to Dismiss Claims of TIG Insurers, Travelers Insurers, 
and Allstate, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co., et al. v. Nat’l Football League, et al., No. 
652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 2, 2012) at 2. Discover Property & Casualty 
Insurance Company has filed a motion to dismiss or stay on forum non conveniens 
grounds suggesting that California is an inconvenient and improper forum.  See id. 
at 1.  
30 Answer of Defendant Allstate Ins. Co. and Crossclaim for Declaratory 
Judgment against Defendants Nat’l Football League and Nat’l Football League 
Props., LLC, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co., et al. v. National Football League, et al., 
14, No. 652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012).  In its cross claim, Allstate 
alleges twenty-five factors that may limit or preclude its duty to indemnify 
including that Allstate’s policies do not provide coverage for claims that arise from 
conduct that is in violation of the law or public policy, the policies do not cover 
bodily injury which did not take place during the policy period, and the excess 
insurance policy does not provide coverage for any bodily injury or damage that 
was expected or intended.  See id. at 14-15. 
31 Nat’l Football League et al., v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., No. B245619, 
216 Cal. App. 4th 902, 908 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2013). 
32  See Consolidated Reply of Defendants, supra note 29, at 25-26; Discover 
Prop. & Cas. Co. et al., supra note 29. 
33 Mem. of Law of Defendants Nat’l Football League and NFL Props. LLC in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss or Stay Discover Complaint and Counterclaims and 
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As Allstate’s cross-claim illustrates, the insurers’ claims are 
predicated on the merits of the underlying case between the NFL and its 
players.34 At the time of this writing, these declaratory relief motions have 
yet to be decided.  However, due to the fact that the court would be 
required to analyze the underlying claims of the players’ lawsuit against the 
NFL in order to decide these motions, the Supreme Court of New York 
should refrain from granting the insurers’ request for declaratory relief in 
order to allow the issues to be decided by the proper fact-finders, the jury.  
If the courts do deny the insurers’ motions for declaratory relief, the 
insurers would likely be required to defend the NFL.  Nevertheless, if this 
case settles and no players choose to opt out of the settlement, these 
motions become wholly irrelevant. 
While there is a strong likelihood that the insurers would have a 
duty to defend, it is just as likely that they would not be required to 
indemnify the NFL.  The NFL’s insurers possess several potential 
arguments that can nullify their duty to indemnify the NFL.  In the event 
that this case proceeds to trial or players choose to opt out of a settlement 
and continue to sue the NFL, the NFL’s insurers could argue that the NFL 
intended and/or expected these injuries.  The NFL conducted studies of 
concussions in professional football spanning from 1994 to 2005, 
examining periods during the 1990s and 2000s.35 One of the most 
significant NFL studies was conducted in 199436 and was set in motion by 
then Commissioner of Football, Paul Tagliabue, who formed the Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (“Committee”).37 The Committee’s goal 
was to study concussions (also referred to as mild traumatic brain injuries 
                                                                                                                 
Cross-Claims of TIG Insurers and Allstate at 11-12, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co. et 
al. v. Nat’l Football League et al., No. 652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2012). 
34 Allstate is claiming it does not owe a duty to defend based on the potential 
of intended and/or expected injury and arguments that injuries did not occur within 
the policy period which would go to the heart of the trigger issues of the 
underlying case. See Answer of Defendant Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 30, at 15. 
35 See, e.g., Nathan Fenno & Luke Rosiak, NFL Concussion Lawsuits, WASH. 
TIMES (July 19, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/football injuries/. 
36 The concussion problem was a rampant issue as early as 1994.  In that year, 
data supplied by twenty-eight NFL teams demonstrated that from 1989 to 1993, 
341 players on the twenty-eight teams in the League had suffered from 445 
concussions. Farber, supra note 25. This equated to about two and a half 
concussions for every 1,000 plays.  Id. 
37 Paul Anderson, A New Era of Pro Football, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Oct. 
17, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1194.  
644      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
 
or MTBIs), in professional football and to determine their potential long-
term effects.38 
After fifteen years, the Committee released several studies that are 
now all considered extremely controversial.39 One of these studies, 
“Concussion in Professional Football: Summary of the Research 
Conducted by the National Football League’s Committee of Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury,” refuted the link between concussions and 
neurodegenerative diseases.40 The study noted that “arbitrary return-to-play 
guidelines may be too conservative for professional football . . . [and] many 
NFL players can safely be allowed to return to play on the day of the injury 
after sustaining a [M]TBI.”41 
Based on this and other evidence, the insurers could argue, similar 
to what the players alleged in their complaint, that the NFL intentionally 
misled the players about the potential consequences of concussions.  If 
proven, this would bar the NFL from coverage under its CGL policies.  The 
insurers could successfully argue that during the fifteen-year period when 
the Committee was conducting studies, the NFL concealed and/or 
misrepresented the long-term effects of concussions from its players and 
knew that its studies were misleading.42 The argument that the NFL 
concealed information, was explored in the October 2009 and January 2010 
Judiciary hearings before the House of Representatives.  The Committee on 
the Judiciary (the “Judiciary”) held a hearing to determine the severity of 
the concussion problem in football and the potential remedies that were 
available.43 
At these hearings, the NFL was questioned about a pamphlet 
dealing with concussions, which it distributed to its players.  The pamphlet 
stated: 
 
                                                                                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (discussing Elliot J. Pellman & David C. Viano, Concussion in 
Professional Football: Summary of the Research Conducted by the National 
Football League’s Committee on Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 21 
NEUROSURGICAL FOCUS (2006)). 
41 Id. 
42 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-Form Complaint, supra note 
22, at 33.  
43 See Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (Pt. I): Hearing Before 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. John 
Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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Question: if I have had more than one concussion, am I at 
increased risks for another injury?  Answer: Current 
research with professional athletes has not shown that 
having more than one or two concussions leads to 
permanent problems if each injury is managed properly.  It 
is important to understand that there is no magic number 
for how many concussions is too many.44 
 
Thus, the NFL was informing its players that there is “no magic number” 
of concussions that makes a player more prone to suffer long-term 
neurological damage at the same time when numerous studies showed a 
link between any blunt force trauma, such as that occurring in football, and 
premature death among athletes.  This type of questionable behavior lends 
support to the players’ allegations that the NFL concealed information from 
them.45 Similarly, during these Judiciary hearings, the NFL Commissioner, 
Roger Goodell, would not unequivocally agree that there was proof of a 
link between concussions and neurodegenerative diseases.46 One Judiciary 
member referred to the League’s denial as a blank rejection and accused 
the League of minimizing the fact that this link existed.47 
If the NFL concussion litigation does not settle, or some players 
opt out of the settlement and continue to sue the NFL, courts would be 
required to analyze these and other defenses to coverage for nearly 200 
CGL policies due to the fact that from 1968 to 2012 the NFL was covered 
by insurance policies issued by thirty-two insurance carriers.48 
Nevertheless, this analysis has yet to occur, as two years after the first 
players filed their lawsuits against the NFL, the NFL entered into a 
preliminary settlement with the players for $765 million.  From this 
settlement amount, $675 million will 
 
                                                                                                                 
44 Id. at 115-16. 
45 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-form Complaint, supra note 
22, at 1. 
46 See Legal issues relating to football head injuries. Pt. I, supra note 43, at 
116-18 (2009) (statement of Comm’r of Football, Roger Goodell, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
47 Id. at 116. (statement of Representative John Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary) (statement of California Representative Linda T. Sanchez). 
48 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 906. 
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[c]ompensate former players and families of deceased 
players who have suffered cognitive injury . . . . Other 
money will be used for baseline medical exams, the cost of 
which will be capped at $75 million.  The NFL also will 
fund research and education at a cost of $10 million . . . . 
The settlement will include all players (whether they were 
part of the suit or not) who have retired as of the date on 
which the court gives preliminary approval . . . .  Current 
players are not eligible.  The NFL has [twenty] years to 
pay the full amount of the settlement, but half of the total 
must be paid within the first three years and the rest over 
the next [seventeen] years.49 
 
According to ESPN, the compensation program is designed to last for up to 
sixty years and will allow retired players who later develop neurological 
diseases or conditions to apply for compensation.50 
While it appeared as though the NFL concussion litigation was 
concluding, the judge handling this litigation denied preliminary approval 
of the settlement, explaining that, “I’m primarily concerned that not 
all Retired NFL Football Players who ultimately receive a Qualifying 
Diagnosis or their related claimants will be paid.”51 This judge commended 
both sides for arriving at this preliminary settlement,52 but explained that 
she was not convinced that the settlement “ha[d] no obvious deficiencies, 
grant[ed] no preferential treatment to segments of the class, and [fell] 
within the range of possible approval.”53 The NFL will likely still arrive at 
a settlement with its players; however, one attorney explained that he 
believes that the current settlement does not adequately compensate many 
of the players and indicated that even if the settlement is approved by the 
judge, many players may “opt out” of the settlement and continue litigation 
against the NFL.54 
                                                                                                                 
49 Fainaru-Wada, supra note 2. 
50 Id. 
51 Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 
supra note 3. 
52 Fainaru-Wada, supra note 2.  
53 Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 
supra note 3 (citing Cordy v. USS-Posco Indus., No. 12-553, 2013 WL 4028627 at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2013). 
54 Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 6. 
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Thus, these settlement discussions and the litigation that may 
follow are only the beginning of the conversation that will take place 
nationwide about concussions in sports.  In fact, in the past three years 
since the initial lawsuits in the NFL concussion litigation were filed, a new 
era of professional football has emerged in which players are informed 
about the risks they face when they step onto the field.55 In this new era, 
players no longer make their own medical determinations as to when they 
obtain a head injury.  Instead, independent neurologists decide when 
concussed players can return to the game.56 This change has not been 
limited to the NFL, however, and this leads to the question: how will the 
numerous issues in the NFL concussion litigation be resolved if this case 
does not settle?  And, how will these questions be answered in the context 
of the NHL concussion litigation?  To evaluate the insurance issues that 
will arise in the NFL concussion litigation if it proceeds and in the NHL 
concussion litigation, this Note will focus on the upcoming NHL 
concussion litigation. 
 
III. INSURANCE CONTRACT BACKGROUND IN NHL 
CONCUSSION LITIGATION 
One type of insurance policy that the NHL has is a CGL policy that 
insures the League for injuries that players sustain as long as those injuries 
are not excluded from coverage.  Although the specific policies sold to the 
NHL by its insurers are not available to the public, the typical CGL 
policy’s terms and provisions will be similar to the clauses of the NHL’s 
CGL insurance policies which the courts will be required to analyze.57 Like 
the NFL did, when the NHL defends the newly formed player-led class 
action, it will likely turn to its insurers for indemnification relying on its 
“insuring clause” within its CGL policy.58 A typical insuring clause 
                                                                                                                 
55 See Anderson, supra note 37. 
56 Id. 
57 The insurance contracts will only be analyzed if these cases are not subject 
to mandatory arbitration. The League will argue that the players’ claims are subject 
to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the players’ collective bargaining agreements. 
See Anderson, supra note 7. 
58 See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 908; Appellants’ 
Brief, Nat’l Football League & NFL Props. LLC, v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., et 
al., 2013 WL 233176 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.) at 1-2 (internal citations omitted) (The 
NFL and NFL Properties filed an action in California against thirty-two general 
liability insurers that issued 187 primary and excess insurance policies to one or 
 
648      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
 
provides that the insurer “will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
bodily injury or property damage to which [the] insurance applies.”59 The 
NHL’s general liability insurers are likely as extensive as the NFL’s 
insurers in number60 and as such, these lawsuits coupled with those on-
going in the NFL, will undoubtedly affect how insurers choose to insure 
any contact sport organization in the future. 
In the NHL, this discussion regarding how to cover the League in 
this concussion era may have already begun in the context of disability 
insurance.  For instance, in 2012, one of the Pittsburgh Penguins’ top 
players, Sidney Crosby, was sidelined for most of the season due to 
concussion-related injuries.61 Since Crosby had been injured and out of the 
lineup for more than thirty games, the Penguins relied on their disability 
insurance policy to cover Crosby’s nine million dollar salary.  Analysts 
have suggested, however, that this “security blanket is poised to 
disappear”62 because insurance companies may cease to insure these 
athletes, forcing teams to take on these million-dollar contracts alone.63 For 
the Penguins, this is especially troubling because if Crosby, who has one 
year remaining on his contract, returns to the ice, he will be in line for a 
new long-term contract for approximately ten million dollars a year.  But if 
no insurance company is willing to insure him against concussions, the 
Penguins may not be able to afford to retain him.64 
The chief executive of one New York-based insurer, HCC 
Specialty, noted that “[r]ight now you’ve got [ten] percent of the [L]eague 
                                                                                                                 
both over a forty-four year period.  “The NFL Policyholders sued twelve primary 
insurers for breach of their duty to defend the NFL Policyholders in underlying tort 
litigation filed by former NFL players, and sued all 32 insurers for a declaratory 
judgment that their policies cover any liability that might be incurred in the tort 
litigation.”) 
59 TODD A. ROSSI & MARK D. MESE, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE 
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 109 (Alan Rutkin & Robert 
Tugander eds., 2010); See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 358 (2008). 
60 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 906. 
61 See Rick Westhead, Concussions Could Ruin NHL Teams If Insurers Pull 
Coverage, THESTAR.COM (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.thestar.com/sports/hockey/2012/01/30/ concussions_could_ruin_nhl 
_teams_if_insurers_pull_coverage.html.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. 
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affected by concussions . . . [w]hile I don’t know where the breaking point 
is, at some point, if it keeps trending this way, [insurance] companies are 
not going to be able to insure NHL players for concussions.”65 Another 
insurer, Toronto-based Sutton Special Risk, an insurer for “off-ice 
insurance to more than 400 NHL players,” rewrote its insurance application 
form in order to focus more attention on players’ concussion histories and 
help protect itself from liability for players with past concussions.66 
Due to the vast number of players who have been sidelined with 
concussions in the NHL, there is no question that this is one of the most 
prevalent issues in the League today.  Despite the magnitude of the 
concussion problem in the NHL, the president of Sutton Special Risk 
professed that it is too early to say that the insurance industry will change 
the policies that it offers to NHL players because the industry is still 
evolving.67 With that said, it is likely a matter of time before this discussion 
of limiting or revoking the League’s insurance for players with concussions 
transcends the context of disability insurance to that of general liability 
insurance.  Insurers will need to make difficult decisions to protect 
themselves from this concussion epidemic that will remain at the forefront 
of contact sports for the foreseeable future.  While insurers may decide to 
take steps to limit their liability through modifying the policies that they 
offer to their contact sport insureds, insurers will still stand behind their 
current policies in the upcoming NHL litigation and likely argue that even 
under their current policies they do not have a duty to defend or indemnify 
the League. 
 
                                                                                                                 
65 Id. 
66 See id. (Sutton Special Risk’s president noted, “[w]e used to have one 
question asking players their history with cardiac issues and other problems like 
concussions . . . [n]ow, concussions have their own section. We’re asking about 
frequency, how bad they were and how many games they missed. We know you’re 
not recovered from brain injuries because the symptoms go away. This is not an 
organ like the liver that can regenerate itself.”). 
67 See NHL concussions put player insurance in question, CBC SPORTS (Jan. 
31, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/nhl/nhl-concussions-put-player-
insurance-in-question-1.1132073. But see Westhead, supra note 61 (according to 
one player agent, new contracts will contain concussion exclusions, making it 
impossible for teams to insure players with past concussions against future brain 
injuries).  
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A. NHL CONCUSSION LITIGATION 
In the NHL class action complaint, the players are alleging 
numerous counts, including fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment, 
fraudulent misrepresentation by nondisclosure, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and negligence.68 The players’ claims rest on the 
growing body of medical evidence linking concussions to long-term injury 
as well as on evidence that the League knew or should have known of those 
medical studies but took no remedial action to prevent injury until 1997.69 
The players note that in 1997 the NHL created a concussion program to 
conduct research about the effects of concussions on players’ brains.  
Despite conducting that research, the players allege that the NHL did 
nothing to actually prevent injury to its players for another fourteen years.70 
Additionally, the players assert that the NHL continues to ignore the 
extensive medical research linking hockey to brain injuries and fosters 
violence in the sport by, among other things, “refusing to ban fighting and 
body checking and by continuing to employ hockey players whose main 
function is to fight or violently body check players on the other team.”71 
Observing that the NHL has an annual gross income of $3.3 billion,72 the 
players argue that the NHL has promoted a culture of violence and 
“purposefully profits from the violence they promote.”73 
The players contend that the NHL did not make any significant 
changes to prevent concussions until 2010 when it made body checking 
with the head a penalty.74 After 2010, the NHL made other noteworthy 
safety changes including requiring a doctor, as opposed to a trainer, to 
examine its players for concussions off the ice and away from the bench75 
and changing its concussion protocols to forbid any concussed player from 
                                                                                                                 
68 See, e.g., Compl., supra note 9, at 36–46. 
69 See id. at  ¶ 7.  
70 See id. at  ¶ 11. 
71 Id. at ¶ 17; see also id. at ¶ 133 (not outlawing fighting and body checks in 
the NHL is significant because “[o]nly [twenty eight percent] of the reported 
concussions in the Cusimano report were the result of a called penalty while 
[approximately sixty four percent] of the total concussions were caused by body 
checking. A legal body check to the other player’s body can still result in the 
checked player’s head hitting the ice, boards or glass, resulting in a concussion.”). 
72 Id. at ¶ 78. 
73 Id. at ¶ 89. 
74 Id. at ¶ 112. 
75 Id. at ¶ 116. 
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returning to the game in which they received the concussion.76 Similar to 
the allegations in the NFL concussion litigation, the NHL players’ overall 
argument is that “[t]he NHL knew that repetitive head impacts in hockey 
games and practices created an unreasonable risk of harm to NHL players77 
. . . [but] withheld [and/or concealed] the information it knew about the 
risks of head injuries in the game from then-current NHL players and 
former NHL players.”78 Moreover, the players allege in their complaint that 
the NHL “deliberately delayed implementing the changes to the game it 
knew could reduce players’ exposure to the risk of life-altering head 
injuries because those changes would be expensive and would reduce its 
profitability.”79 
Overall, the NHL players’ allegations are very similar to those 
made by the NFL players in their class action lawsuit.80 For that reason, it 
is likely the League’s insurers will react in a similar way to how the NFL’s 
insurers have acted thus far.  Yet, even if the NHL and NFL cases both do 
not proceed to trial, these two concussion litigation class action lawsuits 
will motivate insurers to protect themselves from future concussion 
lawsuits.  Hence, regardless of the results of these litigations, insurers must 
confront the fact that under their current CGL policies, they are possibly 
responsible for at least defending, and also potentially indemnifying, their 
insured in the event of a lawsuit based on concussions and related long-
term injuries. 
Due to their likely liability, insurers may take steps to make it clear 
in their policies what the trigger is in the event of a concussion.  If insurers 
do attempt to alter their policies, it is possible that they could face push 
back from individual state insurance regulators, depending on the state.  
However, because the NHL and NFL are both such large entities, it is 
possible they will not be required to obtain permission to alter their CGL 
                                                                                                                 
76 See id. at ¶ 118 (a standard that other countries adopted in 2004). 
77 Id. at ¶ 170. 
78 See id. at ¶¶ 177, 200. 
79 Id. at ¶ 201. 
80 But see Anderson, Concussion Litigation Strikes the NHL, supra note 7 
(“Although the legal theories are similar [between the NFL and NHL concussion 
litigation], the factual allegations in the NHL litigation are far less damning than 
those asserted against NFL. There is no evidence — at least publicly — that shows 
the NHL created (1) a brain injury committee, (2) headed by a rheumatologist and 
(3) spent 15-plus years creating false studies.”).  Additionally, unlike the NFL, the 
NHL was not questioned for their actions in relations to concussions in their league 
by Congress and have not denied that their sport can cause brain damage. Id. 
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policies.  Additionally, insurers must contemplate how their exclusions for 
intended and/or expected injuries may assist them in avoiding 
indemnification and their duty to defend in any continuing litigation. 
 
IV. OPEN QUESTIONS AFTER THE NFL CONCUSSION 
LITIGATION 
A. TRIGGERS AND OCCURRENCES 
 An insurance policy comes into effect or is triggered when a relevant 
condition of the policy has occurred; at that time, the insurers’ obligations 
become due.81 In many insurance cases, the “trigger” of coverage is not at 
issue.82 When the cause or the injury itself does not occur at a discrete 
moment, however, and instead materializes over time, it can be difficult to 
determine what policies were triggered and exactly when they were 
triggered.83 
 The conditions that trigger an insurance policy are called 
occurrences.  An “occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including 
injurious exposure to conditions, which results during the policy period in 
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured.”84 A typical CGL policy states that the bodily 
injury or property damage must be caused by an occurrence that takes place 
during the policy period.85 In either sport, it is undisputed that the affected 
NFL and NHL players sustained bodily injuries, which are defined as 
“bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person.”86 The bodily 
injuries at issue are the neurodegenerative disorders and diseases that the 
plaintiffs sustained due, at least in part, to repeated head traumas while 
playing NFL football and NHL hockey. 
In cases such as these, where harm accrued over a long period of 
time, coverage will turn on the presence of a trigger.  However, the 
standard CGL policy does not clearly specify which trigger theory is 
applicable.  This is the difficulty with latent harms, or “harms that may not 
                                                                                                                 
81 ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 109. 
82 See id. 
83 See BAKER, supra note 59, at 375. 
84 ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 110. 
85 See BAKER, supra note 59, at 358. 
86 Id. at 369. 
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develop into symptomatic diseases for significant periods of time.”87 With 
latent harms, a player is injured, but the injury does not immediately 
manifest itself.  In these instances, a player is arguably injured once they 
receive a concussion, as their brain may begin to develop a 
neurodegenerative disease, but these neurodegenerative diseases do not 
manifest themselves for many years.  Thus, in cases presenting latent 
harms, a court must decide what type of trigger theory to impose. 
 
B. TRIGGER THEORIES 
Courts typically apply one of three main trigger theories to 
determine when an insurance contract is triggered: the initial exposure 
trigger theory, the manifestation trigger theory, or the continuous trigger 
theory.  In the case of latent harms, courts are forced to consider the 
difficulty of determining the point at which an insured became injured.  
Courts were faced with similar questions in the asbestos context and 
considered the unworkability of the initial exposure and manifestation 
trigger theories and the insured’s reasonable expectations.  Inhaling 
asbestos is a type of latent harm because a person who inhales asbestos 
does not appear ill until a long period of time after exposure, when they 
begin to exhibit symptoms.  While an injured person is not aware that they 
have been exposed to asbestos, they are still ill from the moment of their 
initial exposure to the asbestos through the point in time when they exhibit 
signs of diseases such as mesothelioma. 
Consequently, in dealing with asbestos cases, these courts 
employed a continuous trigger theory, finding that the manifestation trigger 
theory and the initial exposure trigger theory, which both utilize a discrete 
moment to trigger insurance policies, were too difficult to apply due to 
issues of proof regarding the timing of the injuries.  While both the 
manifestation and initial exposure trigger theories were implemented in 
earlier asbestos cases, more recent cases have applied a trigger theory more 
akin to the continuous trigger theory.88 
                                                                                                                 
87 Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 
1506 (1998). 
88 See, e.g., J.H. Fr. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506 
(Pa. 1993); AC & S, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 
1985); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
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If the NFL and NHL concussion cases proceed to trial, one of the 
most difficult insurance coverage issues will be determining when the 
players’ injuries actually occurred.  Some of the plaintiffs’ neurological 
injuries may have begun before they started playing professional football or 
professional hockey.89 There is no feasible way to differentiate which 
injuries were exacerbated by playing in the NHL or NFL from those which 
occurred for the first time while playing in the NHL or NFL.  Accordingly, 
it would be nearly impossible to use either an initial exposure theory or a 
manifestation theory to trigger the insurance policies. 
Additionally, neither of these theories would protect the reasonable 
expectations of the insured, the NHL.  “Under the ‘doctrine of reasonable 
expectations,’ an insured is entitled to all the coverage he may reasonably 
expect to be provided according to the terms of the policy.”90 Only “an 
unequivocally conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation of the [insurer’s] 
intent to exclude coverage will defeat that expectation.”91 In asbestos cases, 
courts recognized that attempting to confine an injury in cases of latent 
harm to one discrete moment would undercut the purpose of the insured’s 
policy and ignore the reasonable expectations of the insured.92 This is due 
to the fact that insureds purchase policies so that they can be covered for 
injuries that occur during the policy period.  This expectation of coverage is 
not altered in instances of latent harm where injuries do not occur at finite 
moments.  Thus, if either an initial exposure theory, which covers the 
injury if the insured is exposed to the cause during the policy period, or a 
manifestation theory, which covers the injury if it manifests itself during 
the policy period, is utilized, the insurer would be excused from covering 
the vast majority of the latent harm. 
 
                                                                                                                 
89 Stuart Dean, Concussion: A Word Not Easily Defined and Why that Spells 
Trouble for Football, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1200. 
90 Ky. Ass'n of Counties All Lines Fund Trust v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 626, 
634 (Ky. 2005). The reasonable expectations doctrine “calls for an ascertainment 
of the insured's expectations, followed by a necessarily subjective determination of 
whether that expectation is reasonable.”  2 Couch on Ins. § 22:11. 
91 McClendon, 157 S.W.3d at 634. 
92 See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045. 
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1. Initial Exposure Trigger Theory 
 
The initial exposure trigger theory utilizes the date when the 
insured was first exposed to the harm that caused them to have a bodily 
injury to trigger an insurance policy.93 The Sixth Circuit implemented this 
exposure theory in a 1980 asbestos case due to its conclusion that bodily 
injury from asbestos began with the first exposure to and inhalation of 
asbestos.94 While the injury of neurodegenerative diseases can and often 
does begin with the initial exposure to MTBIs, it would be difficult to 
pinpoint a precise time as the “initial exposure” because if players did not 
exhibit symptoms of a concussion, no official diagnostic medical test was 
conducted when a player was hit.95 Additionally, since there are numerous 
symptoms of concussions,96 and these symptoms can be subtle, concussions 
are often misdiagnosed or entirely undiagnosed.97 
In view of these problems of proof, there are two major difficulties 
in ascertaining the timing of a player’s injury.  First, it would be extremely 
difficult to determine when players received their first concussion or any 
concussion at all, especially in the case of veteran players who played at a 
time when even less was known about concussions.  Second, it would be 
nearly impossible to conclude that a player who sustained a concussion was 
in the early stages of developing a neurodegenerative disorder.  In fact, all 
of the hockey and football players who died or committed suicide and were 
found to be suffering from CTE were not diagnosed until death because, at 
                                                                                                                 
93 ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 116. 
94 Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1218 (6th 
Cir. 1980). 
95 See Ira R. Casson et al., Concussion in the National Football League: An 
Overview for Neurologists, 26 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS 217, 217 (2008); Dan Rosen, 
New concussion protocol goes into effect tonight, NHL.COM (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=556289 (discussing NHL practices prior to 
protocol change in 2011 for concussion testing after injury). 
96 Symptoms are either (1) somatic, including headaches, dizziness, balance 
problems, and nausea, (2) cognitive, including memory, concentration and 
processing speed problems, or (3) affective including anxiety and depression.  
Suzanne Leclerc et al., Recommendations for Grading of Concussion in Athletes, 
31 SPORTS MED. 629, 634 (2001).  
97 See Collins, supra note 13, at 1.   
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the time of this writing, CTE can only be diagnosed post mortem.98 Due to 
this inability to determine the “initial exposure,” an initial exposure trigger 
theory is not well suited to concussion litigation. 
Additionally, the initial exposure trigger theory does not comport 
with the insured’s reasonable expectations.  In Keene, the court analyzed 
the appropriate trigger of coverage for the latent harm of asbestos.99 The 
court noted that if exposure was deemed to be a discrete injury that 
triggered coverage, 
 
[T]he subsequent development of a disease would be 
characterized best as a consequence of the injury.  Future 
stages of development would not constitute new injuries 
and therefore would not trigger additional coverage.  
Under that interpretation, a manufacturer who bought a 
comprehensive general liability policy would not bear the 
risk of liability for diseases that occurred due to exposure 
during a covered period.  It would, however, bear the risk 
of liability for diseases that manifest themselves during the 
covered period, but that occur because of exposure at a 
time when the manufacturer held no insurance.  As a result, 
the manufacturer's purchase of insurance would not 
constitute a purchase of certainty with respect to liability 
for asbestos-related diseases.  The insured would remain 
uncertain as to future liability for injuries whose 
development began prior to the purchase of insurance . . . 
such an exclusion is inconsistent with [the insured’s] 
reasonable expectations when it purchased the policies.100 
 
This same analysis is applicable in this latent harm context.  Insureds 
purchase insurance to obtain certainty that they will be covered for liability.  
Practically speaking, however, the insurers who issued policies to the 
League when its players were first exposed to MTBIs are different from the 
insurers who insured it decades later when the players’ injuries manifested 
themselves as neurological disorders.  Thus, the problem with using an 
                                                                                                                 
98 See Gary W. Small et al., PET Scanning of Brain Tau in Retired National 
Football League Players: Preliminary Findings, 21 AM. J. GERIATRIC. 
PSYCHIATRY 138, 139 (2013). 
99 Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042. 
100 Id. at 1044. 
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initial exposure theory in this context is that an insured, here the League, 
reasonably expects that if it were liable for damages, such as now when it is 
being sued by past players, that it would be covered.  However, the League 
would not be covered or would be covered for only a fraction of the time 
because the players’ injuries had been developing for years after the initial 
exposure. 
Due to the latency of the injuries, however, the analysis for 
determining the trigger of coverage cannot commence until the point of 
manifestation.  Therefore, precisely when the League would expect 
players’ injuries to be covered by the League’s insurance policies, when the 
injuries became apparent, the League would not be covered.  Because this 
would not conform with the NHL’s reasonable expectations, the initial 
exposure trigger theory should not be applied to this litigation. 
 
2. Manifestation Trigger Theory 
 
Under the manifestation trigger theory, insurance coverage is 
triggered when the damage or injury manifests itself or becomes 
apparent.101 In a 1982 asbestos case, the First Circuit adopted a 
manifestation theory on grounds that an injury is not diagnosed or felt until 
it becomes evident.102 
Over time, however, the limitations of the manifestation trigger 
theory have become apparent.  A manifestation trigger theory would be 
exceptionally difficult to implement in the concussion context.  In these 
concussion cases it is difficult to pinpoint at what time the players’ 
neurodegenerative diseases became apparent.  For instance, was it when a 
player obtained a concussion and felt dizzy, when a player could not 
remember the name of his children, or somewhere in between these two 
moments?  In this type of litigation, where thousands of players’ careers are 
involved, making the determination of when players’ injuries manifested 
would be unworkable.  In fact, “[c]ourts in recent years have been moving 
away from the manifestation trigger because of the difficulty in 
determining what constitutes manifestation of an injury concluding that this 
trigger theory is ‘inherently unworkable.’”103 
                                                                                                                 
101 ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 112. 
102 See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st 
Cir. 1982). 
103 Gwen M. Rogers, Medical Monitoring, Trigger of Coverage Analysis, and 
the Duty to Defend, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 869, 890-91 (2005). 
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Additionally, limiting the trigger to the one finite moment of 
manifestation does not fully protect the reasonable expectations of the 
insured.  If manifestation was the sole trigger of coverage, then the 
insurance companies would only bear a fraction of the insured’s total 
liability due to the fact that harm was occurring long before 
manifestation.104 That result would “undermine the function of the 
insurance policies” because when an insured purchases policies, the insured 
could reasonably expect to be free of the risk of being liable for injuries 
that “it could not have been aware prior to its purchase of insurance.”105 If 
the disease manifested soon after a player sustained a MTBI, these losses 
would be covered and the insurer would compensate the insured.  However, 
in the case of neurodegenerative diseases that are caused by earlier 
concussions, insurers would not be liable due to the fact that a long period 
of time exists between exposure and manifestation.106 
Therefore, “to accept the argument that only manifestation triggers 
coverage — and allow insurers to terminate coverage prior to the 
manifestation of many cases of disease — would deprive [the insured] of 
the protection it purchased when it entered into the insurance contracts.”107 
In the latent harm context, the insured purchased a policy believing an 
injury that occurred during the policy period would be covered and not 
expecting that only injuries that occurred and manifested themselves during 
the policy period would be covered.  As one court explained in the asbestos 
context: 
 
The fact that a doctor would characterize cellular damage 
as a discrete injury does not necessarily imply that the 
damage is an ‘injury’ for the purpose of construing the 
policies.  At the same time, the fact that an ordinary person 
would characterize a fully developed disease as an ‘injury’ 
does not necessarily imply that the manifestation of the 
disease is the point of ‘injury’ for purposes of construing 
the policies.108 
 
                                                                                                                 
104 See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045-46. 
105 Id. at 1046. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. 
108 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 984 (N.J. 1994). 
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This same logic applies in the concussion context: while a doctor may 
consider a concussion a discrete injury, that does not necessarily imply that 
the damage of a concussion is an “injury” for purposes of construing an 
insurance policy.  At the same time, the fact that an ordinary person would 
characterize a fully developed neurological disease as an “injury” does not 
necessarily imply that the manifestation of the disease is the point of 
“injury” for purposes of construing the policies. 
In the context of concussion litigation, like “the context of 
asbestos-related disease[s], the term[] ‘bodily injury,’ . . . standing alone, 
simply lack[s] the precision necessary to identify a point in the 
development of a disease at which coverage is triggered.”109 Due to the fact 
that the general terms of an insurance policy in the latent harm context lack 
precision, courts are left to rely on the practicality of implementing a 
trigger theory and determining if that theory comports with the reasonable 
expectations of the insured.  In this context, utilizing the manifestation 
theory would prove to be unworkable due to the difficulty in ascertaining 
when the injury is manifested.  In order to determine the trigger in the NHL 
litigation, courts must ask whether the players suffered MTBIs while they 
were playing in the NHL and if the head traumas that occurred during their 
professional careers caused the neurological damage complained of, as 
opposed to other head impacts the players sustained in earlier or later time 
periods.  At first glance, this may seem simple to ascertain.  However, these 
players have been playing competitive hockey for years, throughout 
childhood into middle school and high school and through college all prior 
to entering the NHL.  Consequently, both the initial exposure theory and 
the manifestation theories are unworkable. 
 
3. Continuous Trigger Theory 
 
More recent CGL policies define an occurrence as “an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 
general harmful conditions.”110 Policies employing this “occurrence” 
definition embrace a continuous trigger theory, which entails providing 
coverage from the date of the initial exposure to the date when the injury 
manifests itself.111 
                                                                                                                 
109 Keene, 667 F.2d at 1043. 
110 BAKER, supra note 59, at 371 (emphasis added). 
111 See ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 118. 
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This theory was formulated because courts concluded that an 
insured should not be without coverage when they reasonably expected that 
they would be covered.112 In the asbestos context, the continuous trigger 
theory has gained widespread acceptance.113 In fact, in Keene, even when 
the insurance policy at issue did not utilize continuous trigger language, the 
D.C. Circuit found that while 
 
The policy language [did] not direct [it] unambiguously to 
either the ‘exposure’ or ‘manifestation’ interpretation, [i]n 
the context of asbestos-related disease[s], the terms ‘bodily 
injury,’ ‘sickness’ and ‘disease,’ standing alone, simply 
lack the precision necessary to identify a point in the 
development of a disease at which coverage is triggered . . 
. .  In interpreting a contract, a term’s ordinary definition 
should be given weight, but the definition is only useful 
when viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.114 
 
Thus, courts in the asbestos context now have guidance from language in 
insurance policies that use the term “continuous,” and when there is no 
such language, courts examine the context of the contract as a whole.  In 
other words, while newer insurance policies, which utilize continuous 
language in defining an occurrence, provide clearer guidance that a 
continuous trigger theory is appropriate, under older policies the NHL can 
still rely on its reasonable expectations because the term “injury” does not 
clearly guide courts to adopt either a manifestation or initial exposure 
trigger theory. 
Another reason courts utilize the continuous trigger theory in the 
asbestos context is that it is supported by medical research.  Medical 
research has revealed “that bodily injury occurs during the exposure period 
. . . [and] it continues to occur past the point of manifestation . . . until the 
                                                                                                                 
112 See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1044. 
113 Rogers, supra note 103 (citing Robert D. Fram, End Game: Trigger of 
Coverage in the Third Decade of CGL Latent Injury Litigation, 454 PRACTISING 
L. INST. 9, 15 (1993); Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047; Skinner Corp. v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., No. C95-995WD, 1996 WL 376657, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 1996); 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 703 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Owens-Illinois, Inc., 650 A.2d at 995; Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 770, 792 (Ohio Misc. 
1995); J.H. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 506-07). 
114 Keene, 667 F.2d at 1043. 
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claimant's death.”115 Asbestos inhalation is a latent harm under the same 
rationale that concussions are a latent harm — a person who breathes in 
asbestos but does not become ill for a long period of time is similar to the 
plaintiffs in this litigation who were exposed to MTBIs and were thus in the 
preliminary stages of neurological disease, but did not know they were 
injured until symptoms of neurological damage manifested at a much later 
time.  Thus, in both cases, a continuous trigger theory provides the greatest 
possible redress for the victims and for the League.116 
 Moreover, a continuous trigger better suits the NHL concussion 
litigation because it best addresses the problems of proof, which make the 
manifestation and exposure theories unworkable.  Again, it is nearly 
impossible to determine when someone is injured due to the latent nature of 
this harm.  These proof problems and the inability of both the manifestation 
and initial exposure trigger theories to fully cover the plaintiffs’ reasonable 
expectations make the continuous trigger theory the best approach for 
deciding when the NHL’s insurance policies are triggered. 
While it would be more beneficial for insurers to control what 
trigger theory courts implement by adding language into their policies, a 
continuous trigger theory does have one advantage for insurers.  Courts 
have determined that the term “occurrence” suggests that the policy was 
intended to cover more than a single accident, and instead, covers 
continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harm.117 Typically, 
insurance policies will contain a provision that explains that continuous 
exposure to the same harm is one occurrence so that the insurer will only 
be liable for their policy limits for a single occurrence.118 This approach 
benefits the insurers because consolidating all the individual injuries as one 
“occurrence” would, to some extent, diminish the insurers’ liability to its 
insured.  This single occurrence policy limit factor, however, would be a 
silver lining to a very dark cloud, as judges will likely invoke the 
continuous trigger theory as the most workable standard limiting insurers’ 
ability to avoid coverage. 
Insurers in the NHL and other contact sports are likely to take 
additional steps in the near future to protect themselves so that they are not 
liable for the entire span of a player’s career when a player develops a 
                                                                                                                 
115 Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702. 
116 See ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 118. 
117 PATRICK J. BOLEY, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 75-76, (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 2010). 
118 Id. at 76. 
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neurodegenerative disease from their contact sport career.  Insurers have a 
few options for how to protect themselves.  For instance, when insurers 
issue replacement policies for older policies that have expired, they may be 
able to change the trigger of coverage or the scope of coverage itself. 
As briefly noted above, one option would be to define the trigger of 
coverage as the first diagnosed concussion or the first diagnosis of a 
neurological disorder in their insurance policies to avoid leaving the 
question of the trigger up to a judge.  Additionally, insurers could add 
concussion exclusions into their policies to avoid covering players with 
histories of concussions.  This may result in pushback from individual 
NHL teams as well as the press and the public at large, however, if the 
NHL’s insurers turn their backs on players who have been in the League 
for a number of years.  Another option that insurers have would be to put 
pressure on the NHL to change its policies about fighting and other safety 
measures in order to insure the League for concussion-related injuries.  
This would likely reduce the number of concussions, as many of the NHL 
players who had CTE in their brains were termed the “NHL enforcers,”119 
players known for their aggressive fighting in the League.  At a minimum, 
insurers will likely expand their underwriting of concussions by asking 
more thorough and extensive questions about a player’s concussion history 
so they can properly assess and price the risk.  While insurers could take an 
even bigger step to protect themselves and stop insuring the NHL and its 
players, since the NHL, a multi-billion dollar industry,120 is a real profit 
center, it would be very difficult for insurers to walk away from it. 
 
V. EXPECTED AND/OR INTENDED INJURIES 
Aside from alleging that its insurance policies were not triggered 
due to a particular trigger theory, insurers can also argue that the League 
expected and/or intended its players’ concussions.  While the insurers could 
raise this defense to coverage, they may find it difficult to persuade a court 
that the League intended and/or expected that the players would have long-
term neurological diseases.  There is ample evidence that physical injuries 
in contact sports are expected, but courts have yet to draw a parallel 
between physical injuries, which are expected and/or intended, and 
cognitive or neurological injuries. 
 
                                                                                                                 
119 Branch, supra note 17. 
120 See Compl., supra note 9, at ¶ 78. 
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A. EXPECTED INJURIES ARE NOT “OCCURRENCES.” 
In order for an event to be covered under a CGL insurance policy, 
it must also take place by chance.121 If the policyholder has control over the 
risk, the event may not be considered an “occurrence.”122 Under the typical 
CGL policy, for “bodily injury” to be covered, it must occur during the 
policy period and cannot, prior to the policy period, be known to have 
occurred by any insured.123 Under this provision, if players knew they had 
sustained MTBIs prior to entering the NHL, the insurer may not be liable. 
The argument that the League expected and/or intended these 
injuries may be difficult to sustain, however, because not all concussions 
lead to neurodegenerative diseases.  Additionally, not all players who 
previously sustained concussions knew that they had been injured.  
Moreover, the League was unlikely to have access to information about 
players’ injuries prior to them entering the League. 
Despite these obstacles, the insurers could still allege that the 
League expected that the players might sustain long-term neurological 
injuries due to the violent nature of the game of hockey.  Under this theory, 
the insurers could argue that they do not have a duty to indemnify the 
League because CGL policies contain an exclusion for intended or 
expected injury.  This provision provides that, “‘bodily injury’ or ‘property 
damage’ expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured” is 
excluded from coverage.124 Expected injury typically requires that the 
insured “knows or reasonably anticipates” that there is a high probability 
that the insured’s conduct will cause harm.125 Therefore, the insurers may 
be able to show that the NHL had knowledge about the risks that the 
players were facing by playing professional hockey and thus knew, or at 
least reasonably anticipated, that they were more prone to suffering from 
long-term cognitive injuries. 
Additionally, the League could be liable for failing to inform its 
players of these health risks if the insurers can show that the League 
possessed information about the seriousness of MTBIs and remained silent.  
                                                                                                                 
121 JOEL R. MOSHER, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 52 (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 2010).  
122 Id. at 53. 
123 See id. at 57. 
124 CHARLES PLATTO, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 147 (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 2010).  
125 Id. at 151.  
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Moreover, if the League engaged in intentional misconduct by fraudulently 
concealing information, as the players allege, the League’s conduct could 
be excluded from coverage.126 
 Thus, the question of what injury the League expected or intended is 
central.  Absent evidence to the contrary, it is likely that the League 
expected that its players could sustain short-term physical injuries but not 
long-term neurological harms.  However, this distinction between the types 
of injury that players would experience may not be enough to secure 
coverage.127 The Evans test, which some courts utilize, requires that the 
insured intended its conduct and intended some kind of injury, but once 
these requirements have been met, it is “immaterial that the actual harm 
caused is of a different character or magnitude from that intended” by the 
insured.128 Under the Evans test, if the insurers proved that the League 
intended or expected that the players would be injured, it would be 
immaterial if the League intended or expected eventual neurological harm, 
and therefore these claims would not be covered under the NHL’s 
insurance policies.  Courts applying the Evans test rationalize its 
implementation by explaining that this test is consistent with both parties’ 
reasonable expectations and is aligned with public policy.129 Thus, under 
the Evans test, a court may find that the League expected or intended to act 
in a way that would result in some type of injury to the players and 
therefore its claims would be not covered by its insurance policies. 
 One notable difference about this argument in the NFL context is 
that there is no condoned physical fighting in the NFL.  As the hockey 
players’ complaint alleges: 
 
For decades, the NHL has been aware or should have been 
aware that multiple blows to the head can lead to long-term 
brain injury, including but not limited to memory loss, 
dementia, depression, and CTE and its related symptoms. 
                                                                                                                 
126 See ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 109-10 (An “occurrence” must be 
accidental, resulting “in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured,” and thus if the insured acted 
intentionally it would not be an occurrence.).  
127 See ERIC MILLS HOLMES, 21 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 
132.2[B][2] (2002) (citing Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 814 S.W.2d 49, 
55 (Tenn. 1991)). 
128 Evans, 814 S.W.2d at 55; see also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 939 
P.2d 1337, 1343 (Ariz. 1997). 
129 Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. 1978). 
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Indeed, since the NHL has permitted bare-knuckle, on-ice 
fighting from its inception to the present, the NHL knew or 
should have known that the nearly century-old data from 
boxing was particularly relevant to professional hockey.130 
 
Boxing was one of the first sports to conduct research on the dangerous 
impacts of multiple blows to the head.131 Due to that widely known 
research, the insurers have a strong argument that the League intended 
and/or expected the players’ injuries by allowing and supporting 
fighting.132  From the prospective of the insurers, due to the fighting in the 
NHL the insurers could invoke the exclusion to avoid indemnifying the 
League.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that the League’s insurers will 
be able to avoid their duty to defend. 
 
                                                                                                                 
130 Compl., supra note 9, at ¶¶ 98, 99. 
131 See Robert A. Stern et. al., Long-term Consequences of Repetitive Brain 
Trauma: Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, 3 PM&R S460, S461 (2011) (“[I]t 
has been known for some time that contact sports may be associated with 
neurodegenerative disease. In 1928, Martland described a symptom spectrum in 
boxers, which he termed ‘punch drink,’ that appeared to result from the repeated 
blows experience in the sport, particularly in slugging boxers who took significant 
head punishment as part of their fighting style.”). 
132 The League can also argue that pursuant to the doctrine of assumption of 
the risk that “a person who voluntarily participates in a sporting activity generally 
consents, by his or her participation, to those injury-causing events, conditions, and 
risks which are inherent in the activity.” Cotty v. Town of Southampton, 64 
A.D.3d 251, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). “Inherent risks in a sport are those that 
are “known, apparent, natural, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the 
participation.” Id. at 253-54. Some jurisdictions have limited their application of 
assumption of risk, and the doctrine’s application has become one of the most 
unsettled areas of tort law.  DAVID HORTON, Extreme Sports and Assumption of 
Risk: A Blueprint, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 599, 601 (2004).  However, even if this 
doctrine is inapplicable, this doctrine is a subset of the intended/expected injury 
doctrine, which the insurers and the League can still utilize.  Nonetheless, this note 
is focusing on the insurers arguments against the League and not the League’s 
arguments against the players. 
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VI. RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE DUTY TO DEFEND 
 Under a CGL policy, the insurer is obligated to defend and 
indemnify its insured.133 These two duties are integrated because the insurer 
will have a stronger incentive to defend fully if it will be held financially 
responsible through a duty to indemnify if it loses the case.  Courts have 
viewed the duty to defend as broader than the duty to indemnify.134 
Because an insurer’s obligation to defend is broader, an insurer may be 
“contractually bound to defend despite not ultimately being bound to 
indemnify.”135 This situation often arises when it comes to light during 
litigation that the insured is not factually or legally liable or that the 
occurrence is outside the policy’s coverage.136 Specifically, an insurer 
could be required to defend its insured throughout litigation and at the 
conclusion of trial obtain a ruling that provides that the claims are outside 
of the policy’s coverage, and thus the insurer would not be required to 
indemnify its insured. 
 
A. DUTY TO DEFEND 
The typical language establishing the insurer’s duty to defend in a 
CGL policy provides, 
 
We will have the right and duty to defend the insured 
against any “suit” seeking those damages.  However, we 
will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” 
seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” 
to which the insurance does not apply.  We may, at our 
discretion, investigate any occurrence and settle any claim 
or “suit” that may result . . . .137 
                                                                                                                 
133 LAURIE E. DUGONITHS, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE 
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 231 (Alan Rutkin & Robert 
Tugander eds., 2010).  
134 Id. at 234.  This duty to defend is broader because the insurer may be 
required to defend a claim even though it is not actually covered by the insured’s 
policy, but the insurer will only have to indemnify if the asserted claim is covered 
by the policy.  Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 695 A.2d 566, 570 (Md. 1997). 
135 Fulton Boiler Works, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 828 F. Supp. 2d 481, 
488 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).  
136 See, e.g., id. 
137 DUGONITHS, supra note 133, at 231. 
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The scope of the insurer’s duty to defend depends on the nature of the 
allegations set forth in the complaint and not on the ultimate basis of the 
liability of the insured.138 Typically, the duty to defend is determined by the 
“eight-corners” rule.139 Under the eight-corners rule, when an insured is 
sued by a third party, the insurer must determine its duty to defend from the 
terms of the policy and the pleadings of the third-party claimant.140 Most 
courts do not allow insurers to examine evidence outside the four corners 
of these two documents.141 Thus, looking exclusively at the allegations that 
the players have made against the NHL, since there is a claim for 
negligence, the insurers will likely be required to defend. 
This conclusion is also supported by the Supreme Court of 
California’s decision in Gray, in which the court held that an insurer had a 
duty to defend its insured despite the fact that the complaint stated that the 
insured intentionally caused bodily injury.142 In Gray, the court focused on 
the specific CGL policy in which the insurer made two promises: 
 
[1.] To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of bodily injury or property damage, and [2.] the 
company shall defend any suit against the insured alleging 
such bodily injury or property damage and seeking 
damages which are payable under the terms of this 
endorsement, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
groundless, false, or fraudulent.143 
 
The Court in Gray concluded that without further clarification, the insured 
would reasonably expect that the insurer would defend him against lawsuits 
seeking damages for bodily injury, whatever the alleged cause of the injury, 
whether intentional or inadvertent.144  
                                                                                                                 
138 Id. at 234-35. 
139 Id. at 236. 
140 Id. 
141 See GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 
305, 307 (Tex. 2006). 
142 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 175, 179 (Cal. 1966). 
143 Id. at 173. 
144 Id.  But see DUGONITHS, supra note 133, at 241 (A minority of jurisdictions 
permit insurers to consider evidence outside of the complaint and the policy in 
evaluating the duty to defend.) However, even in those jurisdictions examining 
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 A minority of jurisdictions permit insurers to consider evidence 
outside of the complaint and the policy in evaluating the duty to defend.145 
However, even in those jurisdictions, examining outside information would 
likely prove insufficient in persuading a court to determine that the insurers 
do not have a duty to defend the League. 
 
B. INSURERS’ DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
Theoretically, the insurer is not forced to defend the insured if the 
insurer believes the claims alleged against it would not be covered under 
the insured’s policy.  One option the insurer possesses is to deny its duty to 
defend.  If the insurers refused to defend in the case at bar, the NHL would 
have two options.  First, it could settle the cases to avoid the risk of 
potentially losing an exorbitant amount of money at trial.  Second, the NHL 
could litigate the case.  In the first hypothetical situation, if any of the 
insurers refused to defend the NHL and a judgment was rendered against 
the NHL, the insurer would no longer have the ability to re-litigate any 
factual issues.146 Moreover, if the NHL could demonstrate that it made a 
reasonable settlement in good faith and its insurers wrongfully refused to 
defend it, then the insurers would be required to compensate the League for 
that settlement.147 In the second scenario, if the League could prove that the 
insurers wrongfully refused to defend it, the insurer would also be required 
to compensate the League for the verdict and the cost of litigation.148  
 Since these methods of refusing to defend are precarious, insurers 
typically file a motion for declaratory judgment in which they ask a court to 
determine whether they have a duty to defend.  Nevertheless, courts 
typically will not grant declaratory relief if the issues giving rise to the 
conflict between the insured and insurer are entangled with the issues that 
will ultimately determine whether the insurer is liable to the 
                                                                                                                 
outside information would likely prove insufficient in persuading a court to 
determine that the insurers do not have a duty to defend the League. 
145 DUGONITHS, supra note 133, at 241. 
146 Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So.2d 342, 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  
147 Id. 
148 Adam M. Smith & Caroline L. Crichton, Bad Faith under a Commercial 
General Liability Policy, in THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 311, 317 (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 
2010); DUGONITHS, supra note 133, at 255. 
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policyholder.149 Just as many insurers filed motions for declaratory 
judgment in the NFL concussion litigation, it is likely that the NHL’s 
insurers and the hockey teams’ individual insurers will file similar motions 
seeking to avoid defending and/or indemnifying the League or the teams. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 It is likely that in the near future other contact sport organizations 
will follow the lead of the NFL and NHL players, as many participants in 
other popular American sports such as wrestling, rugby, soccer, and 
lacrosse “all risk exposure to brain injur[ies] that range from asymptomatic 
subconcussive blows to symptomatic concussion[s] to more moderate or 
severe traumatic brain injur[ies].”150 
 Regardless of what contact sport organizations engage in concussion 
litigation, however, all of the insureds will likely turn to their insurers to 
both defend and indemnify them.  While it will behoove insurers insuring 
contact sport organizations that have yet to bring this type of concussion 
litigation to be proactive in amending their policies, insurers in the current 
NHL concussion litigation will not necessarily be required to indemnify the 
League.  One of the main reasons the League may be able to avoid 
indemnification is due to the fighting that takes place in the League.  
Insurers may be successful in demonstrating that the League intended 
and/or expected that its players were at a heightened risk to suffer from 
neurodegenerative diseases and be able to avoid indemnifying the League 
against the players since bare-knuckle fighting has been part of the sport 
since its inception.151 If the League’s insurers were able to avoid 
indemnification and the League was required to pay for this litigation by 
itself, it could conceivably self-insure due to its vast revenues.152 
Nonetheless, depending on how large of an award the players received, this 
                                                                                                                 
149 See Gendron v. Delpozzo, No. 04-0907, 04-0999, 2005-0027, 2007 WL 
4471053, at *7-9, *11 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007). 
150 See Stern et. al., supra note 131, at 460. 
151 Class Action Compl., Leeman, Aitken, et. al. v. Nat’l Hockey League & 
NHL Bd. of Governors, No. 1:13-cv-01856, 22 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2013). 
152 See id. at 19. This would have also been the case in the NFL concussion 
litigation and will still be the case if the NFL’s insurers are not required to assist 
the NFL in the settlement.  Glenn M. Wong, SN Concussion Report: NFL Could 
Lose Billions in Player Lawsuits, SPORTING NEWS.COM (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://aol.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2012-08-22/nfl-concussion-lawsuits-money-
bankrupt-players-sue-head-injuries. 
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litigation could be very problematic for the League as the game of hockey 
could become less profitable after this litigation if it eliminates or largely 
limits the fighting that fans have come to expect.   
 Conversely, if the insurers are required to indemnify the League, it 
will be costly for the insurers, especially in the event that a continuous 
trigger theory is used, which will trigger more policies.  Despite potentially 
costing insurers more, courts should implement this trigger theory, as it is 
the most appropriate trigger for these cases presenting latent harm as it best 
comports with the League’s reasonable expectations and addresses the 
difficulty of ascertaining the timing of the players’ injuries.  In the future, 
contact sport insurers, including the NFL’s and NHL’s insurers, who wish 
to avoid a court implementing a continuous trigger may modify their 
policies to identify a specific trigger in relation to concussions or include 
additional language to clearly limit their liability to a discrete moment.     
 While the League’s insurers may avoid indemnifying it, since the 
underlying complaint alleges negligence and other claims that could be 
covered by the insurance policies, it appears likely that the League’s 
insurers will be required to defend it.  But it is also likely that both the 
NHL’s and NFL’s concussion cases will settle. 
 Although it is likely that both of these concussion cases may fail to 
ever reach trial, these two lawsuits will have an undeniable impact reaching 
past insurance law and touching on all contact sports in the United States.  
Parents now consider football and hockey more dangerous for their 
children than ever before, and players now realize that there are serious 
long-term risks that could affect their quality of life associated with playing 
these sports.  Thus, while this litigation will greatly affect insurers and their 
relationship with contact sport organizations, it will also change two of the 
most popular American sports for generations to come. 
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